Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, June 13, 2026

Assessment as of: 7:00 PM ET

Data Cutoff: 11:45 AM ET

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Russian forces are increasing the production rate and modernization of their ballistic missiles and drones. Available information suggests that Russia’s monthly missile production surpasses the US’ monthly PAC-3 Patriot air defense interceptor missile production. Chief Researcher of the Ukrainian State Research Institute for Armament Testing and Certification Colonel Oleksandr Zaruba reported on June 13 that Russian forces are producing between 40 and 50 Kh-101 cruise missiles, between 60 and 70 Iskander-M ballistic missiles, and around 10 Iskander-K cruise missiles monthly as of Spring 2026.[i] Zaruba noted that Russian forces are integrating technical solutions from the North Korean KN-23 ballistic missile into the Iskander-M ballistic missile to increase production.[ii] The United States currently produces around 600 PAC-3 Patriot interceptor missiles per year, or about 50 missiles per month according to the US Department oas of early 2026.[iii] Zaruba noted that Russian forces doubled the payload weight of Kh-101 warheads and modernized them to be harder for Ukrainian forces to detect and intercept.[iv] Zaruba stated that Ukrainian forces observed Russian Kh-101 missiles with automatically activating thermal decoys and chaff that disrupt radar systems during the recent strikes on Kyiv City and noted that the missile has a terrain navigation system that scans terrain to increase strike accuracy. Zaruba stated that Russian Iskander-M ballistic missiles have updated countermeasures that imitate the missile's signature to overload Ukrainian radars. Zaruba assessed that Russia is creating a new version of the Iskander-M called the Iskander-1000 with a range of up to 1,000 kilometers. Zaruba noted that Russia is working to launch drones from tactical aviation to make it harder for Ukrainian air defenses to detect these drones during strikes up to 1,000 kilometers in depth.[v]

Russia’s increasingly large and diverse strike packages highlight the critical importance of Western assistance in bolstering Ukraine’s air defense capabilities. Russian forces consistently deploy Kh-101, Iskander-M, Iskander-K, and Shahed/Geran drones to strike Ukraine and will likely use these technological adaptations to increase the scale and scope of the damage such strikes inflict. US-made Patriot air defense systems that can effectively counter Russian ballistic missiles remain critical for Ukrainian air defenses. Ukraine has also been trying to secure production licenses for Patriot interceptor missiles from the United States to allow for production in Ukraine.[vi] Ukraine has also recently tested its first anti-missile interceptor as an alternative to the PAC-3 interceptors and is working with its European partners on a joint anti-ballistic system.[vii] US and international investment into these efforts may also help bolster Ukrainian air defenses against the growing Russian missile threat.

Russia's is reportedly increasing military spending even as Russian revenues decrease. German Institute for International and Security Affairs economist Janis Kluge assessed on June 12, citing data from the Russian Finance Ministry, that Russian military spending reached 5.9 trillion rubles (about $81.4 billion) or 46 percent of the total budget spending in the first quarter of 2026 - 30 percent higher than military spending in the first quarter of 2025.[viii] Kluge reported that Russia's budget law called for military spending to decrease from 7.8 percent of GDP in 2025 to 6.2 percent in 2026 but that military spending in the first quarter of 2026 already accounted for 2.5 percent of Russia's expected GDP for all of 2026. Kluge reported that Russia's revenue was only 8.3 trillion rubles (about $114.5 billion) in the first four months of 2026, indicating that military spending is equivalent to about two-thirds of Russia's budget revenues. Kluge reported that the higher military spending in January to April 2026 is in large part due to higher classified spending, which grew by 43 percent from the first quarter of 2025 and reached 38.2 percent of all federal budget expenditures in the first quarter of 2026. Kluge added that Russia's 2026 budget law stated that about 85 percent of classified expenditures go to the Russian military. Kluge noted, however, that the Russian Finance Ministry may have moved military spending from the fourth quarter of 2025 to the first quarter of 2026 in order to avoid violating 2025 b or that Russia may have frontloaded classified spending more in 2026 than in previous years. Kluge's assessment is in line with recent Ukrainian intelligence reports that overall Russian government spending for the first four months of 2026 was 15.7 percent more than the first four months of 2025 and that military spending, social programs, and support for unspecified sectors of the economy are taking up increasing shares of Russian government spending.[ix] Russian President Vladimir Putin has recently tried to portray Russia's economic performance as strong and stable, ignoring the issues Russia's economy is facing after over four years of war.[x]

Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a decree marginally increasing the authorized end strength of the Russian military as part of ongoing Russian military reforms. Putin signed a decree on June 12 setting the strength of the Russian Armed Forces at 2,399,130 total personnel, including 1,510,000 military personnel.[xi] Putin last issued such a decree on March 4 increasing the authorized end strength of the Russian Armed Forces to 2,391,770 total personnel, including 1,502,640 military personnel.[xii] Putin's June 12 decree is therefore an increase of 7,360 military personnel. The June 12 decree is unlikely to impact the battlefield situation in Ukraine. Russia has expanded the authorized end strength of the Russian Armed Forces nearly every year since launching the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, and the 2026 expansions continue to be the smallest so far. Putin signed decrees increasing the size of the Russian military by 137,000 in 2022, 170,000 in 2023, and 180,000 in 2024.[xiii] ISW continues to assess that the increases support the expansion of the Russian force structure announced under then-Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu in January 2023, as the formation of new Russian military districts, formations, and subordinate units requires more personnel to fully staff them.[xiv]

Russia's growing long-range strike campaign against cities across Ukraine reportedly contributed to record high civilian casualties in the war in May 2026. United Nations Human Rights Monitoring Mission in Ukraine (HRMMU) reported on June 12 that conflict-related violence in Ukraine in May 2026 killed at least 274 civilians and injured 1,763 – the highest number of civilian deaths and injuries in Ukraine since April 2022.[xv] The UN HRMMU reported that the high number is mostly due to Russia's use of powerful weapons against urban areas, including strikes with missiles and glide bombs against areas far from the frontline. The UN HRMMU reported that short-range drone strikes were the primary cause of civilian casualties near the front, with more civilians dying or sustaining injuries in this manner in May 2026 than in any other month in the full-scale invasion. The report noted that civilian casualties have historically increased during the spring and summer seasons but that the 2026 casualties so far are significantly higher than in previous years. Russia forces launched three large series of missile strikes against Ukraine in May 2026 that targeted major cities like Kyiv City and resulted in significant civilian casualties.[xvi]

Unknown actors attempted to assassinate a former Donetsk People's Republic (DNR) official with an improvised explosive device (IED) on June 12. Russian sources reported that an explosion occurred at the house of Andrei Pinchuk in Shchapovo (just south of Moscow City) after a courier delivered a package, but that Pinchuk survived the assassination attempt.[xvii] Pinchuk is a retired colonel in the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) who served as the DNR Minister of State Security from 2014 to 2015 and is a leader of veteran organization Union of Donbas Volunteers.[xviii]

Key Takeaways:

• Russian forces are increasing the production rate and modernization of their ballistic missiles and drones. Available information suggests that Russia’s monthly missile production surpasses the US’ monthly PAC-3 Patriot air defense interceptor missile production.
• Russia’s increasingly large and diverse strike packages highlight the critical importance of Western assistance in bolstering Ukraine’s air defense capabilities.
• Russia's is reportedly increasing military spending even as Russian revenues decrease.
• Unknown actors attempted to assassinate a former Donetsk People's Republic (DNR) official with an improvised explosive device (IED) on June 12.
• Neither Ukrainian nor Russian forces advanced on June 13.
• Russian forces launched 118 drones against Ukraine overnight. Ukrainian forces struck energy and military infrastructure in Russia overnight.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

• Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
• Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis
• Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
• Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
• Significant Activity in Belarus

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Rrgy companies continue to restrict fuel sales throughout Russia as Ukraine's long-range strike campaign against Russian energy infrastructure causes shortages. Russian sources reported that Tatneft gas stations started restricting gasoline sales on June 12 in Moscow City, St. Petersburg, and Kazan, only allowing customers to buy 20 liters (5.28 gallons) of gasoline and up to 40 liters (10.56 gallons) of diesel at a time.[xix] Russian sources reported that Rosneft gas stations restricted their gasoline sales to 90 liters per tank and Lukoil gas stations restricted their gasoline sales to 100 liters per receipt in Moscow City St. Petersburg-based outlet Fontanka reported that the Tatneft hotline stated that limits are in place in all regions where Tatneft operates.[xxi]

Ukrainian forces struck energy infrastructure in Russia on the night of June 12 to 13. Ukrainian military officials reported on June 13 that Ukrainian forces struck five tanks with oil products, two oil tankers, and Russian air defense systems at the oil and gas terminal in Taman, Krasnodar Krai.[xxii] Ukrainian military officials reported fires near the terminal's warehouse infrastructure and cargo lot. NASA Fire Information for Resource Management System (FIRMS) data from June 13 shows heat anomalies at Tamanneftegaz.[xxiii] Krasnodar Krai Governor Veniamin Kondratyev claimed that drone debris caused a fire at the sea terminal in Temryuksy Raion (on the far western edge of Krasnodar Krai, encompassing Taman).[xxiv]

The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces struck an oil preparation and pumping station near Kotovo, Volgograd Oblast (roughly 500 kilometers from the frontline) on the night of June 12 to 13, resulting in a fire.[xxv] The Ukrainian General Staff noted that the facility prepares, transports, and pumps oil through major pipelines to Russian oil refineries and export infrastructure. Volgograd Oblast Governor Andrei Bocharov claimed that drone debris fell and started a fire at unspecified industrial infrastructure in Kotovsky Raion.[xxvi]

Ukrainian forces continue their strikes against Russian military assets in border regions. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on June 13 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian drone control point near Khoromnoye, Bryansk Oblast (roughly three kilometers from the international border) and Russian manpower concentration near Kolotilovka, Belgorod Oblast (roughly two kilometers from the international border) and Novye Yurkovichi and Chernozemny Gorodok, Bryansk Oblast (both on the international border).[xxvii]

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in Sumy Oblast along the international border)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Sumy Oblast on June 12 and 13 but did not advance. Geolocated footage published on June 12 shows Russian forces striking a Ukrainian-held building in eastern Myropillya (northeast of Sumy City), an area where Russian sources previously claimed Russian forces maintained a presence.

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border to create a defensible buffer zone with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Russian forces continued limited offensive operations in northern Kharkiv oblast on June 12 and 13 but did not advance.[xxx]

Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported ground activity in the Velykyi Burluk direction on June 13.

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Oskil River (Russian objective: Cross the Oskil River in Kharkiv Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces recently conducted an infiltration mission in the Kupyansk direction. Geolocated footage published on June 12 shows Russian forces operating in Kindrashivka (north of Kupyansk) after what ISW assess was a Russian infiltration mission.[xxxi] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced in and near Kindrashivka and Tyshchenkivka (north of Kupyansk).

The Ukrainian General Staff reported on June 13 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian manpower concentration near occupied Holubivka (immediately north of Kupyansk).[xxxiii]

Russian forces continued limited offensive operations in in the Borova direction on June 12 and 13 but did not advance.[xxxiv]

Ukrainian counterattacks in the Borova direction are reportedly undermining Russian forces’ efforts in the Lyman directions. A source reporting on the Russian Western Grouping of Forces claimed on June 13 that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Nove and Lypove toward Zelena Dolyna (all southeast of Borova) and are advancing through Russian lines near Serednie toward Shandryholove and Novoselivka (all south of Borova), creating a critical situation for Russian forces.[xxxv] The source claimed that the Russian military command withdrew a significant share of Russian forces from the Svyatohirsk and Yarova areas (both northeast of Lyman) to respond to Ukrainian counterattacks south and southeast of Borova. The source claimed that these Ukrainian counterattacks are degrading Russian efforts in the Lyman direction.

Ukrainian forces continue their intermediate-range strike campaign against Russian military assets in occupied Luhansk Oblast on the night of June 12 to 13. The Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) and USF Commander Major Robert “Magyar” Brovdi reported that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian drone unit temporary deployment point in occupied Dovzhansk (roughly 150 kilometers from the frontline) on the night of June 12 to 13.[xxxvi]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued ground operating in the Slovyansk direction on June 12 and 13 but did not advance.[xxxvii]

Russian forces conducted a FAB-1500 strike in the Lyman direction. Geolocated footage published on June 12 shows Russian forces conducting a FAB-1500 strike on a Ukrainian position near Shchurove (southwest of Lyman).[xxxviii]

Russian forces are attempting to infiltrate to Slovyansk and are striking Ukrainian ground lines of communication (GLOCs). A Ukrainian brigade operating in the Slovyansk direction reported on June 13 that Russian forces are infiltrating through windbreaks south of Zakitne and Kryva Luka (both northeast of Slovyansk) in order to establish GLOCs and accumulate forces to advance to the outskirts of Mykolaivka (northeast of Slovyansk).[xxxix] The brigade reported that Russian forces are attempting to exert fire control over Ukrainian GLOCs through remote mining and drone strikes. Ukrainian 11th Army Corps (AC) spokesperson Lieutenant Colonel Dmytro Zaporozhets reported on June 12 that Russian forces seek to bypass Kramatorsk and that the Kramatorsk direction is the quietest in eastern Ukraine.[xl] Zaporozhets added that Russian forces will not be able to seize Kramatorsk quickly and are focusing assault operations and reconnaissance in the Slovyansk direction, particularly near Kryva Luka, Zakitne, and Rai-Oleksandrivka (southeast of Slovyansk).

The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) is furthering Russian informational efforts exaggerating the Russian presence in Kostyantynivka, as ISW recently assessed.[xli] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on June 13 that elements of the Russian 3rd Combined Arms Army (CAA, Southern Military District [SMD]), 8th CAA (SMD), and 3rd Army Corps (AC, under operational control of the Southern Grouping of Forces) are advancing in eastern and western Kostyantynivka and have seized 172 buildings in the city between June 12 and 13.[xlii] The Russian MoD does not usually post this level of detail about alleged Russian successes in the Kostyantynivka direction, and the June 13 claims are likely part of an ongoing information effort to aggrandize tactical progress. ISW continues to assess that Ukraine's ability to defend Kostyantynivka is deteriorating but that Russian sources appear to be curating their claims about Russian advances in order to create the perception that the Russian presence in the city is more widespread than it actually is.[xliii]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Dobropillya tactical area and in the Pokrovsk direction on June 12 and 13 but did not adva

Ukrainian forces recently destroyed a network of Russian launch points within Pokrovsk. The Ukrainian 7th Rapid Reaction Corps of the Air Assault Forces reported on June 13 that Ukrainian forces destroyed six Russian drone launch and landing points in Pokrovsk that Russian forces were using to strike Ukrainian logistics routes.[xlv] The 7th Corps reported that Russian forces used a cafe, a children's good store, a library, and a private house for the drone points. The 7th Corps reported that Ukrainian forces identified the drone points by studying the flight paths of Russian drones.

Russian forces continued limited offensive operations in the Novopavlivka direction on June 13 but did not advance.[xlvi]

Russian forces continued limited offensive operations in the Oleksandrivka direction on June 12 and 13 but did not advance.[xlvii]

Ukrainian forces continued their frontline strike campaign against Russian military assets in the Oleksandrivka direction. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian drone control point near occupied Voskresenka (southeast of Oleksandrivka) on the night of June 12 to 13.[xlviii]

Ukrainian forces continue their intermediate-range strike campaign against Russian military assets in occupied Donetsk Oblast on the night of June 12 to 13 and previously on June 5. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian command post and a manpower concentration near occupied Soledar (roughly 22 kilometers from the frontline) and a manpower concentration near occupied Uspenivka (either roughly four or 35 kilometers from the frontline) on the night of June 12 to 13.[xlix] Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) Commander Major Robert “Magyar” Brovdi reported on June 13 that Ukrainian forces struck two drone control points of the Russian 120th Naval Infantry Division (Baltic Fleet) (newly formed from the 336th Naval Infantry Brigade) near occupied Novoandriivka (either roughly 10 or 95 kilometers from the frontline).[l] Geolocated footage published on June 12 shows Ukrainian forces striking a Russian truck along the M-30 Pokrovsk-Donetsk City highway north of occupied Donetsk City (at a point approximately 45 kilometers from the frontline).[li] Geolocated footage published on June 5 shows a Ukrainian FP-2 drone striking a Russian military cargo equipment shipment along the Donetska Railway near occupied Debaltseve (at a point roughly 50 kilometers from the frontline).[lii]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Hulyaipole direction on June 12 and 13 but did not advance.[liii]

Russian forces are attempting to bypass Hulyaipole and continue infiltration missions in the Hulyaipole direction as the Russian military command tasked Russian forces with advancing toward Zaporizhzhia City by the end of Summery 2026. Ukrainian Southern Defense Forces Spokesperson Colonel Vladyslav Voloshyn reported on June 13 that Hulyaipole direction is the most active sector of with 40 to 45 daily combat engagements -- and that Russian forces are attacking north of Hulyaipole to bypass the settlement from the west and complicate Ukrainian logistics.[liv] Voloshyn added that Russian forces have not had successes in this sector for the past two weeks including near Vozdvyzhivka (northwest of Hulyaipole), which the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed Russian forces claimed seized on May 27. Voloshyn reported that the Russian military command instructed Russian forces to get as close as possible to Zaporizhzhia City by the end of Summer 2026. ISW continues to assess that the Russian military command likely has an inaccurately inflated assessment of Russian advances in Zaporizhia Oblast, leading the Russian military command to issue overly ambitious orders for Russian forces. The commander of a Ukrainian battalion operating in the Hulyaipole direction reported on June 13 that Russian forces are infiltrating Ukrainian positions using small infantry assault groups with thermal cloaks at night because Ukrainian forces are denying Russian forces from using mechanized equipment.[lvii]

Russian forces conducted limited ground operations west of Orikhiv on June 13 but did not advance.[lviii]

Ukrainian forces continued their intermediate-range strike campaign against Russian military targets in occupied Zaporizhia Oblast overnight on June 12 to 13. The Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) and USF Commander Major Robert “Magyar” Brovdi reported that Ukrainian forces struck the Russian Vostochny training ground in occupied Novopetrivka (either roughly 25 or 100 kilometers from the frontline).[lix] The USF and Brovdi reported that the training ground hosted elements of the Russian 1466th Motorized Rifle Regiment (127th Motorized Rifle Division, 5th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Eastern Military District [EMD]),, and 1461st Motorized Rifle Regiment (37th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade, 36th CAA) at the time of the strike and trained Russian forces fighting in the Hulyaipole direction. Brovdi reported that the 40th Naval Infantry Brigade and 1466th Motorized Rifle Regiment previously experienced manpower shortages after significant fighting.[lx] Brovdi reported that Ukrainian forces also struck a Russian Tor-M2 air defense system in occupied Vershyna Druha (roughly 50 kilometers from the frontline) and a ZU-23-2 towed anti-aircraft gun and a man-portable air defense systems (MANPADS) crew in occupied Novopetrivka on June 12.[lxi] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian command post and a drone control point in occupied Verkhnya Krynytsya (roughly eight kilometers from the frontline) and a Russian manpower concentration in occupied Pryvilne (one of multiple settlements along the frontline to 57 kilometers from the frontline) on the night of June 12 to 13.[lxii]

Russian forces continued limited ground activity east of Kherson City toward the Antonivskyi Bridge and struck intermediate-range Russian military assets on June 13 but did not advance.[lxiii] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian drone control point in occupied Novomykolaivka (one of multiple settlements between 45 and 110 kilometers from the frontline) on the night of June 12 to 13.[lxiv]

Ukrainian forces are striking Russian pontoon bridges built in following Ukrainian strikes against roadway bridges in occupied Crimea. The commander of a Ukrainian USF Regiment reported on June 13 that Ukrainian forces conducted fresh drone strikes against Russian bridges into occupied Crimea overnight on June 12 to 13, including an unspecified railway bridges and a pontoon bridge built near either the Chonhar or Armyansk road bridges (145 and 90 kilometers from the frontline, respectively).[lxv] Geolocated footage published on June 13 shows Ukrainian strikes against a pontoon bridge near the Chonhar roadway bridge.[lxvi] Ukrainian forces struck the Chonhar bridge overnight on June 7 to 8 and on June 9, and next to the Chonhar Bridge by June 10.[lxvii]

Ukrainian forces continue to strike Russian military assets in occupied Crimea. Brovdi reported on June 13 that Ukrainian forces struck the Crimean Titan factory in occupied Armyansk (about 89 kilometers from the frontline) overnight.[lxviii] The Crimean Titan factory produces titanium dioxide and other raw components for gunpowder, rocket fuels, and explosives, and is one of the largest factories in Eastern Europe.[lxix] Geolocated footage published on June 13 shows Ukrainian forces striking the Crimean Titan factory.[lxx] A local Crimea-based Telegram channel claimed that Ukrainian forces also hit an electrical substation and two Russian BMP-1 vehicles near Armyansk.[lxxi]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Russian forces conducted a series of long-range drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of June 12 to 13. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 118 Shahed-type, Gerbera-type, and Italmas-type strike drones, Banderol-type loitering munitions, and Parodiya-type decoy drones from the directions of Kursk and Oryol cities; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; occupied Donetsk City, and occupied Hvardiiske, Crimea.[lxxii] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 110 drones, that three drones struck three locations, and that debris fell on six locations. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces struck civilian, residential, and commercial infrastructure in Dnipropetrovsk, Mykolaiv, and Sumy oblasts.[lxxiii]

Russian forces reportedly launched a remote-controlled Geran drone against Ukrainian energy infrastructure. Geolocated footage published on June 12 shows reportedly remotely-controlled Russian Geran drones striking the Kryvyi Rih Thermal Power Plant (TPP) near Zelenodolsk, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast.[lxxiv]

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

Nothing significant to report.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.