Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, June 11, 2025

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW's interactive map of Ukraine's offensive in Kursk Oblast.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 12:15 pm ET on June 11. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the June 12 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

US Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth stated on June 10 that the United States intends to reduce its budget for the purchase of weapons for Ukraine in 2026.[i] Hegseth did not specify the extent of the planned cutbacks. Hegseth stated that "a negotiated, peaceful settlement" is in the best interest of Ukraine, Russia, and the United States but that "the word victory," as well as the path to victory and to peace, have not been clearly defined.

Reducing US military aid to Ukraine will neither lead to a sustainable peace in Ukraine nor compel Russian President Vladimir Putin to reassess his theory of victory. Putin's theory of victory posits that the Russian military can sustain creeping, incremental advances on the battlefield longer than Ukrainian forces can defend and longer than the West is willing to support Ukraine.[ii] ISW continues to assess that Western military aid, particularly that which only the United States can provide rapidly and at scale, remains crucial in enabling Ukrainian forces to make decisive gains on the battlefield and pressuring Putin to reassess his theory of victory.[iii] Battlefield gains that change Putin's calculus would force Russia to engage in constructive negotiations to ensure a peaceful resolution to the war. A reduction in US aid to Ukraine risks giving Russia greater advantages on the battlefield and would likely embolden Putin to continue his war and strengthen his belief that Russia can conquer Ukraine, which is incompatible with US President Donald Trump's stated goal of ensuring an enduring peace in Ukraine.

The Kremlin continues to attack Ukraine using rhetoric presenting an anachronistic reading of Ukraine's history, denying the existence of an independent Ukrainian language and culture, and discrediting the Ukrainian government. Russian Presidential Aide Vladimir Medinsky claimed to the Wall Street Journal (WSJ) in an interview published on June 11 that the war in Ukraine is a war between two countries with a shared language and culture and likened the war to "a conflict between two brothers."[iv] Medinsky's statement is consistent with other Kremlin rhetoric attempting to portray Ukraine as lacking an independent identity and statehood from Russia — reflective of Russia's war goals that seek Ukraine's complete capitulation to Russia and the installation of a pro-Russian puppet government.[v] Russian State Duma Chairperson Vyacheslav Volodin also reiterated Kremlin rhetorical lines falsely claiming that Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky is illegitimate and only the Ukrainian Verkhovna Rada is legitimate.[vi] The Ukrainian Constitution bars the government from holding elections when martial law is in effect, and the Ukrainian government legally cannot abolish martial law while Russia continues to attack Ukraine.[vii] ISW continues to assess that Russia is very likely promoting such narratives to set conditions for Russia to withdraw from any future peace agreements with Ukraine at a time of Russia's choosing and to support Russia's long-standing demand that Ukraine acquiesce to regime change and the installation of a pro-Russian proxy government.[viii]

Russian officials are also attempting to rhetorically split Ukraine from its Western partners and advocating for an escalation of Russian strike tactics in Ukraine as part of wider efforts to intimidate the West into weakening its support for Ukraine. Russian Presidential Aide Vladimir Medinsky told the Wall Street Journal (WSJ) on June 11 that it is impossible to fight a protracted war against Russia and that Russia always defeats its enemies in protracted wars, citing Russia's 21-year-war with Sweden in the 18th century.[ix] Medinsky claimed that Russia will be "forced to respond" if "Ukraine keeps being driven by the national interests of others." Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov claimed in an interview with Kremlin newswire TASS published on June 9 that European states are the main obstacle to peace in Ukraine and are pushing Ukraine to continue military operations against Russia.[x] Volodin claimed on June 11 that Germany's military support for Ukraine is the reason that Russia has conflict with Germany.[xi] Russian State Duma Defense Committee First Deputy Chairperson Alexei Zhuravlev separately called for Russia to strike Ukraine with a second Oreshnik intermediate-range nuclear-capable ballistic missile and implied that Russia may launch an Oreshnik against Ukraine soon.[xii] Kremlin officials periodically threaten escalation with the West while accusing the West of escalating the war in Ukraine by providing Ukraine with military aid in an effort to prevent the West from giving further assistance to Ukraine, which plays into Putin's theory of victory.[xiii]

Russian officials continue to promote anti-NATO and anti-Western rhetoric, likely as part of the Kremlin's continued efforts to prepare Russian society for a potential future war against NATO. Ryabkov claimed in the TASS interview published on June 9 that NATO expansion is an "acute problem" and a "root cause" of the contradictions between the United States and Russia, and that it will be impossible to resolve the war in Ukraine without solving the problem of NATO.[xiv] Ryabkov stated that the Kremlin demanded a legally binding, long-term guarantee from the United States and NATO in December 2021 that NATO would not expand further nor deploy long-range weapons near the NATO-Russia border.[xv] Ryabkov reiterated that the Kremlin's position on this matter remains unchanged and called for NATO to reduce the size of the NATO contingent in Eastern Europe. Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) Spokesperson Maria Zakharova overstated on June 11 NATO defensive measures in Eastern Europe and claimed that NATO General Secretary Mark Rutte is trying to intimidate the population of NATO countries by saying that Russia is a threat to NATO.[xvi] Russian officials have long used anti-Western and anti-NATO rhetoric to justify and consolidate domestic support for a protracted war against Ukraine and to prepare the Russian domestic audience for a potential future conflict against NATO.[xvii]

Ukrainian forces continue to strike Russian military and defense industrial targets in the Russian rear. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces conducted a drone strike against the Tambov Gunpowder Plant in Kotovsk, Tambov Oblast, the Buturlinovka Airfield in Voronezh Oblast, and an ammunition depot subordinated to Russia's 106th Airborne (VDV) Division in Kursk Oblast overnight on June 10 to 11.[xviii] The Ukrainian General Staff and Ukrainian Center for Countering Disinformation Head Lieutenant Andriy Kovalenko noted that the Tambov Gunpowder Plant, a subsidiary of Russian state-owned defense conglomerate Rostec, produces gunpowder for small arms, artillery, and rocket rounds as well as colloxylin (a form of nitrocellulose used for explosives), and is a main supplier of explosives for the Russian military.[xix] Geolocated footage published on June 11 shows a large fire and secondary explosions at the Tambov plant, and additional footage from Russian sources shows drones reportedly flying in the area.[xx] Geolocated footage published on June 11 shows a Ukrainian airstrike against a Russian base in Kulbaki, Kursk Oblast, where Russian forces reportedly stored electronic warfare (EW) systems, drone jammers, and other electronics.[xxi] The Ukrainian General Staff reported on June 6 that Ukrainian forces struck command posts of the 72nd Motorized Rifle Division (44th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]), including its 30th Motorized Rifle Regiment, near Kulbaki.[xxii]

Ukraine and Russia exchanged the bodies of killed in action (KIA) soldiers on June 11, in accordance with agreements previously reached during talks in Istanbul. The Ukrainian Coordination Headquarters for the Treatment of Prisoners of War (POWs) reported that Russian authorities returned the bodies of 1,212 Ukrainian soldiers.[xxiii] Russian Presidential Aide Vladimir Medinsky claimed that Ukrainian authorities returned the bodies of 27 Russian soldiers.[xxiv] Russian authorities have baselessly accused Ukraine of failing to repatriate the bodies of KIA soldiers following the Istanbul talks and have notably weaponized similar exchanges involving prisoners of war (POWs) to discredit Ukraine and distract from Russia's own abuses of Ukrainian soldiers.[xxv]

Key Takeaways:

• Reducing US military aid to Ukraine will neither lead to a sustainable peace in Ukraine nor compel Russian President Vladimir Putin to reassess his theory of victory.
• The Kremlin continues to attack Ukraine using rhetoric presenting an anachronistic reading of Ukraine's history, denying the existence of an independent Ukrainian language and culture, and discrediting the Ukrainian government.
• Russian officials are also attempting to rhetorically split Ukraine from its Western partners and advocating for an escalation of Russian strike tactics in Ukraine as part of wider efforts to intimidate the West into weakening its support for Ukraine.
• Russian officials continue to promote anti-NATO and anti-Western rhetoric, likely as part of the Kremlin's continued efforts to prepare Russian society for a potential future war against NATO.
• Ukrainian forces continue to strike Russian military and defense industrial targets in the Russian rear.
• Ukraine and Russia exchanged the bodies of killed in action (KIA) soldiers on June 11, in accordance with agreements previously reached during talks in Istanbul.
• Ukrainian forces advanced near Borova. Russian forces advanced near Chasiv Yar, Toretsk, Pokrovsk, and Novopavlivka.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.  

• Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
• Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis
• Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
• Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
• Significant Activity in Belarus

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Ukrainian and Russian forces continued ground assaults in Kursk Oblast but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed on June 11 that Russian forces advanced to the international border southeast of Tetkino (southwest of Glushkovo).[xxvi]

Russian forces continued to attack in unspecified areas of Kursk Oblast on June 10 and 11.[xxvii] Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces attempted to break through to Tetkino from Ryzhivka, Sumy Oblast (southeast of Tetkino) and also attacked near Doroshivka, Sumy Oblast (north of Tetkino).[xxviii]

Russian milbloggers claimed on June 10 that Ukrainian forces struck a bridge in Zvannoye (northeast of Tetkino) in an effort to complicate Russian logistics, and that Ukrainian forces remain in control of the water treatment facilities near Tetkino.[xxix] Former Luhansk People's Republic (LNR) People's Militia representative Lieutenant Colonel Andrey Marochko claimed on June 10 that Ukrainian forces attempted to counterattack near Doroshivka but that Russian forces repelled the attack.[xxx]

Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported ground activity in northwestern Belgorod Oblast on June 11.

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in northern Ukraine along the international border and approach to within tube artillery range of Sumy City)

Russian and Ukrainian forces conducted offensive operations in Sumy Oblast on June 11 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed on June 11 that Russian forces advanced in Novomykolaivka (north of Sumy City).[xxxi]

Russian forces conducted ground operations northeast of Sumy City in Yunakivka and Yablunivka, and made some unspecified tactical gains.[xxxii] A Russian milblogger claimed on June 10 that Ukrainian counterattacks are slowing Russian forces’ rate of advance in the Sumy direction but that Ukrainian forces are not recapturing lost positions.[xxxiii] Russian State Duma's Defense Committee First Deputy Chairperson Alexei Zhuravlev told Russian state media on June 11 that Russian forces are advancing in Sumy Oblast with the goal of creating a 100 kilometer-wide “buffer zone” between the Ukrainian and Russian border.[xxxiv] Zhuravlev also claimed that Russian forces have a slow rate of advance because Russian forces have no reason to rush and because Russia does not need to seize the entirety of Sumy Oblast (the Sumy Oblast southwestern administrative border at its furthest point is only about 117 kilometers from the international border with Russia). Zhuravlyov's statements are likely part of the Kremlin's attempts to justify Russia's slow offensive pace to the Russian domestic audiences.

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 217th Airborne Regiment (98th VDV Division) and 137th VDV Regiment (106th VDV Division) are reportedly operating in the Sumy direction.[xxxv] Drone operators of the Russian “Smuglyanka” Detachment are reportedly supporting Russian Aerospace (VKS) air strikes near Khotin (north of Sumy City).[xxxvi] Elements of the Russian 177th Naval Infantry Regiment (Caspian Flotilla) are reportedly operating near Andriivka and Oleksiivka (both north of Sumy City).[xxxvii]

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Russian forces conducted offensive operations on June 11 in northern Kharkiv Oblast but did not advance.

Russian forces conducted attacks north of Kharkiv City towards Lyptsi and northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk on June 10 and 11.[xxxviii]

Order of Battle: Drone operators from the Russian "Anvar" Spetsnaz Detachment (possibly referring to the BARS-25 "Anvar" volunteer detachment) are reportedly operating in the Kharkiv, Sumy, and Chernihiv Oblast border areas.[xxxix]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on June 11 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northeast of Kupyansk near Dvorichna; east of Kupyansk near Petropavlivka; and southeast of Kupyansk near Stepova Novoselivka and toward Pishchane on June 10 and 11.[xl]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 121st Motorized Rifle Regiment (reportedly of the 68th Motorized Rifle Division, 6th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) are reportedly operating fiber-optic drones in the Kupyansk direction.[xli] A "Storm-V" detachment of the Russian 1st Tank Regiment (2nd Motorized Rifle Division, 1st Guards Tank Army [GTA], Moscow Military District [MMD]) is reportedly operating in the Kupyansk direction.[xlii] Drone operators of the Russian BARS-25 "Anvar" volunteer detachment are reportedly operating in the Valuyki direction (northeast of Kupyansk across the international border).[xliii]

Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Borova direction.

Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on June 10 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently recaptured positions north of Lozova (northeast of Borova), indicating that Russian forces no longer exercise full control of the area near Lozova.[xliv]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Borova near Zeleny Hai and southeast of Borova near Nadiya and Hrekivka and toward Stepove, Olhivka, and Andriivka on June 10 and 11.[xlv]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Lyman direction on June 11 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked north of Lyman near Karpivka, Zelena Dolyna, and Novyi Myr; northeast of Lyman near Yampolivka; and east of Lyman near Torske on June 10 and 11.[xlvi]

The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Lyman direction reported that Russian forces are slowing the pace of their assaults in the Lyman direction and conducting fewer artillery strikes.[xlvii] The spokesperson stated that Russian forces continue to conduct infantry assaults in groups of two to three soldiers and are operating a large number of drones. The spokesperson stated that Russian forces are using motorcycles for transport but are not fielding them for assaults.

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operation in the Siversk direction on June 11 but did not advance.

Russian forces conducted offensive operations north of Siversk near Serebryanka, northeast of Siversk near Hryhorivka and Bilohorivka, and east of Siversk near Verkhnokamyanske on June 10 and 11.[xlviii] Ukraine's Khortytsia Group of Forces reported that Ukrainian forces recently repelled a Russian mechanized and motorized assault consisting of two tanks, three armored personnel carriers, five buggies and all-terrain vehicles, and 24 motorcycles in the Siversk direction.[xlix] A Ukrainian brigade operating in the Siversk direction published footage of the assault on June 10 and reported that the brigade repelled a Russian assault including 19 motorcycles, three buggies, and a platoon's worth of infantry.[l] Additional footage published on June 11 shows Ukrainian forces repelling a roughly reinforced platoon-sized Russian mechanized assault in the Siversk direction comprised of four armored vehicles.[li]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Chasiv Yar direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on June 11 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in the Severny Mine area north of Chasiv Yar.[lii]

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed on June 11 that Russian forces advanced further in fields north of Chasiv Yar and northwest of Kurdyumivka (southeast of Chasiv Yar).[liii]

Russian forces conducted offensive operations in Chasiv Yar itself and south of Chasiv Yar near Bila Hora and toward Stupochky on June 10 and 11.[liv]

Order of Battle: A Russian source credited elements of the Russian 1442nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (6th Motorized Rifle Division, 3rd Army Corps [AC]) with the alleged Russian seizure of Stupochky.[lv] Elements of the 98th Airborne (VDV) Division are reportedly fighting in Shevchenko Microraion (western Chasiv Yar).[lvi] Elements of the 33rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (20th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating in the Chasiv Yar direction.[lvii]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Toretsk direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on June 10 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced north of Toretsk.[lviii]

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced north of Dachne, toward Oleksandro-Shultyne (both north of Toretsk); northeast of Shcherbynivka, northwest of Yablunivka, and southeast of Oleksandro-Kalynove (all west of Toretsk); and southeast of Rusyn Yar (northwest of Toretsk).[lix] One milblogger claimed that Russian forces entered eastern Yablunivka.[lx]

Russian forces continued ground attacks near Toretsk; north of Toretsk near Dyliivka; northwest of Toretsk near Poltavka; west of Toretsk near Shcherbynivka, Yablunivka, and Malynivka; and southwest of Toretsk near Leonidivka on June 10 and 11.[lxi]

The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Toretsk direction reported that Russian forces have suffered 50,000 total personnel casualties, 20,000 of which were killed in action (KIA), in fighting for Toretsk since July 2024.[lxii]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 102nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (150th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA, SMD) are reportedly fighting in Popiv Yar (west of Toretsk), and other elements of the 150th Motorized Rifle Division are also reportedly fighting toward Oleksandro-Kalynove (west of Toretsk and east of Popiv Yar).[lxiii] Elements of the Russian 3rd Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA, formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic [DNR] AC, SMD) and 4th Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd CAA, formerly 2nd Luhansk People's Republic [LNR] AC, SMD) are reportedly fighting north of Toretsk).[lxiv] Drone operators of the Russian 20th Motorized Rifle Division (8th CAA) are reportedly conducting reconnaissance near Katerynivka (northwest of Toretsk).[lxv]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Pokrovsk direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on June 11 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced west of Malynivka (east of Pokrovsk).[lxvi]

Russian forces continued ground assaults northeast of Pokrovsk near Myrne; east of Pokrovsk near Yelyzavetivka, Myrolyubivka, and Novotoretske; southeast of Pokrovsk near Lysivka; south of Pokrovsk near Novoukrainka; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Zvirove, Kotlyne, and Udachne on June 10 and 11.[lxvii]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Novopavlivka direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on June 11 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in southwestern Novomykolaivka (northeast of Novopavlivka) and west and southwest of Bohdanivka (southeast of Novopavlivka).[lxviii]

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced to the southeastern outskirts of Muravka (northeast of Novopavlivka).[lxix]

Russian forces continued ground assaults northeast of Novopavlivka near Muravka and Novoserhiivka; east of Novopavlivka near Kotlyarivka; and southeast of Novopavlivka near Bohdanivka and Horikhove on June 10 and 11.[lxx]

Order of Battle: The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) credited elements of the Russian 90th Tank Division and 55th Motorized Rifle Brigade (both 41st CAA, Southern Military District [SMD]) with reaching the Donetsk-Dnipropetrovsk Oblast border.[lxxi]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kurakhove direction on June 11 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked west of Kurakhove near Kostyantynopil, Bahatyr, Andriivka, and Oleksiivka and southwest of Kurakhove near Odradne on June 10 and 11.[lxxii]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 114th Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA) are reportedly operating in Oleksiivka.[lxxiii]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Velyka Novosilka direction on June 11 but did not make any confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced northeast of Komar (northwest of Velyka Novosilka) and to central Komar.[lxxiv]

Russian forces attacked northwest of Velyka Novosilka near Burlatske, Vesele, Komar, and Shevchenko and toward Myrne and Zaporizhzhia; west of Velyka Novosilka near Vilne Pole; and southwest of Velyka Novosilka near Novosilka on June 10 and 11.[lxxv] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Komar and Vilne Pole.[lxxvi]

The Russian MoD claimed on June 11 that elements of Eastern Grouping of Forces, which has an area of responsibility (AoR) that includes the Velyka Novosilka direction, reached the Donetsk- Dnipropetrovsk Oblast border.[lxxvii] The Russian MoD also credited elements of the Central Grouping of Forces operating in the Novopavlivka direction with reaching the Donetsk-Dnipropetrovsk Oblast administrative border, indicating that the Russian military command is likely pursuing a multipronged effort to advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast from the east in the Novopavlivka direction and from the south in the Velyka Novosilka direction.[lxxviii]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 14th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff's Main Directorate [GRU]) reportedly continue to operate in the Velyka Novosilka direction.[lxxix]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on June 11 but did not advance.

Russian forces continued ground assaults south of Orikhiv toward Novodanylivka; southwest of Orikhiv near Novoandriivka and Stepove; and west of Orikhiv toward Pavlivka on June 10 and 11.[lxxx]

The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Orikhiv direction reported that Russian forces have largely stopped ground assaults and withdrew elements of the 71st Motorized Rifle Regiment (42nd Motorized Rifle Division, 58th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) for rest and reconstitution.[lxxxi] The spokesperson reported that the 71st Motorized Rifle Regiment's commanders lied to the higher Russian military command about seizing Mala Tokmachka (southeast of Orikhiv).

Order of Battle: Elements of the Chechen "Vostok-Akhmat" Battalion are reportedly operating in the Zaporizhia direction.[lxxxii]

Russian forces continued limited ground assaults in the Kherson direction on June 11.[lxxxiii]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 61st Naval Infantry Brigade (Northern Fleet) reportedly continue operating in the Kherson direction.[lxxxiv]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Russian forces conducted a series of missile and drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of June 10 to 11. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched one Iskander-M ballistic missile from Kursk Oblast and 85 Shahed drones from the directions of Kursk and Oryol cities; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; and occupied Cape Chauda and Hvardiiske, Crimea.[lxxxv] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 49 drones in northern, central, eastern, and southern Ukraine. Ukrainian officials reported that the Russian strikes hit residential areas and civilian infrastructure in Kharkiv City and Odesa Oblast and a hospital in Chernihiv City.[lxxxvi] Ukrainian officials reported that the Russian strike against Kharkiv City injured at least 64 civilians and killed two civilians.[lxxxvii] Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces also struck critical energy infrastructure in Kherson Oblast, causing widespread power outages.[lxxxviii]

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky reported on June 10 that Russia used North Korean ballistic missiles in recent strikes and that Ukraine has observed evidence that North Korea now has access to Russian and Iranian drone technology.[lxxxix]

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

Belarus continues to cultivate deeper military cooperation with the People's Republic of China (PRC). The Belarusian Ministry of Defense (MoD) reported on June 10 that Belarusian Military Academy Head Major General Andrei Gorbatenko visited Beijing and signed an agreement to continue training PRC military personnel in Belarus and deepen cooperation in military personnel training.[xc] The Belarusian MoD noted that Belarus has been training PRC soldiers since 1998.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.