Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, July 7, 2026

Assessment as of: 9:30 PM ET

Data Cutoff: 1:45 PM ET

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Ukraine’s intermediate-range strike campaign against a multitude of diverse targets, including Russian air defenses, petroleum product transport, other logistics, and electrical substations, is collapsing logistics in occupied Crimea. Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) Commander Major Robert “Magyar” Brovdi reported on July 7 that Ukrainian forces struck eight Russian shadow fleet tankers, including the Venera-3, Sanar-1, Sanar-17, Klimena, Teti, Alexei Savrasov, Ivan Cheremisinov, and Penelopa tankers; one dry cargo ship; and one ferry in the Sea of Azov transporting gasoline to occupied Crimea on the night of July 6 to 7.[i] Brovdi implied that the strikes against the shadow fleet vessels will inhibit Russian efforts to transport gasoline to occupied Crimea, and a local Crimea-based Telegram also reported that the tankers were ferrying gasoline to Crimea.[ii] NASA Fire Information for Resource Management System (FIRMS) data shows two heat anomalies in the Sea of Azov north of the Kerch Strait on July 7.[iii] Brovdi reported on July 7 that Ukrainian forces also struck 44 electrical facilities in occupied Crimea and occupied southern Ukraine between July 1 and 7.[iv] Adviser to the Ukrainian Defense Minister, Serhii Sternenko, reported on July 7 that there are fires near the Saky 110 kV and Zakhidno-Krymska 330 kV substations, near the Saky railway station, and near a known S-400 air defense system position in occupied Crimea.[v] The Ukrainian General Staff reported on July 7 that Ukrainian forces also struck two railway bridges near occupied Rozdolne (either 110 or 214 kilometers from the frontline) and Ichki (roughly 257 kilometers from the frontline) that Russian forces used for logistics.[vi]

Ukrainian Presidential Office in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea provided a summary on July 6 of Ukrainian strikes against occupied Crimea in June 2026, including on over 15 Russian air defense systems and radar stations; oil terminals in occupied Feodosia; oil tanks at the Kamysh-Burun Combined Heating and Power Plan in occupied Kerch; substations and the Tavriisk Thermal Power Plant in occupied Sevastopol; the Hlibiv underground gas storage facility in occupied Tarkhankhut; the Simferopol gas distribution station; transport and bridge infrastructure, particularly along the A-291 Kerch – Simferopol – Sevastopol – Tavrida and M-14 Rostov-Crimea highways; the Crimean Titan plant in occupied Armyansk; and Russian naval targets.[vii] Advisor to the Crimean occupation head Oleg Kryuchkov stated on July 7 that Ukrainian strikes caused power outages in 18 raions in northern, central, western, and eastern occupied Crimea.[viii] Kherson Oblast occupation head Vladimir Saldo stated on July 6 that the entirety of occupied Kherson Oblast is suffering from partial or complete power outages and declared a state of emergency on July 7.[ix] Zaporizhia Oblast occupation head Yevgeny Balitsky similarly stated on July 6 that Ukrainian strikes caused some power outages in occupied Zaporizhia Oblast.[x] Crimea-based Russian telecommunications operators introduced emergency roaming in occupied Crimea as of July 7 so subscribers can connect to other operators' networks in the event of a complete power outage.[xi] Ukrainian forces have been recently intensifying their intermediate-range strike campaign against energy infrastructure, Russian military assets, and logistics in and to occupied Crimea in recent weeks, causing Russian officials to suspend railway service and limit road traffic. These strikes are degrading Russia's air defense umbrella, impeding its ability to defend against strikes that are increasingly interdicting logistics, depriving Russia of the ability to transport fuel to occupied Crimea, exacerbating fuel shortages, and making it difficult to live and operate in the peninsula.[xii]

Ukraine's successful intermediate- and long-range strike campaigns have forced a reckoning within the Russian ultranationalist information space, causing commentators to blame the Russian federal government for failing to create a cohesive air defense system that can adequately protect private businesses and critical infrastructure from Ukrainian long-range strikes. A prominent Russian milblogger and propagandist published a long appeal to Telegram on July 7 calling for the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) to create a unified operational headquarters for civil drone defense to prevent Ukrainian forces from identifying and striking weak points in the Russian rear.[xiii] The milblogger claimed that Russian air defenses are in disarray as the Russian military and Rosgvardia (Russia's heavily militarized internal security force) are operating air defenses in different federal subjects (regions) while private businesses are also investing in counter-drone systems, but there is no unified actor monitoring drones mid-air or establishing a multi-echeloned air defense across Russia. A Kremlin-affiliated milblogger criticized the Russian government on July 7 for pushing air defense responsibilities on Russian businesses and civilian structures, even though private entities lack the capacity and manpower to effectively defend against Ukrainian strikes.[xiv] The milblogger called for Russia to strengthen federal interagency coordination and create systems that can pool and properly distribute air defense resources. Another prominent Russian political commentator also called on July 6 for the Russian government to create a unified air defense structure, claiming that regional authorities lack the manpower, authority, and competence to organize region-specific air defenses, that the Russian military does not have the manpower to organize zone-based defenses, and that the Russian Aerospace Forces (VKS) is a "fifth wheel" in air defense operations.[xv] A Russian milblogger who has long criticized Russia's failure to guard against Ukraine's exploitations of Russian weaknesses noted on July 6 that Russia’s geographical size is increasingly becoming its weakness as it is extremely difficult for Russian air defenses to defend its vast territory against Ukrainian strikes, noting that the increasing range of Ukrainian strikes means that "there is no rear [in Russia] now.”[xvi] Russian milbloggers have complained for weeks that federal and regional administrative inconsistencies and a lack of structure have facilitated the success of Ukrainian strikes against critical Russian infrastructure as Ukraine has continued to escalate its strike campaign since March 2026.[xvii] Russia lacks the required conventional air defense systems to protect all of its critical facilities and private enterprises within western Russia and is struggling to defend important targets in reportedly well-defended areas deeper in the Russian rear.[xviii]

ISW continues to assess that Russia's refusal or inability to address the gaps in its rear air defense umbrella has led to the current issues Russia is facing, such as repeated Ukrainian strikes on major cities and the wide-scale gasoline shortages in Russia and occupied Ukraine.[xix] Russia will likely struggle to rapidly strengthen its air defense umbrella in the rear while maintaining sufficient protection in frontline areas, and Ukrainian forces will likely be able to continue — if not escalate — their long-range strike campaign until Russia is able to find a solution to these insufficiencies.[xx] Russia's efforts to recruit mobile fire teams and other air defenders for the rear will also face constraints, as these recruitment efforts are in competition with Rusia's need for manpower on the front, particularly as Russia's recruitment rates have been falling in recent months.[xxi]

The Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) reportedly arrested the commander of the Russian 114th Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic Army Corps [DNR AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) on corruption charges. A Russian insider source claimed that the FSB arrested 114th Motorized Rifle Brigade Commander Major General Yuri Zazykin in the Ukrainian theater of operations on July 4 and are holding Zazykin in a pre-trial center in occupied Donetsk Oblast.[xxii] The insider source claimed that Zazykin was about to receive an appointment to the position of deputy commander of the Russian 14th AC (Leningrad Military District [LMD]) prior to his arrest. Elements of the 114th Motorized Rifle Brigade participated in the campaign for Avdiivka, which Russian forces seized in February 2024.[xxiii] Russian state media has previously heralded Zazykin for leading Russian advances in Ukraine, and Russian Defense Minister Andrey Belousov awarded Zazykin with the Hero of the Russia honorific in February 2025.[xxiv] ISW most recently observed elements of the 114th Motorized Rifle Brigade operating east of Dobropillya as of March 2026.[xxv] The Kremlin frequently uses corruption charges as a tool to mask the real reasons for ousting Russian military officials who have fallen from favor.[xxvi]

Key Takeaways:

• Ukraine’s intermediate-range strike campaign against a multitude of diverse targets, including Russian air defenses, petroleum product transport, other logistics, and electrical substations, is collapsing logistics in occupied Crimea.
• Ukraine's successful intermediate- and long-range strike campaigns have forced a reckoning within the Russian ultranationalist information space, causing commentators to blame the Russian federal government for failing to create a cohesive air defense system that can adequately protect private businesses and critical infrastructure from Ukrainian long-range strikes.
• The Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) reportedly arrested the commander of the Russian 114th Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic Army Corps [DNR AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) on corruption charges.
• Ukrainian forces conducted long-range strikes against Russian military assets and energy infrastructure in Russia.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced or maintained positions in Kostyantynivka.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

• Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
• Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis
• Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
• Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
• Significant Activity in Belarus

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Ukrainian forces conducted long-range strikes against Russian military assets and energy infrastructure in Bryansk and Belgorod oblasts on the night of July 6 to 7. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces struck the Kremniy El microchip factory in Bryansk City (roughly 100 kilometers from the international border) and the Bryansky chemical plant in Seltso, Bryansk Oblast (one of several settlements between roughly 115 and 170 kilometers from the international border).[xxvii] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that the Kremniy El plant is a leading Russian manufacturer of microelectronics, including for Russian military equipment, and that the Bryansky chemical plant produces gunpowder, explosives, and rocket fuel components for ammunition and missiles.

The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces also struck an oil depot at the Belgorod Airport in Belgorod City.[xxviii] Geolocated footage posted on July 6 shows fires at the Belgorod Airport.[xxix] Additional footage published on July 6 shows a fire at the Belgorod Main Gas Pipeline Linear Production Department in Belgorod City.[xxx] NASA Fire Information for Resource Management System (NASA FIRMS) data shows heat anomalies at both the Belgorod Airport and Belgorod Main Gas Pipeline Linear Production Department.[xxxi] Acting Belgorod Oblast Governor Alexander Shuvaev acknowledged on July 7 that Ukrainian forces conducted a missile strike against Belgorod City and Raion, causing fires and power outages.[xxxii]

Ukrainian forces may have struck Russian defense industrial enterprises in Moscow Oblast on the night of July 6 to 7. Footage published on July 7 reportedly of the aftermath of Ukrainian strikes shows smoke near the Krasnozavodsk Chemical Plant in Krasnozavodsk (roughly 535 kilometers from the international border), the Central Scientific Research Institute of Precision Machine Building in Klimovsk (roughly 415 kilometers from the international border), and the Central Scientific Research Institute of Special Machine Building in Khotkovo (roughly 510 kilometers from the international border) after reported Ukrainian strikes.[xxxiii] Russian state aviation regulator Rosaviatsia stated on July 7 that it restricted flights at Domodedovo, Vnukovo, and Zhukovsky airports in Moscow Oblast on the night of July 6 to 7.[xxxiv]

Ukraine's July 5-6 strikes against the Omsk Oil Refinery have halted refinery operations. Two industry sources stated to Reuters on July 7 that the Omsk Oil Refinery in Omsk City halted operations after the Ukrainian strike on the night of July 5 to 6.[xxxv] The sources stated that Ukrainian strikes caused a fire and damaged the CUD-10 crude distillation unit, which accounts for around 38 percent of the plant’s daily production capability of 24,580 metric tons. The sources stated that the refinery also halted operations at its CDU-11 processing unit, which accounts for 37 percent of the plant’s capacity and can process 24,000 tons of oil per day. Reuters reported that exchange data indicates that the Omsk refinery is not selling gasoline and diesel on the Saint Petersburg International Mercantile Exchange as of July 7.

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in Sumy Oblast along the international border)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Sumy Oblast on July 6 and 7 but did not make confirmed advances.[xxxvi] Russian milbloggers claimed on July 6 and 7 that Russian forces seized Bachivsk (northwest of Sumy City), Kindrativka, and Andriivka (both north of Sumy City) and advanced west of Chervona Zorya (northwest of Sumy City) and south of Varachyne (north of Sumy City).[xxxvii]

Russian sources are expanding their information operations using likely artificial intelligence (AI)-altered footage to the Sumy direction. Footage published on July 6 shows Russian servicemembers waving flags in Ivolzhanske (north of Sumy City), and ISW assesses that the footage is likely to be AI-altered.[xxxviii] The footage is consistent with a wider pattern of Russian sources publishing AI-altered footage to propagate claims of expansive Russian gains for informational effects.[xxxix]

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border to create a defensible buffer zone with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast and the Velykyi Burluk direction on July 6 and 7 but did not make confirmed advances.[xl] A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed on July 6 that Russian forces advanced west of Bilyi Kolodyaz (northwest of Velykyi Burluk).[xli]

Ukrainian officials denied the claimed Russian seizure of Losivka (northeast of Kharkiv City). A spokesperson for a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Vovchansk direction reported on July 6 that claims that Russian forces seized Losivka are untrue and that Ukrainian forces continue to hold positions in and near Vovchansk (north of Losivka).[xlii] The spokesperson stated that Russian forces are conducting infiltration missions from positions across the border in Russia. The spokesperson reported that Russian forces are conducting rotations and that the number of Russian soldiers in this area is creating complexity for the Ukrainian defenders.

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Oskil River (Russian objective: Cross the Oskil River in Kharkiv Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces conducted offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on July 6 and 7 but did not make confirmed advances.[xliii] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on July 7 that Russian forces seized Petro-Ivanivka (northeast of Kupyansk).[xliv]

Ukrainian forces continued to strike Russian air defense systems and ground lines of communication (GLOCs) in the Kupyansk direction. Geolocated footage published on July 4 shows Ukrainian forces striking a Russian Buk-M3 air defense system near Hlotivka (east of Kupyansk and roughly 24 kilometers from the frontline).[xlv] A Russian source claimed on July 7 that Ukrainian forces struck a bridge over the Urayeva River near Kolykhailino, Belgorod Oblast (northeast of Kupyansk and roughly 15 kilometers from the border) that Russian forces use to supply units fighting in the Kupyansk direction.[xlvi]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Borova direction on July 6 and 7 but did not advance.[xlvii]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Slovyansk direction on July 6 and 7 but did not advance.[xlviii] Geolocated footage published on July 7 shows Russian forces conducting a glide bomb strike against Shchurove (northeast of Slovyansk).[xlix]

Russian forces are purportedly using new long-range fiber optic drones in the Lyman area. Two Russian milbloggers claimed on July 6 and 7 that Russian forces operating near Lyman are using modified fiber optic Molniya fixed-wing first-person view (FPV) drones that are resistant to electronic warfare (EW) and do not rely on Starlink connection.[l] The milbloggers claimed the drones have a range of 50 to even 100 kilometers. Russian forces will likely leverage these longer-range Molniya drones to conduct strikes on Ukrainian logistics and other military assets in the Ukrainian operational rear.[li]

Ukrainian forces recently advanced or maintained positions in Kostyantynivka. Geolocated footage published on July 6 shows Russian forces striking a Ukrainian position in western Kostyantynivka, indicating that Ukrainian forces recently advanced or maintained positions in the area.[lii] Additional geolocated footage published on July 6 shows Russian forces striking a Ukrainian-occupied building in southwestern Kostyantynivka- an area where Russian sources previously claimed that Russian forces maintained positions.[liii]

Russian forces continue to infiltrate into Kostyantynivka and attempt to use flag raisings to claim they have seized and consolidated control over areas of the city. Geolocated footage published on July 7 shows Ukrainian forces striking a Russian-occupied building in central Kostyantynivka after what ISW assesses was a Russian infiltration mission.[liv] The spokesperson of a Ukrainian National Guard unit operating in the Kostyantynivka direction reported on July 7 that Ukrainian forces typically destroy a significant portion of Russian infiltrators before they enter the city but that some Russian servicemembers are still bypassing Ukrainian positions.[lv] The spokesperson added that Russian servicemembers are raising flags in Kostyantynivka in an effort to claim seizures. The spokesperson stated that Russian forces are using Molniya drones to resupply Russian positions, replicating tactics previously used in Pokrovsk. The spokesperson reported that Russian drone operators are striking private homes, high-rises, or roads if they are not able to find their specific target. The spokesperson added that drone operators of the Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies are trying to interdict Ukrainian logistics.

A Russian milblogger acknowledged on July 7 that Ukrainian forces continue to operate in Kostyantynivka. A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces still need to clear Ukrainian groups from Kostyantynivka despite official Russian claims that Russian forces seized the city.[lvi] The milblogger forecast that Russian forces will not be able to clear Kostyantynivka until August.

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Dobropillya and Pokrovsk directions on July 6 and 7 but did not advance.[lvii]

Russian forces conducted limited offensive operations in the Novopavlivka and Oleksandrivka directions on July 6 and 7 but did not advance.[lviii]

Ukrainian forces continued their intermediate-range strike campaign against military assets in occupied Donetsk Oblast on the night of July 6 to 7. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces struck Russian material and equipment depots near Volnovakha (roughly 70 kilometers from the frontline) and Yasynuvata (roughly 40 kilometers from the frontline) on the night of July 6 to 7.[lix] Geolocated footage published on July 7 shows a destroyed Russian Ural truck near Obilne (roughly 80 kilometers from the frontline) along the T-0508 Donetsk City-Novoazovsk highway after a reported Ukrainian strike.[lx]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Hulyaipole direction and in western Zaporizhia Oblast on July 6 and 7 but did not advance.[lxi] A Russian milblogger claimed on July 7 that Ukrainian forces control half of Mala Tokmachka (southeast of Orikhiv) and that Russian forces are unlikely to seize Orikhiv by the fall.[lxii]

Russian forces reportedly continue to strike Zaporizhzhia City. A Russian milblogger claimed on July 7 that Russian forces conducted glide bomb and rocket strikes against Ukrainian barracks, a training ground, and a shooting range in eastern Zaporizhzhia City.[lxiii]

Ukrainian forces continued their intermediate-range strike campaign against Russian military assets in occupied Zaporizhia Oblast. Geolocated footage published on July 6 shows Ukrainian forces striking Russian trucks with Hornet drones just southwest and northwest of Melitopol (roughly 70 kilometers from the frontline).[lxiv]

A Russian milblogger acknowledged on July 7 that Ukrainian forces have cut off Russian logistics to the Kinburn Spit in Mykolaiv Oblast.[lxv] Ukrainian officials reported in late June 2026 that the Russian military command was evacuating some forces from the Kinburn Spit after Ukrainian forces disrupted logistics in the area.[lxvi]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Russian forces conducted a series of long-range drone and missile strikes against Ukraine on the night of July 6 to 7. The Ukrainian Air Force reported on July 7 that Russian forces launched 123 Shahed-, Gerbera-, and Italmas-type strike drones and Parodiya-type decoy drones from the directions of Kursk, Oryol, and Bryansk cities; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; Shatalovo, Smolensk Oblast; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; occupied Cape Chauda, Crimea; and occupied Donetsk City.[lxvii] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 108 drones, that 12 drones struck 10 locations, and that drone debris fell on five locations. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian strikes damaged civilian, industrial, residential, energy, medical, educational, commercial, and railway infrastructure in Chernihiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Kharkiv, Kherson, Kyiv, Mykolaiv, Poltava, and Zaporizhia oblasts.[lxviii] The Ukrainian Energy Ministry reported on July 7 that Russian strikes and hostilities left some consumers in Dnipropetrovsk, Donetsk, Sumy, and Kherson oblasts temporarily without electricity.[lxix] The ministry reported that Russian forces also shelled a repair team carrying out emergency and restoration work in Donetsk Oblast, injuring 12 employees.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky reported on July 6 that the death toll from Russian strikes against Ukraine on the night of July 5 to 6 rose to 22 people.[lxx]

Russian forces continue to target Ukrainian gas stations and post offices. Several Ukrainian energy executives reported on July 6 that Russian forces are increasingly striking gas stations in Ukraine, including in Zaporizhia, Dnipropetrovsk, Sumy, Kherson, Odesa, Kharkiv, and Mykolaiv oblasts, as part of a campaign aiming to replicate the effects of Ukrainian strikes on Russia’s fuel infrastructure.[lxxi] One Ukrainian official reported that Russian forces struck more than 150 gas stations in the past two months (since early May 2026). Several Russian milbloggers claimed on July 6 and 7 that Russian forces struck Nova Poshta facilities in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast as part of a campaign targeting postal infrastructure.[lxxii]

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

Nothing significant to report.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.