Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, July 25, 2026

Assessment as of: 7:00 PM ET

Data Cutoff: 1:45 PM ET

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Note: Today’s update includes static maps only of areas in which noteworthy changes or events occurred.

Russian President Vladimir Putin likely used a meeting with Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev to justify his refusal to freeze the frontline in Ukraine and his decision to continue waging the war as he has been. Putin met with Tokayev in Omsk for the Russian-Kazakhstan Interregional Cooperation Forum on July 25, and Tokayev claimed that it is difficult for many to understand the origin of the Russian war in Ukraine and called for Russia and Ukraine to freeze the frontline and return to Istanbul-format negotiations.[1] Putin did not respond to Tokayev in the public part of the meeting, but Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov claimed that Putin later gave Tokayev a detailed account of the war and told him that it is impossible to freeze the current frontline because Russia must achieve its battlefield objectives.[2] Peskov reiterated the Kremlin’s assertion that fighting could stop “by the end of the day today” if Ukraine “makes the appropriate decisions.” Kremlin officials have consistently called for Ukraine to capitulate to Russia’s maximalist war demands, which the Kremlin has repeatedly emphasized include all of Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts before even beginning peace negotiations, which are not guaranteed to result in a meaningful peace agreement.[3] Putin has faced dropping approval and trust ratings, an increasingly struggling economy, and mounting casualties for minimal gains in Ukraine as he continues to wage his war largely in the same way he has been since 2022.[4] The Kremlin continues to signal to Russians that they should be prepared to bear the costs of a long war against Ukraine and likely used Putin’s meeting with Tokayev as a venue to remind Russians of this justification.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky warned that Russia continues to prepare for involuntary reserve call-ups and is preparing to receive about 30,000 new North Korean troops amid staggeringly high battlefield casualties. Zelensky stated on July 25 that Russian forces suffered about 222,500 casualties, including 131,000 killed and 93,000 wounded, from January to July 2026 (about 31,785 casualties per month) and only recruited about 221,000 personnel (about 31,571 personnel recruited per month) during the same time period.[5] Zelensky noted that most of the wounded Russian soldiers are severely wounded, as Russian forces have poor frontline medicine. Zelensky stated on July 24 that Ukraine has intelligence that the Kremlin is preparing for a “significant” wave of involuntary reserve call-ups in Fall 2026, but did not specify if this formal mobilization would consist of a large call-up or rolling-call ups.[6] Russia has been setting conditions to conduct rolling partial reserve call-ups since at least October 2025 and recently passed bills expanding the pool of recruitable Russians convicted of crimes and setting conditions to suppress civil unrest resulting from mobilization.[7] Russia is holding elections for its State Duma (parliament) in mid-September 2026, and Russian President Vladimir Putin would likely wait until after these elections to announce a new wave of mobilization, which will be very unpopular amongst a Russian population that has faced mounting economic, social, and emotional costs of Putin’s war for the past four and a half years.[8]

Zelensky also warned that Russia has been preparing bases in Voronezh Oblast since June 2026 to receive another 30,000 North Korean soldiers and additional North Korean ballistic missiles.[9] Zelensky did not specify when these North Korean soldiers or munitions would arrive in Russia. North Korea has sent an estimated 15,000 soldiers to Russia, where they supported Russia's effort to push Ukrainian forces from Kursk Oblast in late 2024 into 2025 and have since performed rear area functions, freeing up Russian military personnel to fight on the front lines in Ukraine.[10] It is unclear what functions these North Korean personnel would perform or where in the theater they would operate. ISW has not observed reports of North Korean forces fighting in Ukraine, and Russia and North Korea likely remain hesitant to deploy North Korean military personnel to occupied Ukraine due to the risk of inciting a Western response. 30,000 North Korean soldiers replacing Russian personnel in rear areas in Russia would free up at least some manpower for Russian offensive operations on the frontline, but would not give Russia more than a month's worth of personnel at their current casualty rates.

Russia is expanding its gasoline export ban until the end of 2026. Russian Deputy Prime Minister and Economic Minister Alexander Novak stated that Russia is extending the gasoline export ban until the end of2026 and will consider lifting the ban on diesel exports "as the market recovers." The Russian government temporarily banned gasoline and diesel exports on April 1 and July 8, respectively, as Ukraine ramped up its long-range strike campaigns against Russia's oil refining capacity and intermediate-range campaign against Russian logistics, including the deliveries of fuel to occupied Ukraine and the frontline.[11] Many areas of Russia and occupied Ukraine continue to struggle with fuel shortages, though Russian officials are increasingly posturing that the economic situation and fuel crisis are stabilizing.[12] Ukraine’s strikes continue reducing Russia’s ability to export fuel, depriving Moscow of the chance to fully benefit from the rise in global oil prices in the past few months due to the war in the Middle East.[13]

A Romanian F-16 fighter jet intercepted an unidentified drone in Romanian airspace for the second time in two days on July 25. Romanian President Nicusor Dan stated that a Romanian F-16 intercepted the drone about 10 kilometers west of the Sfantu Gheorghe commune (along the Danube River delta near Romania’s southeastern border with Ukraine) at about 0830 local time.[14] Romanian authorities have not yet specified the origin of the drone. Romanian F-16s intercepted a Shahed-like drone in southeastern Romania on July 24, and Romanian authorities have since confirmed that the drone is a Russian Shahed.[15] Russia’s war in Ukraine, including Russian mass drone strikes against Ukraine, continues to present persistent threats to Romania and the NATO alliance.[16]

Key Takeaways:

• Russian President Vladimir Putin likely used a meeting with Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev to justify his refusal to freeze the frontline in Ukraine and his decision to continue waging the war as he has been
• Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky warned that Russia continues to prepare for involuntary reserve call-ups and is preparing to receive about 30,000 new North Korean troops amid staggeringly high battlefield casualties.
• Russia is expanding its gasoline export ban until the end of 2026.
• A Romanian F-16 fighter jet intercepted an unidentified drone in Romanian airspace for the second time in two days on July 25.
• Ukrainian forces struck Russian energy, logistics, and military assets on July 24 and 25. Russia launched 157 drones and two Kh-59/69 cruise missiles against overnight on July 24 and 25.
• Neither Ukrainian nor Russian forces made confirmed advances on July 25.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

• Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
• Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis
• Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
• Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
• Significant Activity in Belarus

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Ukrainian forces continued their long-range strike campaign against Russian energy, logistics, and military assets on July 24 and 25. Geolocated footage published on July 24 shows a fire at the parking lot of a Wildberries warehouse and logistics facility in Yekaterinburg, Sverdlovsk Oblast (roughly 1,800 kilometers from Ukrainian territory).[17] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky confirmed on July 25 that Ukrainian forces struck a logistics facility in Yekaterinburg.[18] Sverdlovsk Oblast Governor Denis Pasler acknowledged on July 25 that a drone struck the parking lot of a facility in Yekaterinburg and added that the strike did not cause significant damage.[19] Ukrainian forces appear to have struck at least 12 Wildberries warehouses in Russia and occupied Ukraine since July 17.[20] Geolocated imagery published on July 25 shows damage to the Diesel Fuel Deep Purification Unit and the ELOU-AT-3 unit at the Antipinsky Oil Refinery near Tyumen City, Tyumen Oblast (roughly 1,980 kilometers from the frontline), following a reported Ukrainian strike.[21] Zelensky confirmed on July 25 that Ukrainian forces struck an oil refinery in Tyumen City.[22] Tyumen Oblast Governor Alexander Moor acknowledged on July 25 that Ukrainian forces struck the Tyumen Oil Refinery and caused a fire.[23] Zelensky and the Ukrainian Security Service (SBU) reported on July 25 that Ukrainian forces struck several targets in Rostov-on-Don, including a 92Н6Е "Grave Stone" multifunctional radar system and its antenna tower, which are part of the Russian S-400 “Triumph” anti-aircraft missile system; a Tor-M2 anti-aircraft missile system and Pole-21 electronic warfare system; and two fuel and lubricants warehouses.[24]  

Zelensky and the SBU reported that Ukrainian forces also struck several Russian assets in the Caspian Sea from July 24 to 25, including an oil production platform of the Filanovksy oil field, a Project 12418 “Molniya” missile boat, and several cargo vessels under international sanctions that Russia reportedly uses to transport military cargo between Iran and Russia.[25]  

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in Sumy Oblast along the international border)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Sumy Oblast on July 24 and 25 but did not advance.[26]

Ukrainian forces continued to strike Russian military assets in occupied Sumy Oblast and in Belgorod and Bryansk oblasts. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on July 25 that Ukrainian forces struck Russian drone control points near occupied Bilovody (roughly five kilometers from the frontline) and in Lednev, Bryansk Oblast (roughly two kilometers from the international border), as well as a Russian command and observation post near Kazachaya Lisitsa, Belgorod Oblast (roughly 25 kilometers from the international border).[27]

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border to create a defensible buffer zone with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations north and northeast of Kharkiv City on July 24 and 25 but did not advance.[28]

Russian forces are operating in small groups in northern Kharkiv Oblast and previously conducted a flag-raising mission for informational effects. Ukrainian Joint Forces Task Force Spokesperson Colonel Viktor Trehubov stated on July 25 that Russian forces are increasingly attacking in small groups in northern Kharkiv Oblast.[29] Trehubov stated that Russian forces previously claimed to seize Bilyi Kolodyaz but that only isolated Russian infiltrators managed to reach the settlement and raise a flag there.

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Velykyi Burluk direction on July 24 and 25 but did not advance.[30]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Oskil River (Russian objective: Cross the Oskil River in Kharkiv Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk and Borova directions on July 24 and 25 but did not make confirmed advances.[31]

Ukrainian forces continued their intermediate-range strike campaign against Russian military assets in occupied Luhansk Oblast. Crimea-based Ukrainian partisan group Atesh reported on July 24 that Ukrainian forces struck a parking lot of Russian military tank trucks in occupied Luhansk City on the night of July 22 to 23.[32] The Russian military tank trucks were reportedly slated to supply the 15th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (2nd Combined Arms Army, Central Military District) in occupied Donetsk Oblast.

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Slovyansk direction on July 24 and 25 but did not advance.[33]

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky reported that Russian strikes against Slovyansk on the evening of July 24 damaged ten buildings and killed three people.[34] Zelensky previously reported on the afternoon of July 24 that Russian glide bomb strikes against Slovyansk damaged buildings and killed five people.^[35]

Russian forces recently conducted infiltration missions in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area. Geolocated footage published on July 24 and 25 shows Ukrainian forces striking a Russian-occupied building in northwestern Kostyantynivka, a Russian position in central Kostyantynivka, and Russian servicemembers north of Illinivka (west of Kostyantynvika) after what ISW assesses were Russian infiltration missions.[36]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Dobropillya tactical area on July 24 and 25 but did not advance.[37]

Ukrainian National Guard Commander Brigadier General Oleksandr Pivnenko confirmed on July 25 that elements of the Russian 8th Combined Arms Army ([CAA], Southern Military District) and 41st CAA (Central Military District), including the 41st CAA’s 90th Tank Division, conducted a reinforced company-sized assault in the Dobropillya direction on July 22.[38] Pivnenko reported that the elements of the 90th Tank Division and 41st CAA advanced from Novoekonomichne (southeast of Dobropillya), that elements of the 8th CAA advanced from Vozdvyzhenka (southeast of Dobropillya), and that Russian forces attempted to enter settlements near Shakhove (west of Dobropillya) during a four-hour long assault.

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Pokrovsk and Novopavlivka directions on July 23 and 24 but did not advance.[39]

Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Oleksandrivka direction as Russian forces conducted infiltration missions. Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets published a report on July 25 that indicates that Ukrainian forces advanced south of Maliivka and south of Zlahoda (both southeast of Oleksandrivka) and that Ukrainian and Russian positions are intermixed near Novomykolaivka and Rybne (both southeast of Oleksandrivka).[40]

Ukrainian forces continue to make tactical gains in the Oleksandrivka direction and may generate operational effects from these gains in the future. Mashovets reported on July 25 that the Russian 36th CAA (Eastern Military District [EMD]) and attached elements of the Russian Eastern Grouping of Forces are unsuccessfully attempting to halt Ukrainian forces’ tactical gains in the Oleksandrivka direction.[41] Mashovets reported that Ukrainian forces managed to advance in several areas toward the Hulyaipole – Velyka Novosilka road, an important ground line of communication for the 36th and 5th CAAs (EMD).[42] Mashovets reported that Ukrainian forces advanced toward Zaporizke, advanced near Rybne toward Uspenivka (all southeast of Oleksandrivka), and prevented Russian forces from advancing north of Krasnohirske (southeast of Oleksandrivka).[43] Mashovets reported that Ukrainian forces also advanced south of Maliivka, setting the conditions to contest Russian forces’ control over Komyshuvakha (southeast of Oleksandrivka).[44] Mashovets assessed that if Ukrainian forces continue to achieve tactical successes in the Oleksandrivka direction, they may compel Russian forces to redirect part of the 5th CAA to the Oleksandrivka direction, disrupting the 5th CAA’s current primary effort toward Orikhiv (southwest of Oleksandrivka).[45]

The commander of a Ukrainian drone interceptor battery operating in the Oleksandrivka direction reported on July 25 that Ukrainian drone interception has made Russian Shahed, Geran, and Gerbera drones less effective in the Oleksandrivka direction and that Russian forces are conducting guided glide bomb strikes to compensate.[46]

Order of Battle: Mashovets reported on July 25 that elements of the Russian 30th Artillery Brigade (36th CAA, EMD) are operating in the Oleksandrivka direction.[47] ISW last observed evidence of the 30th Artillery Brigade operating in the Velyka Novosilka direction on May 27, 2025.[48]

The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian drone control point in occupied Komar (east of Oleksandrivka and on the frontline) on July 24 or the night of July 24 to 25.[49]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Hulyaipole direction on July 24 and 25 but did not advance.[50]

Russian forces continued limited offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on July 24 and 25 but did not advance.[51]

Russia appears to be capitalizing on an alleged Ukrainian strike against a recreation center in occupied Zaporizhia Oblast to forward Kremlin narratives of Ukraine deliberately targeting civilians. Geolocated footage published on July 25 shows a recreation center on fire north of Kyrylivka (south of Melitopol and roughly 130 kilometers from the frontline) following a reported Ukrainian strike.[52] Zaporizhia Oblast occupation head Yevgeny Balitsky claimed on July 25 that Ukrainian forces struck tourist camps near Krylivka, killing twelve people and injuring seven others.[53] Russian Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Maria Zakharova used the alleged strike to claim on July 25 that Ukrainian forces are deliberately targeting civilians in response to claimed battlefield losses.[54] Former Mariupol Mayoral Adviser Petro Andryushchenko reported on July 25 that Ukrainian forces struck Russian military bases near the Druzhba recreation center near Kyrylivka.[55] No Ukrainian sources have confirmed that Ukrainian forces struck the recreation center itself. Russia has repeatedly used unverifiable claims of Ukrainian strikes against civilian targets in Russia and occupied Ukraine to advance its informational objectives and justify intensified aggression against Ukraine.[56]

Russian nuclear energy news outlet Strana Rosatom claimed on July 25 that occupied Enerhodar is currently without power or water following Ukrainian strikes against the city’s infrastructure.[57]

Neither Ukrainian nor Russian sources reported ground activity in Kherson Oblast on July 25.

Ukrainian forces continued their intermediate-range strike campaign against Russian military assets in occupied Kherson Oblast as Russian forces are reportedly intensifying strikes against Ukrainian civilian and logistics targets in southern Ukraine. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on July 25 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian ammunition depot near occupied Novosemenivka (roughly 85 kilometers from the frontline) on July 24 or overnight on July 24 to 25.[58] The deputy commander of a Ukrainian regiment operating in the Kherson direction reported on July 25 that Russian forces have intensified drone and glide bomb strikes against Ukrainian logistics and civilian targets in Kherson Oblast and near Nikopol, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast (southwest of Zaporizhzhia City) in order to facilitate Russian advances in the Dnipro City direction.[59]

Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces Commander Major Robert “Magyar” Brovdi stated on July 24 that Ukrainian forces struck 19 substations between July 23 and 24 and that Ukrainian forces have struck 136 substations so far in July 2026.[60]

Ukrainian strikes against energy infrastructure in occupied Crimea continue to cause widespread power outages. Crimea-based Telegram channel Crimean Wind reported that power outages occurred in occupied Alushta and Miskhor (roughly 250 and 265 kilometers from the frontline, respectively) and occupied Sakskiy, Simferopol, and Bakhchisaray raions (roughly 160, 215, and 230 kilometers from the frontline, respectively).[61] Sevastopol occupation governor Mikhail Razvozhaev claimed on July 24 that Ukrainian strikes against energy infrastructure are constantly changing the amount of electricity available to occupied Sevastopol.[62]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Russian forces conducted missile and drone strikes against Ukraine overnight on July 24 to 25. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched two Kh-59/69 cruise missiles from over the Black Sea and 157 Shahed-, Gerbera-, and Italmas-type strike drones, Banderol loitering munitions, and Parodiya decoy drones from the directions of Bryansk, Kursk, and Oryol oblasts; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; and occupied Cape Chauda, Crimea and occupied Donetsk City.[63] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed one Kh-59/69 missile and 127 drones, that 26 drones hit nine locations, that debris hit four locations, and that the other Kh-59/69 missile did not hit its target. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian strikes struck a Nova Poshta (Ukrainian private postal service) branch in Sumy City; agricultural enterprises and bread production facilities in Sumy Oblast; civilian infrastructure in Kharkiv, Zaporizhzhia, and Odesa cities; port infrastructure and civilian naval vessels in Mykolaiv Oblast; and four gas stations and a fire station in Poltava Oblast.^[64]

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky warned on the evening of July 24 that Russia is preparing to launch a massive strike package against Ukraine in the next 48 hours (by around July 26).[65]

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

An unexplained fire broke out at a plant in Minsk that manufactures components for Russian missiles. Belarusian outlet Nasha Niva claimed on July 24 that a fire broke out at the “Integral” plant in Minsk following a resident reporting an explosion.[66] The Belarusian Ministry of Emergency Situations acknowledged that the fire occurred but did not explain the cause.[67] Data from Ukraine’s Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) shows that Integral OJSC, which owns the ”Integral” plant, participates in the production of Russian Izdelie-30 and Kh-101 cruise missiles and Iskander-K ballistic missiles, and that the enterprise develops and produces electronic components that Russian manufacturers use in Kh-47 Khinzal ballistic missiles and Kh-69 cruise missiles.[68]

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.