July 24, 2026

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, July 24, 2026

Assessment as of: 5:30 PM ET

Data Cutoff: 1:00 PM ET

 

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

For more information on ISW’s map methodology, please view our statement here.

Note: Today’s update includes static maps only of areas in which noteworthy changes or events occurred.

 

Ukrainian forces appear to have struck at least 10 Wildberries warehouses (the closest Russian equivalent to Amazon) in Russia and occupied Ukraine in the past week. Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) Commander Major Robert "Magyar" Brovdi heavily implied on July 24 that Ukrainian forces struck two Wildberries facilities in Leningrad Oblast and an additional Wildberries facility in occupied Simferopol, Crimea.[1] Geolocated footage publishes on July 24 shows apparent drone strikes and fires at two separate Wildberries logistics centers in Shushary and Utkina Zavod, St. Petersburg, and in occupied Simferopol, Crimea.[2] Wildberries CEO Tatiana Kim acknowledged on July 24 the strikes against the St. Petersburg centers and the Simferopol Wildberries facility and claimed that first responders saved some warehouse space and goods.[3] Wildberries reported on July 24 that it temporarily suspended operations at the Shushary and Utkina Zavod logistics facilities.[4] Russian opposition sources reported that Ukrainian forces also struck a Wildberries warehouse in Tver City, and footage published on July 24 shows a fire reportedly in Tver City.[5] Acting Tver Oblast Governor Vitaly Korolev claimed that there was a fire at an unspecified logistics facility in Elevator, Tver City following a Ukrainian drone strike.[6] Ukrainian forces struck two Wildberries logistics facilities in Moscow and Tambov oblasts between July 17 and 18, one Wildberries facility in Moscow Oblast between July 19 and 20, two Wildberries facilities in Krasnodar and Stavropol krais between July 21 and 22, and one Wildberries facility near Voronezh City between July 22 and 23 in addition to the four hit on the night of July 23 to 24.[7]

Intensified Ukrainian strikes against Wildberries facilities may impose additional requirements on Russia's already-stretched air defenses and will likely increasingly inconvenience Russians who utilize the Wildberries platform. A Russian insider source claimed on July 24 that Russia is urgently building additional fixed Pantsir air defense positions throughout Moscow Oblast following the July 17 to 19 strikes against Wildberries facilities in the oblast.[8] Ukraine's increasing strike campaigns against deep rear areas of Russiastrikes on military logistics and targets at the intermediate-range, and efforts to isolate occupied Crimea are already imposing additional manpower and materiel requirements on Russia in addition to Russia's existing requirements to staff and defend the frontline.[9] Russia will struggle to include Wildberries warehouses and similar facilities in the growing list of rear-area assets it must defend.[10] Disruptions in Wildberries services will likely continue to inconvenience Russians in urban areas such as Moscow and St. Petersburg, whom the Kremlin has sought to shield from the war effort. Strikes against Wildberries facilities may also place financial pressure on elites in Russian President Vladimir Putin's inner circle.[11]  Russian Presidential Administration Chief of Staff Anton Vaino and First Deputy Chief of Staff Alexei Gromov reportedly either back or co-own Wildberries.[12] Recent Ukrainian strikes against Wildberries facilities have reportedly caused about 170 billion rubles (about $2.2 billion) of damage as of July 24, which is likely to place pressure on the elites that own, operate, and maintain stake in Wildberries writ large.[13] Putin notably reportedly asked Russian elites to financially back his war effort in March 2026, breaking a promise he made to oligarchs in July 2000 that he would uphold the privatization of Soviet assets as long as the oligarchs remained out of Russian politics and pledged allegiance to Putin.[14] Russian elites have since reportedly sought to move money abroad to protect their assets from Russian nationalization.[15]

The Russian Central Bank slightly lowered its key interest rate for the fifth time in 2026 while attempting to portray Russia’s economy as stable in line with recent Kremlin messaging. The Russian Central Bank announced on July 24 that it lowered its key interest rate from 14.25 to 14 percent — one of its smallest decreases in recent months — and reiterated the need for a gradual key rate reduction.[16] The Central Bank claimed that Russia’s annual inflation was 5.9 percent as of July 20 and that the annual inflation in 2026 will increase to about six to seven percent due to fuel price increases (resulting in large part from Ukrainian strikes on Russian energy infrastructure). The Central Bank also slightly raised its average key rate forecast range through the end of 2026 from about 14 to 14.5 percent to about 14.5 to 14.6 percent and lowered its forecast for Russian economic growth in 2026 from 0.5 to 1.5 percent to about zero to one percent. Russian Central Bank Chairperson Elvira Nabiullina acknowledged on July 24 that rising fuel prices are contributing to rising prices of other goods and services but noted that the Russian Central Bank considers the accelerated price growth temporary.[17] Nabiullina claimed that the current inflation expectations are natural and may decline as the Russian fuel market stabilizes, reiterating claims that the fuel crisis is already stabilizing in many Russian federal subjects.[18] Nabiullina stated that the Central Bank assumes that Russian companies will restore their production capacity by the end of 2026. Nabiullina’s statements are likely intended to reassure Russian society that Russia’s economy is stabilizing despite the ongoing fuel shortage crisis due to Ukraine’s long-range strike campaign and broader Russian economic issues.[19] Russia continues to struggle with increased and unsustainable war spending, growing inflation, significant labor shortages, and reductions in Russia’s sovereign wealth fund.[20] Russia’s inflation rate is also likely much higher than the Central Bank claims, with the cost of Russia’s monthly minimum food basket growing by 7.9 percent since the start of 2026.[21] ISW continues to assess that the Central Bank is lowering the key rate to project stability and expand capital availability to the Russian defense industry despite also pursuing inflationary fiscal policies.[22]

Romanian aircraft shot down an unspecified drone in Romanian airspace on July 24, while an overnight explosion damaged a cargo vessel bound for Ukraine off the Romanian coast. Romanian President Nicusor Dan stated on July 24 that a Romanian F-16 fighter jet shot down an unspecified drone over an uninhabited area in Romanian airspace around 1100 local time.[23] Romanian Armed Forces Joint Staff Acting Commander Brigadier General Gheorghe Maxim reported that Romanian aircraft intercepted the drone over southeastern Romania.[24] Romanian military officials stated that the drone was not headed toward Bucharest or flying near any military bases or the Cernavoda Nuclear Power Plant. Chief of the Romanian Defense Staff General Gheorghița Vlad stated that Romanian authorities are still investigating the drone's type and origin but noted that the drone visually resembles a Russian Shahed or Geran-2 (Shahed variant) drone. The Romanian Department of Emergency Situations reported on July 24 that an explosion impacted the Liberian-flagged Christiana B dry cargo ship, which was carrying coal from Norfolk, Virginia to Ukraine, about 22 nautical miles southeast of Sfantu Gheorghe, Romania — within the Romanian Exclusive Economic Zone.[25] The Romanian Department of Emergency Situations noted that the explosion was likely either a result of a maritime drone strike or a naval mine detonating and that it caused damage to a warehouse on the vessel. While the actors involved in the July 23 to 24 incidents are unclear, Russia's war in Ukraine continues to present persistent threats to Romania and the NATO alliance. Russian forces recently intensified strikes against cargo vessels traveling to Ukraine in the Black Sea, and a Russian drone previously struck a multi-story apartment complex in Galati, Romania, on the evening of May 28 to 29.[26]

Key Takeaways:

  • Ukrainian forces appear to have struck at least 10 Wildberries warehouses (the closest Russian equivalent to Amazon) in Russia and occupied Ukraine in the past week.
  • Intensified Ukrainian strikes against Wildberries facilities may impose additional requirements on Russia's already-stretched air defenses and will likely increasingly inconvenience Russians who utilize the Wildberries platform.
  • The Russian Central Bank slightly lowered its key interest rate for the fifth time in 2026 while attempting to portray Russia’s economy as stable in line with recent Kremlin messaging.
  • Romanian aircraft shot down an unspecified drone in Romanian airspace on July 24, while an overnight explosion damaged a cargo vessel bound for Ukraine off the Romanian coast.
  • Ukrainian forces continued their long-range strike campaign against Russian energy and logistics assets on July 24. Russian forces launched five Kh-59/69 guided missiles and 180 drones against Ukraine overnight.
  • Neither Ukrainian nor Russian forces made confirmed advances on July 24.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

 

  • Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
  • Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis
  • Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
  • Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
  • Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
  • Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
  • Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
  • Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
  • Significant Activity in Belarus

 

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

See topline text for Ukrainian strikes against Wildberries facilities in Russia and occupied Crimea. 

Ukrainian forces continued their long-range strike campaign against Russian energy and logistics assets on July 24. Geolocated footage published on July 24 shows a fire at the Avitek defense plant in Kirov City, Kirov Oblast (roughly 1,250 kilometers from the international border), following a Ukrainian FP-5 cruise missile strike.[27] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky confirmed on July 24 that Ukrainian forces struck a key Russian military enterprise in Kirov Oblast and noted that the facility supplies components for Russian aviation and missile equipment.[28] Kirov Oblast Governor Alexander Sokolov acknowledged that Ukrainian forces conducted a missile strike against a plant in Kirov Oblast and claimed that the strike killed six people and injured 26.[29] Belgorod Oblast-based outlet Pepel reported on July 23 that Ukrainian forces struck 19 out of the 71 gas stations in Belgorod City, Belgorod Oblast, and its suburbs between July 19 and 23.[30]

Ukrainian investigative group InformNapalm reported on July 23 that a combined Ukrainian human intelligence (HUMINT) and cyber intelligence (CYBINT) operation identified system vulnerabilities that caused a Russian BARS-Moscow (Russian Combat Army Reserve) air defense formation to shoot down a Russian Su-37 fighter aircraft near Lutsino, Moscow Oblast on July 23.[31]

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in Sumy Oblast along the international border)

Russian forces conducted limited offensive operations in northern Sumy Oblast on July 23 and 24 but did not advance as Ukrainian forces counterattacked.[32] A Russian milblogger claimed on July 24 that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Nova Sich (northeast of Sumy City), Mohrytsia (northeast of Sumy City), and Kindrativka (northwest of Sumy City).[33]

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border to create a defensible buffer zone with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations north and northeast of Kharkiv City on July 23 and 24 but did not make confirmed advances.[34] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on July 24 that elements of the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces seized Zakharivka (southeast of Vovchansk).[35]

Russian forces conducted a double-tap strike against Ukrainian emergency workers in Kharkiv Oblast. Zolochiv Military Administration Head Viktor Kovalenko reported on July 24 that a Russian first-person view (FPV) drone struck an ambulance that was responding to an earlier Russian Molniya drone strike in Zolochiv (northwest of Kharkiv City), injuring the driver and a paramedic.[36]

Russian forces recently conducted an infiltration mission in the Velykyi Burluk direction. Geolocated footage published on July 23 and 24 shows Ukrainian forces striking Russian personnel northwest of Artilne (northeast of Velykyi Burluk) after what ISW assesses was an infiltration mission.[37]

The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on July 24 that elements of the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces seized Ivashkyne (northeast of Velykyi Burluk).[38]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Oskil River (Russian objective: Cross the Oskil River in Kharkiv Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces recently conducted an infiltration mission in Kupyansk. Geolocated footage published on July 23 shows Ukrainian forces striking a Russian-occupied building in Kupyansk after what ISW assesses was an infiltration mission.[39]

A source reporting on the Russian Western Grouping of Forces (GoF) claimed that Russian forces attacked in the Borova direction on July 24, but ISW has not observed evidence that Russian forces advanced.[40]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Slovyansk direction on July 19 and 20 but did not make confirmed advances.[41] Geolocated footage published on July 23 shows Russian forces striking Ukrainian-occupied buildings in northern Lyman in areas where Russian sources previously claimed that Russian forces maintained a presence.[42]

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky reported on July 24 that Russian forces conducted glide bomb strikes against Slovyansk, damaging homes and vehicles, killing five, and injuring nine.[43]

Russian forces recently conducted infiltration missions in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area. Geolocated footage posted on July 23 shows Ukrainian forces striking Russian positions in southeastern Mykolaivka and eastern Chervone (both northeast of Kostyantynivka) after what ISW assesses were Russian infiltration missions.[44]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Dobropillya direction on July 23 and 24 but did not advance.[45]

Ukrainian forces confirmed that Russian forces conducted a reinforced company-sized assault in the Dobropillya direction on July 22. Footage published by the Ukrainian State Border Guard Service and reported by Ukrainian media shows Ukrainian forces striking nine tanks, two armored fighting vehicles, three Grad multiple rocket launcher systems (MLRS), and Russian servicemembers during a July 22 mechanized assault as ISW previously reported.[46] The Ukrainian State Border Guard Service appears to have since deleted the footage from their website.[47] Geolocated footage published by Ukrainian units on July 23 shows Ukrainian forces striking a Russian tank and an armored personnel carrier north of Novotoretske (southeast of Dobropillya), a Russian tank in Shakhove (east of Dobropillya), and a BM-21 Grad MLRS in Nove Paltavka (southeast of Dobropillya).[48]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction on July 23 and 24 but did not advance.[49] Geolocated footage published on July 23 shows Ukrainian forces striking a Russian T-72B3A tank reportedly equipped with an Arena-M active protection system north of Boikivka (roughly 5 kilometers from the frontline) with a first-person view drone.[50]

Russian forces are struggling to advance in the Pokrovsk direction. A spokesperson for a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Pokrovsk direction reported on July 24 that Ukrainian forces prevented a Russian assault after Ukrainian intelligence detected a Russian troop concentration and Ukrainian forces struck it with rocket artillery.[51] The spokesperson reported that Russian forces are attempting to shoot down Ukrainian drones delivering provisions to Ukrainian positions and to recover these provisions for themselves.[52] The spokesperson reported that Russian commanders are abandoning communication with assault units when their units encounter Ukrainian drone fire.

Russian forces conducted limited offensive operations in the Novopavlivka direction on July 23 and 24 but did not advance as Ukrainian forces counterattacked.[53]

Russian forces conducted limited offensive operations in the Oleksandrivka direction on July 23 and 24 but did not advance.[54] The commander of a Ukrainian company operating in the Oleksandrivka direction reported on July 24 that Russian forces are less active in the Oleksandrivka direction compared to a few weeks ago and are using fewer armored vehicles in this direction.[55] The commander reported that Russian forces sometimes assault on motorcycles, attempt to advance as far as possible, and then hide their vehicles in windbreaks.

Ukrainian forces continued their intermediate-range strike campaign against Russian energy infrastructure and military assets in occupied Donetsk Oblast. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on July 23 that Ukrainian forces struck a pontoon crossing near occupied Novoekonomichne (roughly 12kilometers from the frontline) that Russian forces are using for military logistics.[56] Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) Commander Major Robert “Magyar” Brovdi reported on July 24 that Ukrainian forces struck two electrical substations near occupied Kremenivka (roughly 89 kilometers from the frontline) and occupied Druzhba (roughly 16 kilometers from the frontline) in 48 hours between July 23 and 24.[57]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Hulyaipole direction on July 23 and 24 but did not make confirmed advances as Ukrainian forces counterattacked.[58] A Russian milblogger claimed on July 24 that Russian forces advanced into eastern Dolynka (northwest of Hulyaipole).[59]

Order of Battle: The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on July 23 that elements of the 312th Rocket Artillery Battalion (reportedly under the operational control of the Eastern Grouping of Forces [GoF]) struck Ukrainian forces in Zaporizhia Oblast.[60] This is the first battlefield evidence ISW has observed of the 312th Rocket Artillery Battalion.

Russian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on July 23 and 24 but did not advance.[61]

Neither Ukrainian nor Russian sources reported ground activity in Kherson Oblast on July 24.

Ukrainian forces continued their intermediate-range strike campaign against energy infrastructure and Russian military assets in occupied Crimea on July 23 and 24. Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) Commander Major Robert “Magyar” Brovdi reported that Ukrainian forces struck 17 electrical substations in occupied Crimea on July 23 and 24, including the 110 kV “Malorichenske” electrical substation at an unspecified location, the 110/35 kV “Prymorskyi” electrical substation in occupied Prymorskyi, the 110/10 kV “Hurzuf” electrical substation in occupied Hurzuf, the 110 kV “Nasosna-16” electrical substation in occupied Vasylkove, the 110 kV “Voskhod” electrical substation in occupied Feodosia, the 110 kV “Oleksiivka” electrical substation in occupied Oleksiivka, the 110 kV “Vesele” electrical substation in occupied Vesele, the 110 kV “Kholodylnyk” electrical substation in occupied Yevpatoria, the 110 kV “Haspra” electrical substation in occupied Haspra, the 110 kV “Krainie” electrical substation in occupied Krainie, the 110 kV “Skvortsovo” electrical substation in occupied Skvortsovo, the 110/10 kV “Blyzhne Kamyshi” electrical substation in occupied Feodosia, the 110 kV “Hlibivka” electrical substation in occupied Vnukove, the 110 kV “Koktebel” electrical substation in occupied Shchebetivka, the 110 kV “Berehove” electrical substation in occupied Molochne, the 110 kV “Sudak” electrical substation in occupied Sudak, and the 110/10 kV “Yalta” electrical substation in occupied Yalta (all ranging from about 135 to 270 kilometers from the frontline).[62] The Ukrainian Security Service (SBU) reported on July 24 that Ukrainian forces struck a Nebo-U radar station at the Belbek military airfield in occupied Belbek (roughly 236 kilometers from the frontline) and a fuel and lubricants tank at the Saki military airfield in occupied Saki (roughly 184 kilometers from the frontline).[63]

The Ukrainian General Staff reported on July 23 that Ukrainian forces struck a tanker in the Black Sea that Russian forces use to transport oil, petroleum products, and fuel.[64]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Russian forces conducted a series of drone and missile strikes against Ukraine on the night of July 23 to 24, including a large missile strike near Kyiv City. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched five Kh-59/69 guided missiles from the airspace over the Black Sea and 180 Shahed-, Gerbera-, and Italmas-type strike drones and Parodiya-type decoy drones from the directions of Bryansk, Kursk, and Oryol cities; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; occupied Donetsk City; and occupied Hvardiiske, Crimea.[65] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 160 drones, that one Kh-59/69 guided missile and 14 drones struck nine locations, and that downed debris struck eight locations. The Ukrainian Air Force later reported on July 24 that Russian forces launched three Iskander-M/S-400 ballistic missiles against Kyiv Oblast and two Onyx anti-ship missiles against Odesa Oblast, that Ukrainian forces intercepted one Iskander-M/S-400 ballistic missile and both Onyx anti-ship missiles, and that the remaining two ballistic missiles struck Bucha Raion, Kyiv Oblast, just outside Kyiv City.[66] Ukrainian Prosecutor General Ruslan Kravchenko reported on July 24 that the Russian missile strike against Kyiv Oblast killed 10 people and injured at least 100.[67] Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces struck gas, energy, residential, industrial, and medical infrastructure in Chernihiv, Kherson, and Odesa oblasts.[68]

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

Nothing significant to report.

 

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.


[1] https://t.me/robert_magyar/2646

[2] https://x.com/Exilenova_plus/status/2080479040633540661?s=20 ; https://x.com/neonhandrail/status/2080486566372446235?s=20 ; https://x.com/neonhandrail/status/2080488404241010924?s=20; https://x.com/Grimm_Intel/status/2080492052408668170; https://x.com/GeoCrow_/status/2080481627747012831; https://x.com/GeoCrow_/status/2080462468363559241; https://x.com/NotWoofers/status/2080488559425769490; https://x.com/Exilenova_plus/status/2080428097409855719?s=20 ; https://x.com/blinzka/status/2080443828129956337?s=20

[3] https://t.me/kimtatyana2024/784

[4] https://t.me/rwb_press_service/1641 ; https://meduza dot io/news/2026/07/24/ukraina-chetvertyy-raz-za-nedelyu-nanesla-udary-po-skladam-wildberries-na-skladah-v-peterburge-i-leningradskoy-nachalsya-pozhar-sortirovochnyy-tsentr-v-simferopole-evakuiroval

[5] https://t.me/sotaproject/116318; https://t.me/astrapress/119745; https://t.me/bbcrussian/97606

[6] https://www.rbc dot ru/rbcfreenews/6a6303bc9a7947c557ce3141

[7] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-18-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-20-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-22-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-23-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-21-2026/

[8] https://t.me/rucriminalinfo_2/1970

[9] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-20-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-21-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-6-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-22-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-7-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-16-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-20-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-28-2026/

[10] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment_16-4/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-7-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-22-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-6-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/ukraines-strike-campaigns-will-likely-continue-to-hurt-russias-economy-and-military-operations-in-ukraine/

[11] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-18-2026/

[12] https://t.me/rucriminalinfo_2/1970; https://www.svoboda dot org/a/strashnee-udarov-po-neftepromu-runet-o-goryaschih-skladah-wildberries/33807422.html

[13] https://www.theguardian.com/world/2026/jul/24/ukraine-warehouse-strikes-wildberries-war-closer-ordinary-russians

[14] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-16-2026/

[15] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-16-2026/

[16] https://tass dot ru/ekonomika/27949075; https://tass dot ru/ekonomika/27948831

[17] https://tass dot ru/ekonomika/27949831; https://tass dot ru/ekonomika/27949309; https://tass dot ru/ekonomika/27949303

[18] https://tass dot ru/ekonomika/27949315

[19] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/ukraines-strike-campaigns-will-likely-continue-to-hurt-russias-economy-and-military-operations-in-ukraine/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-27-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-21-2026/

[20] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-22-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-13-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-3-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-13-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-12-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-20-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-17-2026/

[21] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-22-2026/; https://tass dot ru/ekonomika/27939329

[22] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-19-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-6-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-23-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-20-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-25-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-24-2025/

[23] https://x.com/NicusorDanRO/status/2080571682327048261

[24] https://www.digi24 dot ro/stiri/mapn-ofera-explicatii-despre-drona-care-a-fost-doborata-in-romania-de-un-avion-f-16-3877201

[25] https://www.facebook.com/departamenturgente/posts/pfbid02TAJE4xLg7QZB2fMQKKS4HrmRrnGWYH6tv8LpXhe6SAgjzcFY2xpwL6ByR4wrYSy8l

[26] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-29-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-15-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-20-2026/

[27] https://x.com/posted_news/status/2080585640131932664; https://x.com/Grimm_Intel/status/2080524921319366780; https://x.com/Osinttechnical/status/2080538078943248599  ; https://t.me/synegubov/24124 ; https://t.me/zoda_gov_ua/64907 ; https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/37236?single; https://t.me/bbcrussian/97611; https://t.me/bbcrussian/97614; https://t.me/astrapress/119817; https://t.me/astrapress/119819; https://t.me/andriyshTime/63966; https://t.me/andriyshTime/63970 ; https://t.me/andriyshTime/63977 ; https://t.me/andriyshTime/63982 ; https://x.com/Farleymarley16/status/2080568414964216042; https://x.com/PelicanOSINT/status/2080520787908514208;  https://x.com/Osinttechnical/status/2080537984529498196  ; https://t.me/exilenova_plus/26907?single; https://militarnyi dot com/uk/news/raketa-flamingo-atakuvala-zavod-avytek-u-rosijskomu-kirovi/

[28] https://x.com/ZelenskyyUa/status/2080564824975589402 ; https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/20126

[29] https://t.me/aleksandrsokolov43/8285; https://t.me/aleksandrsokolov43/8286

[30] https://t.me/belpepel/23033 ; https://meduza dot io/news/2026/07/23/vsu-stali-chasche-bit-po-zapravkam-v-belgorode-i-oblasti-za-pyat-dney-atakovano-okolo-20-azs; https://t.me/istories_media/12983

[31] https://t.me/informnapalm/28241?single; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-23-2026/

[32] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41427; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41429; https://t.me/wargonzo/35728; https://t.me/severnnyi/8796; https://t.me/dva_majors/96506

[33] https://t.me/wargonzo/35728

[34] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41427; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41429; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41451; https://t.me/severnnyi/8796; https://t.me/dva_majors/96506 

[35] https://t.me/mod_russia/65879

[36] https://suspilne dot media/kharkiv/1362798-rosijskij-fpv-dron-vluciv-u-svidku-so-ihala-na-viklik-u-zolocevi-paramediki-distali-kontuzii/

[37] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/12534; https://t.me/hart_brigade/1192  

[38] https://t.me/mod_russia/65879

[39] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/12533; https://t.me/ombr41/2916

[40] https://t.me/grvZapad/19232

[41] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41427; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41429; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41451; https://t.me/wargonzo/35728; https://t.me/dva_majors/96506; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/45692

[42] https://x.com/ZoamSc2/status/2080436389859172677; https://x.com/ZoamSc2/status/2080436391989973124; https://x.com/ZoamSc2/status/2080436394489721200; https://x.com/moklasen/status/2080362880088563731?s=20; https://t.me/Secrets_of_Vinakos/16350

[43] https://x.com/ZelenskyyUa/status/2080610158300787061 ; https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/20127

[44] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/12532 ; https://t.me/official24ombr/2457 ; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/12535

[45] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41429; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41451; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41427

[46] https://x.com/Danspiun/status/2080634062276796906?s=20; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/07/24/vorog-zdijsnyv-sprobu-masovanogo-tankovogo-proryvu-na-dobropilskomu-napryamku/; https://suspilne dot media/donbas/1362834-davno-takogo-ne-bulo-u-napramku-dobropilla-prikordonniki-zirvali-masovanij-tankovij-sturm-rosian/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-23-2026/

[47] https://dpsu dot gov.ua/uk/news/52500-video-davno-takoyi-dvizhuhi-ne-bulo-na-dobropilskomu-napryamku-protivnik-zdijsniv-nevdalu-sprobu-masovanogo-tankovogo-prorivu;

[48] https://x.com/moklasen/status/2080325958343492027?s=20l; https://t.me/Centr_omega_NGU/10214; https://x.com/99Dominik_/status/2080572185983230104?s=20; https://x.com/PuenteUribarri/status/2080549819999756525?s=20; https://x.com/99Dominik_/status/2080566652920291654?s=20

[49] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41427; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41429; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41451; https://t.me/wargonzo/35728; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/119775

[50] https://x.com/moklasen/status/2080325958343492027; https://t.me/Centr_omega_NGU/10214; https://t.me/milinfolive/176587; https://x.com/WritingFates/status/2080326764794961924

[51] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/07/24/zirvaly-shturm-udarom-gradu-na-pokrovskomu-napryamku-voyiny-152-yi-brygady-pokazaly-fokus-staroyi-shkoly/; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ev5iYUPt_aU&t=8s

[52] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/07/24/na-pokrovskomu-napryamku-rosiyany-polyuyut-na-ukrayinski-drony-iz-proviziyeyu-shhob-hoch-yakos-nagoduvaty-svoyih-shturmovykiv/; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ev5iYUPt_aU&t=8s

[53] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41429

[54] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41427; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41429; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41451

[55] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/07/24/radiorozvidka-pershoyu-znahodyt-okupantiv-u-23-orb-rozpovily-yak-vyyavlyayut-rosijski-grupy-v-zelenczi/; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ev5iYUPt_aU&t=8s; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/07/24/starayemos-i-na-50-kilometriv-u-glybynu-praczyuvaty-na-oleksandrivskomu-napryamku-ukrayinski-drony-uspishno-rizhut-logistyku/

[56] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41426

[57] https://t.me/robert_magyar/2650

[58] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41427; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41429; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41451; https://t.me/wargonzo/35728; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/45686; https://t.me/voin_dv/20344; https://t.me/voin_dv/20341

[59] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/45686

[60] https://t.me/mod_russia/65867

[61] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41427; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41429; https://t.me/wargonzo/35728;

[62] https://t.me/robert_magyar/2650

[63] https://www.facebook.com/photo/?fbid=1410341354526104&set=a.276500821243502

[64] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41426

[65] https://t.me/kpszsu/69891

[66] https://t.me/kpszsu/69965

[67] https://t.me/ruslan_kravchenko_ua/1152

[68] https://t.me/chernigivskaODA/30671 ; https://t.me/chernigivoblenergo/5322 ; https://t.me/chernigivoblenergo/5320 ; https://t.me/phogovua/10758 ; https://t.me/odeskaODA/17953 ; https://t.me/odeskaODA/17963 ; https://t.me/odeskaODA/17965

View Citations