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July 19, 2026
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, July 18, 2026
Assessment as of: 9:45 PM ET
Data Cutoff: 2:00 PM ET
Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.
Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.
Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.
For more information on ISW’s map methodology, please view our statement here.
CTP is publishing CTP-ISW's July 18 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment on July 19. We apologize for the delayed publication. CTP-ISW will publish its July 19 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment later this evening.
Russian Chief of the General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov again aggrandized Russian battlefield advances in Donetsk Oblast on July 18, but several of his claims are not corroborated by any available evidence. Gerasimov conducted a choreographed inspection of the Western Grouping of Forces headquarters on July 19 and made a speech in which he presented an assessment of Russian advances on several areas of the battlefield between the Kupyansk and Pokrovsk directions that are exaggerated beyond current battlefield realities.[1] Gerasimov claimed that Russian forces entered Pidlyman (immediately south of Borova); seized Pyskunivka and reached Mykolaivka (both east of Slovyansk); advanced to within five kilometers of Kramatorsk; entered Oleksiyevo-Druzhkivka (northwest of Kostyantynivka); entered Dobropillya and Hannivka (immediately north of Dobropillya); have nearly seized Shevchenko, Krasnoyarske, and Svitle (all east to southeast of Dobropillya); and seized Myrne (northeast of Pokrovsk).[2] Gerasimov also reiterated his claim that Russian forces are advancing west from Kupyansk towards Shevchenkove, though Russian forces have not yet seized Kupyansk and do not currently have any consolidated advances in the town besides limited infiltration zones. ISW has observed no evidence to assess that Russian forces have entered Dobropillya, Hannivka, Oleksiyevo-Druzhkivka, Svitle, or Krasnoyarske, and has observed evidence to assess that Russian forces have only infiltrated in a small part of Shevchenkove. ISW has observed evidence to assess that Russian forces have infiltrated as close as 8.5 kilometers from Pidlyman, three kilometers from Pyskunivka, nine kilometers from Mykolaivka, and 6.1 kilometers from both Kramatorsk and Oleksiyevo-Druzhkivka. ISW has observed evidence to assess Russian forces have advanced to between 7.2 to 7.3 kilometers from Dobropillya and Hannivka and infiltrated or advanced to about 2.2 kilometers from Svitle and 3.2 kilometers from Krasnoyarske. ISW had not observed claims from Russian milbloggers or media (which usually first release breaking news of most recent Russian gains) in Pidlyman, Krasnoyarske, Svitle, or Oleksiyevo-Druzhkivka, or that Russian forces reached Mykolaivka.
Gerasimov and other senior Russian commanders have held choreographed meetings to make aggrandized claims at least once a month since January 2026, likely as part of a cognitive warfare effort intended to falsely portray Russian forces as advancing across the theater and Ukrainian lines as imminently collapsing.[3] Gerasimov's July 18 speech was unusually short and reiterates several claims from recent speeches, however.[4] The shortened speech and relatively few new claims of advance may reflect the relatively short amount of time between the July 18 speech and the July 3 meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin and other senior Russian commanders.[5] This difference may also reflect the reality that Russian forces have few gains to report. ISW has observed evidence to assess that Russian forces have lost terrain at a rate of about 1.6 square kilometers per day between July 1 to 17, 2026, and Russian forces will likely continue to struggle to achieve meaningful territorial advances as they have in recent months.[6] Putin, Gerasimov, and other senior Russian commanders have routinely advanced claims that intend to convince Russians, Ukrainians, and the West that a Russian victory in Ukraine is inevitable.[7] These claims of advance continue to portray Putin's fabricated reality that significantly differs from that portrayed by all available evidence, however.




Continued Ukrainian strikes against vessels in the Black Sea and Sea of Azov are reportedly compelling Russian forces to divert Russian elite drone units from the frontline and are hampering Russian energy and agricultural logistics. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on July 18 that Ukrainian forces struck two tankers, two crane vessels, and one tugboat in the Azov and Black Seas on the night of July 17 to 18.[8] Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) Commander Major Robert “Magyar” Brovdi reported on July 18 that Ukrainian forces struck eight dry cargo ships, one gas tanker, one tugboat, and two crane vessels in the Black Sea and one oil tanker in the Sea of Azov on July 18, likely referring to some of the same strikes as the Ukrainian General Staff.[9] Brovdi reported that Ukrainian forces have struck 172 Russian naval vessels in the past 13 days (since about July 5). Brovdi reported that Ukrainian strikes have compelled Russian forces to redeploy up to 200 drone crews of the Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies from the frontline, all of the 51st Air Defense Division (4th Air Force and Air Defense Army, Russian Aerospace Forces [VKS] and under the operational control of the Southern Military District [SMD]), and an entire, anti-aircraft regiment from the Black Sea Fleet (BSF) (likely the 1096th Anti-Aircraft Missile Regiment) to defend against Ukrainian drone strikes targeting naval vessels.[10] Brovdi reported that Russian forces are assigning one Rubikon drone crew to defend each vessel.
Ukrainian open-source intelligence (OSINT) source Voidgroup stated on July 17, citing sources in the Russian military command vertical in occupied Crimea, that Russian BSF Commander Admiral Sergei Pinchuk issued an order dated July 10 that elements of the BSF compile lists to evacuate the families of Russian servicemembers from occupied Crimea.[11] Voidgroup noted that the order may only apply to BSF units stationed in occupied Sevastopol and not all of Crimea. Voidgroup noted that the order applies to the elements of the 4th Air Force and Air Defense Army, the 166th Naval Engineering Service Detachment, the 1127th Missile and Artillery Armament Repair Plant, the 13th Black Sea Fleet Ship Repair Plant, the 639th Medical Equipment and Supplies Support Center of the Russian Ministry of Defense, and other medical, meteorological, administrative, and training elements based or stationed in Sevastopol. Captain First Rank of the Ukrainian Naval Reserve officer Captain First Rank Andriy Ryzhenko reported on July 18 that Ukrainian forces struck over 100 river-sea class vessels in the last ten days (since about July 10) that ferry up to 7,000 tons of fuel each to Crimea, and that Crimea needs about 5,000 tons of fuel per day just for civilian use.[12] Reuters reported on July 17 that Ukrainian strikes against Russian vessels in the Azov and Black seas and strikes against Russian energy infrastructure are disrupting the Russian agricultural industry.[13] Analyst for grain market research firm SovEcon Andrey Sizov assessed that Russian wheat exports could fall short by five to 10 million tons if Russia cannot export wheat through the Sea of Azov. Ukrainian strikes against Russian ships in the Black and Azov seas since the beginning of the Ukrainian 40-day intermediate and long-range strike campaign on June 25 are diverting Russian military resources and disrupting Russian exports and efforts to provide fuel to Crimea.[14] Ukrainian forces will likely continue to strike both energy infrastructure in Russia and vessels transiting to Russia and occupied Crimea, and Ukrainian strikes appear to be having a cumulative effect and hampering the Russian economy outside of the energy industry.[15]
Ukrainian forces struck two logistics facilities of Russia’s largest online retailer Wildberries (roughly equivalent to Russia’s version of Amazon) overnight on July 17 to 18, causing significant damage to the facilities. Russian officials and the Wildberries Press Service claimed on July 18 that Ukrainian drones struck two Wildberries warehouses in Elektrostal, Moscow Oblast, and Kotovsk, Tambov Oblast overnight, causing fires at both facilities.[16] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine General Oleksandr Syrskyi reported that Ukrainian forces had struck two significant logistics facilities in Moscow and Tambov oblasts roughly 500 kilometers and 700 kilometers from the frontline overnight.[17] The current scale of the damage is unclear, though some Russian and investigative sources have offered potential figures. Independent Russian investigative source The Bell reported, citing a source familiar with the situation, that the Ukrainian strikes may have damaged about 10 to 15 percent of Wildberries’ total warehouse space and assessed that the Elektrostal warehouse is likely Wildberries' largest warehouse.[18] The Bell's source assessed that the strikes are not likely to paralyze Wildberries’ broader logistical capacity but will likely significantly disrupt its services in Moscow Oblast —Wildberries' largest market. Russian business newspaper Vedomosti reported, citing two real estate consultants, that Wildberries may have lost about 350 square kilometers or seven percent of its total warehouse capacity.[19] Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces Commander Major Robert "Magyar" Brovdi and Russian opposition source Vazhnye Istorii separately estimated that the strikes could cause Wildberries almost 100 billion rubles (about $1.28 billion) in losses.[20] Russian opposition source Meduza reported that Russian e-commerce platform Ozon changed its terms of agreement between Ozon and sellers using the Ozon platform in June 2026, removing Ozon's obligation to compensate the seller for the loss or damage of goods in a case of force majeure, but that Russian media only picked up on this change after the July 17 to 18 strikes.[21] These Ukrainian strikes stand to inconvenience major Russian online retailers, the smaller businesses who use these retailers as platforms, and the Russians who utilize these platforms to purchase goods — particularly in the Moscow area. These inconveniences come amid ongoing Russian economic issues and decreasing approval ratings for Russian President Vladimir Putin and may increase societal strain if such strikes continue.
The strikes on the Wildberries facilities prompted a significant reaction in the Russian information space. Moscow Oblast Governor Andrei Vorobyov claimed the Elektrostal strike injured at least 37 people and killed one.[22] Tambov Oblast Governor Yevgeny Pervyshov claimed that the Kotovsk strike injured at least 25 and killed seven.[23] Russian officials broadly condemned the Ukrainian strikes as criminal terrorist acts and accused Ukrainian forces of deliberately targeting civilian areas.[24] Russian forces have consistently hit Ukrainian civilian logistics and postal infrastructure in Ukraine throughout the war, however.[25] Russian authorities may seek to escalate this information effort in order to accuse Ukraine of war crimes and targeting civilians as they have in the past.[26]
Mykolaiv Oblast Military Administration Head Vitaly Kim resigned from his post on July 17.[27] Kim stated that he will take up the post of minister of veterans' affairs, though he has not officially received a new appointment as of July 18.
Key Takeaways:
- Russian Chief of the General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov again aggrandized Russian battlefield advances in Donetsk Oblast on July 18, but several of his claims are not corroborated by any available evidence.
- Continued Ukrainian strikes against vessels in the Black Sea and Sea of Azov are reportedly compelling Russian forces to divert Russian elite drone units from the frontline and are hampering Russian energy and agricultural logistics.
- Ukrainian forces struck two logistics facilities of Russia’s largest online retailer Wildberries (roughly equivalent to Russia’s version of Amazon) overnight on July 17 to 18, causing significant damage to the facilities.
- Mykolaiv Oblast Military Administration Head Vitaly Kim resigned from his post on July 17.
- Ukrainian forces struck Russian oil and energy infrastructure overnight on July 17 to 18.
- Neither Ukrainian nor Russian forces made confirmed advances on July 18.
- Russia launched two Iskander-M ballistic missiles, two Onyx anti-ship missiles, three Kh-59/69 cruise missiles, and 90 drones against Ukraine overnight.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.
- Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
- Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis
- Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
- Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
- Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
- Significant Activity in Belarus
Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
See topline text for strikes against Wildberries facilities in Moscow and Tambov oblasts.
Ukrainian forces struck Russian oil and energy infrastructure overnight on July 17 to 18. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces struck the Nefto-Service oil depot in Noginsk, Moscow Oblast overnight (roughly 490 kilometers from the international border) and caused a fire.[28] Geolocated footage published on July 18 shows a smoke plume rising from Noginsk.[29] Moscow Oblast Governor Andrei Vorobyov acknowledged that a Ukrainian drone strike caused a fire at an oil depot in Noginsk.[30] Kursk Oblast Governor Alexander Khinshtein claimed that Ukrainian strikes against an unspecified power facility in Kursk Oblast caused power outages for over 46,000 energy consumers.[31]
Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in Sumy Oblast along the international border)
Russian forces recently conducted an infiltration mission north of Sumy City. Geolocated footage published on July 18 shows Ukrainian forces striking a Russian-occupied building in northern Korchakivka (north of Sumy City) after what ISW assesses was a Russian infiltration mission.[32]

A source reporting on the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces (GoF) claimed on July 18 that Ukrainian forces have recently intensified strikes against Russian frontline logistics along the international border with Kursk Oblast.[33]
Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border to create a defensible buffer zone with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)
Ukrainian forces cleared Russian servicemembers from positions where Russian servicemembers previously infiltrated north of Kharkiv City. Geolocated footage published on July 17 shows Ukrainian forces operating in northern Shevchenka and clearing a building in northern Kozacha Lopan (both north of Kharkiv City), indicating that Ukrainian forces cleared Russian servicemembers who had previously infiltrated those areas.[34] Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on July 17 and 18 but did not advance.[35]
A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Velykyi Burluk direction on July 17, but ISW has not observed evidence indicating that Russian forces advanced.[36]
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Oskil River (Russian objective: Cross the Oskil River in Kharkiv Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)


Ukrainian forces reportedly cleared Russian forces south of Kupyansk. A source reporting on the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces (GoF) acknowledged on July 18 that Ukrainian forces again control Kupyansk-Vuzlovyi (just south of Kupyansk) after Russian forces previously conducted infiltration missions to the settlement.[37]

Russian forces continued limited offensive operations in the Borova direction on July 17 and 18 but did not advance.[38]
Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 137th Separate Reconnaissance Battalion (4th Tank Division [TD]) are striking Ukrainian equipment north of Vyshche Solone (southeast of Borova).[39] This is the first time ISW has observed evidence about this battalion’s operations in Ukraine.
Ukrainian forces continued their intermediate-range strike campaign against Russian military assets in occupied Luhansk Oblast. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces struck a railway bridge over the Bila River near occupied Sabivka (roughly 90 kilometers from the frontline) on the night of July 17 to 18, and that Russian forces used the bridge for military logistics.[40] Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) Commander Major Robert “Magyar” Brovdi reported on July 18 that Ukrainian forces struck electrical substations in occupied Kadiivka, Solidarne, Hrechyshkyne, and Komysarivka (roughly 60, 58, 68, and 55 kilometers from the frontline) between July 15 and 18.[41]
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)


Ukrainian forces reportedly counterattacked in the Slovyansk direction and maintain positions in central Lyman, contrary to Russian claims. Geolocated footage published on July 17 shows Russian forces striking a Ukrainian position in central Lyman, indicating that Ukrainian forces maintain positions in the area contrary to Russian claims.[42] A source reporting on the Russian Western Grouping of Forces (GoF) claimed on July 18 that Ukrainian forces are regularly conducting counterattacks in Lyman.[43] Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Slovyansk direction on July 17 and 18 but did not advance.[44]


The Spokesperson for a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Lyman direction reported on July 18 that Ukrainian drone activity is forcing Russian forces to conduct logistics by foot and with drones.[45]
Russian forces continued infiltration operations in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area on July 17 and 18 but did not make confirmed advances.[46] A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed on July 17 that Russian forces advanced in Shevchenko Microraion in southern Chasiv Yar (northeast of Kostyantynivka).[47]

The Ukrainian 425th Skala Regiment published geolocated footage on July 18 showing Ukrainian soldiers holding a flag in the House of Culture in western Kostyantynivka.[48] The Skala Regiment reported that Ukrainian forces conducted a clearing operation within Kostyantynivka and control the city.[49] An officer of a Ukrainian brigade also operating in the Kostyantynivka direction reported that Ukrainian forces control a significant part of Kostyantynivka.[50] ISW has not observed sufficient evidence to assess that Ukrainian forces exercise control within the entire administrative boundaries of Kostyantynivka. ISW continues to assess that Russian forces have infiltrated throughout much of Kostyantynivka but that these individual infiltrators do not control many of the areas of Kostyantynivka into which they have infiltrated.[51] Ukrainian military sources reported in June 2026 that approximately 100 to 150 Russian infiltrators were operating within Kostyantynivka.[52]
Russian forces continued offensive operations east and southeast of the Dobropillya tactical area and the Pokrovsk direction on July 17 and 18 but did not advance.[53] Geolocated footage published on July 18 shows Russian forces striking a Ukrainian position in Bilytske (north of Pokrovsk), indicating that Ukrainian forces maintain a presence in the area contrary to Russian claims.[54]


Russian forces continued limited offensive operations in the Novopavlivka direction on July 17 and 18 but did not advance.[55] A Russian milblogger posted a map on July 18 that acknowledges that neither Ukrainian nor Russian forces control southwestern Novopavlivka.[56]

The spokesperson for a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Novopavlivka direction reported on July 18 that Russian forces dropped 27 guided bombs on Novopavlivka during a single day.[57]
Ukrainian forces advanced or maintained positions in the Oleksandrivka direction as Russian forces conducted infiltration missions. Geolocated footage posted on July 17 shows Russian forces striking a Ukrainian position west of Myrne (east of Oleksandrivka), indicating that Ukrainian forces advanced or maintained positions in the area.[58] Geolocated footage published on July 18 shows Ukrainian forces striking Russian-occupied buildings in Andriivka-Klevtsove (northeast of Oleksandrivka), indicating a small Russian group presence at two locations in Andriivka-Klevtsove.[59] These groups may have recently infiltrated these locations or may have remained in the area after Ukrainian forces previously reseized the settlement.
A Ukrainian drone pilot operating in the Oleksandrivka direction reported that Russian forces continue attempts to infiltrate past Ukrainian positions in the Oleksandrivka direction, including sometimes assaulting through fields rather than through windbreaks and continuing to advance even after Ukrainian forces strike Russian servicemembers with first-person-view (FPV) drones.[60]

Ukrainian forces continued their intermediate-range strike campaign against Russian logistics in occupied Donetsk Oblast. Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) Commander Major Robert “Magyar” Brovdi reported on Jul 18 that Ukrainian forces struck the 220 kV electrical substations “Azovska” in occupied Mariupol (roughly 110 kilometers from the frontline) and an electrical substation in occupied Yasynivka (roughly 40 kilometers from the frontline).[61] Geolocated footage published on July 11 shows a destroyed cargo truck off the H-21 Makiivka-Zuhres highway near occupied Zuhres (roughly 65 kilometers from the frontline).[62]
Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Hulyaipole direction and in western Zaporizhia Oblast on July 17 and 18 but did not advance.[63]

Russian forces attempted a roughly platoon-sized motorized assault in the Orikhiv direction. Geolocated footage published on July 17 shows Ukrainian forces striking Russian servicemembers during a motorized assault involving at least eight Russian servicemembers and four all-terrain vehicles (ATVs) north of Mali Shcherbaky (west of Orikhiv).[64]
Footage published on July 17 shows Ukrainian forces striking a bridge near Orikhiv that Russian forces use for logistics.[65]
Ukrainian forces continued intermediate-range strikes against Russian military assets and energy infrastructure in occupied Zaporizhia Oblast. Geolocated footage published on July 17 shows multiple burning transport vehicles on the M-14 Melitopol-Berdyansk highway (roughly 80 kilometers from the frontline).[66]
The Ukrainian State Regulatory Commission and Ukrainian state nuclear energy enterprise Energoatom rejected Russian claims that a Ukrainian strike killed the chief engineer at the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP). Russian nuclear energy state agency Rosatom CEO Alexey Likhachev claimed on July 15 that a Ukrainian drone strike killed Russian occupation chief engineer of the ZNPP Alexander Yakovlev.[67] The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) recognized on July 15, 2026, that Russian authorities had notified them of the supposed death of Yakovlev.[68] The Ukrainian State Regulatory Commission and Ukrainian nuclear energy operator Energoatom stated on July 17 that Yakovlev is not the legitimate legal chief engineer of the ZNPP and that the only legal chief engineer of the ZNPP remains Denys Marynenko, who Russian forces denied access to the plant after they occupied it.[69]
Neither Ukrainian nor Russian sources reported ground activity in the Kherson direction on July 18.

Ukrainian forces continued to strike energy infrastructure in occupied Kherson Oblast between July 15 and 18. Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) Commander Major Robert “Magyar” Brovdi reported on July 18 that Ukrainian forces struck an electrical substation near occupied Havrylivka Druha (roughly 65 kilometers from the frontline) between July 15 and 18.[70]
Ukrainian forces continued strikes against Russian military assets and energy infrastructure in occupied Crimea. Brovdi reported that Ukrainian forces struck the 110 kV “Koktebel” electrical substation in occupied Shchebetovka (245 kilometers from the frontline), the 110 kV “Kerchensk” and 220 kV “Komysh-Burun” electrical substations in occupied Kerch (roughly 280 kilometers from the frontline), the “Kuban-Crimea” electricity transfer point in occupied Hlazivka (roughly 240 kilometers from the frontline), and the 220 kV “Chornomorska” electrical substation in occupied Vulkanivka between July 15 and 18.[71] Crimea-based Telegram channel Crimean Wind claimed that Ukrainian forces may have struck the Balaklava Thermal Power Plant (TPP) following an audible explosion in occupied Sevastopol (about 240 kilometers from the frontline).[72] Crimean Wind reported that Ukrainian forces struck the Hvardiiske Airfield (roughly 195 kilometers from the frontline) and that local residents reported more than 20 impacts at the airfield.[73]
Ukrainian forces continued strikes against Russian naval assets near occupied Kerch. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on July 18 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian Project 10410 Svetlyak-class patrol ship near occupied Kerch for the second consecutive night on the night of July 17 to 18.[74]
Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)
Russian forces conducted a series of missile and drone strikes against Ukraine from July 17 to 18. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched two Iskander-M ballistic missiles, two Onyx anti-ship missiles, and three Kh-59/69 cruise missiles from occupied Crimea, and launched 90 Shahed-, Gerbera-, and Italmas-type strike drones, Parodiya-type decoy drones, and Banderol-type loitering munitions from the directions of Bryansk and Oryol cities; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; occupied Donetsk City; and occupied Hvardiiske, Crimea.[75] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed one Kh-59/69 cruise missile and 69 drones, that missiles and 19 drones struck 19 locations, and air object fragments fell on five locations. The Ukrainian Air Force noted that Russian forces’ main direction of attack was Odesa Oblast. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces struck transportation, industrial, civilian, energy, residential, port, and railway infrastructure in Dnipropetrovsk, Kharkiv, Odesa, and Zaporizhia oblasts.[76]
Russian forces conducted a double-tap strike in Kharkiv Oblast. Derhachi Military Administration Head Vyacheslav Zadorenko reported on July 18 that Russian forces struck a house in Derhachi, Kharkiv Oblast with a Geran-type strike drone and later conducted a second strike on the same house after police officers responded to the initial strike.[77]
Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)
Belarusian State-owned Oil and Gas Company Belarusneft denied reports that Belarus has imposed fuel limits at gas stations near the border with Russia.[78] Russian firms have nevertheless relied on the Belarusian energy industry to mitigate Russian refining capacity shortages, including by increasing imports from Belarusian refineries.[79]
Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

[1] https://t.me/mod_russia/65699
[2] https://t.me/mod_russia/65700
[3] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-5-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-25-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-24-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-22-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-16-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-11-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-15-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-17-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-10-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-11-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-5-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-6-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-7-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-10-2025/;
[7] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-4-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-3-2026/
[8] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-25-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-24-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-11-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-16-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-23-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-31-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-24-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-20-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-26-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-9-2026/
[4] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-4-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-15-2026/
[5] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-4-2026/
[6] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-17-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-3-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-29-2026/;
[7] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-9-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-4-2026/;
https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-26-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-15-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-27-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-2-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-21-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-24-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-10-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-22-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-27-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-27-2026/
[8] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41240
[9] https://t.me/robert_magyar/2619; http://t.me/robert_magyar/2621
[10] https://t.me/robert_magyar/2620
[11] https://voidgroup dot org/russia-prepares-crimea-military-family-evacuation/; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/07/17/logistychnyj-lokdaun-v-diyi-okupanty-u-krymu-formuyut-spysky-na-evakuacziyu-rodyn-vijskovyh/
[12] https://24tv dot ua/ru/toplivnyj-krizis-krymu-ukraina-provodit-ataki-tankery-more_n3107462
[13] https://www.reuters.com/business/fuel-crisis-attacks-azov-sea-tighten-squeeze-russian-farmers-2026-07-17/
[14] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-12-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-10-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-8-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-9-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-11-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-16-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-14-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-16-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-26-2026/
[15] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-17-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-13-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-13-2026/
[16] https://t.me/rwb_press_service/1619; https://t.me/PervyshovEA/4584; https://t.me/PervyshovEA/4585; https://t.me/tass_agency/385826; https://t.me/tass_agency/385846; https://t.me/tass_agency/385847;
[17] https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/20023; https://t.me/osirskiy/1770
[18] https://t.me/Bell_tech/5545
[19] https://www.vedomosti dot ru/business/articles/2026/07/18/1214725-uscherb-skladi-wildberries
[20] https://t.me/robert_magyar/2623; https://t.me/istories_media/12929; https://t.me/notes_veterans/28597
[21] https://meduza dot io/news/2026/07/18/ozon-kak-i-wildberries-izmenil-usloviya-dogovora-s-prodavtsami-marketpleys-ne-budet-kompensirovat-utratu-tovara-pri-udarah-dronami
[22] https://t.me/tass_agency/385846; https://t.me/tass_agency/385847
[23] https://t.me/PervyshovEA/4584; https://t.me/PervyshovEA/4585
[24] https://t.me/MID_Russia/87196; https://t.me/tass_agency/385854; https://t.me/tass_agency/385831; https://t.me/tass_agency/385833; https://t.me/tass_agency/385865; https://ria dot ru/20260718/sk-2105541270.html; https://t.me/tass_agency/385830; https://t.me/tass_agency/38583
[25] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-16-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-15-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-29-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-29-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-21-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-2-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-26-2026/
[26] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-2-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-18-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-15-2025/
[27] https://t.me/VitaliiKimOfficial/22733
[28] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41240
[29] https://x.com/NOELreports/status/2078452206580216234; https://x.com/blinzka/status/2078487296765034950
[30] https://t.me/vorobiev_live/12109
[31] https://t.me/tass_agency/385841
[32] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/12495 ; https://www.facebook.com/reel/1539890534528768
[33] https://t.me/severnnyi/8725
[34] https://x.com/Bielitzling/status/2078280817256616104 ; https://x.com/Skelya425/status/2078031038089945483 ; https://x.com/Bielitzling/status/2078081686638567793
[35] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41222 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41227 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41241 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/96300
[36] https://t.me/dva_majors/96300
[37] https://t.me/severnnyi/8719
[38] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41222 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41227 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/35619 ; https://t.me/grvZapad/19167
[39] https://t.me/kantemirovec_svo/746 ; https://t.me/Osintpen/3158
[40] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41240 ;
[41] https://t.me/robert_magyar/2622
[42] https://x.com/ZoamSc2/status/2078292204393775485 ; https://x.com/ZoamSc2/status/2078325669805830594 ; https://t.me/Secrets_of_Vinakos/16229
[43] https://t.me/grvZapad/19167
[44] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41222 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41227 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41241 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/35619 ; https://t.me/severnnyi/8719 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/73565 ; https://t.me/grvZapad/19167
[45] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/07/18/odnorazovi-nosylnyky-odnorazovi-drony-pid-lymanom-vorog-namagayetsya-hoch-yakos-nalagodyty-logistyku/; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rBRDb7fweok&t=610s
[46] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41222; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41227; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41241; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/73565; https://t.me/wargonzo/35619
[48] https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/37168; https://t.me/skala425/931; https://suspilne dot media/donbas/1358348-sili-oboroni-zacistili-centr-kostantinivki-425-osp/; https://t.me/operativnoZSU/216224 ; https://www.facebook.com/reel/1551614666415074; https://militarnyi dot com/uk/news/skelya-provely-zachystku-v-kostyantynivtsi/
[49] https://t.me/skala425/931
[50] https://suspilne dot media/1358086-obrali-zapobizni-zahodi-kerivnikam-ukroboronpromu-ukraina-vidkrie-arhivi-rozvidki-sodo-podij-na-volini-1606-den-vijni/?anchor=live_1784363991&utm_source=copylink&utm_medium=ps
[51] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-12-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-16-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-18-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-7-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-12-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-7-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-1-2026/
[52] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-15-2026/ ;
[53] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41222; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41227; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41241; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/119334
[54] https://t.me/Don_Guards_51st/1238; https://t.me/Osintpen/3156
[55] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41227
[56] https://t.me/divgen/82428
[57] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/07/18/ne-mozhut-zahopyty-to-znyshhuyut-kabamy-okupanty-vbomblyuyut-novopavlivku-u-zemlyu/ ; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rBRDb7fweok&t=1460s
[58] https://x.com/aroslav24470/status/2078269262527938959 ; https://t.me/vbs_orel/10
[59] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/12496; https://t.me/craftoriz/685; https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/2078402317443879072
[60] https://suspilne dot media/dnipro/1358236-2-3-fpv-v-serednomu-na-vijskovogo-rf-pilot-fpv-42-ombr-na-pozivnij-mongol-pro-boi-na-oleksandrivskomu-napramku/
[61] https://t.me/robert_magyar/2622
[62] https://x.com/neonhandrail/status/2078139451046584458?s=20 ; https://www.tiktok.com/@dimonchik855/video/7662456797579496725?is_from_webapp=1&sender_device=pc ; https://x.com/neonhandrail/status/2078139973224780100?s=20
[63] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41222; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41227; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41241; https://t.me/wargonzo/35619; https://t.me/dva_majors/96300
[64] https://x.com/moklasen/status/2078184272188342280?s=20; https://x.com/moklasen/status/2078184275095027862?s=20; https://t.me/ombr65/718; https://militarnyi dot com/uk/news/65-ta-brygada-rozbyla-rosijskyj-shturm-shhe-do-peretynu-liniyi-frontu/; https://www.facebook.com/share/r/1EXfD91HYE/
[65] https://x.com/ZSUNews/status/2078126576567464430
[66] https://x.com/neonhandrail/status/2078159532304560434; https://x.com/GirkinGirkin/status/2078134839996305656
[67] https://tass dot ru/proisshestviya/27920485
[68] https://x.com/iaeaorg/status/2077479046791754018
[69]https://www.facebook.com/snriu/posts/pfbid0ARrV29ubVaTHNZQvfVu4yhWooyfpNJd6KaabEKNuFvoNNF1ZrSL1uaVUR7XjjF3Pl; https://www.facebook.com/energoatom.ua/posts/pfbid0rgf3zzPM7CaZoHRay4t8WCdereM3AZcvJqQCRQbN1uqeuvm5JbfmeJLB39YcRyz4l ;
[70] https://t.me/robert_magyar/2622
[71] https://t.me/robert_magyar/2622
[72] https://t.me/Crimeanwind/104997
[73] https://t.me/Crimeanwind/104996 ; https://t.me/Crimeanwind/104998 ; https://t.me/Crimeanwind/104999 ; https://t.me/Crimeanwind/105003 ; https://t.me/Crimeanwind/105008
[74] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41240 ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-17-2026/
[75] https://t.me/kpszsu/68985
[76] https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/30858; https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/30881; https://t.me/zadorenko_v/18314; https://t.me/ihor_terekhov/4340; https://t.me/odeskaODA/17716; https://t.me/odesaMVA/2827; https://t.me/odeskaODA/17733; https://t.me/odeskaODA/17740; https://t.me/UkrzalInfo/8323; https://t.me/zoda_gov_ua/64533; https://t.me/Mykola_Kalashnyk/10928
[77] https://t.me/zadorenko_v/18314
[78] https://t.me/tass_agency/385869
[79] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/gasoline-shortages-in-occupied-ukraine-show-the-synergy-of-ukraines-long-range-and-mid-range-strike-campaigns/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-8-2025/; https://t.rbc dot ru/tyumen/07/10/2025/68e4fe6f9a79474b4ba503a3; https://www.interfax dot ru/russia/1051259; https://nsk.rbc dot ru/nsk/15/10/2025/68ef19259a7947c523d30e25