Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, July 11, 2026

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The recent, intensified Ukrainian strikes against Russian seaborne gasoline tankers in the Sea of Azov have reportedly forced Russia to close some maritime routes. The Ukrainian General Staff and Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) Commander Major Robert “Magyar” Brovdi reported on July 11 that Ukrainian forces struck 28 Russian vessels, including 21 tankers, four tugboats, two dry cargo ships, and a dredger in the Azov Sea on the night of July 10 to 11.[1] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that the oil tankers transported Russian petroleum products in violation of international sanctions and that the remaining vessels supported Russian military logistics and transported cargo — presumably in the Sea of Azov.[2] Brovdi implied that Russian authorities appear to have stopped maritime traffic through the Kerch Strait.[3] Brovdi reported on July 11 that Ukrainian forces have struck a total of 76 vessels between July 6 and 11, including in the Sea of Azov. Reuters reported on July 10, citing three grain export industry sources, that Russian authorities temporarily suspended seaborne shipping through the Don-Azov Canal, which connects the Sea of Azov with the Don River, following recent Ukrainian strikes against Russian vessels in the Sea of Azov.[4] One of the sources stated that Russian border guards stopped accepting requests for passage through the Kerch Strait as of 1810 local time on July 10 and did not specify when the suspension would expire. Ukrainian strikes against Russian seaborne gasoline transports over the past week represent a new phase in Ukraine's efforts to isolate occupied Crimea from the Russian logistics network and disrupt Russian seaborne shipping routes, especially for petroleum products and grain.[5]

Starboard Maritime Intelligence data indicates a possible 55 percent decline in vessels with active automatic identification system (AIS) transponders in the Sea of Azov between June 30 and July 11. Ship-tracking data from Starboard Maritime Intelligence recorded 267 possible vessels with active AIS transponders in the Sea of Azov on June 30 but only 120 possible vessels with active AIS transponders in the Sea of Azov on July 11, potentially marking a 55 percent decrease. Starboard data from June 30 shows active AIS transponder ships throughout the Sea of Azov, along the coasts of Russia and occupied Ukraine, and at Russian and occupied Ukrainian ports. Starboard data from July 11 shows substantially fewer active AIS transponder ships throughout the Sea of Azov, with most ships clustered near ports, coasts, or in the Taganrog Bay. Starboard data from both June 30 and July 11 also shows multiple AIS transponder locations at inland points in Russia and occupied Ukraine. AIS data can be spoofed and jammed, leading to AIS signals appearing on land or outside their vessel's actual operating path. The Starboard data shows a methodologically consistent count of AIS transponders actively reporting locations, spoofed or otherwise, in the Sea of Azov and the Kerch Strait and therefore does not represent the exact number of vessels in these areas.

Intensified Ukrainian strikes against seaborne vessels may have prompted Russian vessels to alter their behavior in the Sea of Azov in any of several ways consistent with the Starboard data and AIS signal anomalies. Fewer ships may be sailing in the Sea of Azov due to the increased threat of Ukrainian strikes. Some ships sailing in the Sea of Azov may have turned off their AIS transponders, consistent with Russian attempts to obfuscate the location of Russian ships in general and ships in the Sea of Azov specifically.[6] Starboard data from June 10 and 11 also indicates that Russia continues to jam AIS transponder signals, as it has been doing since prior to the most recent Ukrainian strikes against ships in the Sea of Azov, possibly as a precaution against the enduring threat of Ukrainian drone strikes.

Russian consumer gasoline prices are skyrocketing amid Ukraine's intensifying long-range strike campaign against Russian oil refineries and gasoline producers. Kremlin news agency Interfax reported on July 11, citing data from the Russian Federal State Statistics Service (Rosstat), that consumer prices for gasoline increased by an average of 6.88 percent in June 2026 compared to much lower increases of 0.85 percent in May 2026, 0.61 percent in April 2026, 1.08 percent in March 2026, 0.61 percent in February 2026, and 1.35 percent in January 2026.[7] Interfax noted that consumer prices for AI-92 gasoline increased by 7.3 percent, AI-95 gasoline by 6.7 percent, AI-98 gasoline by 3.1 percent, and diesel fuel by 7.1 percent in June 2026. Interfax reported that consumer gasoline prices increased by 19.9 percent from June 2025 to June 2026,  by 11.13 percent in all of 2024, and by 10.78 percent in all of 2025. Ukrainian long-range strikes against Russian oil infrastructure and intermediate-range strikes against fuel deliveries to and within occupied Ukraine during the summer months, when Russia experiences increased demands for fuel for the tourist season, are severely limiting the amount of gasoline and other fuel available for consumers in Russia and occupied Ukraine and are very likely a main driver of the spike in consumer gasoline prices in June 2026.[8] At least 78 of Russia's 83 federal subjects as well as occupied Ukraine are experiencing gasoline shortages due to Ukraine's intensified strike campaigns.[9] Ukraine will likely continue intensifying its strike campaigns as Russia struggles to find solutions to the air defense insufficiencies that have contributed to the success of the Ukrainian campaigns, exacerbating fuel shortages for both domestic civilian consumers and even impacting near rear and frontline Russian logistics.[10]

Russia appears to have been engaged in a hacking operation that targeted civilian cameras across European NATO member states and in Ukraine. The Telegraph reported on July 10, citing the Dutch General Intelligence and Security Service (AIVD) and Military Intelligence and Security Service (MIVD) that Kremlin-based hackers have been spying on NATO military bases in Europe by hacking into civilian cameras pointing at military equipment transportation routes to identify the types of weapons Ukraine received.[11] The Dutch intelligence services reported that the Russian operation targeted European NATO members states, including the Netherlands, and Ukraine. The Telegraph speculated that hackers likely accessed civilian doorbell systems to monitor weapons transportation routes.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky authorized the creation of a long-range strike command and a new rapid-response branch within the Ukrainian Armed Forces on July 10. Zelensky signed a decree on July 10 ordering the creation of the Long-Range (Global) Influence Command subordinate to the Ukrainian Armed Forces and ordering Ukrainian authorities to appoint a commander of the new formation.[12] Zelensky noted that the Long-Range (Global) Influence Command's objective is to degrade Russia's warfighting potential, likely referring to suppressing Russian military targets in the deep rear.[13] Zelensky signed a second decree on July 10 ordering the creation of the Joint Rapid Response Forces within Ukraine’s Ground Forces and appointed 8th Airborne Assault Corps Commander Brigadier General Dmytro Voloshyn as its commander.[14]

Key Takeaways:

• The recent, intensified Ukrainian strikes against Russian seaborne gasoline tankers in the Sea of Azov have reportedly forced Russia to close some maritime routes.
• Starboard Maritime Intelligence data indicates a possible 55 percent decline in vessels with active automatic identification system (AIS) transponders in the Sea of Azov between June 30 and July 11.
• Intensified Ukrainian strikes against seaborne vessels may have prompted Russian vessels to alter their behavior in the Sea of Azov in any of several ways consistent with the Starboard data and AIS signal anomalies.
• Russian consumer gasoline prices are skyrocketing amid Ukraine's intensifying long-range strike campaign against Russian oil refineries and gasoline producers.
• Russia appears to have been engaged in a hacking operation that targeted civilian cameras across NATO countries and in Ukraine.
• Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky authorized the creation of two new commands within the Ukrainian Armed Forces on July 10.
• Russian forces launched six Iskander-M and S-400 ballistic missiles, four Kh-59/69 guided cruise missiles, two Kh-31 anti-radar missiles, and 121 drones against Ukraine overnight.
• Russian forces recently advanced in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area, and Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Novopavlivka direction.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

• Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
• Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis
• Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
• Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
• Significant Activity in Belarus

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

The Ukrainian General Staff provided additional battle damage assessment (BDA) after recent Ukrainian strikes against Russian defense industrial and energy infrastructure in Russia. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on July 11 that Ukrainian strikes against the Titan-Barrikady federal research and production center in Volgograd City, Volgograd Oblast on June 27 caused approximately 105 million dollars in damages.[15] The Ukrainian General Staff added that Ukrainian strikes against the St. Petersburg Oil Terminal in Leningrad Oblast on July 4 damaged two RVS-3000 oil tanks, four RVS-10000 oil tanks, a RVS-15000 tank, a RVS-20000 tank, a process pipeline overpass, and other processing equipment.[16] The Ukrainian General Staff added that the Ukrainian forces struck the AVT-6 processing and distillation unit and damaged the AVT-1 and AVT-3 unit pipelines at the Slavneft-Yanos Oil Refinery in Yaroslavl City, Yaroslavl Oblast on July 6, and that Ukrainian strikes against the Borisoglebsk military airfield in Voronezh Oblast on July 8 resulted in fires at 28 aviation kerosene tanks with a total volume of 1,600 cubic meters.[17] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that a Ukrainian strike against the TAIF-NK JSC Oil Refinery in Nizhnekamsk, Republic of Tatarstan on July 8 caused a fire at the delayed coking unit and damaged cable trestles, pipelines, and utility buildings. The Ukrainian General Staff clarified that the Ukrainian strike against the Ilsky Oil Refinery in Ilsky, Krasnodar Krai on July 10 caused fires at the AT-5 and AT-6 atmospheric distillation units and near AT-2 and AT-3 units and damaged pipelines at the facility.[18]

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in Sumy Oblast along the international border)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Sumy Oblast on July 10 and 11 but did not make confirmed advances.[19] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced north of Mohrytsya and along the T-1901 highway in southern Myropillya (both northeast of Sumy City).[20]

Russian forces continue to exaggerate their successes in the northern Sumy Oblast. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on July 11 that Russian forces seized Bachivsk (northwest of Sumy City), and a Russian milblogger claimed that elements of the Russian 349th Akhmat-Russia Motorized Rifle Regiment (reportedly of the 42nd Motorized Rifle Division, 58th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD], and under the operational control of the Northern Grouping of Forces) seized the settlement.[21] This is the first report ISW has observed of the 349th Motorized Rifle Regiment being subordinated to the 42nd Motorized Rifle Division.

Ukrainian Northern Group of Forces Spokesperson Colonel Vadym Mysnyk stated that Ukrainian forces control Bachivsk and that Ukrainian forces stopped a Russian infiltration attempt in the area.[22]

Geolocated footage published on July 11 shows Russian Aerospace Forces (VKS) conducting a FAB-500 strike on a Ukrainian position north of Stepok (east of Sumy City).[23]

Ukrainian forces struck Russian military assets in Belgorod and Kursk oblasts' border areas on July 10 and the night of July 10 to 11. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on July 11 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian drone control point near Krisanovo, Belgorod Oblast (southeast of Sumy City and roughly eight kilometers from the border with Ukraine) and a manpower concentration near Karyzh, Kursk Oblast (northwest of Sumy City and roughly eight kilometers from the border with Ukraine).[24] Geolocated footage published on July 10 shows Ukrainian forces striking a Russian 2S7 Pion self-propelled artillery system using a High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS) and Hornet and HX-2 strike drones near Lyubinovka, Kursk Oblast (northeast of Sumy City and roughly 11 kilometers from the border with Ukraine).^[25]

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border to create a defensible buffer zone with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations north and northeast of Kharkiv City on July 10 and 11 but did not make confirmed advances.[26] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced north of Volokhivske, south of Volokhivka, south of Okhrymivka, and south of Chaikivka (all northeast of Kharkiv City).[27]

Russian forces continue offensive operations in the Velykyi Burluk direction on July 10 and 11 but did not make confirmed advances.[28] A source reporting on the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces claimed on July 11 that Russian forces marginally advanced near Artilne (northeast of Velykyi Burluk).[29]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Oskil River (Russian objective: Cross the Oskil River in Kharkiv Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on July 10 and 11 but did not make confirmed advances as Ukrainian forces counterattacked.[30] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced in Kupyansk-Vuzlovyi (south of Kupyansk).[31] A source reporting on the Russian Western Grouping of Forces claimed on July 11 that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Kindrashivka, Radkivka, and Myrove (all north of Kupyansk), while a Russian milblogger claimed on July 11 that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Kurylivka (southeast of Kupyansk).[32]

Ukrainian strikes reportedly continue to degrade Russian forces' ability to conduct tactical maneuvers in the Kupyansk direction. A Ukrainian brigade operating in the Kupyansk direction reported on July 10 that Ukrainian forces struck Russian radar stations, an electronic warfare complex, repeaters, and communications antennas in the Kupyansk direction, and that these strikes constrained Russian forces’ ability to maneuver in the area and allowed the brigade to strike Russian assault groups.[33]

Russian continued offensive operations in the Borova direction on July 10 and 11 but did not advance as Ukrainian forces counterattacked.[34] A source reporting on the Russian Western Grouping of Forces claimed on July 11 that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Shykhivka (southeast of Borova).

Ukrainian forces continued their intermediate-range strike campaign against Russian military assets in occupied Luhansk Oblast. Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) Commander Major Robert “Magyar” Brovdi reported on July 11 that Ukrainian forces struck electrical substations in occupied Sentyanivka (roughly 55 kilometers from the frontline) and Kalynove (roughly 45 kilometers from the frontline).[35]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Slovyansk direction on July 10 and 11 but did not make confirmed advances.[36] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced southeast of Starodubivka (northeast of Slovyansk) and north of Malynivka (southeast of Slovyansk).[37]

Slovyansk Military Administration Head Vadym Lyakh reported on July 11 that Russian forces dropped three FAB-250 glide bombs on central Slovyansk, killing one and injuring three.[38]

Order of Battle: Geolocated footage published on July 10 shows elements of the Russian 370th Special Purpose Detachment (16th Spetsnaz Brigade) striking a grounded Ukrainian drone in Lyman, the first frontline evidence ISW has observed of this unit.[39]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area as Ukrainian forces counterattacked. Geolocated footage published on July 10 shows Ukrainian forces striking a Russian-occupied position in the southwestern outskirts of Kostyantynivka, indicating that Russian control of terrain in southwestern Kostyantynivka is further than ISW previously assessed.[40] A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed on July 10 that Ukrainian forces attacked in the northeastern outskirts of Kostyantynivka and that Ukrainian small groups are counterattacking throughout the city.[41] The milblogger claimed that Ukrainian drone surveillance in Kostyantynivka is preventing Russian forces from navigating open terrain in some areas of the city.

The Donetsk Oblast Prosecutor's Office reported that Russian forces carried out seven airstrikes against Kramatorsk and Bilenke (immediately east of Kramatorsk) on July 10, killing four civilians, including a child, and injuring nine civilians.[42]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Dobropillya direction on July 10 and 11 but did not advance.[43]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction on July 10 and 11 but did not advance.[44] Geolocated footage published on July 10 shows Russian forces striking a Ukrainian position west of Kotlyne (southwest of Pokrovsk), an area where Russian sources previously claimed Russian forces maintained a presence.[45]

Order of Battle: Geolocated footage published on July 10 shows elements of the Russian “Salehard” Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) Battalion striking a Ukrainian position in a mine west of Kotlyne (west of Pokrovsk), the first frontline evidence ISW has observed of this unit.[46]

Geolocated footage published on July 11 shows Russian Aerospace Forces conducting a FAB-500 guided bomb strike against a Ukrainian position in Novofedorivka (northwest of Pokrovsk).[47]

A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger acknowledged on July 10 that Ukrainian forces recently advanced in southern Novopavlivka and that it is unclear if Russian forces retained positions on the southern outskirts of the settlement.^[48] The milblogger claimed that the frontline sector near Novopavlivka is a contested "grey zone" and that Russian or Ukrainian forces will have to consolidate positions and extend logistics before fully controlling the settlement.

Russian forces continued limited offensive operations in the Oleksandrivka direction on June 10 and 11 but did not advance as Ukrainian forces counterattacked.[49] A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed on July 10 that Ukrainian forces counterattacked and advanced beyond Ivanivka (northeast of Oleksandrivka) and into Novopavlivka.[50]

Ukrainian forces continued their intermediate-range strike campaign against Russian military assets and energy infrastructure in occupied Donetsk Oblast. Ukrainian officials reported on July 11 that Ukrainian forces struck electrical substations in occupied Volnovakha (roughly 75 kilometers from the frontline) and occupied Sofiivka (roughly 40 kilometers from the frontline); the Starobeshevskyi and Kalmiuskemilitary training grounds near Dokuchaievsk (roughly 75 kilometers from the frontline); and an award ceremony of the Russian 1194th Motorized Rifle Regiment (4th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade, 3rd Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 2nd Luhansk People's Republic Army Corps [LNR AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) in Horlivka (roughly 30 kilometers from the frontline) on July 10 or on the night of July 10 to 11.[51] A Kremlin-affiliated milblogger claimed on July 10 that Ukrainian forces conducted a large series of air strikes against central occupied Horlivka.[52]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Hulyaipole direction on July 10 to 11 but did not advance.[53]

Russian forces conducted limited ground attacks west of Orikhiv in western Zaporizhia Oblast on June 10 and 11 and are reportedly fielding new strike drones in the area.^[54] A Ukrainian defense manufacturer reported on July 11 that Russian forces began fielding the K-8 Dvushka strike drone in Zaporizhia Oblast, which is resistant to Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW), can carry up to five kilograms of munitions, and has a maximum speed of 150 kilometers per hour.[55]

Ukrainian forces continued their intermediate-range strike campaign against Russian military assets in occupied Zaporizhia Oblast on the night of July 10 to 11. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian drone control point near occupied Pershotravneve (one of multiple settlements between the frontline and about 120 kilometers from the frontline).[56] Southern Ukrainian news outlet RIA Pivden reported on July 11 that Ukrainian strikes destroyed a repair base of the Russian 58th Combined Arms Army (CAA, Southern Military District [SMD]) at the Dormash Plant in occupied Berdyansk (roughly 100 kilometers from the frontline) overnight.[57]

Neither Russian nor Ukrainian forces reported ground activity in the Kherson direction on July 11 as Ukrainian forces continued strikes against frontline Russian military assets in the area. Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) Commander Major Robert “Magyar” Brovdi reported that Ukrainian forces struck a communications point of the Russian 14th Army Corps ([AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) near occupied Chukalivka (southwest of Kherson City).[58]

Ukrainian drone strikes are reportedly causing Russian forces to suffer boat shortages in occupied Kherson Oblast, and this shortage is likely impeding Russian ground operations in the Dnipro River island delta. Crimea-based Ukrainian partisan group Atesh reported on July 10 that Ukrainian strikes have destroyed nearly all of the Russian military's high-speed motorboats in the Dnipro River delta, impeding Russian logistics and personnel movements to the islands in the delta.[59] The Atesh movement reported that the Russian military command is not replacing the destroyed boats but did not specify a reason. Russian forces have struggled with boat shortages in the Dnipro River at various points from 2023 to 2025, but reports of shortages declined going into 2026.[60]

Ukrainian forces reportedly continued their long-range strike campaign against Russian military assets in occupied Crimea. Crimea-based Telegram channel Crimean Wind reported on July 10 that a Ukrainian strike against a Russian airfield near occupied Hvardiiske (roughly 195 kilometers from the frontline) caused a fire.[61]

The Russian Federal Government claimed on July 10 that federal authorities have allocated 4.3 billion rubles (about 55.9 million dollars) in support to tourism companies in occupied Crimea that are struggling due to declining tourism rates from Ukrainian strikes against occupied Crimea.[62]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Russian forces conducted a series of drone and missile strikes against Ukraine on the night of July 10 to 11. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched six Iskander-M and S-400 ballistic missiles from Bryansk Oblast, four Kh-59/69 guided cruise missiles from the airspace over occupied Crimea, two Kh-31 anti-radar missiles from the Black Sea, and 121 Shahed-, Gerbera-, and Italmas-type strike drones and Parodiya-type decoy drones from the directions of Kursk and Oryol cities; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; occupied Donetsk Oblast; and occupied Hvardiiske, Crimea.[63] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 111 drones and two Kh-59/69 guided cruise missiles; that all ballistic missiles, two guided cruise missiles, and seven drones struck 11 locations; and that debris fell on three locations. The Ukrainian Air Force is clarifying information about the impact of the two Kh-31 anti-radar missiles. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces struck residential, commercial, agricultural, railway, port, and medical infrastructure in Chernihiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Kharkiv, Kyiv, Mykolaiv, Odesa, and Sumy oblasts, and Kyiv, Kherson, Kharkiv, and Sumy cities.[64]

Sumy Oblast Military Administration head Oleh Hryhorov reported on July 11 that Russian forces killed five and injured at least 30 civilians in a guided bomb strike on Sumy City.[65]

Kharkiv City Mayor Ihor Terekhov reported on July 11 that Russian forces struck a gas station in Kharkiv City, causing injuries.[66]

Russian forces continued to strike civilian targets and conducted a double-tap strike in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast on July 10. The Ukrainian State Emergency Services reported on July 10 that Russian forces struck emergency workers in Nikopol, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast as they were fighting a fire in a school building after a previous Russian strike.[67]

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

Nothing significant to report.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.