Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, January 8, 2025

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Note: The data cut-off for this product was 12:00 PM ET on January 8, except for preliminary reports of the possible Russian strike against Lviv Oblast. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the January 9 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Preliminary unconfirmed reports suggested that Russian forces may have conducted an Oreshnik intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) strike against Lviv Oblast on the night of January 8, but Ukrainian officials have not yet confirmed these reports. The Ukrainian Air Force issued a missile alert in all of Ukraine around 23:30 local time due to the threat of a Russian ballistic missile launch from Kapustin Yar (where Russia reportedly stores Oreshnik missiles and the alleged launch site of the first Russian Oreshnik strike against Ukraine in November 2024) and noted explosions in Lviv Oblast.[i] The BBC's Ukrainian service stated that unofficial monitoring channels reported launch activity at the Kapustin Yar missile launch site in Astrakhan Oblast.[ii] Ukrainian outlets and X (formerly Twitter) accounts noted that Ukrainian monitoring Telegram channels suggested that Russian forces may have conducted an Oreshnik strike.[iii] A Ukrainian Telegram source posted footage reportedly showing multiple strikes in quick succession, which may be showing Oreshnik's multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle (MIRV) payload.[iv] Russian milbloggers claimed that an Oreshnik struck the gas field and storage facility near Stryi, Lviv Oblast.[v] Lviv City Mayor Andriy Sadovyi stated that there was a series of powerful explosions in the city in the evening, and Lviv Oblast Military Administration Head Maksym Kozytskyi stated that Russian forces struck an unspecified critical infrastructure facility in the region.[vi] Sadovyi later reported that it is currently unknown if Russian forces used an Oreshnik against Lviv Oblast.[vii] ISW cannot independently verify if the strike against Lviv Oblast was an Oreshnik strike.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky had warned on the afternoon of January 8 about a possible "new massive Russian strike" on the night of January 8 to 9.[viii] The US Embassy in Kyiv City reported on January 8 that it received information about a potentially significant air strike "over the next several days."[ix] Russian forces have only conducted one other known strike with the Oreshnik, which struck Dnipro City on November 21, 2024, as part of a larger missile strike against the city's critical infrastructure and industrial enterprises.[x] The Kremlin has leaned on the November 2024 Oreshnik strike and subsequent threats to use the Oreshnik against Ukraine as part of a reflexive control campaign aimed at discouraging Western support for Ukraine and has intensified efforts to threaten the West with Oreshniks since Fall 2025.[xi]

The Kremlin again explicitly rejected the security guarantees for Ukraine that the United States and Europe are currently finalizing with Ukraine as part of a peace agreement. Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) Spokesperson Maria Zakharova responded on January 8 to the Coalition of the Willing's recent efforts to finalize the details about a multinational force deployment to Ukraine in order to guarantee a future ceasefire, which Zakharova labeled as "militaristic declarations" from an "axis of war."[xii] Zakharova stated that Russia will consider Western military deployments to Ukraine as a "foreign intervention" that will pose a "direct threat" to Russia's security and as "legitimate combat targets" for the Russian military. Zakharova reiterated Kremlin calls for any future peace agreement to address the war's alleged "root causes" and to include stipulations on Ukrainian neutrality, "demilitarization" (reductions in the Ukrainian military such that Ukraine cannot defend itself), "denazification" (the replacement of the current Ukrainian government with a pro-Russian puppet government), and protections for ethnic Russians and Russian-speakers in Ukraine — Russia's original stated war aims from 2022. Zakharova also called for an agreement to recognize the "territorial realities" that resulted from Russia's sham and illegal referendums in 2014 and 2022 — referring to Kremlin demands for recognition of illegally annexed Crimea and all of Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts as part of the Russian Federation. Zakharova's January 8 statements are the latest in a string of Kremlin statements rejecting the peace plan that Ukraine, the United States, and Europe are currently discussing, particularly provisions on security guarantees for post-war Ukraine.[xiii]

The owner of the Russian-flagged Bella-1 oil tanker that the US Coast Guard seized on January 7 is reportedly affiliated with Russian efforts to evade sanctions against the Venezuelan oil sector. The United States had previously sanctioned the owner of the Bella-1 for cooperating with the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps Quds Force (IGRC-QF), but the tanker re-registered as the Marinera under the ownership of Russian company Burevestmarine in late December 2025.[xiv] Russian businessman Ilya Bugai owns and directs Burevestmarine, which Bugai registered in July 2025.[xv] Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty reported on January 8 that Bugai is also the CEO of Rusneftekhimtorg, which former Odesa City Councilmember Viktor Baransky (a pro-Russian politician whose citizenship Ukraine stripped in 2024) owns.[xvi] Baransky is linked to the Fides Ship Management LLC and Rustanker LLC, both of which the United States sanctioned in 2021 for violating US sanctions against Venezuelan oil.[xvii] Russian opposition outlet Verstka reported in December 2024 that some entities of Baransky's group of companies, the Palmira Group, participated in sanctions evasion schemes to transport Venezuelan and Russian oil and Iranian goods.[xviii]

Russia appears to be attempting to distance itself from the Bella-1 oil tanker even as it seeks to protect other likely shadow fleet vessels. The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) published on January 8 another response to the US seizure of the Bella-1 that rejected US assertions that the Bella-1 had been flying under a false flag and aimed to circumvent sanctions against Venezuela.[xix] The Russian MFA condemned the seizure of the Bella-1 and claimed that US and Western sanctions against Venezuelan oil are illegitimate.[xx] The Russian MFA claimed that Russia had granted the vessel "temporary permission" to fly a Russian flag as of late December 2025, notably refraining from describing the Bella-1 as a Russian vessel despite its new registration under a Russian company. The MFA briefly acknowledged that the Bella-1 had been en route to an unspecified Russian port at the time of the seizure. The New York Times reported on January 6 and 8, citing the official Russian vessel registry, that five oil tankers operating in Venezuelan waters in recent weeks — all under US sanctions for shipping either Russian or Iranian oil — have switched to Russian flags and declared home ports in Sochi or Taganrog, Russia, in recent days.[xxi]

The Russian military command reportedly continues to create new military units and formations but will likely struggle to staff them to their full doctrinal end strength. John Hardie, the deputy director of the Russia program at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, reported on January 7 that Russian milblogger accounts and military recruitment sites are recruiting for the 1244th Guards Artillery Brigade, a reserve unit of the 31st Combined Arms Army (CAA), possibly located in Tver Oblast.[xxii] Hardie noted that the Russian military command is reportedly going to equip the brigade with self-propelled guns, Giatsint-B and D-30 towed howitzers, and Uragan and Grad multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS) and will equip the brigade's reconnaissance-strike battalion with Orlan-10/30, Zala, and Supercam reconnaissance drones and Lancet loitering munitions.[xxiii] It is unclear in which military district the 31st CAA will operate.

Hardie also stated that the Russian military command formed the 76th Rocket Artillery Brigade in the Leningrad Military District (LMD).[xxiv] Hardie noted that elements of the brigade marched in the May 2025 Victory Day parade in Luga, Leningrad Oblast and that the Kurgan Oblast government in February 2025 confirmed the existence of the brigade, which reportedly includes many residents from Kurgan Oblast.[xxv] Hardie assessed that the 76th Artillery Brigade may be the brigade that Russian General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov referenced in his December 18 speech when announcing the formation of an artillery brigade in 2025.[xxvi] Hardie also amplified a Russian social media post from October 2025 claiming that the brigade was operating in the "Chernihiv direction" and a letter from the unit's commander from December 2025 stating that the brigade is engaged in the ”counterterrorism” zone, likely referring to oblasts along the Russian-Ukrainian border.[xxvii] Leaked Russian documents that Ukraine's "I Want to Live" initiative published in October 2025 further list the 76th Rocket Artillery Brigade as operating in the Bryansk direction.[xxviii]

Hardie additionally reported that Russian media outlets and social media posts indicate that the Russian military command is creating the 34th Artillery Division in the Moscow Military District (MMD), including its 273rd and 303rd artillery brigades.[xxix] Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets first reported in January 2024 on the problems the Russian military command was facing in meeting its deadline to create the 34th Artillery Division by late February 2024.[xxx] The creation of the 76th Rocket Artillery Brigade and 34th Artillery Division may be part of then-Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu’s military reforms from late 2022 and late 2023 to reconstitute the LMD and MMD.[xxxi] ISW continues to assess that Russia is likely struggling to build out its strategic reserve to staff new units and formations due to high losses in Ukraine, and the Russian military command will likely similarly struggle to staff the new units and formations at their doctrinal end strength.[xxxii] The new units and formations will likely, in reality, be much smaller, particularly as fighting continues in Ukraine.

The United Kingdom provided Ukraine with air defense systems amidst Russia’s escalating long-range drone and missile strikes against Ukrainian civilian and critical infrastructure. UK Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for the Armed Forces Al Carns reported on January 6 that the United Kingdom delivered 13 Raven air defense systems and two prototype Gravehawk air defense systems to Ukraine and that the first batch of the remaining 15 contracted Gravehawk systems will arrive to Ukraine at an unspecified date in the near future.[xxxiii] Russia's long-range missile and drone strikes seek to exploit Ukraine’s insufficient quantity of air defense systems to protect both the front and rear, and British provisions will help create a denser Ukrainian air defense umbrella.

Key Takeaways:

• Preliminary unconfirmed reports suggested that Russian forces may have conducted an Oreshnik intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) strike against Lviv Oblast on the night of January 8, but Ukrainian officials have not yet confirmed these reports.
• The Kremlin again explicitly rejected the security guarantees for Ukraine that the United States and Europe are currently finalizing with Ukraine as part of a peace agreement.
• The owner of the Russian-flagged Bella-1 oil tanker that the US Coast Guard seized on January 7 is reportedly affiliated with Russian efforts to evade sanctions against the Venezuelan oil sector
• Russia appears to be attempting to distance itself from the Bella-1 oil tanker even as it seeks to protect other likely shadow fleet vessels.
• The Russian military command reportedly continues to create new military units and formations but will likely struggle to staff them to their full doctrinal end strength.
• The United Kingdom provided Ukraine with air defense systems amidst Russia’s escalating long-range drone and missile strikes against Ukrainian civilian and critical infrastructure.
• Russian forces recently advanced in Sumy Oblast.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.  

• Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
• Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis
• Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
• Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
• Significant Activity in Belarus

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Ukrainian forces likely continued their long-range strike campaign against Russian military and industrial infrastructure overnight on January 7 to 8. Geolocated footage published on January 7 shows a large fire at the Salyut plant in Moscow City.[xxxiv] Russian opposition outlet Astra reported that Russian state-owned defense conglomerate Rostec operates the Salyut plant, which manufactures and services engines for military and civilian airframes.[xxxv] A Chechen opposition outlet reported on January 7 that Ukrainian forces conducted a drone strike against the Vladimir Putin Spetsnaz University in Gudermes, Republic of Chechnya.[xxxvi] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on January 7 that Russian air defenses downed a Ukrainian drone over an unspecified area in the Republic of Chechnya.[xxxvii]

The all-Russian pro-Ukrainian Freedom of Russia Legion (LSR) reported on January 8 that elements of the LSR conducted a sabotage mission in early January 2026 that destroyed 15 KamAZ, Ural, and ZIL trucks belonging to the Russian 350th Motorized Rifle Regiment (69th Motorized Rifle Division, 6th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) in Kochegury, Belgorod Oblast (roughly 65 kilometers from the frontline).[xxxviii] The LSR reported that Kochegury is a Russian logistics hub and that the sabotage mission degraded the 350th Motorized Rifle Regiment’s ability to quickly transport ammunition and servicemembers.

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in northern Ukraine along the international border)

Russian forces recently advanced in Sumy Oblast.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on January 8 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced southwest of Yablunivka (northeast of Sumy City).[xxxix]

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced southeast of Andriivka (north of Sumy City).[xl]

Russian forces attacked northwest of Sumy City near Ryzhivka; north of Sumy City near Oleksiivka and Kindrativka, and toward Andriivka; northeast of Sumy City near Yunakivka; and southeast of Sumy City near Vysoke and Hrabovske on January 7 and 8.[xli]

Ukraine’s Kursk Grouping of Forces reported on January 8 that Russian forces conducted a relatively large-scale combined assault between Andriivka and Oleksiivka on January 7.[xlii] The grouping of forces reported that five Russian assault groups unsuccessfully attempted to infiltrate Ukrainian lines through a gas pipeline and employed all-terrain vehicles (ATVs) to approach Ukrainian defensive positions. A Russian milblogger reportedly affiliated with the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces claimed on January 8 that Russian forces began methodically shelling Andriivka in December 2025 to prepare for a Russian attack against the settlement.[xliii] Russian milbloggers claimed that individual Ukrainian servicemembers remain in Andriivka – despite Russian claims of the seizure of the settlement as of January 7 and December 27.[xliv]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 810th Separate Naval Infantry Brigade (Black Sea Fleet [BSF]) are reportedly operating south of Oleksiivka.[xlv] Drone operators of the 56th Airborne (VDV) Regiment are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions in the Sumy direction.[xlvi]

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on January 8 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced in Lyman and Vovchanski Khutory (both northeast of Kharkiv City).[xlvii]

Russian forces continued offensive operations northeast of Kharkiv City near Zelene, Buhruvatka, Vilcha, Vovchansk, Vovchanski Khutory, Lyman, Starytsya, Tykhe, and toward Ternova and Hrafske on January 7 and 8.[xlviii]

Russian forces continued offensive operations northeast of Velykyi Burluk near Milove and toward Khatnie and southeast of Velykyi Burluk near Ambarne on January 7 and 8 but did not advance.[xlix]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on January 8 and infiltrated east of Kupyansk but did not make confirmed advances.

Assessed Russian infiltrations: Geolocated footage published on January 8 shows Russian servicemembers waving flags in eastern Podoly (east of Kupyansk) in what ISW assesses was a Russian infiltration mission that did not change the control of terrain or the forward edge of battle area (FEBA).[l]

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced southeast of Pishchane.[li]

Russian forces attacked near Kupyansk itself; north of Kupyansk near Dvorichanske and Kindrashivka and toward Kutkivka; northeast of Kupyansk near Fyholivka; northwest of Kupyansk near Tyshchenkivka; south of Kupyansk near Kupyansk-Vuzlovyi; and southeast of Kupyansk near Stepova Novoselivka and Pishchane on January 7 and 8.[lii]

An officer of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Kupyansk direction reported on January 8 that Ukrainian forces continue to eliminate Russian forces hiding in Kupyansk.[liii] The spokesperson reported Russian forces continue to use small group infiltration tactics, wearing camouflage suits to infiltrate during bad weather. The spokesperson reported that Russian forces attempt to disguise themselves in civilian clothes in acts that likely qualify as perfidy under international law.

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 352nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (11th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) reportedly continue to operate in the Kupyansk direction.[liv]

Ukrainian forces either maintained positions or recently advanced in the Borova direction.

Refinement of area under Russian claims: Geolocated footage published on January 7 shows Ukrainian forces operating south of Zahryzove (northeast of Borova), an area in which Russian sources previously claimed that Russian forces maintained positions.[lv]

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger acknowledged that Ukrainian forces advanced near Nova Kruhlyakivka (northeast of Borova).[lvi]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Borova near Borivska Andriivka and Bohuslavka and toward Nova Kruhlyakivka and southeast of Borova near Novoyehorivka and Novovodyane on January 7 and 8.[lvii]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 1st Tank Regiment (2nd Motorized Rifle Division, 1st Guards Tank Army [GTA], Moscow Military District [MMD]) are striking Ukrainian positions south of Zahryzove.[lviii]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Slovyansk-Lyman direction but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced north and south of Lyman itself, northeast and southwest of Korovii Yar, and to the northeastern outskirts of Svyatohirsk (both northwest of Lyman).[lix]

Russian forces attacked near Lyman itself; northwest of Lyman near Derylove and Shandryholove and toward Drobysheve; north of Lyman near Stavky; northeast of Lyman near Kolodyazi and Myrne; and east of Lyman near Zarichne on January 7 and 8.[lx]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Siversk direction on January 8 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked near Siversk itself, northwest of Siversk near Zakitne, Dibrova, and Ozerne and southwest of Siversk near Pazeno and Vasyukivka and toward Riznykivka and Bondarne on January 7 and 8.[lxi]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area on January 8 and infiltrated on the eastern outskirts of Kostyantynivka but did not make confirmed advances.

Assessed Russian infiltration: Geolocated footage published on January 7 shows Russian forces operating on the eastern outskirts of Kostyantynivka during what ISW assesses was a Russian infiltration mission that did not change control of terrain or the forward edge of the battle area (FEBA).[lxii]

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces seized Novomarkove (northeast of Kostyantynivka), which the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed Russian forces had seized as of March 12, 2025, indicating that Russian forces either lost positions in the area since March 12 or did not seize these positions in March 2025.[lxiii] A Russian milblogger claimed Russian forces seized Sofiivka (southwest of Druzhkivka), which Russian sources claimed Russian forces had seized as recently as December 28, indicating that Russian forces likely lost positions in the area since December 28.[lxiv] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Sofiivka as of December 23.[lxv]

Refinement of areas under Russian claims: Geolocated footage published on January 6 shows Ukrainian forces operating south of Kostyantynivka, in an area which Russian sources previously claimed Russian forces controlled.[lxvi]

Russian forces attacked near and within Kostyantynivka itself; northeast of Kostyantynivka near Chasiv Yar and Minkivka; southeast of Kostyantynivka near Kleban-Byk, Oleksandro-Shultyne, and Pleshchiivka; south of Kostyantynivka near Ivanopillya and Yablunivka and toward Illinivka; south of Druzhkivka near Rusyn Yar; and southwest of Druzhkivka near Sofiivka on January 7 and 8.[lxvii]

The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area reported on January 8 that Russian drone ranges significantly increased in 2025, which has made it difficult for Ukrainian forces to travel into Kostyantynivka, and that Russian drone ranges will likely continue to increase.[lxviii] The spokesperson noted that Russian forces are attempting to interdict Ukrainian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) with drones but that poor weather conditions are hindering Russian drone operations. The spokesperson noted that high winds during blizzards are cutting fiber optic cables attached to Russian drones.

Order of Battle: First-person view (FPV) drone operators of the Russian 136th Motorized Rifle Brigade (58th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) are striking Ukrainian forces in northern Oleksiyevo-Druzhkivka (east of Druzhkivka).[lxix] Drone operators and artillery elements of the Chechen 78th Sever-Akhmat Motorized Rifle Regiment (42nd Motorized Rifle Division, 58th CAA) and 1194th Motorized Rifle Regiment (4th Motorized Rifle Brigade, 3rd CAA, formerly 2nd Luhansk People's Republic Army Corps [LNR AC], SMD) are striking Ukrainian forces south of Kostyantynivka.[lxx] Drone operators of the 238th Artillery Brigade and 68th Separate Reconnaissance Battalion (both of the 20th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA, SMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Novoselivka (northwest of Kostyantynivka) and Novopavlivka (southwest of Druzhkivka), respectively.[lxxi] FPV drone operators of the 58th Separate Spetsnaz Battalion (unofficially designated the Okhotnik [Hunter] Spetsnaz Detachment) (51st CAA, formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic [DNR] AC, SMD) are reportedly operating in the Kostyantynivka direction.[lxxii]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Dobropillya tactical area on January 8 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked east of Dobropillya near Shakhove, Nove Shakhove, and Dorozhnie and southeast of Dobropillya near Zapovidne and Ivanivka on January 7 and 8.[lxxiii]

Order of Battle: FPV drone operators of the Russian 33rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (20th Motorized Rifle Division) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Toretske (east of Dobropillya).[lxxiv] Elements of the 61st Separate Naval Infantry Brigade (Northern Fleet) reportedly continue to operate near Shakhove.[lxxv]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction on January 8 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced west of Rodynske (north of Pokrovsk).[lxxvi]

Russian forces attacked near and within Pokrovsk itself; northwest of Pokrovsk near Hryshyne; north of Pokrovsk near Rodynske; northeast of Pokrovsk near Chervonyi (Krasnyi) Lyman and Fedorivka; east of Pokrovsk near and within Myrnohrad; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Kotlyne, Udachne, and Molodetske on January 7 and 8.[lxxvii]

Ukrainian 7th Rapid Reaction Corps of the Air Assault Forces Spokesperson Serhiy Okishev reported on January 8 that Russian forces are advancing toward Hryshyne and Rodynske and conducting mechanized assaults in an attempt to cut off Ukrainian GLOCs to Pokrovsk.[lxxviii] Okishev reported that Ukrainian forces continue to control northern Myrnohrad and that Russian forces are attempting to gain a foothold on the eastern outskirts of Myrnohrad. Okishev added that Russian forces have not conducted motorized and mechanized assaults near Myrnohrad since early January 2026. Okishev noted that the military command of the Russian 76th Airborne (VDV) Division employs poorly trained servicemembers for supply missions, demining, and rear support functions, while relatively well-trained servicemembers engage in urban combat. The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in Myrnohrad reported that there are roughly 12 military units from the Russian 51st CAA operating in and near the town.[lxxix] The spokesperson reported that Russian forces have decreased the intensity of overt assaults since the start of 2026 while increasing attempts to covertly infiltrate residential areas of the town in small groups of two to four. The spokesperson added that Russian fiber optic drones with a range of 10 to 20 kilometers hamper Ukrainian logistics and expand the kill zone. The spokesperson noted that cold weather conditions make drone batteries lose power more quickly, complicating Russian forces’ fiber optic drone operations.

The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Pokrovsk direction reported on January 8 that Russian forces continue to use infiltration tactics and quad bikes in the brigade’s area of responsibility (AoR).[lxxx] The officer added that Russian forces are concentrating on the seizure of Bilytske (north of Pokrovsk) and advancing toward Dobropillya while continuing mechanized assaults to meet an unspecified deadline for the seizure of Bilytske.

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 9th Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA) are reportedly operating west of Rodynske.[lxxxi] Elements of the 27th Motorized Rifle Division (2nd CAA, Central Military District [CMD]) are reportedly operating north of Pokrovsk and toward Hryshyne.[lxxxii]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Novopavlivka direction on January 8 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced east of Novopavlivka itself.[lxxxiii]

Russian forces attacked near Novopavlivka itself and south of Novopavlivka near Dachne and Filiya on January 7 and 8.[lxxxiv]

A Ukrainian drone battalion operating in the Novopavlivka direction reported on January 8 that Ukrainian forces repelled a roughly platoon-sized Russian mechanized assault in the Novopavlivka direction, destroying one tank and damaging five other tanks and two infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs).[lxxxv]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Oleksandrivka direction on January 8 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced north of Vidradne (south of Oleksandrivka).[lxxxvi]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Oleksandrivka near Zelenyi Hai and southeast of Oleksandrivka near Oleksandrohrad, Sichneve, Stepove, Verbove, Krasnohirske, and Vyshneve on January 7 and 8.[lxxxvii]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Hulyaipole direction on January 8 and infiltrated in central Bratske but did not make confirmed advances.

Assessed Russian infiltrations: Geolocated footage published on January 8 shows two Russian servicemembers from the 36th Motorized Rifle Brigade (29th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Eastern Military District [EMD]) raising a flag in central Bratske (northwest of Hulyaipole) in what ISW assesses was a Russian infiltration mission that did not change control of terrain or the forward edge of battle area (FEBA) at this time.[lxxxviii] ISW cannot independently verify the likely route of Russian forces to central Bratske.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian sources, including the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD), claimed on January 8 that Russian forces seized Bratske.[lxxxix] Russian milbloggers also claimed that Russian forces advanced east of Bratske, northeast of Zaliznychne (west of Hulyaipole), and northwest of Dorozhnyanka (south of Hulyaipole).[xc]

Russian forces attacked near and within Hulyaipole; north of Hulyaipole near Zelene, Dobropillya, Yehorivka, and Varvarivka; northeast of Hulyaipole near Solodke, Zlahoda, and Rybne; south of Hulyaipole near Dorozhnyanka; and west of Hulyaipole toward Zaliznychne on January 7 and 8.[xci] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked west of Hulyaipole.[xcii]

Order of Battle: Assault elements of the Russian 57th Motorized Rifle Brigade (5th CAA, EMD) are reportedly operating in southwestern Hulyaipole.[xciii] KVN first-person view (FPV) fiber optic drone operators of the 305th Artillery Brigade (5th CAA) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions in the Zaporizhia direction.[xciv]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on January 8 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced northeast of Stepnohirsk (west of Orikhiv) and northeast of Prymorske (northwest of Orikhiv).[xcv]

Russian forces attacked southeast of Orikhiv near Bilohirya; west of Orikhiv near Stepnohirsk and Pavlivka; northwest of Orikhiv near Prymorske and Lukyanivske, and toward Richne, Novoyakovlivka, Novoboikivske, and Mahdalynivka on January 7 and 8.[xcvi] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Prymorske.[xcvii]

Order of Battle: FPV drone operators of the Russian 19th Motorized Rifle Division (58th CAA, Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Orikhiv.[xcviii] Elements of the 108th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (7th VDV Division) reportedly continue to operate near Prymorske.[xcix] Elements of the 247th VDV Regiment (7th VDV Division) reportedly continue to operate near Stepnohirsk.[c] Elements of the 328th VDV Regiment (104th VDV Division) and 11th Separate VDV Brigade reportedly continue to operate near Lukyanivske.[ci]

Russian forces continued limited ground assaults in the Kherson direction on January 8 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked east of Kherson City near the Antonivskyi Bridge and west of Kherson City on Karantynnyi Island on January 7 and 8.[cii]

Kherson Oblast Military Administration Head Oleksandr Prokudin reported on January 8 that a Russian drone strike against a civilian car killed one civilian and injured another near Tarasa Shevchenka (northeast of Kherson City).[ciii] Prokudin also reported on January 8 that Russian forces struck central Kherson City, killing at least four civilians and wounding seven.[civ] A Russian milblogger claimed on January 8 that there was an explosion in the Kherson City building of Ukraine‘s Security Service (SBU) and accused Ukrainian forces of planning a false flag terror attack in Kherson City in the near future, likely in an effort to set information conditions for a possible Russian strike against the city.[cv]

Order of Battle: Unmanned ground vehicle (UGV) operators of the Russian 98th VDV Division are operating in the Kakhovka (northeast of Kherson City) direction.[cvi]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

See topline text for preliminary reports about a possible Russian Oreshnik strike on the night of January 8.

Russian forces conducted a series of drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of January 7 to 8. The Ukrainian Air Force stated that Russian forces launched 97 Shahed-type, Gerbera-type, and other drones — of which roughly 70 were Shahed-type drones – from the directions of Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; occupied Cape Chauda and Hvardiiske, Crimea; and occupied Donetsk Oblast.[cvii] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 70 drones, that 27 drones struck 13 locations, and that drone debris fell at one location. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces struck civilian and energy infrastructure in Zaporizhia and Dnipropetrovsk oblasts.[cviii] The Ukrainian Ministry of Energy reported that Russian strikes left Dnipropetrovsk and Zaporizhia oblasts almost completely without electricity, and Zaporizhia Oblast Head Ivan Fedorov later reported that Zaporizhia Oblast was experiencing its first total region-wide blackout in recent years.[cix] Ukrainian steel company Zaporizhstal reported that it suspended all production due to power outages.[cx] Kryvyi Rih Military Administration Head Oleksandr Vilkul reported that two Russian Iskander-M ballistic missiles struck apartment buildings during a combined missile and drone strike against the city on the afternoon of January 8.[cxi] Vilkul reported that the strikes injured 17 civilians and damaged 29 multi-story buildings. Odesa Oblast Military Administration Head Oleh Kiper reported on January 8 that Russian drones struck port infrastructure in Odeskyi Raion and damaged an oil storage tank.[cxii]

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

Nothing significant to report.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.