{{currentView.title}}
1 day ago
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, January 6, 2026
Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.
Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.
Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.
For more information on ISW's map methodology, please view our statement here.
Note: The data cut-off for this product was 11:30 AM ET on January 6. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the January 7 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.
Ukrainian forces continued their long range strike campaign against Russian military and energy infrastructure overnight on January 5 to 6. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on January 6 that Ukrainian forces struck the 100th Arsenal of the Russian Main Missile and Artillery Directorate (GRAU) near Neya, Kostroma Oblast.[1] Sources within Ukraine’s Security Service (SBU) told Ukrainian media outlets that the strike caused secondary explosions of ammunition.[2] The sources added that the arsenal supplied ammunition depots in the Russian Central and Moscow military districts. Geolocated footage published on January 6 shows a smoke plume near the arsenal.[3] Kostroma Oblast Governor Sergei Sitnikov claimed on January 6 that falling drone fragments started a fire at an unspecified military base in Neysky Raion, and announced the opening of an evacuation point for residents of southern Neya.[4] The Ukrainian General Staff reported on January 6 that Ukrainian forces also struck the Gerkon Plus oil depot near Streletskie Khutora, Usmansky Okrug, Lipetsk Oblast, starting a fire.[5] Sources within the SBU told Ukrainian media outlets that the depot supplies oil to Tambov, Voronezh, and Lipetsk oblasts.[6] Geolocated footage published on January 6 shows a fire at the depot.[7] Lipetsk Oblast Governor Igor Artamonov claimed on January 6 that falling drone fragments started a fire at an unspecified industrial facility in Usmansky Okrug.[8]
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky met with leaders of states in the Coalition of the Willing in Paris on January 6 to discuss possible security guarantees for post-war Ukraine. The Coalition of the Willing issued a statement reiterating that ensuring Ukraine's sovereignty and lasting security will be an "integral" part of a future peace agreement.[9] The coalition stated that it is ready to commit to politically and legally binding guarantees that will activate upon the start of a ceasefire. The guarantees will include a US-led ceasefire monitoring and verification mechanism; the long-term military assistance and armament of Ukraine; a multinational force to support deterrence measures in the air, at sea, and on land; binding commitments to support Ukraine in the event of renewed Russian aggression, including the use of military capabilities, intelligence and logistics support, diplomatic initiatives, and the implementation of additional sanctions on Russia; and deepening long-term defense cooperation with Ukraine, including joint training and defense industrial production. Kremlin officials have repeatedly labelled such Western security guarantees for Ukraine, particularly the deployment of foreign troops, as "unacceptable" to Russia.[10]
A German military document reportedly describes how Russia is using covert attacks against German infrastructure to prepare for a potential Russia-North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) war in the future, in line with ISW's ongoing assessments. Western outlets reported in late December 2025 and early January 2026 that a German military document states that Russia is intensifying its covert attacks on key German infrastructure, likely as possible preparation for a wider conflict.[11] The document reportedly also frames Russian cyber operations and influence campaigns as preparation for a military confrontation. The document further notes that Germany expects Russia to target German energy and defense infrastructure early, given Germany's role as a NATO hub for moving and sustaining forces and forecasts that Russia will see Germany as a priority target for long range missile strikes, armed drones, and special forces after an open armed attack on NATO's eastern flank. The document presents an assessment that Russia will develop these capabilities and "strategic options" by 2029 at the latest, even if Russia's war against Ukraine continues unchanged. ISW continues to assess that Russia would likely be able to pose a significant threat to NATO earlier than many Western estimates, particularly in the event of a future ceasefire in Ukraine that would free up Russian forces and allow Russia to rearm and reconstitute.[12] Russian covert attacks against German infrastructure are likely a line of effort within Russia’s "Phase Zero" campaign—the informational and psychological condition-setting phase—to prepare for a possible NATO-Russia war in the future.[13]
Key Takeaways:
- Ukrainian forces continued their long range strike campaign against Russian military and energy infrastructure overnight on January 5 to 6.
- Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky met with leaders of states in the Coalition of the Willing in Paris on January 6 to discuss possible security guarantees for post-war Ukraine.
- A German military document reportedly describes how Russia is using covert attacks against German infrastructure to prepare for a potential Russia-NATO war in the future, in line with ISW's ongoing assessments.
- Russian forces recently advanced in the Siversk and Hulyaipole directions.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.
- Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
- Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis
- Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
- Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
- Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
- Significant Activity in Belarus
Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
Ukrainian forces reportedly struck Russian manpower concentrations and drone control points in Russia overnight on January 5 to 6. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on January 6 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian manpower concentration near Staroselye, Belgorod Oblast (southeast of Sumy City and immediately on the international border with Sumy Oblast) and drone control points near Grayvoron, Belgorod Oblast (six kilometers from the frontline) and Valetovka, Kursk Oblast (three kilometers from the frontline).[14]
Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in northern Ukraine along the international border)
Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Sumy Oblast on January 6 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced near Andriivka and marginally southwest of Varachyne (both north of Sumy City).[15]
Russian forces conducted limited attacks north of Sumy City near Andriivka and Varachyne and toward Novokostyantynivka, northeast of Sumy City near Yunakivka, and southeast of Sumy City toward Ryasne on January 5 and 6.[16]
Ukrainian Kursk Group of Forces Spokesperson Oleksandr Nevidomy refuted Russian claims that Russian forces control Varachyne and Andriivka as of January 5.[17] A Russian milblogger reportedly affiliated with the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces claimed that Russian and Ukrainian forces each control about half of Andriivka.[18] The milblogger implied that elements of the Russian 83rd Airborne (VDV) Brigade recently conducted a disorganized withdrawal from positions near Yablunivka (northeast of Sumy City).[19]
A Russian milblogger published footage on January 6 of a Russian first person view (FPV) drone strike against a Ukrainian bridge over the Znobivka River in an unspecified area of Sumy Oblast.[20] The footage shows the Russian FPV drone striking an explosive already planted along the bridge, detonating the explosive and destroying the bridge.
Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 98th VDV Division, 30th Motorized Rifle Regiment (72nd Motorized Rifle Division, 44th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]), and Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces in Sumy Oblast.[21]
Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)
Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on January 6 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claim: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced in Vovchanski Khutory and Starytsya and between Lyman and Vilcha (all northeast of Kharkiv City).[22] The milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces still hold positions on the southern outskirts of Starytsya.
Russian forces attacked northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk, Vovchanski Khutory, Lyman, Starytsya, and Prylipka on January 5 and 6.[23] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Starytsya.[24]
Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian Chechen Zapad-Akhmat Battalion (reportedly of the Southern Military District [SMD]), the Russian 128th Motorized Rifle Brigade (44th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]), and the Chechen Kurchaloyevsky Raion Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) department reportedly continue to strike Ukrainian forces near Vovchanski Khutory.[25]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Velykyi Burluk direction on January 6 but did not advance.
Russian forces attacked northeast of Velykyi Burluk near Milove and toward Khatnie and southeast of Velykyi Burluk near Ambarne and Obukhivka on January 5 and 6.[26]
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on January 6 but did not make confirmed advances.
Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed on January 6 that Russian forces seized Pishchane and advanced in eastern Kurylivka (both southeast of Kupyansk) and in northern Kindrashivka (north of Kupyansk).[27]
Russian forces attacked west of and toward Kupyansk itself; north of Kupyansk near Dvorichanske and Petro-Ivanivka and toward Kindrashivka and Kutkivka; northeast of Kupyansk near Odradne; east of Kupyansk toward Petropavlivka; and southeast of Kupyansk toward Kurylivka on January 5 and 6.[28]
A servicemember of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Kupyansk direction noted on January 6 that Ukrainian forces are more easily able to detect Russian small groups trying to infiltrate Ukrainian positions, given the lack of foliage.
Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian Kontora Detachment of the 375th Separate Anti-Tank Artillery Battalion of the 47th Tank Division (1st Guards Tank Army [GTA], Moscow Military District [MMD]) are striking Ukrainian unmanned ground vehicles (UGVs) in eastern Kurylivka.[29] Artillery elements of the 82nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (69th Motorized Rifle Division, 6th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) and elements of the 352nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (11th Army Corps [AC], LMD) are reportedly operating in the Kupyansk direction.[30]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Borova direction on January 6 but did not advance.

Refinement of areas under Russian claims: Russian milbloggers acknowledged on January 5 and 6 that Russian forces did not seize Novoplatonivka, contrary to previous Russian claims of seizing the settlement.[31]
Russian forces attacked northeast of Borova near Novoplatonivka and east of Borova near Nadiya on January 5 and 6.[32]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Slovyansk-Lyman direction on January 6 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced east and southeast of Sosnove (northwest of Lyman).[33]
Russian forces attacked near Lyman itself; northwest of Lyman near Drobysheve and toward Sosnove; north of Lyman near Stavky; northeast of Lyman near Myrne; and east of Lyman near Zarichne on January 5 and 6.[34]
A Russian milblogger claimed on January 6 that Russian forces are infiltrating Ukrainian lines through forests south and southeast of Lyman to avoid Ukrainian drone observation.[35]
Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies reportedly continue to strike Ukrainian forces in the Lyman direction.[36]
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)

Russian forces recently marginally advanced in the Siversk direction.
Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on January 6 indicates that Russian forces recently marginally advanced south of Yampil (northwest of Siversk).[37]
Russian forces attacked northwest of Siversk near Dibrova, Ozerne, and Zakitne; south of Siversk near Svyato-Pokrovske; and southwest of Siversk near Vasyukivka and Pazeno and toward Riznykivka on January 5 and 6.[38]
Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces still hold Dibrova despite geolocated footage published on January 4 showing Ukrainian forces in the village.[39]
Order of Battle: Artillery elements of the Russian 2nd Artillery Brigade (3rd Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 2nd Luhansk People's Republic Army Corps [LNR AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Riznykivka.[40]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area on January 6 but did not make confirmed advances.


Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced south of Kostyantynivka itself, east of Berestok (south of Kostyantynivka), and north of Sofiivka (southwest of Druzhkivka).[41]
Refinement of area under Russian claims: Geolocated footage published on January 6 shows Russian forces striking a Ukrainian position along Uchbova Street in southern Kostyantynivka, an area in which Russian sources previously claimed that Russian forces maintained positions.[42]
Russian forces attacked near and within Kostyantynivka itself; northeast of Kostyantynivka near Chasiv Yar; west of Kostyantynivka toward Mykolaipillya; southeast of Kostyantynivka near Kleban-Byk, Oleksandro-Shultyne, and Pleshchiivka; south of Kostyantynivka near Shcherbynivka and Ivanopillya and toward Berestok; southwest of Kostyantynivka toward Stepanivka; south of Druzhkivka near Rusyn Yar; and southwest of Druzhkivka toward Sofiivka on January 5 and 6.[43]
The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Kostyantynivka direction reported on January 6 that Russian forces are operating in small infantry groups to infiltrate and bypass Ukrainian positions and are using heavy bomber drones for logistics.[44] The spokesperson reported that Russian infantry are exploiting unfavorable weather conditions that degrade Ukrainian drone operations and are attempting to avoid detection at night by using anti-thermal imaging cloaks to camouflage heat signatures.
Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies are striking Ukrainian positions in northwestern Kostyantynivka and south of the town.[45] Drone operators of the 58th Separate Spetsnaz Battalion (unofficially designated the Okhotnik [Hunter] Spetsnaz Detachment) (51st CAA, formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic [DNR] AC, SMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions in the Kostyantynivka direction.[46] FPV drone operators of the 242nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (20th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA, SMD) reportedly struck Ukrainian drone antennas near Raiske (southwest of Druzhkivka).[47]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Dobropillya tactical area on January 6 but did not make confirmed advances.
Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced north of Shakhove (east of Dobropillya).[48]
Russian forces attacked northeast of Dobropillya toward Kucheriv Yar; east of Dobropillya near Shakhove and Nove Shakhove and toward Novyi Donbas; and southeast of Dobropillya near Zapovidne and Ivanivka on January 5 and 6.[49]
A Russian milblogger implied that Russian sources are not accurately portraying the situation near Novyi Donbas.[50]
Order of Battle: FPV drone operators of the Russian 33rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (20th Motorized Rifle Division) are reportedly striking Ukrainian personnel near Toretske (east of Dobropillya).[51] Elements of the 61st Separate Naval Infantry Brigade (Northern Fleet) reportedly continue to operate near Shakhove.[52] Drone operators and artillery crews of the 150th Motorized Rifle Division (8th CAA) are reportedly operating in the Dobropillya direction.[53]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction on January 6 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked near and within Pokrovsk; northwest of Pokrovsk near Hryshyne; north of Pokrovsk near Rodynske and toward Bilytske; northeast of Pokrovsk near Sukhetske, Zatyshok, and Chervonyi (Krasnyi) Lyman; east of Pokrovsk near and within Myrnohrad; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Kotlyne, Udachne, and Molodetske on January 5 and 6.[54] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Hryshyne.[55]
Ukrainian 7th Rapid Reaction Corps of the Air Assault Forces Spokesperson Serhiy Okishev reported on January 6 that the Russian Aerospace Forces (VKS) conducted 21 airstrikes in the Pokrovsk-Myrnohrad direction alone on January 5, as Russian forces have decreased the intensity of ground assaults.[56] Okishev noted that Russian forces have shifted tactics near Myrnohrad from mechanized assaults to infiltrations using motorcycles and buggies in recent weeks. A Ukrainian servicemember operating in the Pokrovsk direction reported that Russian forces continue to suffer heavy casualties while using infiltration tactics.[57]
The Ukrainian General Staff reported on January 6 that Ukrainian forces struck Russian drone control points near Pokrovsk on the night of January 5 to 6.[58] Geolocated footage published on January 6 shows Ukrainian forces conducting a High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS) multiple launch rocket system (MLRS) strike against at least 10 Russian servicemembers and light vehicles on the M-30 Pokrovsk-Selydove highway northeast of Novoukrainka (south of Pokrovsk), likely on January 3.[59]
Order of Battle: FPV drone operators of the Kaira Drone Detachment of the 39th Motorized Rifle Brigade (68th AC, Eastern Military District [EMD]) are striking Ukrainian vehicles in Bilytske.[60]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Novopavlivka direction on January 6 but did not make confirmed advances.
Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced east of Novopavlivka and north and northwest of Filiya (south of Novopavlivka).[61]
Russian forces attacked near and within Novopavlivka and south of Novopavlivka near Dachne and Filiya on January 5 and 6.[62]
A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger noted on January 6 that Russian forces’ previous mechanized assaults against Novopavlivka failed to seize dominating heights northwest of the settlement, leaving Russian forces with control of the southeastern half of the settlement and forcing Russian forces to shift attacks to the fields between Ivanivka (southwest of Novopavlivka) and Novopavlivka.[63]
Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 90th Tank Division (41st CAA, Central Military District [CMD]) reportedly continue to operate south of Novopavlivka.[64]
Russian forces attacked northeast of Oleksandrivka near Ivanivka; east of Oleksandrivka near Oleksandrohrad; and southeast of Oleksandrivka near Verbove, Oleksiivka, Vyshneve, Sichneve, and Sosnivka on January 5 and 6 but did not advance.[65]
Ukrainian forces continued their mid range strike campaign against Russian military targets in occupied Donetsk Oblast on the night of January 5 to 6. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that a Ukrainian drone strike destroyed a Russian 9S32 radar of an S-300V air defense system near occupied Novoyanysol, Donetsk Oblast (about 80 kilometers from the frontline).[66]
Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)
Russian forces recently advanced in the Hulyaipole direction.

Assessed Russian advances: The Ukrainian General Staff posted a map on January 5 acknowledging a Russian presence south of Hulyaipole.[67]
Russian forces attacked near Hulyaipole itself; north of Hulyaipole near Dobropillya, Varvarivka, Zelene, and Pryluky; and northeast of Hulyaipole near Zlahoda, Uspenivka, and Solodke on January 5 and 6.[68] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Hulyaipole and Andriivka (north of Hulyaipole).[69]
Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 60th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (5th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces in Zaliznychne (west of Hulyaipole).[70]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on January 6 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked west of Orikhiv near Plavni and Prymorske and northwest of Orikhiv toward Veselyanka and Hryhorivka on January 5 and 6.[71]
Ukrainian Southern Defense Forces Spokesperson Colonel Vladyslav Voloshyn reported that Russian forces are trying to move through the former Kakhovka Reservoir, which largely dried up following the Russian detonation of the Nova Kakhovka Dam in early June 2023, to enter the rear of Ukrainian positions near Stepnohirsk (west of Orikhiv) and seize the settlement.[72] Voloshyn noted that the potential Russian seizure of the area would allow Russian forces to take fire control over Ukrainian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) between Zaporizhzhia City and Hulyaipole and Orikhiv. Voloshyn stated that Russian forces are using small assault groups and infiltration tactics, but that Ukrainian forces are counterattacking. Voloshyn reported that Russian forces are accumulating assault groups near Mali Shcherbaky, Shcherbaky (both west of Orikhiv), Novoandriivka (southwest of Orikhiv), Novodanylivka (south of Orikhiv), and Mala Tokmachka (southeast of Orikhiv) to attack Orikhiv. A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian authorities have significantly improved the supply of FPV drones to Russian forces in the Zaporizhia direction.[73]
Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian Chechen Vostok-Akhmat Battalion are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces on the outskirts of Orikhiv.[74] Drone operators of the 108th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (7th VDV Division), Valkiriya Special Detachment (4th Military Base, 58th CAA, Southern Military District [SMD]), and Viking Drone Detachment are reportedly operating in the Zaporizhia direction.[75]
Russian forces continued limited ground assaults in the Kherson direction on January 6 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked in unspecified areas in the Kherson direction on January 5 and 6.[76]
Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian Smuglyanka Detachment are reportedly coordinating Russian glide bomb strikes against Ukrainian forces in Tavriiske (northeast of Kherson City).[77] Fiber optic drone operators of the Kasper Group of the Russian 18th CAA (SMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian vehicles in Kherson City.[78] Unmanned ground vehicle (UGV) operators of the 98th VDV Division are reportedly operating in the Kherson direction.[79]
Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)
Russian forces conducted a series of drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of January 5 to 6. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 61 Shahed-type, Gerbera-type, and other drones – of which about 40 were Shahed-type drones – from the directions of Kursk and Oryol cities; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; and occupied Donetsk Oblast.[80] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 53 drones and that eight drones struck six locations.
Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)
Nothing significant to report.
Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

[1] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/33473
[2] https://suspilne dot media/1206832-sbu-atakuvala-arsenal-u-kostromskij-oblasti-ta-naftobazu-v-lipecku-u-rf/; https://t.me/army_tv/14560; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/01/06/guchno-ta-z-vognykom-atakovani-raketno-artylerijskyj-arsenal-ta-naftobaza-na-terytoriyi-krayiny-agresora/; https://www.ukrinform dot ua/amp/rubric-ato/4077253-sbu-vrazila-raketnij-arsenal-u-kostromskij-oblasti-ta-naftobazu-v-lipeckij-dzerelo.html
[3] https://x.com/blinzka/status/2008480669819654528?s=20; https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/32907
[4] https://t.me/sk_sitnikov/13705
[5] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/33474
[6] https://suspilne dot media/1206832-sbu-atakuvala-arsenal-u-kostromskij-oblasti-ta-naftobazu-v-lipecku-u-rf/; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/01/06/guchno-ta-z-vognykom-atakovani-raketno-artylerijskyj-arsenal-ta-naftobaza-na-terytoriyi-krayiny-agresora/; https://t.me/army_tv/14560
[7] https://x.com/99Dominik_/status/2008570357654188184; https://x.com/blinzka/status/2008490683032891631; https://x.com/GeoConfirmed/status/2008579443795849266
[8] https://t.me/igor_artamonov48/5868
[9] https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2026/01/06/robust-security-guarantees-for-a-solid-and-lasting-peace-in-ukraine-statement-of-the-coalition-of-the-willing-issued-by-france/
[10] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-18-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-17-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-16-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-11-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-10-2025/
[11] https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-01-05/germany-sees-russian-covert-attacks-as-prelude-to-wider-conflict?srnd=homepage-europe; https://www.welt dot de/politik/deutschland/article695779eb04e7d12184982970/operationsplan-der-regierung-deutschland-im-konfliktfall-priorisiertes-ziel-fuer-weitreichende-waffen-russlands.html; https://www.politico dot eu/article/germany-new-military-plan-foreign-sabotage-hybrid-attacks-as-preparation-for-war/
[12] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-13-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-11-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-24-2025/;
[13] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-20-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-29-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-22-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-12-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-10-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-9-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-5-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-27-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-24-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-2-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-5-2026/
[14] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/33474
[15] https://t.me/rybar/76527
[16] https://t.me/rybar/76527; https://t.me/severnnyi/6255; https://t.me/wargonzo/31552
[17] https://suspilne dot media/sumy/1206322-varacine-ta-andriivka-na-sumsini-pid-kontrolem-zsu-uv-kursk/
[18] https://t.me/severnnyi/6255
[19] https://t.me/severnnyi/6256
[20] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/193357
[21] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/38202; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/193346; https://t.me/wargonzo/31561 ; https://t.me/armycorp44/465
[22] https://t.me/rybar/76552
[23] https://t.me/rybar/76547; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/33472 ; https://t.me/Joint_Forces_Task_Force/19880; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/33444 ; https://t.me/Joint_Forces_Task_Force/19878; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/33442; https://t.me/dva_majors/86232 ; https://t.me/severnnyi/6255; https://t.me/wargonzo/31552
[25] https://t.me/RKadyrov_95/6287
[26] https://t.me/rybar/76547; https://t.me/rybar/76552; https://t.me/dva_majors/86232 ; https://t.me/severnnyi/6255
[27] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/193328
[28] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/33444; https://t.me/Joint_Forces_Task_Force/19878; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/33442; https://t.me/motopatriot78/47141; https://t.me/wargonzo/31552; https://t.me/rybar/76547; https://t.me/rybar/76552; https://t.me/dva_majors/86232; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/193328; https://t.me/wargonzo/31552; https://t.me/rybar/76552
[29] https://x.com/ZoamSc2/status/2008375305421918410?s=20; t.me/brussinf/10312
[30] https://t.me/milinfolive/163885; https://t.me/dva_majors/86238; https://t.me/motopatriot78/47146 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/47157
[31] https://t.me/motopatriot78/47144; https://t.me/rybar/76533
[32] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/33444; https://t.me/Joint_Forces_Task_Force/19878; https://t.me/rybar/76533
[33] https://t.me/rybar/76555
[34] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/33472; https://t.me/Joint_Forces_Task_Force/19880; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/33444; https://t.me/Joint_Forces_Task_Force/19878; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/33442; https://t.me/wargonzo/31552;
[35] https://t.me/rybar/76555
[36] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/193346
[37] https://x.com/99Dominik_/status/2008479604785271217?s=20; https://x.com/PuenteUribarri/status/2008471986100379815?s=20 ; https://t.me/umftteam/802
[38] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/33472 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/33444 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/33442 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/31552 ; https://t.me/rybar/76555
[39] https://t.me/dva_majors/86232 ; https://t.me/rybar/76555; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-5-2026/
[40] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/193327; https://t.me/shock3OA/4373
[41] https://t.me/motopatriot78/47155 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/31552 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/193328 ;
[42] https://x.com/GeoConfirmed/status/2008502226453409921?s=20 ; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/2008423247017374208?s=20 ; https://t.me/icpbtrubicon/916
[43] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/33472 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/33444 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/33442
[44] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/01/06/stvorena-velychezna-sira-zona-na-kostyantynivskomu-napryamku-voroga-znyshhuyut-zavchasno/
[45] https://x.com/GeoConfirmed/status/2008502226453409921?s=20; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/2008423247017374208?s=20; https://t.me/icpbtrubicon/916
[46] https://t.me/nm_dnr/14863
[47] https://t.me/nm_dnr/14860
[48] https://t.me/motopatriot78/47155
[49] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/33472 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/33444 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/33442 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/47155 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/31552 ;
[50] https://t.me/motopatriot78/47156
[51] https://t.me/NeoficialniyBeZsonoV/49059
[52] https://t.me/motopatriot78/47146 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/47157
[53] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/106981
[54] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/33472; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/33444; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/33442; https://t.me/wargonzo/31552; https://t.me/motopatriot78/47151
[55] https://t.me/motopatriot78/47151
[56] https://suspilne dot media/donbas/1206608-tisk-na-flangah-majze-vdvici-bilse-aviaudariv-oficer-7-korpusu-pro-zminu-taktiki-rf-pid-pokrovskom-ta-mirnogradom/
[57] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/01/06/namagayutsya-perty-inkoly-neraczionalno-na-pokrovskomu-napryamku-v-rosiyan-velychezni-vtraty/
[58] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/33474
[59] https://x.com/99Dominik_/status/2008453148256440653?s=20; https://x.com/bayraktar_1love/status/2008435957343682661?s=20; https://x.com/bayraktar_1love/status/2007458104569384965?s=20; https://t.me/ButusovPlus/25869; https://x.com/markito0171/status/2008457865313366307; https://x.com/GloOouD/status/2008463060181402088; https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/32909; https://t.me/kyriienko_press/856; https://t.me/ButusovPlus/25941; https://militarnyi dot com/uk/news/himars-vysokotochnym-udarom-znyshhyv-grupu-rosiyan-i-tehniku-pid-pokrovskom/
[60] https://t.me/otrad_kaira/168; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/10950; https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/2008274844891443225?s=20; https://t.me/Osintpen/2322
[61] https://t.me/motopatriot78/47153; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/38214; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/193328; https://t.me/rybar/76529
[62] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/33472; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/33444; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/33442; https://t.me/wargonzo/31552; https://t.me/motopatriot78/47153
[63] https://t.me/rybar/76529
[64] https://t.me/motopatriot78/47153
[65] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/33472; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/33444; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/33442
[66] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/33474
[67] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/33413
[68] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/33472; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/33444 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/33442
[69] https://t.me/voin_dv/18271; https://t.me/dva_majors/86232
[70] https://t.me/voin_dv/18275
[71] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/33444; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/33442; https://t.me/dva_majors/86232; https://t.me/wargonzo/31552
[72] https://suspilne dot media/zaporizhzhia/1206286-pocnutsa-zapekli-boi-za-pidstupi-do-orihova-sili-oboroni-pivdna-pro-orihivskij-napramok/
[73] https://t.me/dva_majors/86232
[74] https://t.me/RKadyrov_95/6286
[75] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/38197; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/193350; https://t.me/wargonzo/31549
[76] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/33444; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/33442
[77] https://t.me/dva_majors/86228
[78] https://t.me/osvedomitell_alex/31930
[79] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/38202
[80] https://t.me/kpszsu/51716