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Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, January 5, 2026
Assessment as of: 6:10 pm ET
Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.
Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.
Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.
For more information on ISW's map methodology, please view our statement here.
Note: The data cut-off for this product was 11:30 am ET on January 5. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the January 6 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.
Russia is modifying its Shahed long-range strike drones to target Ukrainian aircraft as part of a wider effort to innovate and maximize long-range drone capabilities. Ukrainian electronic and radio warfare expert Serhiy “Flash” Beskrestnov published images and footage on January 4 showing a downed Shahed drone equipped with a man-portable air defense system (MANPADS), likely a Verba MANPADS, operating as a remotely launched short range air defense system. Beskrestnov reported that Russian forces fielded the modified drones for the first time overnight on January 3 to 4.[1] The footage indicates that Russia mounted the Verba MANPADS on the top of the drone and mounted an antenna for remote control on the wing stabilizer. Beskrestnov stated that Russian forces also modified the Shahed with a camera and a radio modem, allowing the drone operator to control the drone as it flies. The MANPADS are positioned to fire in front of the drone as it flies, indicating that Russian forces likely intend to use this adaptation to target Ukrainian fighter jets and helicopters operating as part of Ukraine's air defense umbrella. Verba MANPADS have an operational range of roughly six kilometers and a maximum altitude of trajectory of about 4.5 kilometers when fired from the ground.[2] Russian forces have continuously innovated modifications to Shahed drones throughout the war to maximize capabilities and damage potential. Previous modifications have allowed Russian forces to target mobile components of the Ukrainian air defense umbrella, including Ukrainian mobile target groups on the ground and aircraft in the air.[3] Russian forces previously equipped Shahed drones with other air-to-air weapons as part of the effort to degrade Ukrainian air defenses.[4]
Ukrainian and Russian forces have been engaged in an offense-defense race since 2022 to develop new technology, as Russian forces have escalated their long-range strike campaign and Ukrainian forces have responded by innovating new air defense measures to combat the strikes.[5] Ukrainian drones have developed interceptor drones capable of downing Russian drones.[6] The MANPADS on the Shahed drones are front-facing, leaving the drones vulnerable to Ukrainian interceptor drones that approach Russian drones from behind. Russia’s continued efforts to degrade Ukrainian air defenses through constant innovation and adaptation underscore the need for a flexible, well-rounded, and well-provisioned Ukrainian air defense umbrella, including an arsenal of interceptor drones.
Russian forces struck a hospital in Kyiv City and an American-owned enterprise in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast during missile and long-range drone strikes overnight on January 4 to 5. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched nine Iskander-M ballistic missiles/S-300 air defense missiles from Bryansk and Voronezh oblasts and 165 Shahed, Gerbera, and other types of long-range strike drones from Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Kursk and Oryol cities, and Shatalovo, Smolensk Oblast.[7] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 137 drones and that 26 Russian drones struck 10 locations. Geolocated footage published on January 5 shows the Medikom Medical Center burning in Kyiv City following a Russian drone strike.[8] Ukrainian officials reported that the Russian strike against the medical center in Kyiv City killed at least one patient and injured at least three others, and that there were about 70 patients at the facility at the time of the strike.[9] Additional geolocated footage published on January 5 shows a drone strike and explosion at an American-owned vegetable oil enterprise in Dnipro City, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast.[10] Dnipropetrovsk Oblast officials corroborated reports of a strike against the enterprise and reported that the strike spilled 300 metric tons of vegetable oil.[11] Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces also struck energy infrastructure in Kharkiv and Kyiv oblasts.[12]
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky announced further personnel changes within the Ukrainian government and security services on January 5. Zelensky signed a decree on January 5 appointing Major General Yevheniy Khmara, head of the Alpha Special Operations Center of Ukraine’s Security Service (SBU), as acting head of the SBU.[13] SBU Head Lieutenant General Vasyl Malyuk announced his resignation on January 5 but stated that he will remain in the SBU to direct asymmetric operations.[14] Zelensky stated on January 5 that he and Malyuk discussed potential candidates to head the SBU permanently.[15]
European authorities are investigating deliberate damage to undersea cables in the Baltic Sea for the second time since December 31. Lithuanian National Crisis Management Center Head Vilmantas Vitkauskas stated on January 5 that Lithuanian and Latvian authorities are investigating deliberate damage to an undersea optics cable in the Baltic Sea that occurred on the evening of January 2.[16] Vitkauskas stated that authorities are currently investigating an unspecified ship and its crew, currently docked in the port of Liepaja, but did not name the ship or its affiliation or attribute the damage to a specific actor. Finnish and Estonian authorities reported damage to an undersea communications cable between Estonia and Finland due to deliberate cutting on December 31 and detained the crew of the Fitburg, a ship carrying sanctioned Russian steel products from St. Petersburg, under suspicion of cutting the cables, but have not yet attributed a specific actor to the incident.[17] The December 31 and January 2 undersea cable incidents come against the backdrop of Russia’s intensifying “Phase Zero” campaign to destabilize Europe, undermine NATO’s cohesion, and set the political, informational, and psychological conditions for a potential future Russian war against NATO.[18]
Key Takeaways:
- Russia is modifying its Shahed long-range strike drones to target Ukrainian aircraft as part of a wider effort to innovate and maximize long-range drone capabilities.
- Russian forces struck a hospital in Kyiv City and an American-owned enterprise in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast during missile and long-range drone strikes overnight on January 4 to 5.
- Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky announced further personnel changes within the Ukrainian government and security services on January 5.
- European authorities are investigating deliberate damage to undersea cables in the Baltic Sea for the second time since December 31.
- Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Kupyansk direction. Russian forces recently advanced in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area.
We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.
- Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
- Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis
- Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
- Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
- Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
- Significant Activity in Belarus
Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
Ukrainian forces likely continued their long-range strike campaign against Russian defense industrial base (DIB) infrastructure overnight on January 4 to 5. Geolocated footage published on January 4 shows smoke rising from the Energiya chemical plant in Yelets, Lipetsk Oblast, likely due to a Ukrainian drone strike.[19] Ukrainian defense outlet Militarnyi reported that the Energiya plant produces sealed lead-acid, nickel-cadmium, and lithium-ion batteries, uninterruptible power sources, and electrochemical energy sources, which the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and other Russian DIB customers use.[20] Lipetsk Oblast Governor Igor Artamonov claimed on January 5 that a downed Ukrainian drone caused a fire in an industrial zone of Yelets.[21]
Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in northern Ukraine along the international border)
Russian forces continued offensive operations in Sumy Oblast on January 5 but did not make confirmed advances.
Unconfirmed claims: The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that the Russian 34th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (49th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) seized Hrabovske (southeast of Sumy City).[22] Russian milbloggers and Ukrainian sources acknowledged that Russian forces seized Hrabovske as of December 21.[23] Russian milbloggers also claimed that Russian forces seized eastern Komarivka (northwest of Sumy City) and advanced north of the settlement and west of Hrabovske.[24]
Russian forces attacked in Kursk and Sumy oblasts, including northwest of Sumy City toward Komarivka and southeast of Sumy City near Hrabovske and Vysoke, on January 4 and 5.[25]
Ukrainian State Border Guard Service Spokesperson Colonel Andriy Demchenko reported on January 5 that Russian forces advanced into Hrabovske but have not been able to consolidate these gains to advance further in the settlement.[26] Demchenko stated that Russian forces are attempting to probe the border area in other areas of Sumy Oblast but are suffering casualties. A Russian milblogger reportedly affiliated with the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces claimed that Russian forces will likely deploy additional naval infantry elements to the Sumy direction, including elements of the Russian 145th Naval Infantry Regiment (810th Separate Naval Infantry Brigade, Black Sea Fleet).[27]
Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 30th Motorized Rifle Regiment (72nd Motorized Rifle Division, 44th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) and 810th Separate Naval Infantry Brigade are reportedly operating in Oleksiivka (north of Sumy City).[28] Elements of the 1443rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (reportedly under the operational control of the Northern Grouping of Forces and formed during the 2022 partial reserve call-up) are reportedly operating near Varachyne (north of Sumy City) and Yablunivka (northeast of Sumy City).[29] Elements of the 217th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (98th VDV Division) and the 104th VDV Regiment (76th VDV Division) are reportedly operating in the Sumy direction.[30]
Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)
Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on January 5 but did not advance.
Russian forces attacked northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk, Starytsia, Prylipka, Lyman, and toward Izbytske on January 4 and 5.[31]
Order of Battle: Drone operators and other elements of the Russian Black Raven drone detachment (reportedly of the 3rd Motorized Rifle Division, 20th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Moscow Military District [MMD]) and of the 245th Motorized Rifle Regiment (47th Tank Division, 1st Guards Tank Army [GTA], MMD) are reportedly operating in Kharkiv Oblast.[32]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Velykyi Burluk direction on January 5 but did not advance.
Russian forces attacked northeast of Velykyi Burluk near Milove and toward Khatnie and southeast of Velykyi Burluk near Dvorichanske and toward Kolodyazne on January 4 and 5.[33]
Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 344th Motorized Rifle Regiment (69th Motorized Rifle Division, 6th CAA, Leningrad Military District [LMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Khatnie (northeast of Velykyi Burluk).[34]
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)
Ukrainian forces recently marginally advanced in the Kupyansk direction.
Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on January 5 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently marginally advanced in central Kupyansk.[35]
Russian forces attacked toward Kupyansk itself; north of Kupyansk near Kutkivka; northeast of Kupyansk near Fyholivka; east of Kupyansk near Petropavlivka and Pershotravneve; and southeast of Kupyansk near Kurylivka, Stepova Novoselivka, and Hlushkivka on January 4 and 5.[36]
A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger refuted the Russian Ministry of Defense's (MoD) January 4 claim that Russian forces seized Podoly (southeast of Kupyansk).[37]
Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 27th Motorized Rifle Brigade (1st Guards Tank Army [GTA], Moscow Military District [MMD]) are striking Ukrainian positions south of Kindrashivka.[38]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Borova direction on January 5 but did not advance.
Russian forces attacked east of Borova near Nadiya and southeast of Borova near Olhivka and Hrekivka on January 4 and 5.[39]
A Ukrainian brigade operating in the Borova direction reported on January 5 that Ukrainian forces repelled a Russian attempt to use the Soyuz gas pipeline to infiltrate and accumulate forces north of Novoplatonivka and toward Nova Kruhlyakivka and Zahryzove (all northeast of Borova).[40] The Ukrainian brigade reported that 50 Russian servicemembers used the pipeline for the planned infiltration mission.
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Lyman direction on January 5 but did not make confirmed advances.
Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced northeast of Lyman.[41]
Russian forces attacked near Lyman itself; northwest of Lyman near Drobysheve, Yarova, and Novoselivka and toward Sosnove; north of Lyman near Stavky; and east of Lyman near Zarichne and Torske on January 4 and 5.[42] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Stavky.[43]
The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Lyman direction reported on January 5 that Russian forces continue to use small group infiltration tactics to advance with poorly-trained servicemembers.[44] The spokesperson further reported that Russian forces are deploying well-trained drone operators to interdict Ukrainian logistics with sleeper drones.
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Siversk direction on January 5 but did not make confirmed advances.
Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced northwest of Dibrova (northwest of Siversk).[45]
Refinement of area under Russian claims: Geolocated footage published on January 4 shows Ukrainian forces operating in northern Dibrova, an area where Russian forces previously claimed that Russian forces maintained positions.[46]
Russian forces attacked near Siversk itself; northwest of Siversk near Platonivka, Zakitne, and Dronivka; south of Siversk near Svyato-Pokrovske; and southwest of Siversk near Vasyukivka and toward Riznykivka and Bondarne on January 4 and 5.[47]
A Ukrainian brigade operating in the Siversk direction reported on January 5 that Russian forces continue attempts to infiltrate into Dronivka and to use the T-0513 Siversk-Zakitne highway to bypass Ukrainian positions.[48] The brigade added that Russian forces have intensified attempts to cross the Siverskyi Donets River on motorized rubber boats from Yampil (northwest of Siversk) and seize Dronivka, Platonivka, and Zakitne. The brigade noted that Russian forces are attempting to deploy artillery and drone operators near the northeastern outskirts of Dronivka and within the Serebryanske forest (northwest to northeast of Siversk).
Russian forces recently advanced in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area.
Assessed Russian advance: Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported that Russian forces advanced north of Yablunivka (southwest of Kostyantynivka) along the H-20 Pokrovsk-Kostyantynivka highway.[49]
Assessed Russian infiltration: Mashovets reported that Russian forces infiltrated further within southeastern Kostyantynivka.[50]
Unconfirmed claims: Mashovets reported that Russian forces do not currently maintain positions in Ivanopillya (south of Kostyantynivka), which ISW assessed that Russian forces seized as of November 21.[51] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced north of Sofiivka (southwest of Druzhkivka).[52]
Russian forces attacked near and within Kostyantynivka itself; east of Kostyantynivka near Predtechyne; southeast of Kostyantynivka near Oleksandro-Shultyne, Stupochky, and Pleshchiivka; south of Kostyantynivka near Shcherbynivka and Ivanopillya; southwest of Kostyantynivka near Yablunivka and toward Stepanivka; south of Druzhkivka near Rusyn Yar and toward Berestok; and southwest of Druzhkivka near Sofiivka and toward Pavlivka on January 4 and 5.[53]
Mashovets reported on January 5 that Russian forces are focusing their efforts on southeastern and eastern Kostyantynivka.[54] Mashovets reported that Russian forces are conducting infiltration missions in the southeastern outskirts of Kostyantynivka and are attempting to increase their presence in the area. Mashovets reported that Russian forces are primarily attempting to amass infantry in forward assault groups south and southwest of Kostyantynivka.[55] Mashovets reported that Russian forces are attempting to reach the Stepanivka-Berestok line. Mashovets noted that the Russian command is amassing forces near Kostyantynivka and that there are elements of three combined arms armies (CAAs) – the 3rd CAA (formerly 2nd Luhansk People's Republic Army Corps [LNR AC], Southern Military District [SMD]), 8th CAA (SMD), and 51st CAA (formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic [DNR] AC, SMD) – and the 3rd AC (under the operational control of the Southern Grouping of Forces) operating in the Kostyantynivka direction.[56]
A Ukrainian brigade operating in the Kostyantynivka direction reported on January 5 that Russian forces are attempting to exploit poor weather conditions to advance in Chasiv Yar (northeast of Kostyantynivka) and are intensifying assault operations.[57]
Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 72nd Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd AC), the 1008th, 1307th, and 1442nd motorized rifle regiments, the 89th Tank Regiment (all 6th Motorized Rifle Division, 3rd AC), and the 77th Motorized Rifle Regiment (7th Military Base, 49th CAA, SMD) are operating southeast of Kostyantynivka.[58] Elements of the Chechen 78th Sever-Akhmat Motorized Rifle Regiment (42nd Motorized Rifle Division, 58th CAA, SMD) are operating near Kostyantynivka.[59] Elements of the 103rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (150th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA) and the 4th Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd CAA) are operating near Pleshchiivka and Ivanopillya.[60] Drone operators of the Khugin Drone Company of the 4th Motorized Rifle Brigade are also striking Ukrainian vehicles in central Kostyantynivka.[61] Elements of the 54th Motorized Rifle Regiment (6th Motorized Rifle Division), the 77th Motorized Rifle Regiment, the 1219th Motorized Rifle Regiment (20th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA), and the 1436th Motorized Rifle Regiment (132nd Motorized Rifle Brigade, 51st CAA) are operating toward Stepanivka.[62] Lancet loitering munition operators of the 238th Artillery Brigade (8th CAA) are reportedly striking Ukrainian artillery near Raiske (southwest of Druzhkivka).[63] Artillery elements of the 150th Motorized Rifle Division are striking Ukrainian positions north of the Kleban-Byk Reservoir (south of Kostyantynivka).[64]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Dobropillya tactical area on January 5 but did not make confirmed advances.
Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces entered Novyi Donbas (east of Dobropillya).[65]
Russian forces attacked northeast of Dobropillya near Zolotyi Kolodyaz; east of Dobropillya near Shakhove and Zapovidne; and southeast of Dobropillya near Ivanivka on January 4 and 5.[66]
Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 61st Separate Naval Infantry Brigade (Northern Fleet) reportedly continue to operate near Shakhove.[67]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction on January 5 but did not make confirmed advances.
Unconfirmed claims: Russian sources claimed that Russian forces advanced into Bilytske (north of Pokrovsk) and to the north of Kotlyne, Udachne, and Molodetske (all southwest of Pokrovsk).[68]
Russian forces attacked near and within Pokrovsk itself; northwest of Pokrovsk near Hryshyne; north of Pokrovsk near Rodynske; northeast of Pokrovsk near Chervonyi (Krasnyi) Lyman, Sukhetske, and Zatyshok; east of Pokrovsk near and within Myrnohrad; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Kotlyne, Molodetske, and Udachne on January 4 and 5.[69]
The Ukrainian 7th Rapid Reaction Corps of the Air Assault Corps reported on January 5 that Russian forces are attempting to advance north of Pokrovsk in small fireteams of six to eight servicemembers.[70] The corps added that Russian forces are attempting to bypass the Pokrovsk-Myrnohrad agglomeration through Hryshyne and Rodynske and have been using light vehicles and infantry in assaults near Hryshyne since January 3. The corps reported that Ukrainian forces continue to control northern Myrnohrad. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on January 4 that Russian forces in Pokrovsk are wearing civilian clothes in deception tactics that amount to acts of perfidy — a war crime under the Geneva Convention.[71]
Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 5th Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA) are reportedly operating near Myrnohrad.[72] First-person view (FPV) drone operators of the 80th Sparta Separate Reconnaissance Battalion (51st CAA) are reportedly striking Ukrainian artillery systems near Myrne (northwest of Pokrovsk).[73]
Russian forces attacked near Novopavlivka itself and south of Novopavlivka near Filiya and Dachne on January 4 and 5.[74]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Oleksandrivka direction on January 5 but did not advance.
Russian forces attacked near Oleksandrivka itself; northeast of Oleksandrivka near Zelenyi Hai; and southeast of Oleksandrivka near Vyshneve, Oleksandrohrad, Sosnivka, Vorone, and Oleksiivka on January 4 and 5.[75] A Ukrainian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked toward Vidradne (south of Oleksandrivka).[76]
Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Hulyaipole direction on January 5 but did not advance.
Russian forces attacked near and within Hulyaipole; northwest of Hulyaipole near Pryluky and toward Svyatopetrivka; north of Hulyaipole near Yehorivka, Zelene, Varvarivka, and Dobropillya; northeast of Hulyaipole near Zlahoda, Solodke, and Uspenivka; and south of Hulyaipole near Dorozhnyanka on January 4 and 5.[77] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Hulyaipole.[78]
Ukrainian Southern Defense Forces Spokesperson Colonel Vladyslav Voloshyn reported on January 5 that Ukrainian forces hold positions throughout Hulyaipole and are conducting operations within the town, which is a contested “gray zone.”[79] Voloshyn stated that Russian forces conducted a record number of ground assaults in the Hulyaipole direction on January 4, mostly within Hulyaipole itself and north of Hulyaipole near Varvarivka. Voloshyn added that Russian artillery units operating in this direction received 1,600 shells in the past two to three days (presumably since January 2) for fire support missions.
Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 143rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (127th Motorized Rifle Division, 5th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly intercepting Ukrainian drones over Varvarivka.[80] Drone operators of the Russian 60th Motorized Rifle Brigade (5th CAA) are reportedly striking Ukrainian vehicles near Hulyaipole.[81] Drone operators of the 14th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff's Main Directorate [GRU]) reportedly continue to strike Ukrainian vehicles near Verkhnya Tersa (northwest of Hulyaipole).[82]
Ukrainian forces recently maintained positions or advanced in western Zaporizhia Oblast.
Refinement of area under Russian claims: Geolocated footage published on January 4 shows Russian forces striking a Ukrainian position south of Lukyanivske (northwest of Orikhiv), an area in which Russian sources previously claimed that Russian forces maintained positions.[83]
Russian forces attacked southeast of Orikhiv near Mala Tokmachka; west of Orikhiv near Stepove, Novoyakovlivka, Plavni, Prymorske, Kamyanske, and Shcherbaky; and northwest of Orikhiv toward Veselyanka and Hryhorivka on January 4 and 5.[84]
Ukrainian Southern Defense Forces Spokesperson Colonel Vladyslav Voloshyn reported on January 5 that Russian forces are attempting to reach Pavlivka (northwest of Orikhiv) and push Ukrainian forces out of Stepnohirsk (west of Orikhiv) due to the settlement’s proximity to Zaporizhzhia City.[85] Voloshyn reported that Russian forces deployed additional assault groups to the Orikhiv direction and are conducting small group infiltration operations, which could threaten Orikhiv from the east. ISW has previously assessed that Russian forces are trying to advance in western Zaporizhia Oblast to approach within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City.[86]
Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 328th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (104th VDV Division) are striking Ukrainian positions south of Lukyanivske.[87] Elements of the 7th VDV Division reportedly continue to operate near Prymorske and Stepnohirsk and elements of the 42nd Motorized Rifle Division reportedly continue to operate toward Orikhiv.[88]
Russian forces continued limited ground attacks in the Kherson direction on January 5 but did not advance.
Russian forces attacked east of Kherson City toward the Antonivskyi Bridge on January 5.[89]
Ukrainian Kherson Oblast Military Administration Head Oleksandr Prokudin reported on January 5 that Russian forces used three drones to strike a humanitarian assistance site in Darivska Hromada, Kherson Oblast, killing one civilian and wounding two others.[90]
Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 331st VDV Regiment (98th VDV Division) reportedly continue to strike Ukrainian forces in the Kherson direction.[91]
Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)
See topline text.
Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)
Nothing significant to report.
Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.
[1] https://t.me/serhii_flash/6785; https://t.me/serhii_flash/6787; https://x.com/GrandpaRoy2/status/2008039444012835259; https://militarnyi dot com/uk/news/pzrk-na-zbytomu-shahedi-rosijska-verba/
[2] https://odin.tradoc.army.mil/Search/WEG/Verba
[3] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-2-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-23-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-1-2025/
[4] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-1-2025/
[5] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-30-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-22-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-18-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-14-2025/; https://t.me/kpszsu/41800; https://t.me/kpszsu/38013; https://t.me/kpszsu/46009 ; https://t.me/kpszsu/49152; https://t.me/kpszsu/43331; https://t.me/kpszsu/48627; https://t.me/kpszsu/41186; https://t.me/kpszsu/38277; https://t.me/kpszsu/42755; https://t.me/kpszsu/40795; https://t.me/kpszsu/41330; https://t.me/kpszsu/50944; https://t.me/kpszsu/37643; https://t.me/kpszsu/43959; https://t.me/kpszsu/37314; https://t.me/kpszsu/41578; https://t.me/kpszsu/47866; https://t.me/kpszsu/46825
[6] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-30-2025/
[7] https://t.me/kpszsu/51667
[8] https://t.me/obolonlife/46242; https://x.com/giK1893/status/2007992679381320129; https://english.nv [dot] ua/russian-war/russian-drone-hits-kyiv-hospital-killing-patient-officials-say-50573283.html#goog_rewarded; https://x.com/zarGEOINT/status/2008054612964880574; https://x.com/zarGEOINT/status/2008056858008064454
[9] https://suspilne dot media/kyiv/1205494-ataka-po-kievu-vlucili-u-medcentr-zaginulo-dvoe-ludej/; https://t.me/tkachenkotymur/2160; https://t.me/UA_National_Police/56627; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/01/05/vorog-vluchyv-u-medzaklad-v-obolonskomu-rajoni-kyyeva-ye-zagyblyj-ta-troye-postrazhdalyh/; https://t.me/akovalenko1989/10263
[10] https://t.me/insiderUKR/115004; https://t.me/dnepr_operativ/99867; https://x.com/99Dominik_/status/2008174602569334987; https://x.com/ukrliberation/status/2008182908310429729; https://t.me/timofiypt_kucher/33187; https://x.com/bayraktar_1love/status/2008130742723993883; https://x.com/99Dominik_/status/2008139871559512367; https://x.com/wartranslated/status/2008182927344243027?s=20
[11] https://suspilne dot media/dnipro/1205838-rf-vdarila-po-amerikanskomu-zavodu-u-dnipri-na-dorogi-viteklo-300-tonn-olii-so-kazut-ocevidci/; https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/26778; https://t.me/borys_filatovv/3004; https://meduza dot io/news/2026/01/05/rossiyskie-drony-udarili-po-amerikanskomu-maslozavodu-v-dnepre-na-dorogi-vylilos-300-tonn-masla
[12] https://suspilne dot media/1205476-u-harkovi-pid-zavalami-sukaut-ludej-vibuh-avto-v-kievi-rozsliduut-ak-terakt-1412-den-vijni/?anchor=live_1767612479&utm_source=copylink&utm_medium=ps; https://t.me/astrapress/101301; https://militarnyi dot com/uk/news/rf-b-ye-balistykoyu-po-harkovu-p-yat-udariv-po-energetychnyh-ob-yektah/; https://suspilne dot media/kyiv/1205530-e-zagiblij-naslidki-rosijskogo-obstrilu-kiivsini/; https://t.me/kyivregionpolice/21216
[13] https://suspilne dot media/1205942-sbu-timcasovo-ocolit-general-major-evgenij-hmara/; https://president dot gov.ua/documents/192026-57933
[14] https://t.me/SBUkr/16493
[15] https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/17564
[16] https://www.lrt dot lt/naujienos/pasaulyje/6/2797027/nkvc-kabelis-baltijos-juroje-pazeistas-netoli-nuo-liepojos-uosto-trikdziu-tai-nesukels
[17] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-2-2026/
[18] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-20-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-29-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-22-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-12-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-10-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-9-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-5-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-27-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-24-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-2-2026/
[19] https://t.me/DniproOfficial/7041; https://x.com/99Dominik_/status/2007891449501929488; https://t.me/astrapress/101266
[20] https://militarnyi dot com/uk/news/drony-atakuvaly-tsehy-zavodu-energyya-najbilshogo-u-rf-vyrobnyka-dzherel-zhyvlennya-dlya-ozbroyennya/
[21] https://t.me/igor_artamonov48/5862
[22] https://t.me/mod_russia/60096; https://t.me/mod_russia/60097; https://t.me/mod_russia/60099;
[23] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-21-2025/
[24] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/38180; https://t.me/rybar/76525; https://t.me/motopatriot78/47112
[25] https://t.me/dva_majors/86194; https://t.me/rybar/76511; https://t.me/severnnyi/6244; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/38180; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/106923; https://t.me/wargonzo/31534
[26] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/01/05/zajshly-v-grabovske-ale-dali-ne-zmogly-vorog-zaznaye-velykyh-vtrat-na-sumshhyni/
[27] https://t.me/severnnyi/6245; https://t.me/iamsniper/17375
[28] https://t.me/severnnyi/6245
[29] https://t.me/severnnyi/6245
[30] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/38175
[31] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/33434; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/33408; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/33410; https://t.me/Joint_Forces_Task_Force/19875; https://t.me/Joint_Forces_Task_Force/19874; https://t.me/dva_majors/86194; https://t.me/rybar/76511; https://t.me/severnnyi/6244; https://t.me/wargonzo/31534
[32] https://t.me/notes_veterans/26491; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/38192
[33] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/33408; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/33410; https://t.me/Joint_Forces_Task_Force/19875; https://t.me/Joint_Forces_Task_Force/19874
[34] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/38192
[35] https://x.com/Bielitzling/status/2008211773476708768?s=20; https://www.instagram.com/8_th_regiment_uasof/reel/DTIhMjaDLS1/?hl=en
[36] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/33434 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/33408 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/33410; https://t.me/Joint_Forces_Task_Force/19875 ; https://t.me/Sladkov_plus/14934 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/31534
[37] https://t.me/rybar/76524
[38] https://x.com/Bielitzling/status/2007989416569286703?s=20 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/60082
[39] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/38170; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/38168; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/33434
[40] https://t.me/oaembr77/1004; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/01/05/soyuz-ne-dopomig-na-harkivshhyni-desantnyky-zirvaly-masovanyj-shturm-po-truboprovodu/; https://suspilne dot media/kharkiv/1205648-na-kupanskomu-napramku-rosiani-znov-namagalisa-vikoristati-gazoprovid-dla-prosuvanna-ci-vdalosa-zupiniti-sturm/
[41] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/193144
[42] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/33434; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/33408; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/33410; https://t.me/Joint_Forces_Task_Force/19875; https://t.me/Joint_Forces_Task_Force/19874; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/193144; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/38168
[43] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/38168
[44] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/01/05/nemaye-fiksovanoyi-liniyi-zitknennya-na-lymanskomu-napryamku-okupantam-ne-dayut-prosuvatysya/
[45] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/193144
[46] https://x.com/Bielitzling/status/2007888817005695329?s=20; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CVADw4iRbW0
[47] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/33434; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/33408; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/33410; https://t.me/wargonzo/31534; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/38188
[48] https://t.me/sloaembr_81/346; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/01/05/vorog-namagayetsya-infiltruvatys-81-sha-brygada-rozpovila-pro-sytuacziyu-poblyzu-dronivky/
[49] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/3170
[50] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/3170
[51] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/3171; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-25-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-21-2025/
[52] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/193136
[53] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/33434; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/33408; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/33410; https://t.me/dva_majors/86194; https://t.me/rybar/76511; https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/3170; https://t.me/wargonzo/31534; https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/3171;
[54] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/3170
[55] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/3171
[56] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/3172
[57] https://suspilne dot media/donbas/1205792-bitva-za-casiv-ar-trivae-vijsko-rf-aktivizue-sturmi-pid-prikrittam-negodi/; https://www.facebook.com/24th.brigade/posts/pfbid02E9sUAiez1soCfuzkMXcAYaJe8jF98FQKqswxChRLz3zt7Qbs3zjFrZXP71gRTXjQl?locale=uk_UA
[58] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/3170
[59] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/3172
[60] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/3171
[61] https://t.me/z4lpr/1423; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/2008065045851476048
[62] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/3171
[63] https://t.me/nm_dnr/14856
[64] https://t.me/mod_russia/60102 ; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/2008224296259199030
[65] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/69888
[66] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/33410; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/33408; https://t.me/wargonzo/31534
[67] https://t.me/motopatriot78/47113
[68] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/69888; https://t.me/tass_agency/355652; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/193136
[69] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/33434; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/33410; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/33408; https://t.me/tass_agency/355652; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/193136; https://t.me/wargonzo/31534
[70] https://www.facebook.com/reel/2702339573462688; https://suspilne dot media/donbas/1206120-rosijski-vijska-namagautsa-diati-grupami-po-6-8-bijciv-iz-vihodom-u-pivnicnomu-napramku-vid-pokrovska-7-korpus/
[71] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/33407
[72] https://t.me/motopatriot78/47113
[73] https://t.me/nm_dnr/14857
[74] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/106916; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/33434; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/33410; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/33408
[75] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/33434; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/33410; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/33408; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/38168
[76] https://t.me/voin_dv/18262
[77] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/33410; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/33408; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/33434
[78] https://t.me/voin_dv/18262; https://t.me/dva_majors/86194; https://t.me/wargonzo/31534
[79] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/01/05/syly-oborony-pivdnya-u-gulyajpoli-tochatsya-vulychni-boyi-misto-zaraz-velyka-sira-zona/
[80] https://t.me/voin_dv/18261
[81] https://t.me/voin_dv/18265
[82] https://t.me/voin_dv/18267
[83] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/10938 ; https://t.me/GORA_GROUP_BPLA/891 ; https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/2007909291781661012?s=20
[84] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/33408 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/33410 ; https://t.me/yurasumy/26367 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/31534 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/38185
[85] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/01/05/u-sylah-oborony-poyasnyly-chomu-vorog-posylyv-ataky-na-stepnogirsk/
[86] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-4-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-26-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-31-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-2-2026/
[87] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/10938 ; https://t.me/GORA_GROUP_BPLA/891 ; https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/2007909291781661012?s=20 ;
[88] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/38185
[89] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/33434













