{{currentView.title}}
4 hours ago
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, January 30, 2026
Assessment as of: 7:45pm ET
Data cutoff: 12:30 on January 30
Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.
Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.
Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.
For more information on ISW's map methodology, please view our statement here.
The Kremlin disagreed with the US position that territorial control of Donetsk Oblast remains the only unresolved issue at the US-Ukraine-Russia peace negotiations. US Secretary of State Marco Rubio stated on January 28 that the United States, Ukraine, and Russia have narrowed peace negotiations to only "one central issue," which concerns Donetsk Oblast.[1] Russian Presidential Aide Yuriy Ushakov, who is often the sole Kremlin official to comment on US-Russian talks in recent months, disagreed with Rubio's characterization of the peace process during a Russian state TV interview on January 29.[2] Ushakov also stated during an interview with another state TV channel that territorial issues are the “most important” but that “many other issues remain” on the agenda.[3] Ushakov's comments to Russian state TV channels suggest that the Kremlin is continuing to set domestic information conditions likely in an effort to justify Russia's refusal to make concessions for a negotiated peace settlement.
The Kremlin acknowledged and reportedly agreed to US President Donald Trump's request for a temporary moratorium on striking Ukrainian energy infrastructure. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov acknowledged on January 30 that Trump made a “personal request” to Russian President Vladimir Putin to refrain from striking Kyiv until February 1 and confirmed that the Kremlin agreed to Trump's request.[4] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky reported on January 30 that Russian forces did not conduct strikes against energy facilities in Ukraine on the night of January 29 to 30 but that Russian forces did strike energy infrastructure in several oblasts during the day on January 29.[5] Zelensky noted that Russian forces are now instead targeting Ukrainian logistics. Several Duma deputies insisted that the strikes moratorium is not a major Russian concession and indicated that Russian forces will not cease hostilities.[6] Prominent Russian milbloggers complained that the ceasefire does not support Russia and questioned Russian officials’ hesitation to comment on earlier ceasefire reports.[7] ISW continues to assess that the reported moratorium on energy strikes does not mark a significant Russian condescension as the Kremlin has been consistently rejecting a long-term ceasefire, including on January 29.[8]
Russian forces continue to execute Ukrainian prisoners-of-war (POW) on the battlefield in violation of international law. The servicemember of a Ukrainian border unit reported on January 25 that elements of the Russian Senezh Spetsnaz Center (formerly subordinated to the Russian General Staff's Main Directorate [GRU] and now directly subordinated to the Russian General Staff) executed multiple Ukrainian border guards who had surrendered to the Russian forces during a cross-border attack in Chernihiv Oblast in December 2025.[9] Russian forces have sharply increased extrajudicial executions of Ukrainian prisoners-of-war (POWs) on the frontline since late 2024 in violation of international law, particularly in areas of heavy combat.[10] ISW continues to assess that the Russian military command is endorsing and sometimes ordering war crimes on the battlefield and that Russia is torturing and abusing Ukrainian civilian prisoners as part of the wider military modus operandi.[11]
Key Takeaways:
- The Kremlin disagreed with the US position that territorial control of Donetsk Oblast remains the only unresolved issue at the US-Ukraine-Russia peace negotiations.
- The Kremlin acknowledged and reportedly agreed to US President Donald Trump's request for a temporary moratorium on striking Ukrainian energy infrastructure.
- Russian forces continue to execute Ukrainian prisoners-of-war (POW) on the battlefield in violation of international law.
- Russian forces recently advanced near Lyman, in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area, and in western Zaporizhia Oblast.
We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.
- Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
- Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis
- Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
- Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
- Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
- Significant Activity in Belarus
Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
Nothing significant to report.
Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in Sumy Oblast along the international border)
Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Sumy Oblast on January 29 and 30 but did not make confirmed advances.
Russian forces attacked in Sumy and Kursk oblasts, including northeast of Sumy City near Yunakivka and north of Sumy City near Oleksiivka and toward Mala Korchakivka on January 29 and 30.[12] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Yunakivka.[13]
Ukrainian Joint Forces Task Force Spokesperson Colonel Viktor Trehubov reported on January 30 that Russian forces have consolidated positions in Hrabovske and are attempting to advance farther toward Ryasne (both southeast of Sumy City).[14] A Russian milblogger reportedly affiliated with the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces noted on January 30 that Bila Bereza (northwest of Sumy City), a settlement whose seizure the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on January 29, only had a population of 14 in 2001, contrary to the Russian MoD’s claims of the settlement’s importance.[15]
Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian Anvar Spetsnaz Detachment (possibly referring to the BARS-25 Anvar volunteer detachment) are reportedly striking Ukrainian equipment and positions in Mala Rybytsia (northeast of Sumy City), Vyshenky (northwest of Sumy City), and Sukhodil (northwest of Sumy City).[16] Drone operators of the Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces in Sumy Oblast.[17]
Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border to create a defensible buffer zone with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)
Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on January 30 but did not make confirmed advances.
Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed on January 30 that Russian forces have seized about half of Hrafske and advanced near Symynivka (both northeast of Kharkiv City).[18]
Russian forces attacked northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk, Vovchanski Khutory, Tykhe, Starytsya, Prylipka, Dehtyarne, and Kruhle and toward Ternova, Nesterne, Symynivka, and Hrafske on January 29 and 30.[19]
Ukrainian Joint Forces Task Force Spokesperson Colonel Viktor Trehubov reported on January 30 that Russian forces have numerical superiority in manpower in the Vovchansk direction.[20] Trehubov noted that Russian forces are attempting to cross the frozen Vovcha River on the southern outskirts of Vovchansk and advance near Vilcha (northeast of Kharkiv City), Vovchansk, and Vovchanski Khutory. The Ukrainian 16th Army Corps (AC) reported on January 30 that the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces commander (likely referring to Russian Northern Grouping of Forces Commander Colonel General Yevgeny Nikiforov) appointed a commission to evaluate the lack of progress in the Vovchansk direction and that this commission may relieve some Russian commanders.[21] The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Kharkiv direction reported on January 30 that Russian forces have shifted tactics in the past two weeks from employing individual sabotage and reconnaissance groups to conducting probing actions.[22] The spokesperson stated that Russian forces have limited arms and supplies and that Ukrainian forces are striking exposed Russian servicemembers in open fields and Russian ground lines of communications (GLOCs) in the near rear. The spokesperson stated that Russian forces are using KAB guided glide bombs, helicopter-launched munitions, and a large number of drones to strike Ukrainian positions in the Kharkiv direction.[23]
Order of Battle: Self-propelled artillery and multiple launch rocket system (MLRS) elements of the Russian 288th Artillery Brigade (1st Guards Tank Army [GTA], Moscow Military District [MMD]) and drone operators of the 41st Motorized Rifle Regiment (72nd Motorized Rifle Division, 44th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) are reportedly operating in Kharkiv Oblast.[24]
Russian forces continued offensive operations northeast of Velykyi Burluk near Chuhunivka and toward Khatnie; east of Velykyi Burluk toward Hryhorivka; and southeast of Velykyi Burluk toward Kolodyazne on January 29 and 30 but did not advance.[25]
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Oskil River (Russian objective: Cross the Oskil River in Kharkiv Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on January 30.
Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on January 30 indicates that Russian forces have advanced east of Holubivka (north of Kupyansk), though this footage was likely not recent.[26]
Assessed Russian infiltration: Geolocated footage published on January 30 shows a single Russian servicemember in central Petropavlivka (east of Kupyansk) in what ISW assesses was an infiltration mission that did not change the forward edge of the battle area (FEBA).[27]
Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced west of Fyholivka (northeast of Kupyansk).[28]
Russian forces attacked near Kupyansk itself; north of Kupyansk near Kutkivka; northeast of Kupyansk near Fyholivka; east of Kupyansk toward Petropavlivka; and southeast of Kupyansk toward Kurylivka, Pishchane, and Novoosynove on January 29 and 30.[29]
Ukrainian Joint Forces Task Force Spokesperson Colonel Viktor Trehubov reported on January 30 that about 50 Russian servicemembers remain in Kupyansk itself, most of whom are in a small area north of central Kupyansk.[30] Trehubov reported that Russian forces can only conduct logistics to these personnel through drone-dropped supplies. Trehubov assessed that the Russian military command is likely misleading these personnel about the control of terrain (CoT) around these positions in order to prevent these personnel from surrendering to Ukrainian forces. Trehubov noted that Ukrainian forces are not rushing to clear these positions in order to conserve manpower and are instead clearing individual buildings.
Order of Battle: Multiple launch rocket system (MLRS) elements of the Russian 27th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (1st Guards Tank Army [GTA], Moscow Military District [MMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces in Kupyanskyi Raion.[31]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Borova direction on January 30 but did not advance.
Russian forces attacked northeast of Borova near Borivska Andriivka and southeast of Borova near Hrekivka, Stepove, and Druzhelyubivka on January 29 and 30.[32]
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)
Russian forces recently advanced in the Slovyansk direction.
Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on January 30 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced east of Lyman.[33]
Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced south of Stavky (northeast of Lyman), west of Ozerne (southeast of Lyman), south of Zakitne (northeast of Slovyansk), and northwest of Pazeno (southeast of Slovyansk).[34]
Russian forces attacked near and within Lyman itself; northwest of Lyman near Yarova and Svyatohirsk; north of Lyman near Drobysheve; northeast of Lyman near Zarichne and Stavky; southeast of Lyman near Yampil and Maslyakivka; northeast of Slovyansk near Zakitne and Dronivka; east of Slovyansk near Riznykivka; and southeast of Slovyansk near Bondarne and toward Rai-Oleksandrivka and Nykyforivka on January 29 and 30.[35] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Zakitne.[36]
The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Lyman direction reported on January 30 that Russian forces continue to employ KAB guided glide bombs and drones to strike Ukrainian positions as well as small group infiltration tactics.[37] The spokesperson noted that Russian KAB strikes are most damaging to Ukrainian forces but that Ukrainian forces employ electronic warfare (EW) to disrupt the bombs‘ guidance systems. The spokesperson reported that both Russian and Ukrainian forces are deploying sleeper drones to interdict logistics. A Ukrainian brigade operating in the Slovyansk direction reported on January 29 that Russian forces are deploying drone control points in the Serebryanske forest area and near Siversk to disrupt Ukrainian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) near Dronivka.[38] The brigade added that Russian forces are attempting to cross frozen portions of the Siverskyi Donets river at night. The brigade noted that Russian forces use drones to guide small infantry groups while using anti-thermal cloaks, windbreaks, and other terrain features to avoid drone observation.
Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 7th Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 2nd Luhansk People's Republic Army Corps [LNR AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) reportedly continue to operate near Siversk and Zakitne.[39] Elements of the Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies are reportedly operating in the Lyman direction.[40]
Russian forces recently advanced in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area.
Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on January 28 indicates that Russian forces advanced west of Stupochky (east of Kostyantynivka).[41]
Assessed Russian infiltrations: Geolocated footage shows Russian forces operating in southern Kostyantynivka in what ISW assesses was an infiltration mission that did not change the control of terrain or forward edge of battle (FEBA).[42]
Unconfirmed claims: The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces seized Berestok (south of Kostyantynivka).[43] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced southwest of Stepanivka (southwest of Kostyantynivka) and northwest of Rusyn Yar (south of Druzhkivka).[44]
Refinement of areas under Russian claims: Geolocated footage published on January 30 shows Russian forces operating in central Illinivka (south of Kostyantynivka), an area in which a Russian source previously claimed that Russian forces maintained positions.[45]
Russian forces attacked near and within Kostyantynivka itself; north of Kostyantynivka near Maiske; northeast of Kostyantynivka near Markove and toward Pryvillya; southeast of Kostyantynivka near Shcherbynivka; south of Kostyantynivka near Pleshchiivka, Berestok, and Illinivka; southwest of Kostyantynivka near Stepanivka; south of Druzhkivka near Rusyn Yar; and southwest of Druzhkivka near Sofiivka and toward Pavlivka and Novopavlivka on January 29 and 30.[46]
Order of Battle: First-person view (FPV) drone operators of the Russian 4th Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd CAA) are striking Ukrainian forces in southeastern Kostyantynivka.[47] Knyaz Vandal Novgorodsky (KVN) fiber optic FPV drone operators of the 27th Artillery Regiment (6th Motorized Rifle Division, 3rd AC, under operational control of the Southern Grouping of Forces) struck a bridge in northern Kostyantynivka.[48] Fiber-optic and FPV drone operators of the 1st Motorized Rifle Battalion of the Baltic Fleet (Consolidated Motorized Rifle Regiment of the Navy, under operational control of the Central Grouping of Forces) are striking Ukrainian forces north of Yablunivka (southwest of Kostyantynivka) and Illinivka.[49] Drone operators of the 54th Motorized Rifle Regiment (6th Motorized Rifle Division) are observing Russian artillery strikes against Ukrainian positions near Stepanivka.[50] FPV drone operators of the 57th Spetsnaz Company (8th CAA, SMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Novopavlivka and Pavlivka (southwest of Druzhkivka).[51]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Dobropillya tactical area on January 30 but did not advance.
Russian forces attacked northeast of Dobropillya toward Kucheriv Yar and east of Dobropillya near Toretske, Zapovidne, Vilne, Ivanivka, and Novyi Donbas on January 29 and 30.[52]
Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 150th Motorized Rifle Division (8th CAA) reportedly continue to operate near Toretske.[53]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction on January 30 but did not advance.
Russian forces attacked near and within Pokrovsk itself; northwest of Pokrovsk near Hryshyne; north of Pokrovsk near Rodynske and Bilytske; northeast of Pokrovsk near Krasnyi (Chervonyi) Lyman; east of Pokrovsk near Myrnohrad; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Kotlyne, Udachne, Novopidhorodne, and Molodetske on January 29 and 30.[54]
Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 112th Motorized Rifle Regiment (under the operational control of the 9th Motorized Rifle Brigade, 51st CAA, formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic [DNR] AC, SMD) reportedly continue to operate near Pokrovsk.[55] FPV drone operators of the 80th Sparta Separate Reconnaissance Battalion (51st CAA) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Shevchenko, Novooleksandrivka (both northwest of Pokrovsk), and Bilytske.[56]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Novopavlivka direction on January 30 but did not advance.
Russian forces attacked near and within Novopavlivka itself, northeast of Novopavlivka near Muravka and Novomykolaivka, and south of Novopavlivka near Filiya on January 29 and 30.[57]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Oleksandrivka direction on January 30 but did not advance.
Russian forces attacked northeast of Oleksandrivka near Ivanivka, Oleksandrohrad, and Andriivka-Klevtsove and toward Lisne and southeast of Oleksandrivka near Verbove and Oleksiivka on January 29 and 30.[58] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked from Bohodarivka (southwest of Oleksandrivka).[59]
A servicemember of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Oleksandrivka direction reported on January 30 that Russian servicemembers are relying on small group infiltration tactics to advance rather than massed infantry attacks and mechanized assaults.[60] The servicemember stated that Ukrainian forces are striking Russian drone launch points to counter Russian efforts to interdict Ukrainian ground lines of communications (GLOCs) with drones.
Order of Battle: FPV drone operators of the Russian Snegiri Reconnaissance Group (37th Motorized Rifle Brigade, 36th CAA, Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly operating in the southern Dnipropetrovsk Oblast (Oleksandrivka) direction.[61]
Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)
Russian forces continued infiltration missions northwest of Hulyaipole on January 30 but did not make confirmed advances in the Hulyaipole direction.
Assessed Russian infiltrations: Geolocated footage published on January 30 shows Russian forces raising flags in western Ternuvate (northwest of Hulyaipole).[62] ISW assesses that this event does not indicate a change in the control of terrain or forward edge of the battle area (FEBA) at this time, given that Ukrainian Southern Defense Forces Spokesperson Colonel Vladyslav Voloshyn reported on January 30 that Ukrainian forces maintain control over Ternuvate.[63] Voloshyn reported that a Russian sabotage and reconnaissance group recently entered Ternuvate under the cover of poor weather conditions to film the flag raising but that Ukrainian forces eliminated the Russian forces involved. Additional geolocated footage shows Russian forces operating along the T-0814 highway in western Hulyaipole in what ISW assesses was an additional infiltration operation that did not change the control of terrain or FEBA.[64]
Unconfirmed claims: The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that elements of the Russian 36th Motorized Rifle Brigade (29th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Eastern Military District [EMD]) seized Ternuvate.[65] Russian milbloggers also claimed that Russian forces advanced northeast, north, and south of Ternuvate, into Kosivtseve, and west of Pryluky (both northwest of Hulyaipole).[66]
A Ukrainian brigade operating in the Hulyaipole direction refuted on January 30 Russian claims that Russian forces control Zlahoda (northeast of Hulyaipole).[67] The Russian MoD claimed the seizure of Zlahoda as of October 24, 2025.[68]
Russian forces attacked near Hulyaipole itself; northwest of Hulyaipole near Pryluky and Olenokostyantynivka and toward Svyatopetrivka; north of Hulyaipole near Danylivka, Nove Zaporizhzhia, Zelene, Varvarivka, Dobropillya, and Radisne; northeast of Hulyaipole near Rybne; and west of Hulyaipole toward Zaliznychne and Staroukrainka on January 29 and 30.[69] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked from Staroukrainka, Vozdvyzhivka, and Rizdvyanka (both northwest of Hulyaipole) and near Zaliznychne and Ternuvate.[70]
A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed on January 30 that Ukrainian forces are conducting small group infiltration attempts into Hulyaipole itself – contrary to Russian claims of full control of the town.[71] The milblogger claimed that constant snowfall, poor visibility, and Ukrainian drone strikes are hindering Russian efforts to conduct logistics after their claimed advances in December 2025.
Order of Battle: Drone operators and assault elements of the Russian 1466th Motorized Rifle Regiment (127th Motorized Rifle Division, 5th CAA, EMD) are striking Ukrainian positions in and operating in northwestern Hulyaipole.[72]
Russian forces recently advanced in western Zaporizhia Oblast.
Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on January 30 indicates that Russian forces seized Lukyanivske (northwest of Orikhiv) and north of Lobkove (west of Orikhiv).[73]
Assessed Russian infiltrations: Geolocated footage published on January 29 shows Ukrainian drones striking a Russian-occupied building along the E-105 Vasylivka-Kamyanske highway northwest of Stepnohirsk (west of Orikhiv) during what ISW assesses was a Russian infiltration mission that did not change control of terrain or the forward edge of the battle area (FEBA) at this time.[74]
Unconfirmed claims: The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on January 30 that Russian forces seized Richne (northwest of Orikhiv).[75] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced in southern Mala Tokmachka (southeast of Orikhiv).[76]
Russian forces attacked southeast of Orikhiv near Mala Tokmachka; south of Orikhiv near Novodanylivka; southwest of Orikhiv near Nesteryanka; west of Orikhiv near Stepnohirsk and Prymorske; and northwest of Orikhiv near Lukyanivske and Pavlivka and toward Novoyakovlivka and Mahdalynivka on January 29 and 30.[77] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Bilohirya (southeast of Orikhiv).[78]
A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed on January 29 that Ukrainian forces retain the ability to move reinforcements into Stepnohirsk, contrary to Russian claims of the seizure of the settlement.[79] The milblogger refuted Russian claims of the seizure of Novoyakovlivka, stating that Russian forces do not fully control the settlement.[80] The milblogger criticized Russian forces for often misrepresenting their control of some buildings on the outskirts of settlements in the Zaporizhia direction as control of entire settlements in their reports to the Russian military command.
Order of Battle: Assault elements of the Russian 328th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (104th VDV Division) are operating in eastern Lukyanivske.[81] Kh-51P Lancet loitering munition and Knyaz Vandal Novgorodsky (KVN) fiber optic first-person view (FPV) drone operators of the 291st Artillery Brigade (58th CAA, Southern Military District [SMD]) are striking Ukrainian positions northeast of Orikhiv.[82] Elements of the 71st Motorized Rifle Regiment (42nd Motorized Rifle Division, 58th CAA) are reportedly operating south of Novodanylivka.[83] Elements of the 11th Separate Airborne (VDV) Brigade reportedly participated in the claimed seizure of Novoyakovlivka as of January 27.[84] Drone operators of the 7th VDV Division reportedly continue to strike Ukrainian positions near Prymorske and north of Stepnohirsk.[85]
Ukrainian forces continued their mid-range strike campaign against Russian military targets in occupied Zaporizhia Oblast overnight on January 29 to 30. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on January 30 that Ukrainian forces struck the base of a repair unit of an unspecified Russian Spetsnaz (Russian General Staff's Main Directorate [GRU]) brigade near Tokmak (approximately 30 kilometers from the frontline); logistics depots belonging to an unspecified artillery regiment near Okhrymivka (approximately 120 kilometers from the frontline); unspecified facilities of the 76th VDV Division near Kyrylivka (approximately 195 kilometers from the frontline); and a 9K33 Osa air defense system near Semenivka (approximately 30 kilometers from the frontline).[86]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kherson direction on January 30 but did not advance.
Russian forces attacked in Kherson Oblast, including east of Kherson City toward the Antonivskyi Bridge, on January 29 and 30.[87]
Order of Battle: Artillery elements of the Russian 8th Artillery Regiment (18th CAA, SMD) and FPV drone operators of the 98th VDV Division are reportedly operating in the Kherson direction.[88]
Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)
See the topline text for reports about the reported moratorium on Russian strikes against Ukrainian energy assets.
Russian forces conducted another series of drone and missile strikes against Ukraine overnight on January 29 to 30. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched one Iskander-M ballistic missile from Voronezh Oblast and 111 Shahed, Gerbera, and Italmas-type strike drones – of which about 70 were Shaheds – from the directions of Bryansk, Oryol, and Kursk cities; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; and occupied Donetsk City.[89] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 80 strike drones, that the Iskander-M and 25 Russian drones struck 15 locations, and that drone fragments struck two locations. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces struck a warehouse in a suburb of Kharkiv City and residential areas and an unspecified critical infrastructure facility in Zaporizhzhia City.[90] Zaporizhia Oblast Military Administration Head Ivan Fedorov reported that the Russian strikes injured 24 civilians in Zaporizhzhia City.[91] Ukrainian state energy operator Ukrenergo reported that rolling blackouts continue throughout Ukraine.[92]
Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)
The Belarusian Ministry of Defense (MoD) announced on January 29 that Belarus received a batch of Su-30SM2 fighter jets from Russia.[93] The Belarusian MoD did not specify the number of fighter jets that Russia provided.
Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.
[1] https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/rubio-says-territorial-issue-over-donetsk-yet-be-bridged-between-russia-ukraine-2026-01-28/ ; https://www.politico dot eu/article/donetsk-marco-rubio-ukraine-russia-peace-deal/
[2] https://tass dot ru/politika/26290545
[3] https://tass dot ru/politika/26289815
[4] https://tass dot ru/politika/26297073; https://www.fontanka dot ru/2026/01/30/76240641/
https://x.com/ZelenskyyUa/status/2017193287778456042; https://x.com/ZelenskyyUa/status/2017193283810709722
[6] https://t.me/DeputatZhuravlev/14728; https://news dot ru/vlast/v-gd-otvetili-vozmozhno-li-energeticheskoe-peremirie-mezhdu-rf-i-ukrainoj; https://life dot ru/p/1836311
[7] https://t.me/dva_majors/87335; https://t.me/milinfolive/165385; https://t.me/osvedomitell_alex/32379; https://t.me/osvedomitell_alex/32385; https://t.me/osvedomitell_alex/32386; https://t.me/osvedomitell_alex/32387
[8] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-29-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-20-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-14-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-8-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-2-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-29-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-22-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-19-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-16-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-12-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-10-2025/
[9] https://suspilne dot media/chernihiv/1227597-specpidrozdil-rf-senez-atakuvav-pozicii-prikordonnikiv-na-cernigivsini-ta-rozstrilav-polonenih/
[10] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-9-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-23-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-13-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-23-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-28-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-16-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-15-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-4-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-1-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-5-2025/
[11] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-30-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-20-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-occupation-update-may-1-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-8-2025/
[12] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/34389 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/34387; https://t.me/wargonzo/31983 ; https://t.me/severnnyi/6545
[13] https://t.me/dva_majors/87301; https://t.me/severnnyi/6545
[14] https://t.me/Joint_Forces_Task_Force/19978
[15] https://t.me/severnnyi/6548; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-29-2026/; https://t.me/mod_russia/60745
[16] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/196170
[17] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/196107
[18] https://t.me/severnnyi/6545 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/39135
[19] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/34420 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/34389 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/34387 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/39135 ; https://www.pravda dot com.ua/news/2026/01/29/8018420/; https://militarnyi dot com/uk/news/digtyarne-nesterne-ta-krugle-dpsu-zachyshhaye-naseleni-punkty-na-harkivshhyni-ta-berut-okupantiv-u-polon/ ; https://t.me/wargonzo/31983
[20] https://t.me/Joint_Forces_Task_Force/19978
[21] https://t.me/corpsarmy16/2046; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/01/30/komisiyi-z-syevyera-prybuly-na-vovchanskyj-napryamok-vstanovyty-prychyny-zryvu-nastupu-hoche-rosijske-komanduvannya/
[22] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Uu50wPIJ4ps; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/01/30/jdut-cherez-chyste-pole-duzhe-legka-mishen-na-harkivshhyni-rosiyany-atakuyut-tymy-kogo-ne-shkoda/
[23] https://suspilne dot media/kharkiv/1227547-u-planah-rosii-stvoriti-na-harkivsini-bufernu-zonu-prikordonnik-brigadi-gart-pro-situaciu-na-pivnoci-oblasti/
[24] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/196137; https://t.me/wargonzo/31981
[25] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/39135 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/34389; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/34387; https://t.me/wargonzo/31983
[26] https://x.com/UAControlMap/status/2016969118029693301 ; https://x.com/Ryan72101/status/2016830161979600966; https://x.com/legion_svoboda/status/2016802097417589229?s=20
[27] https://t.me/Osintpen/2465 ; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/11152
[28] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/70298
[29] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/34389; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/34420; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/34420; https://t.me/wargonzo/31983; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/70298
[30] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/01/30/rosiyany-tam-obyektyvno-vzhe-pryrecheni-u-kupyansku-blyzko-50-okupantiv-perebuvayut-v-izolyacziyi/
[31] https://t.me/mod_russia/60726
[32] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/34420; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/34389; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/34387; https://t.me/luhanskaVTSA/32621
[33] https://www.facebook.com/reel/2108285056587543; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/11150
[34] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/39145
[35] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/34389 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/34420 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/34387 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/87301 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/48159 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/31983 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/39145
[36] https://t.me/dva_majors/87301
[37] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Pv_REa89kRY; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/01/30/zhduny-sylno-pominyaly-kartynu-na-poli-boyu-poblyzu-lymana-osnovna-problema-syl-oborony-cze-bombovi-udary/
[38] https://t.me/sloaembr_81/354; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/01/29/diyut-pid-prykryttyam-drona-povodyrya-pihotynczi-rf-namagayutsya-prosuvatys-u-napryamku-dronivky/
[39] https://t.me/motopatriot78/48157 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/48166
[40] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/196107
[41] https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/2017271103547195862?s=20; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/2017259412788822214?s=20; https://t.me/fifthbrUA/1280
[42] https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/2017246459956007227?s=20; https://t.me/BBpS_28/1095
[43] https://t.me/mod_russia/60733; https://t.me/mod_russia/60737
[44] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/108406; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/108409
[45] https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/2017226515725816015?s=20; https://t.me/beslavnaya_baltica/176
[46] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/34420; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/34389; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/34387; https://t.me/rybar/77090; https://t.me/wargonzo/31983; https://t.me/motopatriot78/48153; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/39145
[47] https://t.me/huginbps/217; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/2017241991533191223?s=20
[48] https://t.me/warhistoryalconafter/257668; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/2017264212460916783?s=20
[49] t.me/beslavnaya_baltica/178; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/2017227299423125663?s=20; t.me/beslavnaya_baltica/176; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/2017226515725816015?s=20; https://t dot me/kamtoday41/44227; https://veteranvmf dot ru/tpost/u92k1kuk61-pozdravlenie-glavnokomanduyuschego-voenn
[50] https://t.me/SouthernRepublic/30328; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/2017222612443660669?s=20
[51] https://t.me/nm_dnr/14969
[52] https://t.me/motopatriot78/48145; https://t.me/wargonzo/31983; https://t.me/motopatriot78/48153
[53] https://t.me/motopatriot78/48153
[54] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/34420; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/34389; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/34387; https://t.me/wargonzo/31983; https://t.me/motopatriot78/48145
[55] https://t.me/wargonzo/31992
[56] https://t.me/nm_dnr/14970
[57] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/34420; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/34389; https://t.me/motopatriot78/48140
[58] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/34420; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/34389; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/34387
[59] https://t.me/voin_dv/18510
[60] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Pv_REa89kRY; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/01/30/vyyavyly-yihni-tochky-zlotu-zmenshyly-vplyv-na-oleksandrivskomu-napryamku-u-vorozhyh-pilotiv-nemaye-shansiv/
[61] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/196119
[62] https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/2017152611145990551 ; https://t.me/voin_dv/18504 ; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/11147 ; https://t.me/Osintpen/2461
[63] https://t.me/suspilnezaporizhzhya/49729; https://suspilne dot media/zaporizhzhia/1227473-u-silah-oboroni-pivdna-zaperecili-okupaciu-selisa-ternuvate-so-na-zaporizzi/
[64] https://x.com/99Dominik_/status/2017279813355012381 ; https://t.me/fifthbrUA/1284
[65] https://t.me/mod_russia/60734 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/60738; https://t.me/mod_russia/60740
[66] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/108409; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/108406; https://t.me/rybar/77086
[67] https://t.me/ombr_110/2050; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/01/30/zlagoda-na-dniprovshhyni-pid-nashym-kontrolem-110-ta-brygada/
[68] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-24-2025/
[69] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/34420; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/34389; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/34387; https://t.me/rybar/77086
[70] https://t.me/wargonzo/31983; https://t.me/dva_majors/87301; https://t.me/voin_dv/18508; https://t.me/voin_dv/18510; https://t.me/rybar/77086
[71] https://t.me/rybar/77086; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-28-2025/
[72] https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/2016961707210588296; https://t.me/NO_NAME_GROUP1466/324
[73] https://t.me/Angryb1rdsss/152; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/11154
[74] https://t.me/rubak_vyriy/137; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/11146
[75] https://t.me/mod_russia/60735
[76] https://t.me/rybar/77071
[77] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/34420; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/34389; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/34387; https://t.me/dva_majors/87301; https://t.me/rybar/77071; https://t.me/rusich_army/28038; https://t.me/wargonzo/31983
[78] https://t.me/dva_majors/87301
[79] https://t.me/rybar/77071; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-20-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-28-2025/
[80] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-27-2026/
[81] https://t.me/Angryb1rdsss/152; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/11154
[82] https://t.me/brigada291art/187; https://t.me/Osintpen/2460
[83] https://t.me/motopatriot78/48134
[84] https://t.me/russian_airborne/12484; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/196176; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-27-2026/
[85] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/39129
[86] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/34411
[87] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/34420; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/34389; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/34387
[88] https://t.me/osvedomitell_alex/32407; https://t.me/milinfolive/165376
[89] https://t.me/kpszsu/54029
[90] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/01/30/vorog-vdaryv-raketoyu-po-peredmistyu-harkova-vynykla-masshtabna-pozhezha/ ; https://t.me/astrapress/103212 ; https://t.me/ivan_fedorov_zp/32885; https://t.me/zoda_gov_ua/55355
[91] https://t.me/ivan_fedorov_zp/32909; https://t.me/zoda_gov_ua/55369
[92] https://t.me/Ukrenergo/4604; https://suspilne dot media/1226797-30-sicna-u-vsih-oblastah-ukraini-vimikatimut-svitlo-za-grafikami-ukrenergo/
[93] https://t.me/modmilby/53234; https://t.me/milinfolive/165380













