Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, January 29, 2026

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US Secretary of State Marco Rubio confirmed that the United States and Ukraine have finalized security guarantees for Ukraine. Rubio stated on January 28 that it “could [be] argue[d]” that the United States and Ukraine have finalized security guarantees.[i] Rubio stated that the United States will play a “key role” in security guarantees for Ukraine and noted that there is a “general consensus” on the possible deployment of a small contingent of European troops to Ukraine with US support.[ii] Rubio also stated that the United States may send a representative to the planned upcoming Ukrainian-Russian negotiations in Abu Dhabi on February 1, but that US Special Envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff and former Senior Advisor to the US President Jared Kushner will not participate.[iii]

The Kremlin continues to reject Western security guarantees for Ukraine, however. Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov gave an interview to Turkish media outlets on January 29 in which he rejected the terms of Western security guarantees to Ukraine by falsely dismissing Western security guarantees as an attempt to protect the "illegitimate" Ukrainian government and reiterating Russian commitment to the security guarantees framework Russia presented during the 2022 Istanbul negotiations.[iv] The draft 2022 Istanbul amounted to Ukraine's full capitulation to Russia by imposing harsh limits against the size and activity of Ukraine's military while imposing no such restrictions on Russia, as well as providing Russia with veto power over the ability of states guaranteeing Ukraine's security to respond to future armed conflict in Ukraine.[v] Lavrov also reiterated the Kremlin’s commitment to the demands that Russian President Vladimir Putin laid out in his June 2024 speech to the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), in which Putin demanded the capitulation to Russia’s original war demands of both Ukraine and NATO.[vi] Lavrov also falsely claimed that the current Ukrainian government poses a persistent threat to Russian security.

Other Russian officials continue to reiterate Russia’s commitment to achieving its original war demands on the battlefield. Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov asserted on January 29 that the Kremlin should not negotiate with Ukraine and should instead continue the war.[vii] The Russian Federation Council and State Duma deputies, who often act as bullhorns for the Kremlin’s rhetorical lines, also reiterated the Kremlin’s commitment to advancing on the frontline and false claims that Ukraine has no right to the territories that Russia has illegally annexed, and called for Ukraine to capitulate to Russia to make negotiations easier.[viii] The Kremlin has continuously rejected any meaningful security guarantees for Ukraine proposed during the peace process.[ix] The Kremlin’s continued refusal of security guarantees for Ukraine suggests that it remains committed to Putin’s theory of victory — the theory that Russia can win in Ukraine by outlasting Ukraine’s ability to fight and the West’s desire to support Ukraine.[x]

US President Donald Trump stated that Russian President Vladimir Putin has agreed to a week-long moratorium on strikes against some Ukrainian energy infrastructure, as the Kremlin continued to reiterate its unwillingness to commit to a long-term ceasefire. Trump stated on January 29 that he asked Putin to halt strikes against Kyiv and unspecified various towns for a week as of an unspecified date.[xi] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky did not directly confirm the reported short-term ceasefire and responded to Trump's statement by noting that Ukraine is undergoing an extreme winter and thanking Trump and the United States for their “efforts to stop” Russian strikes on Ukraine’s energy sector.[xii] Russian officials have not confirmed this reported energy strikes moratorium, however. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov refused to comment on initial reports of an alleged agreement with Ukraine regarding a moratorium on long-range strikes against energy infrastructure.[xiii] Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov also reiterated on January 29 that a long-term ceasefire of 60 or more days is "unacceptable" to Russia, claiming that Ukraine can use any ceasefire to rest, rearm, and reconstitute its military.[xiv] Russian milbloggers claimed on January 29 that the Russian military command issued an order on January 28 to halt long-range strikes from 0700 on January 29 through February 3.[xv] The milbloggers claimed that the moratorium includes all targets in Kyiv City and Oblast as well as all energy infrastructure throughout Ukraine. Some of the milbloggers hedged that it is unclear how accurate this information is, however.[xvi] The precise terms of this strikes moratorium remain unclear, and ISW will continue to monitor for further clarification.

The reported week-long moratorium on energy strikes does not mark a significant Russian concession, given that Russia continues to reject a long-term ceasefire and has previously offered similar short-term moratoriums to advance its political objectives. A temporary moratorium against long-range strikes can benefit Russia if both Russia and Ukraine participate in the moratorium. Russian forces will be able to amass drone and missile stockpiles that it can use to launch large, combined strikes in the future, while Ukraine ceases its strikes against Russian energy infrastructure.[xvii] The Kremlin has previously offered short-term ceasefires as part of a cognitive warfare effort to portray the Kremlin as acting in good faith while rejecting Ukrainian and US calls for a longer or permanent moratorium on long-range strikes against civilian infrastructure.[xviii] A Kremlin affiliated Russian milblogger emphasized in a response that the ceasefire is only temporary but criticized the Kremlin for accepting the ceasefire, claiming that the Kremlin is losing valuable leverage against Ukraine by halting the strikes.[xix] The milblogger also claimed that the energy strikes moratorium is tied to the next round of Ukraine-Russia talks in Abu Dhabi, reportedly scheduled for February 1. Other Russian milbloggers also criticized the strikes moratorium and expressed relief that the moratorium is so short, so Russia can continue to pressure Ukraine through its strike on energy infrastructure.[xx] Another milblogger asserted that Russia's war in Ukraine is part of a larger war and therefore if Russia makes concessions "at one point" then the Kremlin will leverage these concessions to advance its objectives.[xxi]

Russian forces are using cheap Molniya fixed-wing first-person view (FPV) drones equipped with Starlink satellite terminals to conduct battlefield air interdiction (BAI) against Ukrainian highways at an operational depth (about 25 to 100 or more kilometers from the frontline). Ukrainian Ministry of Defense (MoD) advisor on defense technology and drone and electronic warfare (EW) expert Serhiy “Flash” Beskrestnov reported on January 29 that Russian forces have recently begun conducting several Molniya fixed-wing first-person view (FPV) drone strikes per day against Ukrainian vehicles traveling along the E-50 Pokrovsk-Pavlohrad highway, roughly 50 kilometers from the frontline.[xxii] Ukrainian military sources told Ukrainian broadcaster Suspilne on January 29 that Russian forces began employing Molniya drones in ongoing strikes against a section of the E-50 highway running between Troitske (roughly 35 kilometers behind the frontline) and Pavlohrad (roughly 78 kilometers behind the frontline) roughly two weeks ago (about mid-January 2026).[xxiii] Russian forces have been employing fixed-wing drones against targets at an operational depth from the frontline for months, including using Molniyas and other drones as “mothership drones” to carry one or more shorter-range drones to areas far from the front line, including in strikes against Zaporizhzhia City in early October 2025.[xxiv] Russian forces have recently begun equipping Molniya-2 fixed-wing FPV drones with Starlink satellite terminals to significantly expand their range and resistance to Ukrainian EW.[xxv] The recent strikes against the E-50 Pokrovsk-Pavlohrad highway appear to be part of an attempt to replicate prior Russian BAI campaigns against Ukrainian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) supplying Pokrovsk and Hulyaipole against other parts of the frontline with relatively cheap Molniya drones.[xxvi] Ukrainian Defense Minister Mykhailo Fedorov reported on January 29 that SpaceX and the Ukrainian MoD are cooperating to prevent Russian forces from using the Starlink system to guide Russian drones in strikes against targets in Ukraine.[xxvii]

The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) appears to be conducting a dedicated recruitment campaign for the Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) at Russian universities. Russian science outlet T-Invariant published an investigation on January 28 into the Russian MoD’s new dedicated recruitment effort for the USF at Russian universities.[xxviii] T-Invariant spoke to several students at Russian universities, including several in Moscow City, who reported receiving a letter from their university informing the students that they failed their exams and faced expulsion and student debt. The letters stated that university officials would hold off from expelling the students for three days while the students considered a recruitment offer from the Russian MoD. The MoD reportedly offers a one-year fixed term military service contract with the USF in which the students are "guaranteed" to be released from military service if they decline to sign another contract upon the expiration of their initial contract; that the students can only serve in USF units and that the MoD cannot transfer the students to non-USF units; and that the students will receive financial benefits. T-Invariant reported that the Russian MoD began recruiting USF drone operators at Russian universities in December 2025 by offering salaries of 5.2 to 5.5 million rubles (about $69,103 to 73,090) per year and promises to place the students about 20 kilometers behind the frontlines. T-Invariant reported that these initial efforts at Russian universities were insufficient to attract students from the Russian Higher School of Economics, a prestigious, Moscow-based university. A Russian lawyer reported on January 24 that he received a copy of a guidebook from the Russian MoD for military centers in universities across Russia on expanding recruitment efforts for the USF, including recruitment of both male and female students.[xxix] The lawyer noted that the universities were to advertise special contracts guaranteeing only one year of service, but assessed that Russian President Vladimir Putin's September 2022 order establishing partial mobilization would likely supersede the language of a contract restricting service to only one year. Russian opposition outlet Verstka reported on January 27 that Russian military recruiters are characterizing these special contracts as a "bait and switch" that promised to put individuals in specific units but actually has no guarantee of an assignment into such units.[xxx] These reports are consistent with recent Russian reporting that the MoD had intensified its recruitment campaign for the USF at Russian universities.[xxxi] ISW continues to assess that Russia may intend to use at least some of those recruited for the USF to staff the conventional Russian ground forces.[xxxii]

Ukraine and Russia exchanged killed-in-action (KIA) servicemembers on January 29. Official Ukrainian sources reported on January 29 that Russia returned to Ukraine the remains of 1,000 KIA soldiers in what was the first repatriation event of 2026.[xxxiii] Russian Presidential Aide Vladimir Medinsky claimed that Ukraine returned to Russia the bodies of returned 38 KIA servicemembers.[xxxiv] It is unclear why the number of exchange KIA between Russia and Ukraine differed, but Russia routinely augments the number of KIA personnel provided to Ukraine to create a false perspective that Ukraine is suffering far higher losses than Ukraine.[xxxv] Russian forces are losing more personnel than Ukraine; however, due to Russian tactics that favor highly attritional assaults.[xxxvi] Russia has also delivered unlabeled remains that may include Russian servicemembers to artificially augment the number of claimed Ukrainian KIA personnel as part of this cognitive warfare effort.[xxxvii]

Belarusian balloons illegally entered Lithuanian and Polish airspace on the nights of January 27 to 28 and January 28 to 29, respectively. Lithuanian National Crisis Management Center Head Vilmantas Vitkauskas reported on January 28 that Lithuanian authorities detected 42 balloons entering Lithuanian airspace from Belarus on the night of January 27 to 28, the largest number of Belarusian balloons violating Lithuanian airspace since the start of these balloon incursions in October 2025.[xxxviii] Vitkauskas stated that Lithuanian authorities shut down Vilnius International Airport three times on the evening of January 27 in response to the balloons. Vitkauskas stated that Lithuanian authorities recovered eight balloons with smuggled cargo on the morning of January 28, found the remains of several other balloons, and arrested four people. The Polish Armed Forces Operational Command reported on January 29 that Polish military radar detected balloon-like objects entering Polish airspace from Belarus late on January 28 and temporarily restricted airspace over Podlaskie Voivodeship (along Poland's eastern border with Belarus) in response.[xxxix] Belarusian balloons have frequently violated Polish and Lithuanian airspace since October 2025.[xl] ISW continues to assess that Russia is intensifying its covert and overt attacks against Europe and that Russia has entered “Phase Zero” – the informational and psychological condition-setting phase – to prepare for a possible NATO-Russia war in the future.[xli] ISW continues to assess that Russia has de facto annexed Belarus and that Belarusian incursions into NATO airspace are very likely part of Russia’s broader Phase Zero effort.[xlii]

Key Takeaways:

• Russian forces recently advanced in western Zaporizhia Oblast.
• US Secretary of State Marco Rubio confirmed that the United States and Ukraine have finalized security guarantees for Ukraine.
• The Kremlin continues to reject Western security guarantees for Ukraine, however.
• US President Donald Trump stated that Russian President Vladimir Putin has agreed to a week-long moratorium on some Ukrainian energy infrastructure, as the Kremlin reiterated its unwillingness to commit to a long-term ceasefire.
• The reported week-long moratorium on energy strikes does not mark a significant Russian concession, given that Russia continues to reject a long-term ceasefire and has previously offered similar short-term moratoriums to advance its political objectives.
• Russian forces are using cheap Molniya fixed-wing first-person view (FPV) drones equipped with Starlink satellite terminals to conduct battlefield air interdiction (BAI) against Ukrainian highways at an operational depth (about 25 to 100 or more kilometers from the frontline).
• The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) appears to be conducting a dedicated recruitment campaign for the Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) at Russian universities.
• Ukraine and Russia exchanged killed-in-action (KIA) servicemembers on January 29.
• Belarusian balloons illegally entered Lithuanian and Polish airspace on the nights of January 27 to 28 and January 28 to 29, respectively.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.  

• Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
• Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis
• Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
• Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
• Significant Activity in Belarus

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Nothing significant to report.

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in Sumy Oblast along the international border)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Sumy Oblast on January 29 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on January 29 that Russian forces seized Bila Bereza (northwest of Sumy City).[xliii] Russian milbloggers also claimed that Russian forces advanced southwest of Komarivka (northwest of Sumy City).[xliv]

Russian forces attacked in Sumy and Kursk oblasts, including southwest of Glushkovo near Novyi Put; north of Sumy City near Kostyantynivka, Kindrativka, Oleksiivka and Andriivka and toward Nova Sich; and northeast of Sumy City near Kucherov, Sadky, Loknya, Yablunivka, and Yunakivka and toward Mala Korchakivka and Myropillya, on January 28 and 29.[xlv]

A Russian milblogger reportedly affiliated with the Northern Grouping of Forces claimed on January 29 that the Russian military command is deploying elements of the Russian 22nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (72nd Motorized Rifle Division, 44th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) to train in occupied Bilovodsk, Luhansk Oblast before committing elements of the regiment to attritional assaults near Tetkino (southwest of Glushkovo).[xlvi] The milblogger claimed that these assaults aim to seize Ryzhivka (just south of Tetkino on the international border and northwest of Sumy City) as part of Russian efforts to establish a “buffer zone” in northern Sumy Oblast.[xlvii] The milblogger claimed that the Russian military command commits wounded servicemembers to combat operations and criticized the regimental commander for ordering attritional assaults.

Geolocated footage published on January 28 showing drone operators of the Russian Chechen Akhmat Spetsnaz Kashtan Detachment striking an industrial thermal power plant (TPP) in northern Sumy City (about 20 kilometers behind the frontline), reportedly with Molniya-2 fixed-wing drones.[xlviii] Russian forces continue to target Ukrainian energy and industrial infrastructure in rear areas with smaller and cheaper drones that can fly longer ranges.

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 30th Motorized Rifle Regiment (72nd Motorized Rifle Division) are reportedly operating toward Mala Korchakivka.[xlix] Elements of the 9th Motorized Rifle Regiment (18th Motorized Rifle Division, 11th AC, LMD) are reportedly operating near Tetkino and Glushkovo.[l] Counter-drone elements of the BARS-Kursk Detachment (Russian Combat Army Reserve) are reportedly operating in the border areas of Kursk Oblast.[li]

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border to create a defensible buffer zone with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on January 29 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk, Starytsya, Zelene, Vovchanski Khutory, Prylipka, Kruhle, Symynivka, Nesterne, and Tykhe and toward Ternova and Hrafske on January 28 and 29.[lii]

The commander of a Ukrainian reconnaissance unit operating in northern Kharkiv Oblast reported on January 29 that Russian forces are using the clear weather to increase drone strikes 10 to 15 kilometers behind the frontline and that Russian forces are wearing snowsuits in an attempt to blend in with the snow.[liii] The commander noted that poorly trained Russian servicemembers sometimes expose themselves to Ukrainian drone operators by using flashlights at night for navigation.

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 71st Guards Motorized Rifle Division (14th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian vehicles near Karaichne (northeast of Kharkiv City).[liv]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Velykyi Burluk direction on January 28 and 29 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced southeast of Chuhunivka (northeast of Velykyi Burluk).[lv]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Velykyi Burluk near Hryhorivka and southeast of Velykyi Burluk toward Obukhivka and Kolodyazne on January 28 and 29.[lvi]

A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger acknowledged on January 28 that difficult weather conditions and terrain are hindering Russian advances in the Velykyi Burluk direction.[lvii] The milblogger admitted that Russian forces have difficulty making significant advances while relying on small group infiltration tactics.

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Oskil River (Russian objective: Cross the Oskil River in Kharkiv Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on January 29 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced northwest of Dvorichna (north of Kupyansk).[lviii]

Russian forces attacked near Kupyansk itself; north of Kupyansk near Kutkivka and Dvorichna and toward Radkivka; east of Kupyansk toward Petropavlivka; and southeast of Kupyansk near Pishchane and toward Novoosynove on January 28 and 29.[lix]

Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported on January 28 that Russian forces redeployed elements of the 47th Tank Division (1st Guards Tank Army [GTA], Moscow Military District [MMD]), likely including several motorized rifle battalions of the 272nd and 245th motorized rifle regiments, to the Lyman Pershe (northeast of Kupyansk) area.[lx] Mashovets stated that Russian forces also reinforced elements of the 2nd Guards Motorized Rifle Division (1st GTA) southeast of Kupyansk with elements of the division operating in the Lyman direction. Mashovets stated that the Russian 6th CAA (Leningrad Military District [LMD]) regrouped elements of its 68th Motorized Rifle Division operating on a bridgehead on the Oskil River north of Kupyansk, including its 121st and 122nd motorized rifle regiments, and concentrated personnel belonging to at least three divisions against Kupyansk. Mashovets stated that Russian forces are attempting to overextend Ukrainian defensive lines near Kupyansk to exploit vulnerabilities during future offensive operations.[lxi] Mashovets assessed that Russian forces will likely attack the eastern part of Kupyansk from the north and along the Oskil River from the south near Kolisnykivka and Kivsharivka (both southeast of Kupyansk).[lxii]

Ukrainian Joint Forces Task Force Spokesperson Colonel Viktor Trehubov reported on January 29 that Russian forces continue efforts against Kupyansk, periodically increasing and decreasing the intensity of their offensive operations.[lxiii] Trehubov stated that Russian forces need time to regroup and do not have a sufficient manpower advantage to intensify attacks without frequently rotating troops. An officer of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Kupyansk direction reported on January 29 that Russian servicemembers are attempting to infiltrate Kupyansk from the north with small groups of servicemembers and that approximately 50 Russian servicemembers remain in Kupyansk.[lxiv] The officer stated that Russian forces have recently begun to intensively use long-range drones at night to strike Ukrainian ground lines of communications (GLOCs). The officer also denied the Russian claimed seizure of Kupyansk-Vuzlovyi (south of Kupyansk).

A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger rejected on January 28 Russian Chief of the General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov’s January 27 claims that Russian forces cleared Kupyansk-Vuzlovyi and are fighting for Kivsharivka, stating that Russian forces have not reached both settlements and criticizing the practice of premature announcements of the seizure of settlements.[lxv] The milblogger noted on January 29 that the lack of evidence of fighting in Ukrainian forces’ footage taken in Kupyansk-Vuzlovyi indicates that Russian forces are at least 10 kilometers from the settlement.[lxvi] The milblogger cautioned the Russian military command to avoid sending troops in “one-way assaults” to attempt to refute Ukrainian statements.

Russian forces continued offensive operations northeast of Borova near Borivska Andriivka; southeast of Borova near Hrekivka and toward Druzhelyubivka; and south of Borova near Oleksandrivka on January 28 and 29 but did not advance.[lxvii]

Ukrainian forces continued their mid-range strike campaign against Russian military targets in occupied Luhansk Oblast overnight on January 28 to 29. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on January 29 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian 1L119 Nebo-SVU radar station in occupied Lymarivka (approximately 120 kilometers from the frontline).[lxviii]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Slovyansk direction on January 28 and 29 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked near and within Lyman itself; northwest of Lyman near Drobysheve, Svyatohirsk, and Yarova; northeast of Lyman near Stavky and Myrne; southeast of Lyman near Yampil; southwest of Lyman toward Staryi Karavan, Brusyn, Shchurove, and Brusivka; northeast of Slovyansk near Zakitne; east of Slovyansk near Svyato-Pokrovske and Riznykivka; southeast of Slovyansk near Dibrova and toward Rai-Oleksandrivka and Nykyforivka on January 28 and 29.[lxix]

Ukrainian Joint Forces Task Force Spokesperson Colonel Viktor Trehubov reported on January 29 that Russian forces continue attempts to infiltrate Lyman with small groups.[lxx] The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Lyman direction reported on January 29 that Russian forces are conducting solo assaults rather than attacking in pairs and that their anti-drone cloaks obstruct Russian forces' movement and vision in the snow.[lxxi] The spokesperson stated that Russian servicemembers have insufficient food, supplies, or medicine and travel 10 to 15 kilometers to reach the frontline. The chief sergeant of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Slovyansk direction reported on January 29 that Russian forces continue to employ fireteam infiltration tactics while using unmanned ground vehicles (UGVs) and drones for logistics.[lxxii] The chief sergeant noted that even though Russian forces have difficulty moving in the snow, Russian forces' thermal cloaks and snowsuits allow them to avoid Ukrainian drone detection.

Geolocated footage published on January 28 shows a Russian drone striking a Ukrainian vehicle in Preobrazhenivka, Kharkiv Oblast (northwest of Slovyansk, Donetsk Oblast; roughly 97 kilometers behind the frontline) while reportedly receiving guidance from a ZALA reconnaissance drone.[lxxiii] ISW is unable to confirm the specific type of drone that Russian forces used in the Preobrazhenivka strike, but the Russian milblogger who published the footage suggested that the drone was a fixed-wing drone -- which would be consistent with a Molniya fixed-wing first-person view (FPV) drone or another drone with similar capabilities to the Molniya.[lxxiv]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 88th Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 2nd Luhansk People’s Republic Army Corps [LNR AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) are striking Ukrainian positions near Riznykivka.[lxxv] FPV drone operators of the 752nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (3rd Motorized Rifle Division, 20th CAA, Moscow Military District [MMD]) reportedly continue to strike Ukrainian positions in the Lyman direction.[lxxvi]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area on January 29 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked near and within Kostyantynivka itself; north of Kostyantynivka near Maiske and toward Virolyubivka; northeast of Kostyantynivka near Markove and Holubivka; east of Kostyantynivka near Predtechyne; southeast of Kostyantynivka near Kleban-Byk and Shcherbynivka; south of Kostyantynivka near Pleshchiivka, Berestok, and Illinivka; southwest of Kostyantynivka near Stepanivka; and southwest of Druzhkivka near Sofiivka and toward Novopavlivka on January 28 and 29.[lxxvii]

The commander of a Ukrainian drone platoon operating in the Kostyantynivka direction reported on January 29 that Russian forces have concentrated specialized drone operators and relatively well-trained assault infantry in the Kostyantynivka direction and toward Druzhkivka, Kramatorsk (northwest of Kostyantynivka), and Slovyansk.[lxxviii]

Order of Battle: First-person view (FPV) drone operators of the Russian 58th Separate Spetsnaz Battalion (unofficially designated the Okhotnik [Hunter] Spetsnaz Detachment) (51st CAA, formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic Army Corps [DNR AC], SMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Kostyantynivka.[lxxix] Scalpel loitering munition operators of the 381st Artillery Regiment (150th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA, SMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Mykolaipillya (south of Druzhkivka).[lxxx] Kh-51 Lancet loitering munition operators of the 238th Artillery Brigade (8th CAA) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions in Staroraiske (west of Druzhkivka) and Raiske (southwest of Druzhkivka).[lxxxi] Drone operators of the Smuglyanka Detachment are reportedly operating in the Kostyantynivka direction.[lxxxii]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Dobropillya tactical area but did not advance on January 29.

Russian forces attacked northeast of Dobropillya toward Kucheriv Yar and east of Dobropillya near Nove Shakhove, Ivanivka, Vilne, Zapovidne, Toretske, and Novyi Donbas on January 28 and 29.[lxxxiii]

Russian forces continued infiltration missions in northwestern Pokrovsk on January 29 but did not make confirmed advances.

Assessed Russian infiltrations: Geolocated footage published on January 29 shows Russian servicemembers operating along a windbreak in northwestern Pokrovsk during what ISW assesses was a Russian infiltration mission that did not change control of terrain or the forward edge of the battle area (FEBA) at this time.[lxxxiv]

Russian forces attacked near and within Pokrovsk itself; northwest of Pokrovsk near Hryshyne; north of Pokrovsk near Rodynske and Bilytske; east of Pokrovsk near Rivne and Myrnohrad; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Kotlyne, Udachne, Novopidhorodne, and Molodetske on January 28 and 29.[lxxxv]

A Ukrainian brigade operating in the Pokrovsk direction reported on January 29 that Russian forces continue to exploit bad weather, which hinders Ukrainian drone operations, in order to infiltrate and accumulate personnel in central Myrnohrad.[lxxxvi] The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Pokrovsk direction reported on January 29 that Russian forces may be preparing to advance in the Pokrovsk direction, as they have been using an increasing number of guided glide bombs and moving artillery closer to the front lines.[lxxxvii] The spokesperson reported that small arms engagements have become less frequent, however, because Ukrainian forces quickly eliminate Russian servicemembers attempting infiltration operations. The spokesperson reported that Russian forces continue to fly drones at low altitudes to ambush Ukrainian positions and use many fiber optic drones because they can operate in poor weather conditions. The spokesperson noted that Russian forces are also using diversionary tactics during assaults by employing infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs) to draw Ukrainian fire as infantry riding motorcycles and quad bikes attack from the flanks.

A Russian milblogger claimed that elements of the Russian 2nd Radiation, Chemical and Biological Defense Regiment (2nd CAA, Central Military District [CMD]) are reportedly using Kuryer unmanned ground vehicles (UGVs) to deploy smoke screens before assaults in the Pokrovsk direction.[lxxxviii]

Order of Battle: Molniya-2 fixed-wing FPV drone operators of the Russian 120th Artillery Brigade (41st CAA, Central Military District [CMD]) are reportedly operating in the Pokrovsk direction.[lxxxix]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Novopavlivka direction but did not advance on January 29.

Russian forces attacked northeast of Novopavlivka near Muravka and Novomykolaivka and south of Novopavlivka near Filiya and Dachne on January 28 and 29.[xc]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Oleksandrivka direction but did not advance on January 29.

Russian forces attacked northeast of Oleksandrivka near Ivanivka, Oleksandrohrad, and Andriivka-Klevtsove and southeast of Oleksandrivka near Verbove and Oleksiivka on January 29.[xci]

The Ukrainian General Staff reported on January 29 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian drone control point in occupied Novohryhorivka (southeast of Oleksandrivka and approximately 10 kilometers from the front line) on the night of January 28 to 29.[xcii]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 36th Motorized Rifle Brigade (29th CAA, Eastern Military District [EMD]) are striking Ukrainian forces in central Pokrovske (north of Oleksandrivka).[xciii]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Hulyaipole direction on January 28 and 29 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked near Hulyaipole itself; northwest of Hulyaipole near Varvarivka, Svyatopetrivka, Olenokostyantynivka, Zelene, and Pryluky and toward Tsvitkove, Ternuvate, and Vozdvyzhivka; north of Hulyaipole near Dobropillya, Danylivka, Nove Zaporizhia, Radisne, and Yehorivka; and southwest of Hulyaipole toward Zaliznychne on January 28 and 29.[xciv]

The Ukrainian General Staff reported on January 29 that Ukrainian forces struck Russian drone control points near Solodke and Rivnopillya (both northeast of Hulyaipole).[xcv] A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed on January 29 that even though Russian forces previously seized the area between Haichur and Yanchur rivers, Ukrainian forces continue to conduct increased small group operations within the area.[xcvi] The milblogger claimed that it is premature to announce the seizure of Ternuvate and claimed that Russian small group activity decreased in the area due to poor weather conditions and the need to reorganize logistics following claimed rapid Russian advances in the area.

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 38th Motorized Rifle Brigade and 189th Motorized Rifle Regiment (both of the 35th Combined Arms Army [CAA], EMD) reportedly continue to operate in Zaporizhia Oblast.[xcvii]

Russian forces recently advanced in western Zaporizhia Oblast.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on January 28 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced northwest of Stepnohirsk (west of Orikhiv).[xcviii]

Russian forces attacked east of Orikhiv near Myrne; southeast of Orikhiv near Mala Tokmachka; west of Orikhiv near Stepove, Stepnohirsk, and Prymorske; and northwest of Orikhiv near Lukyanivske and Pavlivka and toward Novoyakovlivka on January 28 and 29.[xcix]

The Ukrainian General Staff reported on January 29 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian ammunition depot near occupied Vasylivka (about 13 kilometers behind the frontline) on the night of January 28 to 29.[c]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Shaman detachment of the Russian 1455th Motorized Rifle Regiment (reportedly of the 42nd Motorized Rifle Division, 58th CAA, Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Komyshuvakha (northwest of Orikhiv).[ci] Drone operators of the 7th Airborne (VDV) Division reportedly continue to strike Ukrainian forces near Prymorske and north of Stepnohirsk.[cii] Interceptor drone operators of the 4th Military Base (58th CAA) are reportedly intercepting Ukrainian heavy bomber drones in the Orikhiv direction.[ciii] Drone operators and other elements of the 239th Separate Reconnaissance Battalion (19th Motorized Rifle Division, 58th CAA) reportedly continue to operate in the Zaporizhia direction.[civ]

Russian forces continued limited ground assaults in the Kherson direction on January 29 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked in the Kherson direction, including east of Kherson City near the Antonivskyi Bridge, on January 29.[cv]

The Ukrainian General Staff reported on January 29 that Ukrainian forces struck Russian drone control points near occupied Pidstepne (east of Kherson City).[cvi]

A Russian milblogger claimed on January 29 that Russian forces continue to strike critical infrastructure in the Kherson direction regardless of reports of a moratorium on strikes against energy infrastructure.[cvii]

Order of Battle: Molniya-2 fixed-wing first-person view (FPV) drone operators and multiple launch rocket system (MLRS) artillery elements of the Russian 98th VDV Division, including its 217th VDV Regiment, reportedly continue to strike Ukrainian positions in Kherson Oblast.[cviii]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Russian forces conducted a series of drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of January 28 to 29. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 105 Shahed-type, Gerbera-type, Italmas-type, and other drones — of which roughly 70 were Shaheds — from the directions of Bryansk and Oryol cities; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; occupied Hvardiiske, Crimea; and occupied Donetsk City.[cix] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 84 drones and that 18 drones struck seven locations. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces struck industrial and civilian infrastructure in Odesa and Zaporizhia oblasts.[cx]

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

The Belarusian State Border Committee stated on January 28 that Belarus plans to build five new border outposts along the international border with Ukraine in 2026 as part of Belarusian and Union State border security measures.[cxi] Belarus is also reportedly building a large military training ground near Prybor, Gomel Oblast, close to Ukraine’s northern border.[cxii]

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.