Data cutoff: 12pm on January 24

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

For more information on ISW's map methodology, please view our statement here.

US, Ukrainian, and Russian delegations concluded a second day of trilateral talks in Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates (UAE) on January 24. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky characterized the talks as constructive and reported on January 24 that the delegations discussed parameters for ending Russia's war in Ukraine, the necessity of US involvement in ending the war, and security guarantees necessary to end the war.[i] Zelensky stated that Ukraine is ready to hold another round of trilateral meetings if all sides are willing, potentially during the week of January 25 to 31. A source in the Ukrainian delegation told Ukrainian broadcaster Suspilne that the trilateral talks on January 24 were three hours long and that senior White House officials characterized the meeting as "productive."[ii]

Kremlin officials continue to respond to ongoing negotiations by reiterating Russia's commitment to Russian President Vladimir Putin's original maximalist war aims in Ukraine while attempting to rhetorically shift the blame for the Kremlin's own reticence onto Ukraine. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov stated on January 23 that it is important to implement the "Anchorage formula" as negotiations continue.[iii] Kremlin officials often attempt to exploit the lack of clarity about the outcome of the August 2025 US-Russian Alaska Summit to claim that the summit achieved a joint US-Russian understanding and agreement to end the war in Ukraine, and present the agreement in ways that benefit Russia -- including by obfuscating Russia's own efforts to impede the peace process.[iv] The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) told Kremlin-affiliated outlet Izvestiya on January 24 that Russia insists that Ukraine must end its alleged prosecution of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church Moscow Patriarchate (UOC MP), the Kremlin-controlled Russian Orthodox Church's (ROC) subordinate element in Ukraine, as a condition for peace in Ukraine.[v] Kremlin officials frequently demand that any military or diplomatic end to the war addresses the war's "root causes."[vi] "The Kremlin has frequently used the concept of "root causes" as shorthand to call back to its original maximalist war justifications and demands, and has cloaked the issue of the UOC MP in this root causes language.[vii] The Kremlin has long controlled the ROC's spiritual doctrine and has used the UOC MP as an extension of the Kremlin and a tool of Russia's hybrid warfare that seeks to enforce Russian ideologies in Ukrainian society and persecute religious minorities in occupied Ukraine.[viii] Russian MFA Spokesperson Maria Zakharova also seized on an alleged Ukrainian strike in occupied Kherson Oblast to claim that Ukraine took steps to escalate the war and is unwilling to negotiate, setting conditions for Russia's own rejection of a peace deal that does not meet all of its demands.[ix] The Kremlin has used the allegation of Ukrainian strikes to justify and deflect blame away from Russia for stalled peace negotiations, including with the claimed strike against Putin's residence in Novgorod Oblast on December 29, and in occupied Khorly, Kherson Oblast on January 1. These dates have each conveniently aligned with peace talks -- including a Putin call with US President Donald Trump.[x] Kremlin officials have continuously and explicitly rejected a peace on any terms other than those Russia dictates.[xi] The Kremlin continues to demonstrate its unwillingness to engage in good faith negotiations to end its war in Ukraine and to portray Ukraine rather than Russia as the impediment in the peace process -- particularly by invoking the ambiguity around the August 2025 Anchorage summit and claimed Ukrainian strikes against Russia and occupied Ukraine.[xii]

Russia launched another combined missile and drone strike overnight on January 23 to 24 primarily targeting Ukrainian energy infrastructure throughout Ukraine, particularly Kyiv City. The Ukrainian Air Force reported on January 24 that Russian forces launched six Iskander-M ballistic missiles/S-300 air defense missiles; two Zirkon hypersonic cruise missiles; 12 Kh-22/32 cruise missiles; one Kh-59/69 cruise missile; and 375 Shahed-type, Gerbera-type, Italmas-type, and other drones, of which roughly 250 were Shaheds.[xiii] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed nine Kh-22/32s, five Iskander-M/S-300s, one Kh-59/69, and 357 drones, that two missiles and 18 drones struck 12 locations, and that there is no information on the location of four missiles. Ukrainian Deputy Prime Minister and Development Minister Oleksiy Kuleba reported that Russian strikes killed one civilian and wounded dozens in Kyiv City and left over 800,000 subscribers in Kyiv City and over 400,000 subscribers in Chernihiv City without power.[xiv] Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces launched 25 Shaheds and at least one Iskander-M against Kharkiv City overnight, injuring at least 31 civilians and damaging at least 44 buildings, including a civilian infrastructure facility.[xv] Ukraine's Energy Ministry reported that Russian strikes also caused power outages in Kyiv, Chernihiv, and Kharkiv oblasts and that hourly power outages are in effect for most of Ukraine.[xvi]

Russia's intensified long-range strike campaign targeting Ukrainian energy infrastructure throughout Fall 2025 and Winter 2025-2026 has significantly degraded Ukraine's energy grid, disproportionately effecting Ukrainian civilians. Maksym Timchenko, the head of Ukraine’s largest private energy company DTEK, told Reuters on January 23 that Russian strikes against DTEK energy infrastructure have degraded DTEK's total power generation capacity by 60 to 70 percent and caused damages estimated at $64 to 70 billion to repair.[xvii] Timchenko stated that the temperature in Ukraine has fluctuated between negative 15 and 20 degrees Celsius (five to negative four degrees Fahrenheit) for the past two weeks. Timchenko stated that Russian strikes cause rolling blackouts that leave Ukrainian civilians with only three to four hours of power per day. Russia likely intends to degrade Ukraine's power generation capacity and ability to provide Ukrainians with heat in the dead of winter, including by attempting to split Ukraine’s energy grid in half and create energy islands that are cut off from Ukraine’s electricity generation, deliveries, and transmission systems.[xviii] Russia began increasing the intensity of its strikes against Ukraine's energy infrastructure throughout Fall 2025 into Winter 2025-2026 with the goal of causing large scale disruptions to the Ukrainian power system, in what ISW continues to assess is a Russian effort to degrade Ukraine’s energy security and industrial capacity and demoralize the Ukrainian populace.[xix]

Russia’s continued devastating strike campaign against Ukrainian energy infrastructure emphasizes Ukraine’s urgent need for additional air defense systems and munitions for a holistic and well-rounded air defense umbrella. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on January 23 that US President Donald Trump agreed to provide Ukraine with an unspecified number of PAC-3 interceptors for Patriot air defense systems to combat Russia's continued long-range strike campaign.[xx] Ukrainian Air Force Spokesperson Colonel Yuriy Ihnat recently noted that Ukraine's shootdown rate of Russia's long-range strike packages is high, but that the drones and missiles that breach Ukraine's air defenses cause extensive damage.[xxi] Russian forces often launch no or few missiles for multiple days in a row before launching strike packages with a significant quantity of missiles, likely stockpiling missiles between strike series in order to maximize damage with larger strike packages.[xxii] Russia has also been equipping Shahed drones with cluster warheads and mines that detonate after being downed, innovating strike tactics, and adapting Shahed technology to enable the drones to change targets in real time--all of which have the effect of maximizing the damage Shahed drones can inflict on Ukrainian targets.[xxiii] Russia’s increasingly large strike packages highlight the critical importance of Western assistance in bolstering Ukraine’s air defense capabilities, particularly with US-made Patriot air defense systems that can effectively counter Russian ballistic missile threats.[xxiv] Ukraine also requires partner support to maintain a diverse air defense umbrella comprised of not only high-end Patriot systems, but also interceptor drones, well-equipped mobile fire groups, and fighter jets.

Independent reporting continues to indicate that Russian forces and authorities continue systematically abusing Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs) in Russian detention in violation of international law. Human Rights Watch published a report on December 11, 2025, detailing Russia's systematic physical and psychological abuse and torture of Ukrainian POWs, including interviews with six Ukrainian POWs, all captured in 2022, and who spent two to three years in Russian detention.[xxv] All six of the interviewed Ukrainian POWs described Russian forces committing violence against the POWs at all stages of the detention process between the frontline and more permanent detention facilities in Russia and occupied Ukraine. One of the POWs detailed a Russian battlefield commander torturing him for information about the Ukrainian military in a near-rear areas. All six POWs described how Russia frequently transferred personnel between permanent detention facilities and that the guards would beat the POWs upon their arrival at the new facility. Four of the POWs stated that Russian military personnel committed violent acts against POWs, not just sdetention facility staff. Five of the six POWs stated that Russian forces committed sexual violence against them, including rape. Human Rights Watch reported that Russian forces and authorities inflicted the worst abuse against Ukrainians who joined the military before 2022, soldiers with high ranks or serving in especially valuable roles, and against younger soldiers. Human Rights Watch reported that Russian forces and authorities steal the personal items and clothing from POWs, and four of the POWs described being left without adequate clothing items. Human Rights Watch detailed that Russian authorities deny POWs food, hygiene items, and clothing in adequate amounts and conditions; deny POWs sufficient time and facilities for personal hygiene; and overcrowd the detention facilities, contributing to significant health problems, including malnutrition and "catastrophic" weight loss among the POWs. Human Rights Watch reported that Russia aims to break the personality and dignity of the Ukrainian POWs.

Thousands of Ukrainians remain in Russian detention and are subject to this abuse. The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) estimated on September 22, 2025 that Russian forces took at least 13,500 Ukrainian soldiers as POWs between February 2022 and September 2025 and that between 6,000 to 10,000 remained in Russian detention as of September 2025.[xxvi] The OSCE noted that Russia has at least 222 detention sites for Ukrainian POWs, most of which are in occupied Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts and the remainder are largely scattered throughout Russia. The OSCE reported that Russia detained Ukrainian POWs and civilians for "countering the special military operation" -- Russia's vague shorthand to avoid acknowledging that it's illegal invasion of Ukraine is a war –in order to deny Ukrainian POWs the protections afforded to persons considered hors de combat in international law. Russian forces have sharply increased extrajudicial executions of Ukrainian POWs on the frontline since late 2024 in violation of international law, particularly in areas of heavy combat.[xxvii] ISW continues to assess that the Russian military command is endorsing and sometimes ordering war crimes on the battlefield and that Russia is torturing and abusing Ukrainian civilian prisoners as part of the wider military modus operandi.[xxviii]

Russian milbloggers continue to highlight the inconsistency between the Russian military command’s claims of advances and the reality on the battlefield particularly in the Kupyansk direction. A Russian milblogger published an image on January 23 reportedly showing encircled Russian servicemembers in central Kupyansk, reporting that Ukrainian forces have encircled the servicemembers for the past three months and that Russian forces cannot reinforce or resupply the position.[xxix] The milblogger stated that the Russian servicemembers have managed to hold their position by retrieving ammunition and weapons from dead Ukrainian soldiers. Another Russian milblogger responded to this report by criticizing the gap between the Russian military command’s exaggerated claims of Russian control of Kupyansk and the reality for Russian forces in the town.[xxx] The milblogger further criticized the Russian General Staff for demanding exaggerated claims of advances from subordinate echelons that sometimes result in an eight-to-10-kilometer gap between claimed Russian advances and the real frontline, including in the Pokrovsk and Slovyansk directions and in western Zaporizhia Oblast.[xxxi] Another milblogger criticized the Russian military command on January 17 for the discrepancy between the claimed battlefield victories and the actual situation for Russian forces on the ground.[xxxii] The milblogger criticized the Russian military command for wasting personnel on flag-raising missions in areas that Russian forces do not control to support these claimed advances, but noted that these Russian personnel frequently die on such missions. A third Kremlin-affiliated milblogger warned on January 17 that the situation with inflated gains in the Kostyantynivka direction could become as bad as the Kupyansk direction, publishing a map showing the discrepancy between the inflated claims and the "actual" extent of Russian advances in the area (actual as claimed by the milblogger, which is likely also somewhat inflated).[xxxiii] Russian milbloggers have increasingly been rejecting the alternate battlefield reality that Russian President Vladimir Putin and senior Russian military commanders are trying to create, but the Russian military command appears to remain committed to this alternative reality.[xxxiv]

Ukrainian Defense Minister Mykhailo Fedorov appointed former Deputy Digital Transformation Minister Valeria Ionan as a Ukrainian Ministry of Defense (MoD) advisor on international projects.[xxxv] Fedorov stated that Ionan will focus on systemic international assistance to Ukraine's defense projects and strengthening existing and creating new partnerships.

Key Takeaways:

• US, Ukrainian, and Russian delegations concluded a second day of trilateral talks in Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates (UAE) on January 24.
• Kremlin officials continue to respond to ongoing negotiations by reiterating Russia's commitment to Russian President Vladimir Putin's original maximalist war aims in Ukraine while attempting to rhetorically shift the blame for the Kremlin's own reticence onto Ukraine.
• Russia launched another combined missile and drone strike overnight on January 23 to 24 primarily targeting Ukrainian energy infrastructure throughout Ukraine, particularly Kyiv City.
• Russia's intensified long-range strike campaign targeting Ukrainian energy infrastructure throughout Fall 2025 and Winter 2025-2026 has significantly degraded Ukraine's energy grid, disproportionately effecting Ukrainian civilians.
• Russia’s continued devastating strike campaign against Ukrainian energy infrastructure emphasizes Ukraine’s urgent need for additional air defense systems and munitions for a holistic and well-rounded air defense umbrella.
• Independent reporting continues to indicate that Russian forces and authorities continue systematically abusing Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs) in Russian detention in violation of international law.
• Thousands of Ukrainians remain in Russian detention and are subject to this abuse.
• Russian milbloggers continue to highlight the inconsistency between the Russian military command’s claims of advances and the reality on the battlefield particularly in the Kupyansk direction.
• Ukrainian Defense Minister Mykhailo Fedorov appointed former Deputy Digital Transformation Minister Valeria Ionan as a Ukrainian Ministry of Defense (MoD) advisor on international projects.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area. Russian forces recently advanced in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area and near Slovyansk.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.  

• Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
• Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis
• Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
• Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
• Significant Activity in Belarus

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Fires continued to burn for the second day in a row after a Ukrainian drone strike against Russian oil infrastructure in Penza Oblast. Geolocated footage published on January 24 shows fires burning for the second day in a row after Ukrainian drones struck the Penzanefteprodukt oil depot in Penza City, Penza Oblast on the night of January 22 to January 23.[xxxvi] Penza Oblast Governor Oleg Melnichenko stated on January 24 that Russian firefighters are still extinguishing a fire at the oil depot following the Ukrainian drone strike.[xxxvii]

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in Sumy Oblast along the international border)

Russian sources claimed that Russian forces continued offensive operations in Kursk and northern Sumy oblasts on January 24.

Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces continued offensive operations in unspecified areas of Kursk and northern Sumy oblasts on January 23 and 24.[xxxviii]

The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Sumy direction reported on January 23 that Russian forces are reducing the intensity of ground assaults while increasing the tempo of drone and artillery strikes.[xxxix] The spokesperson reported that Russian forces appear to be using increased strikes to assemble assault groups, which Ukrainian forces rapidly detect and target, effectively turning assembly areas into “kill zones” (areas of elevated drone strike risk).

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border to create a defensible buffer zone with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on January 24 but did not make confirmed advances.

Assessed Russian infiltrations: Geolocated footage published on January 23 shows Ukrainian forces striking Russian positions in northwestern Symynivka (northeast of Kharkiv City) after what ISW assesses was a Russian infiltration mission that did not change the control of terrain or the forward edge of the battle area (FEBA) at this time.[xl]

Unconfirmed claims: The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on January 24 that Russian forces seized Starytsya (northeast of Kharkiv City).[xli] The Russian Northern Grouping of Forces and Russian milbloggers credited elements of the Russian 7th Motorized Rifle Regiment (11th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) and of the 9th Motorized Rifle Regiment (18th Motorized Rifle Division, 11th AC) with seizing Starytsya.[xlii] A Russian milblogger reportedly affiliated with the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces rejected the Russian MoD's claim that Russian forces seized Starytsya, however, and claimed that the settlement remains a contested "gray zone."[xliii]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Kharkiv City near Starytsya, Prylipka, Vovchansk, Vovchanski Khutory, Kruhle, Nesterne, Hrafske, and Dehtyarne on January 23 and 24.[xliv]

Derhachi City Military Administration Head Vyacheslav Zadorenko reported on January 24 that Russian forces are deliberately using precision guided munitions and first-person view (FPV) drones against civilians in northern Kharkiv Oblast in order to train Russian FPV drone operators to more effectively strike Ukrainian forces in the future – echoing the tactic of Russian “human safari” drone strikes against civilians in the Kherson direction.[xlv] Zadorenko noted that Russian forces are also conducting "double tap" strikes against Ukrainian rescue workers responding to these drone strikes against Ukrainian civilians.

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 6th Radiation, Chemical, and Biological Defense Regiment (under the operational control of the Northern Grouping of Forces) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Ukrainske (northeast of Kharkiv City).[xlvi]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Velykyi Burluk direction on January 24 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced from the international border to eastern Chuhunivka (northeast of Velykyi Burluk).[xlvii]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Velykyi Burluk near Ambarne and Khatnie and toward Chuhunivka on January 23 and 24.[xlviii]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Oskil River (Russian objective: Cross the Oskil River in Kharkiv Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on January 24 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked near and within Kupyansk itself; east of Kupyansk toward Petropavlivka; southeast of Kupyansk near Pishchane; and south of Kupyansk toward Kupyansk-Vuzlovyi on January 23 and 24.[xlix]

Ukrainian Joint Forces Task Force Spokesperson Colonel Viktor Trehubov reported on January 23 that Ukrainian forces finished clearing Kupyansk, that no more than 50 Russian servicemembers remain in the town, and that these Russian servicemembers are concentrated in only a few blocks.[l] The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Kupyansk direction reported on January 23 that a Russian drone dropped a flag on a position within Kupyansk to create the appearance that Russian forces control parts of the town.[li]

Russian forces continued offensive operations southeast of Borova near Druzhelyubivka and Novoyehorivka and south of Borova near Oleksandrivka and toward Korovii Yar on January 23 and 24 but did not advance.[lii]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)

Russian forces recently advanced in the Slovyansk direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on January 24 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in eastern Riznykivka (east of Slovyansk).[liii]

Russian forces attacked near Lyman itself; northwest of Lyman near Novoselivka and Yarova and toward Svyatohirsk and Sosnove; north of Lyman near Drobysheve and Stavky; east of Lyman near Zarichne and Torske; southeast of Lyman near Yampil and Dibrova; northeast of Slovyansk near Zakitne; east of Slovyansk near Riznykivka, Siversk, and Ozerne; and southeast of Slovyansk near Zvanivka and toward Nykyforivka and Bondarne on January 23 and 24.[liv]

The commander of a Ukrainian drone unit operating in the Slovyansk direction reported on January 24 that Russian forces are relying on fireteam infiltration tactics and intensive first-person view (FPV), reconnaissance, and fiber-optic drone use to interdict Ukrainian ground lines of communication (GLOCs).[lv] The commander stated that Russian forces have recently intensified drone strikes against both military and civilian vehicles in frontline towns, including Slovyansk and Mykolaivka (just east of Slovyansk), and extended the “kill zone“ (an area of elevated drone strike risk) to strike railway tracks and Ukrainian rotation routes. The commander noted that Russian forces are moving more openly in rear areas and argued that Ukrainian forces should accordingly prioritize strikes against Russian logistics rather than frontline infantry. The commander added that the Russian forces’ shortage of mechanized vehicles has forced Russian forces to rely on drone-supported infantry assaults to seize positions. The commander noted that Russian infantry carries anti-tank mines to destroy Ukrainian fortified positions.

A non-commissioned officer (NCO) of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Lyman direction reported on January 24 that Russian fireteam infiltration tactics have lost effectiveness in recent months as Ukrainian drone operators have extended the “kill zone” in the brigade's area of responsibility (AoR) to strike Russian infantry on the approaches to Ukrainian positions as well as mortar crews and drone operators in the Russian near rear.[lvi]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 7th Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 2nd Luhansk People's Republic Army Corps [LNR AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) reportedly continue to operate near Siversk and Zakitne.[lvii] Drone operators of the Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies reportedly continue to operate in the Lyman direction.[lviii]

Ukrainian and Russian forces recently advanced in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area.

Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on January 20 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently marginally advanced along the Donetska railway in southeastern Kostyantynivka.[lix]

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on January 21, 22, and 23 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in southeastern Kostyantynivka, northern Ivanopillya (southeast of Kostyantynivka), and north of Yablunivka (southwest of Kostyantynivka).[lx]

Assessed Russian infiltrations: Geolocated footage published on January 23 shows Ukrainian forces striking a Russian-occupied building in eastern Kostyantynivka after what ISW assesses was a Russian infiltration mission that did not change the control of terrain or the forward edge of the battle area (FEBA) at this time.[lxi]

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced west of Illinivka (south of Kostyantynivka).[lxii]

Refinement of areas under Russian claims: Geolocated footage published on January 22, 23, and 24 shows Russian forces striking Ukrainian positions in northern Minkivka (northeast of Kostyantynivka) and east of Berestok (south of Kostyantynivka) and Stepanivka (southwest of Kostyantynivka) – areas where Russian sources previously claimed that Russian forces maintained a presence.[lxiii]

Russian forces attacked near and within Kostyantynivka itself; northeast of Kostyantynivka near Orikhovo-Vasylivka and toward Minkivka; south of Kostyantynivka near Pleshchiivka; southeast of Kostyantynivka near Kleban-Byk and Shcherbynivka; southwest of Kostyantynivka toward Stepanivka and Illinivka; south of Druzhkivka near Rusyn Yar; and southwest of Druzhkivka near Sofiivka and toward Novopavlivka and Pavlivka on January 23 and 24.[lxiv] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked from Pavlivka towards Novopavlivka.[lxv]

Order of Battle: Molniya-2 fixed-wing first-person view (FPV) drone operators of the Russian 103rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (150th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA, SMD) are striking Ukrainian positions east of Berestok.[lxvi] Knyaz Vandal Novgorodsky fiber optic drone operators of the 4th Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd CAA) are striking Ukrainian positions in southeastern Kostyantynivka.[lxvii] Artillery elements of the Fakel Detachment (Russian Volunteer Corps) are striking Ukrainian positions in northern Minkivka.[lxviii] Drone operators of the Chechen 78th Sever-Akhmat Motorized Rifle Regiment (42nd Motorized Rifle Division, 58th CAA, SMD) reportedly continue to strike Ukrainian positions in Kostyantynivka.[lxix] Elements of the 150th Motorized Rifle Division (8th CAA) reportedly continue to operate near Novopavlivka.[lxx] FPV drone operators of the 68th Separate Reconnaissance Battalion of the 20th Motorized Rifle Division (8th CAA) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Druzhkivka, Varvarivka, and Novoandriivka (both west of Druzhkivka).[lxxi] Lancet loitering munition operators of the 238th Artillery Brigade (8th CAA) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Raiske (southwest of Druzhkivka).[lxxii] Drone operators of the Smuglyanka Detachment and Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies are reportedly coordinating airstrikes against Ukrainian positions in Kramatorsk (north of Druzhkivka) with Russian Aerospace Forces (VKS) elements.[lxxiii] FPV drone operators of the 255th Motorized Rifle Regiment (20th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA) reportedly continue to operate in the Kostyantynivka direction.[lxxiv]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Dobropillya tactical area on January 24 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced in northern Toretske (east of Dobropillya).[lxxv]

Russian forces attacked east of Dobropillya near Ivanivka, Toretske, and Novyi Donbas and southeast of Dobropillya near Dorozhnie on January 23 and 24.[lxxvi]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction on January 24 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced west of Rodynske (north of Pokrovsk).[lxxvii]

Russian forces attacked near and within Pokrovsk itself; northwest of Pokrovsk near Hryshyne and toward Shevchenko; north of Pokrovsk near Bilytske and Rodynske; northeast of Pokrovsk near Sukhetske and Krasnyi (Chervonyi) Lyman; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Kotlyne, Udachne, and Molodetske on January 23 and 24.[lxxviii]

Ukrainian 7th Rapid Reaction Corps of the Air Assault Forces Commander Brigadier General Yevhen Lasiychuk reported on January 23 that Ukrainian forces maintain full control over northern Pokrovsk, northern Myrnohrad, Svitle, and Rivne (all east of Pokrovsk).[lxxix] Lasiychuk stated that Ukrainian forces maintain fire control beyond the line of contact in both Myrnohrad and Pokrovsk. Lasiychuk stated that the Russian command often issues unreasonable and arbitrary deadlines to subordinate Russian commanders, such as the command to seize Hryshyne by January 1, 2026. Lasiychuk noted that the open terrain between Hryshyne and Pokrovsk hinders the Russian advance as it renders Russian forces vulnerable to Ukrainian drone strikes. An officer of a Ukrainian drone detachment operating in the Pokrovsk direction reported on January 24 that Russian forces continue to use small-group infiltration tactics to attempt to advance.[lxxx] The officer stated that Russian forces use also motorcycles or all-terrain vehicles (ATVs).

Order of Battle: FPV drone operators of the Russian 80th Sparta Separate Reconnaissance Battalion (51st CAA, formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic [DNR] AC, SMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Vasylivka (northwest of Pokrovsk).[lxxxi]

Russian forces continued offensive operations near Novopavlivka itself and south of Novopavlivka near Filiya on January 23 and 24 but did not advance.[lxxxii]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Oleksandrivka direction on January 24 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced east of Ivanivka (northeast of Oleksandrivka).[lxxxiii]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Oleksandrivka near Zelenyi Hai and Ivanivka on January 23 and 24 but did not advance.[lxxxiv]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Hulyaipole direction on January 24 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked near Hulyaipole itself; northwest of Hulyaipole near Svyatopetrivka; north of Hulyaipole near Zelene, Varvarivka, Nove Zaporizhzhia, and Dobropillya; northeast of Hulyaipole near Zlahoda and Solodke; south of Hulyaipole near Dorozhnyanka; and west of Hulyaipole toward Zaliznychne on January 23 and 24.[lxxxv] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Hulyaipole and Kosivtseve and toward Bratske (both northwest of Hulyaipole).[lxxxvi]

The chief sergeant of a Ukrainian drone battalion operating in the Hulyaipole direction reported on January 23 that Russian forces are infiltrating central Hulyaipole but have not yet consolidated positions within the settlement.[lxxxvii] The chief sergeant stated that Russian forces took advantage of foggy weather to accumulate servicemembers and material on the outskirts of Hulyaipole but that Russian forces have not made significant advances in the Hulyaipole direction for the past month. The chief sergeant stated that the Russian offensive against Hulyaipole has culminated and that Russian forces have been unable to bring artillery and other combat support elements from the rear into Hulyaipole.

Order of Battle: First-person view (FPV) drone operators of the Russian 305th Artillery Brigade (5th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Eastern Military District [EMD]) are striking Ukrainian positions south of Vozdvyzhivka (northwest of Hulyaipole).[lxxxviii] FPV drone operators of the 37th Motorized Rifle Brigade (36th CAA, EMD) are intercepting Ukrainian drones northwest of Solodke.[lxxxix] Elements of the 218th Tank Regiment (127th Motorized Rifle Division, 5th CAA) and the 189th Motorized Rifle Regiment (35th CAA, EMD) reportedly continue to operate in the Zaporizhia direction.[xc]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on January 24 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced along the T-0803 Novofedorivka-Novodanylivka highway in central Novodanylivka (south of Orikhiv).[xci]

Russian forces attacked east of Orikhiv near Myrne; southeast of Orikhiv near Bilohirya; south of Orikhiv near Novodanylivka; west of Orikhiv near Plavni; and northwest of Orikhiv near Prymorske, Stepnohirsk, and Lukyanivske and toward Pavlivka on January 23 and 24.[xcii]

Order of Battle: FPV drone operators of the Russian 291st Motorized Rifle Regiment (42nd Motorized Rifle Division, 58th CAA, Southern Military District [SMD]) reportedly continue to strike Ukrainian positions near Orikhiv.[xciii] Drone operators of the 108th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (7th VDV Division) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Prymorske.[xciv] Drone operators of the 104th VDV Division reportedly continue to operate in the Zaporizhia direction.[xcv]

Russian forces continued limited ground attacks in the Kherson direction on January 24 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked in the Kherson direction, including east of Kherson City near the Antonivskyi Bridge, on January 24.[xcvi]

Order of Battle: FPV drone operators of the Russian 331st Airborne (VDV) Regiment and multiple launch rocket system (MLRS) artillery elements of the 1065th VDV Artillery Regiment (both of the 98th VDV Division) reportedly continue to strike Ukrainian positions in the Kherson direction.[xcvii]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

See topline text for reports on Russian long-range strikes against Ukraine.

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

Belarusian opposition news outlet Flagshtok reported on January 24 that Belarus has begun constructing a large military training ground near the village of Prybor, Gomel Oblast, close to Ukraine’s northern border, with satellite imagery and procurement records confirming that work is underway.[xcviii] Flagshtok reported that the Belarusian government has allocated millions of dollars for site preparation through 2028 while simultaneously building a nearby military town, likely to host the Belarusian Special Operations Forces’ (SSO) new 37th Separate Airborne Assault Brigade.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.