Assessment as of: 4:30pm ET

Data cutoff: 12:00 PM ET on January 21

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

For more information on ISW's map methodology, please view our statement here.

US officials will meet with Ukrainian officials on January 21 and 22 and with Russian President Vladimir Putin on January 22 to continue peace negotiations. US Special Envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff met with lead Russian negotiator and Russian Direct Investment Fund (RDIF) CEO Kirill Dmitriev on the sidelines of the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland on January 20, and US President Trump stated on January 21 that he will meet with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky at the forum on January 22.[1] Witkoff stated that he and former Senior Advisor to the US President Jared Kushner would meet with Ukrainian officials, including Ukrainian Defense Council Secretary Rustem Umerov, on the evening of January 21 and will meet with Putin in Russia on January 22.[2] Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov confirmed that Witkoff and Kushner will meet with Putin on January 22.[3] Witkoff stated that negotiations on the 20-point peace plan are "down to land deals now."[4] Witkoff stated that he and Kushner will travel to the United Arab Emirates to meet with "working groups" after the meeting in Russia.

The Kremlin remains committed to its original war aims and is not publicly showing any new willingness to commit to meaningful compromises to end its war against Ukraine. Bloomberg reported on January 21 that unspecified sources stated that Putin received a draft peace plan earlier in January 2025 from Dmitriev and that the Kremlin viewed the proposal as a significant step forward even though it fell short of a finalized agreement.[5] The sources noted that many issues that are important to Russia are either not included in the draft plan or framed in "unsatisfactory" ways. Bloomberg's sources stated that US recognition of occupied Crimea and other unspecified occupied territories of Ukraine as under Russian control is a priority for Putin and that Russia remains opposed to the deployment of NATO troops to Ukraine as part of future security guarantees for Ukraine. The sources stated that Russia is seeking protections for the Russian language and the Russian Orthodox Church (a Kremlin-controlled arm of influence) in Ukraine.

Russian Security Council Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev stated on January 21 that Russia is "reclaim[ing] its own lands" in Ukraine through the war and Russia's illegal, sham referendums in occupied Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts in 2022.[6] Medvedev claimed that these lands and people have been part of Russia "for centuries." Medvedev's statements are in line with repeated Kremlin statements, including those calling for Ukraine to cede  "Novorossiya" to Russia   — referring to an invented region that Kremlin officials often claim is “integral” to Russia and that includes not only Crimea and the four oblasts that Russia has illegally annexed, but also Kharkiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Mykolaiv, and Odesa oblasts. The US-proposed 28-point peace plan only allowed for Russian occupation of Crimea, all of Luhansk and Donetsk oblasts, and the currently occupied parts of Zaporizhia and Kherson oblasts, requiring Russia to cede occupied territories outside of these five regions, including in Kharkiv, Mykolaiv, and Dnipropetrovsk oblasts.[7]

Russia's position remains fundamentally unchanged, as Kremlin officials have repeatedly called for a future peace settlement to address the alleged "root causes" of the war, including Ukraine's alleged discrimination against Russian-speakers and the Russian Orthodox Church in Ukraine.[8] Kremlin officials have also repeatedly rejected the use of foreign troops in security guarantees for post-war Ukraine — a core element of the peace plan that the Trump administration has thus far negotiated. The Kremlin is attempting to position itself as a reliable negotiating partner interested in peace while indicating that its commitment to achieving its original war aims is unchanged.

Reports of the draft list of the top United Russia candidates for the September 2026 State Duma elections have reportedly generated internal Kremlin discussions that not only reflect factional maneuvering to gain power but also show the Kremlin's concern about the Russian public's attitude toward a protracted war. Russian opposition outlet Meduza reported on January 21 that sources close to the Russian Presidential Administration and United Russia stated that the recently reported list of top five leaders to represent United Russia in the September 2026 elections is not finalized and that the content and even the format of the list could still significantly change.[9] Meduza's sources stated that Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov and lead Russian negotiator and Russian Direct Investment Fund (RDIF) CEO Kirill Dmitriev could become candidates on the list. Russian outlets recently reported that Russian Security Council Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev was on the list, and Meduza's sources stated that Medvedev is trying to position himself at the top in order to change his image in the eyes of the Russian elite and public away from being seen an "internet troll" in an "obscure position."[10] Meduza's sources noted that some Russian officials do not support Medvedev's inclusion on the list, with Russian Presidential Administration Deputy Head Sergei Kiriyenko reportedly fearful that Medvedev's inclusion would strengthen Medvedev's position as a potential successor to Russian President Vladimir Putin and Duma Speaker Vyacheslav Volodin threatened by Medvedev possibly replacing him in that role. Meduza sources stated that United Russia will struggle with Medvedev at the top the list due to his "controversial image" and "clearly pro-war" position as the Russian people are "tired of war" and that other war-related figures on the list could exacerbate the perception of United Russia as a "party of war." A source assessed that the Kremlin political bloc is including people related to the war on the list in order to please Putin, who wants to see war-related figures emerge as the new elite in Russia. A source stated that the list will need to completely change if there is peace or a truce in Ukraine, including possibly to include Dmitriev (likely since he has been leading the Russian negotiating team in peace talks). Meduza's sources also reported that there are disagreements within the Kremlin about United Russia's future platform and ideological messaging, with some calling for a platform of self-sacrifice and collectivism while Kiriyenko is advocating for a campaign with "hints at post-war development." Meduza's sources largely presented internal debates about the United Russia list as centered around concerns about Russian domestic attitudes about the war, suggesting the Russian inner circle is divided about the wisdom of campaigning on a platform directly or indirectly promoting a protracted war in Ukraine and calling for more sacrifices from the Russian people.

The United States seized another oil tanker involved with shipping sanctioned Russian oil off the coast of Venezuela. US Southern Command reported on January 20 that it seized the Sagitta tanker as part of US President Donald Trump’s quarantine of sanctioned vessels in the Caribbean Sea.[11] The US Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) sanctioned the Sagitta in January 2025 for transporting Russian crude oil.[12] Ukraine’s Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported that the vessel sailed under the flag of Guyana as of January 16 and that the tanker exported Russian oil and oil products, including to the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and India.[13] Data from the Starboard Maritime Intelligence ship-tracking platform indicates that the ship has sailed under both the Panamanian and Guyanese flags and that the ship has not turned on its automatic identification systems (AIS) signal since May 11, 2025, at the entrance to the Strait of Hormuz.

Key Takeaways:

• US officials will meet with Ukrainian officials on January 21 and 22 and with Russian President Vladimir Putin on January 22 to continue peace negotiations.
• The Kremlin remains committed to its original war aims and is not publicly showing any new willingness to commit to meaningful compromises to end its war against Ukraine.
• Reports of the draft list of the top United Russia candidates for the September 2026 State Duma elections have reportedly generated internal Kremlin discussions that not only reflect factional maneuvering to gain power but also show the Kremlin's concern about the Russian public's attitude toward a protracted war.
• The United States seized another oil tanker involved with shipping sanctioned Russian oil off the coast of Venezuela.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced in western Zaporizhia Oblast. Russian forces recently advanced in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area and in western Zaporizhia Oblast.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.    

• Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
• Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis
• Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
• Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
• Significant Activity in Belarus

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Ukrainian forces may have struck Russian energy infrastructure overnight on January 20 to 21. Footage published on January 20 shows explosions and fires at the Oryol Thermal Power Plant (TPP) in Oryol City, after a likely Ukrainian strike.[14] Oryol Oblast Governor Andrei Klychkov acknowledged that UAF strikes against Oryol City energy infrastructure caused power and water outages in Oryol City.[15]

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in Sumy Oblast along the international border)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Sumy Oblast on January 21 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked in unspecified areas of Kursk and Sumy oblasts on January 20 and 21.[16]

The Ukrainian 8th Airborne Assault Corps reported on January 21 that Ukrainian forces struck and destroyed a Russian Buk M-2 and Buk M-3 air defense systems in the Sumy direction and that the combined cost of both systems is roughly $70 million.[17]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions in Sumy Oblast.[18]

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border to create a defensible buffer zone with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on January 21 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced within central Vovchanski Khutory,  south of Lyman, and near Starytsya, Symynivka, and Dehtyarne (all northeast of Kharkiv City).[19]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk, Vilcha, Lyman, Nesterne, Kruhle, Hrafske, Dehtyarne, and Symynivka and toward Izbytske, on January 20 and 21.[20]  A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near the southeastern outskirts of Vovchansk.[21]

The Ukrainian 16th Army Corps reported on January 21 that elements of the Russian 82nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (69th Motorized Rifle Division, 6th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) operating near Synelnykove (northeast of Kharkiv City) are struggling to establish communications and to determine boundaries of the areas of responsibility between individual units, resulting in friendly fire and casualties.[22]

A Russian milblogger reportedly affiliated with the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces downplayed the Russian cross-border attack into Dehtyarne (along the Kharkiv-Belgorod Oblast international border).[23] The milblogger noted that Russian forces have conducted cross-border attacks in northern Ukraine several times in recent weeks. The milblogger asserted that the international border area is porous such that both Ukrainian and Russian forces can cross the border and seize settlements, but that Russia's problem is not crossing the border but rather exploiting these advances to reach operational depths. The milblogger noted that Russian forces do not have sufficient reserves to stretch Ukrainian forces with these attacks without stretching their own forces. The milblogger equated the personnel cost of one cross-border attack to that of one rotation of personnel in the border area. The milblogger's comments are consistent with ISW's assessments.[24]

Order of Battle: A Russian milblogger credited elements of the Russian 27th Motorized Rifle Division (2nd CAA, Central Military District [CMD]) with the seizure of Dehtyarne, which ISW assesses that Russian forces seized as of January 16.[25] First-person view (FPV) drone operators of the Chechen Akhmat Spetsnaz Vakha Battalion and of the 245th Motorized Rifle Regiment (47th Tank Division, 1st Guards Tank Army [GTA], Moscow Military District [MMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces in Kharkiv Oblast.[26]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Velykyi Burluk direction on January 21 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced northeast of Hryhorivka (northeast of Velykyi Burluk).[27]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Velykyi Burluk near Milove, Ambarne, and Khatnie and toward Chuhunivka and southeast of Velykyi Burluk near Dvorichanske on January 20 and 21.[28]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Oskil River (Russian objective: Cross the Oskil River in Kharkiv Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on January 21 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked near and within Kupyansk itself; northeast of Kupyansk near Krasne Pershe and Novovasylivka; east of Kupyansk near Podoly and toward Petropavlivka; and southeast of Kupyansk near Pishchane and toward Kurylivka on January 20 and 21.[29]

Order of Battle: First-person view (FPV) drone operators of the Russian 68th Motorized Rifle Division (6th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) reportedly continue to strike Ukrainian positions in Kharkiv Oblast, likely referring to the Kupyansk direction.[30] 

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Borova direction on January 21 bur did not advance.

Russian forces attacked north of Borova near Bohuslavka, southeast of Borova near Olhivka, Tverdokhlibove, Novoserhiivka, and Novomykhailivka, south of Borova near Korovii Yar, and southwest of Borova near Oleksandrivka on January 20 and 21.[31]

Ukraine's 10th Army Corps on January 20 denied Russian claims that Russian forces seized Novoplatonivka (north of Borova) and reported that Ukrainian forces control the settlement.[32]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Slovyansk direction on January 21 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced southeast of Zakitne (northeast of Slovyansk).[33]

Russian forces attacked near Lyman itself; northwest of Lyman near Stavky and toward Svyatohirsk; northeast of Lyman near Drobysheve and Zarichne;  southeast of Lyman near Dibrova, Ozerne, and Yampil; northeast of Slovyansk near Dronivka and Zakitne; east of Slovyansk near Riznykivka; and southeast of Slovyansk near Pazeno and Bondarne on January 20 and 21.[34]

A Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces battalion operating in the Slovyansk direction reported on January 20 that Russian forces continue attempts to seize Dronivka and advance to Zakitne and Kryvyi Luka (east of Slovyansk), but that Ukrainian forces have fire control over Russian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) forcing Russian forces to travel considerable distances or attempt to infiltrate through kill zones on motorcycles and all terrain vehicles (ATVs).[35]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 7th Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 2nd Luhansk People's Republic Army Corps [LNR AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) reportedly continue to operate near Zakitne (northeast of Slovyansk) and Siversk (east of Slovyansk).[36] Drone operators and other elements of the Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies and 16th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff's Main Directorate [GRU]) are reportedly operating in the Lyman direction.[37]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on January 20 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced north of the T-0504 Kostyantynivka-Pokrovsk highway north of Stupochky (east of Kostyantynivka).[38]

Assessed Russian infiltrations: Geolocated footage published on January 20 and 21 shows Ukrainian forces striking Russian forces in northeastern Kostyantynivka and south of Illinivka (west of Kostyantynivka) after what ISW assesses were both Russian infiltration missions that did not change the control of terrain or the forward edge of the battle area (FEBA) at this time.[39]

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced east of Novopavlivka (southwest of Druzhkivka).[40]

Refinement of areas under Russian claims: Geolocated footage published on January 21 shows drone operators of the Russian 2nd Motorized Rifle Battalion of the 103rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (150th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA, SMD) striking Ukrainian positions north of Kleban-Byk (south of Kostyantynivka) – an area where Russian sources previously claimed that Russian forces maintained a presence.[41]

Russian forces attacked near Kostyantynivka itself; east of Kostyantynivka near Predtechyne and Stupochky; southeast of Kostyantynivka near Pleshchiivka; south of Kostyantynivka near Ivanopillya and Shcherbynivka and toward Berestok; southwest of Kostyantynivka near Stepanivka; west of Kostyantynivka toward Illinivka; and southwest of Druzhkivka toward Sofiivka, Novopavlivka, and Pavlivka on January 20 and 21.[42]

Order of Battle: FPV drone operators of the Russian 68th Reconnaissance Battalion (20th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA) reportedly continue to strike Ukrainian forces near Mykolaipillya (south of Druzhkivka).[43] FPV drone operators of the 150th Motorized Rifle Division are striking Ukrainian positions in northern Torske (southwest of Druzhkivka).[44] Artillery elements of the 1st Krasnodar Battalion of the 238th Artillery Brigade (8th CAA) and reconnaissance drone operators of the 439th Rocket Artillery Brigade (8th CAA) are reportedly spotting and striking Ukrainian positions near Illinivka.[45] Elements of the 255th Motorized Rifle Regiment (20th Motorized Rifle Division) reportedly continue to operate in the Kostyantynivka direction.[46] FPV drone operators of the Chechen 78th Sever-Akhmat Motorized Rifle Regiment (42nd Motorized Rifle Division, 58th CAA, SMD) reportedly continue to strike Ukrainian forces in Kostyantynivka.[47]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Dobropillya tactical area on January 21 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northeast of Dobropillya toward Kucheriv Yar; east of Dobropillya near Nove Shakhove, Shakhove, Ivanivka, Toretske, and Novyi Donbas; and southeast of Dobropillya near Toretske on January 20 and 21.[48] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Vilne (east of Dobropillya), Shakhove, and toward Kucheriv Yar.[49]

Order of Battle: Drone operators and artillery elements of the Russian 150th Motorized Rifle Division (8th CAA) reportedly continue to operate in the Dobropillya tactical area.[50]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction on January 21 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced west of Rodynske (north of Pokrovsk) and north of Pokrovsk.[51]

Russian forces attacked near and within Pokrovsk itself; northwest of Pokrovsk near Hryshyne and toward Serhiivka; north of Pokrovsk near Bilytske and Rodynske; northeast of Pokrovsk near Sukhetske, Chervonyi (Krasnyi) Lyman, and Zatyshok; east of Pokrovsk near Myrnohrad; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Kotlyne, Udachne, Molodetske and Novopidhorodne on January 20 and 21.[52]

The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Pokrovsk direction reported on January 21 that Russian forces continue attempts to infiltrate in small groups of two to three servicemembers in the Pokrovsk direction but that Ukrainian forces have established a multikilometer "kill zone" (an area of elevated drone strike risk) around Pokrovsk.[53]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 27th Motorized Rifle Division (2nd CAA, Central Military District [CMD]) are reportedly operating near Hryshyne.[54]

Russian forces continued offensive operations near Novopavlivka itself and south of Novopavlivka near Filiya and Dachne on January 20 and 21 but did not advance.[55]

Neither Ukrainian nor Russian sources reported ground activity in the Oleksandrivka direction on January 21.

The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Oleksandrivka direction reported on January 21 that both Ukrainian and Russian forces are using unmanned ground vehicles (UGVs) and drones in the brigade's area of responsibility (AoR).[56] The spokesperson stated that Russian forces have a high quantity of personnel to conduct assaults but that 95 percent of Russian attacks are unsuccessful.

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Hulyaipole direction on January 21 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked near Hulyaipole itself; northwest of Hulyaipole toward Ternuvate; north of Hulyaipole near Yehorivka and Nove Zaporizhzhia, Dobropillya, Varvarivka, and Zelene; northeast of Hulyaipole near Zlahoda; and south of Hulyaipole near Dorozhnyanka on January 20 and 21.[57] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Hulyaipole, Blahodatne, Bratske, (both northwest of Hulyaipole) and  Zaliznychne (west of Hulyaipole).[58]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 394th Motorized Rifle Regiment (127th Motorized Rifle Division, 5th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly operating west of Hulyaipole.[59] Drone operators and other elements of the 57th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (5th CAA) and of the 218th Tank Regiment (127th Motorized Rifle Division) reportedly continue to operate in the Hulyaipole direction.[60]

Ukrainian and Russian forces recently advanced in western Zaporizhia Oblast.

Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on January 20 shows Ukrainian forces clearing Russian-occupied buildings in central Stepnohirsk (west of Orikhiv) and geolocated footage published on January 21 shows Russian forces striking Ukrainian positions in central Stepnohirsk – indicating that Ukrainian forces advanced in the area on a previous date.[61]  ISW did not previously extend Russian advances to this area given the lack of available video evidence that would have indicated Russian forces advanced into central Stepnohirsk.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on January 21 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in western Bilohirya (southeast of Orikhiv).[62]

Russian forces attacked west of Orikhiv near Stepnohirsk and Prymorske on January 20 and 21.[63]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 247th Airborne (VDV) Regiment are striking Ukrainian positions in central Stepnohirsk.[64] Drone operators and other elements of the 71st Motorized Rifle Regiment and 50th Self-Propelled Artillery Regiment (both of the 42nd Motorized Rifle Division, 58th CAA, Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating near Novodanylivka (south of Orikhiv).[65] Elements of the 7th VDV Division reportedly continue to operate in the Zaporizhia direction, including near Prymorske.[66]

Neither Ukrainian nor Russian sources reported ground activity in the Kherson direction on January 20 and 21.

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 229th and 331st VDV regiments (both of the 98th VDV Division) are reportedly operating in the Kherson direction.[67]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Russian forces conducted a series of missile and drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of January 20 to 21. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched one Iskander-M ballistic missile from occupied Crimea and 97 Shahed-type, Gerbera-type and other drones — of which roughly 70 were Shahed-type drones — from the directions of Kursk and Oryol cities; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; occupied Cape Chauda, Crimea; and occupied Donetsk City.[68] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 84 drones, that 13 drones and the ballistic missile struck 11 locations, and that drone debris impacted one location. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces struck civilian, residential, industrial, and energy infrastructure in Kyiv, Chernihiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Kharkiv, Odesa, and Zaporizhia oblasts.[69]

Ukrainian officials continue to report on the effects of recent Russian strikes against energy infrastructure, particularly in Kyiv City. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky reported that Russian strikes against Ukrainian energy infrastructure have left 60 percent of Kyiv City without electricity and about 4,000 buildings in the city without heat as of the morning of January 21.[70] Kyiv City Mayor Vitaliy Klitschko stated to The Times on January 20 that about 600,000 people have left Kyiv City in January 2025 and that Ukrainian authorities have had to drain the city's large, centralized heating and water system to prevent the water from freezing and bursting the pipes.[71] Klitschko stated that there have been rolling blackouts and minimal heating in Kyiv City since the large-scale Russian strikes against the capital on the night of January 8 to 9 at the start of a period of severe cold weather. Ukrainian news agency RBK-Ukraine reported that a source in the Ukrainian government assessed that Russia is trying to turn Kyiv City into an uninhabitable city to damage the morale of all Ukrainians.[72] The source assessed that Russia may also be trying to force Ukrainians to flee the country for Europe in order to drive a wedge in Ukrainian-European relations.

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

Nothing significant to report.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.