Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, January 20, 2026

Data Cutoff: 12:15 PM ET

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Russian strikes against Ukrainian energy infrastructure cut power to electrical substations powering the Chornobyl Nuclear Power Plant on January 20, consistent with a recent warning from Ukrainian military intelligence. International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Director General Rafael Grossi reported on January 20 that military activity damaged several Ukrainian electrical substations vital for nuclear safety at the Chornobyl Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) and cut all power to the NPP — the second time since about January 12 that Russian strikes have damaged substations supporting the Chornobyl NPP.[1] The Ukrainian Energy Ministry reported that engineers have since restored power to the Chornobyl NPP as of January 20.[2] Ukraine’s Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) warned on January 17 that Russia was planning strikes on electricity transmission substations, which Ukrainian nuclear power plants depend on to operate.[3] Grossi stated on January 16 that IAEA teams had observed military activities or air raid alarms at all five nuclear sites in Ukraine from January 11 to 18.[4]

Russia downplayed the impact of Russian strikes on the Chornobyl NPP even as it continues to pose increasing threats to all of Ukraine's NPPs. Russian Permanent Representative to the UN in Vienna Mikhail Ulyanov — who also represents Russia to the IAEA — responded to the Chornobyl NPP power outage by criticizing "attempts to create the impression" that "minor power outages" at NPPs are "fraught with the possibility of a nuclear catastrophe."[5] Ulyanov claimed that Russia is not deliberately attempting to degrade power supplies to Ukraine's NPPs and criticized Ukraine for seeking assistance from the IAEA in the aftermath of Russian strikes. Reporting on Ulyanov's statement, Russian state newswire TASS characterized Ukraine's condemnations of the strikes as "dramatization," further diminishing the impact of Russian strikes.[6] Ulyanov claimed that the IAEA's document on the International Nuclear and Radiological Event Scale states that power outages pose "zero nuclear threat" as justification for his dismissive statements.[7]

Ulyanov is deliberately ignoring the context of this power outage amid the systemic threat and damages that Russia has caused to Ukrainian NPPs throughout the course of the war. The January 20 Russian strike against a substation supporting the Chornobyl NPP was not an isolated incident, as Russia conducts repeat strikes against individual substations and other electricity generation and transmission infrastructure in Ukraine.[8] These repeated strikes significantly raise the possibility of either destroying the infrastructure object or damaging it so seriously that it takes months or years to render operable again. Russian strikes and other military operations have directly impacted Ukrainian NPPs, particularly the Chornobyl NPP. A Russian Shahed drone notably struck the sarcophagus containing the Chornobyl NPP's melted-down nuclear reactor in February 2025, damaging the containment structure so severely that it could no longer adequately contain the radiation from the reactor without significant repairs.[9] Repeated power outages also strain the ability of NPPs to conduct their base safety functions, as demonstrated by Russia's occupation of the Zaporizhzhia NPP (ZNPP), which has suffered dozens of partial power outages since February 2022.[10] The ZNPP has suffered at least 10 total power outages in its entire operational history, all of which occurred due to Russian military activity since the start of Russia's full-scale invasion.[11] Russia has also heavily militarized the ZNPP by storing military equipment next to the ZNPP's nuclear reactors, stationing military personnel at and around the ZNPP, and launching drones from the ZNPP's grounds.[12] The Kremlin has continually attempted to portray Ukraine as an unsafe steward of the ZNPP and other nuclear power plants to obfuscate that the greatest threat to Ukrainian nuclear security is not Ukraine but is actually Russia and its continued war.[13] The Kremlin likely seeks to downplay its role in the degradation of Ukraine's nuclear power plants and ongoing threat to nuclear security as part of efforts to continue justifying its war effort, including the Russian long-range strike campaign that seeks to destroy Ukrainian energy infrastructure and deprive Ukrainians of heat in the dead of winter.

Russian missile and drone strikes overnight on January 19 to 20 significantly damaged additional energy infrastructure throughout Ukraine, particularly Kyiv City. The Ukrainian Air Force reported on January 20 that Russian forces launched 18 Iskander-M ballistic missiles/S-300 air defense missiles; one Zirkon hypersonic cruise missile; 15 Kh-101 cruise missiles; and 339 Shahed-type, Gerbera-type, Italmas-type, and other drones, of which roughly 250 were Shaheds.[14] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 14 Iskander-M/S-300s, 13 Kh-101s, and 315 drones, that five missiles and 24 drones struck 11 locations, and that downed debris fell on 12 locations. Ukrainian Air Force Spokesperson Colonel Yuriy Ihnat reported that Ukrainian forces were unable to down the Zirkon hypersonic missile, which struck an infrastructure facility in Vinnytsia Oblast.[15] Ukraine’s largest private energy company, DTEK, reported that Russian strikes left 173,000 households in Kyiv City without power after restoring power to another 162,000 households that also lost power.[16] Ukraine's Energy Ministry reported that Russian strikes also caused power outages in Kyiv, Odesa, Dnipropetrovsk, Sumy, Rivne, and Kharkiv oblasts.[17]

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky reported that Ukraine received a shipment of air defense missiles on January 18, which significantly supported Ukraine's capability to down a majority of the Russian drones and missiles in the January 19 to 20 strike.[18] Ihnat noted on January 20 that Ukraine's shootdown rate for this strike package was relatively high but that the drones and missiles that did breach Ukraine's air defenses caused extensive damage.[19] Russia has been conducting a long-range strike campaign that purposefully targets Ukrainian civilian and energy infrastructure and disproportionately impacts civilians throughout the war and has intensified these strikes in recent months.[20] Russian forces often launch no or few missiles for multiple days in a row before launching strike packages with a significant quantity of missiles, likely stockpiling their missiles between strike series in order to launch larger strike packages to maximize damage.[21] Russia's increasingly large strike packages highlight the critical importance of Western assistance in bolstering Ukraine's air defense capabilities, particularly with US-made Patriot air defense systems that can effectively counter Russian ballistic missile threats.[22]

Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov reiterated the Kremlin's commitment to its original war demands against the background of expected peace talks at the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland on January 20, and falsely accused Ukraine of beginning the war by attacking Russia. Lavrov gave a speech and held a press conference outlining Russia's foreign policy in 2025 and reiterated Russia's commitment to addressing the so-called "root causes" of its war in Ukraine.[23] Lavrov and other Kremlin officials have repeatedly defined these "root causes" as NATO expansion and alleged discrimination against Russian people, the Russian language, and the Russian Orthodox Church (a Kremlin-controlled arm of influence) in Ukraine.[24] Lavrov also reiterated on January 20 the Kremlin's rejection of any peace deal that does not cede all of "Novorossiya" to Russia and that provides Ukraine with security guarantees from Europe. Novorossiya is an invented region that the Kremlin often claims is "integral" to Russia and includes areas of eastern and southern Ukraine beyond the oblasts that Russia has illegally annexed.[25] Lavrov explicitly rejected the US-Ukrainian-European 20-point peace plan and listed demands inconsistent with terms in the original US-proposed 28-point peace plan, including the demand for territories that go beyond those that Russia has illegally annexed.[26] Lavrov also rejected a possible temporary or permanent ceasefire in Ukraine because Ukraine could "then attack the Russian Federation again" — falsely accusing Ukraine of having attacked Russia in the past, whereas Russia has been the one to initiate all military aggression against Ukraine. Senior Kremlin officials, including Russian President Vladimir Putin, have repeatedly demonstrated that Russia will not be satisfied with a peace settlement that does not meet Russia's uncompromising terms or that only pertains to Ukraine and does not radically restructure NATO.[27] Lavrov's January 20 statements set conditions for Russia to justify to domestic audiences its rejection of any terms that emerge from talks at the Davos Summit.

Drone operators of the Russian Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies are increasingly conducting mid-range strikes against Ukraine's high value, Western-provided air defenses and rocket launchers. Rubikon posted geolocated footage on January 20 showing a first-person view (FPV) drone striking a High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS) moving along a road on the night of January 19 to 20 near Novobakhmetieve (northwest of Pokrovsk and roughly 43 kilometers from the frontline).[28] A Russian milblogger claimed that the signal and image quality of the footage suggest that Rubikon used a drone leveraging communications with a Starlink system.[29] Rubikon also posted geolocated footage on January 17 of an FPV drone striking the launcher and AN/MPQ-53 radar station of a Patriot air defense system near Berezivka (just southwest of Kharkiv City and roughly 44 kilometers from the front line).[30] Russian milbloggers claimed that Rubikon used a BM-35 strike drone but disagreed whether Russian forces hit a real Patriot system or a decoy.[31] One milblogger noted that the FPV strike on the Patriot demonstrates how some Russian frontline drones can now fly far beyond Kharkiv City (roughly 23 kilometers from the frontline), especially with the help of "mothership drones" (such as Molniya fixed-wing FPV drones) that carry one or more shorter-range drones to areas far from the front line.[32] Russian forces equip Molniya-2 drones with Starlink satellite systems and have long leveraged "mothership" drones that can carry and extend the range of FPV drones, increasing the range and efficiency of Russian drone strikes against Ukraine's near rear.[33] ISW continues to assess that Russian forces are trying to exploit Ukraine’s scarcity of air defense systems, underscoring Ukraine’s urgent need for point-defense air defense systems to down reconnaissance and strike drones, as electronic warfare (EW) systems are likely insufficient to defend Ukrainian infrastructure and high-value targets from such a geographically pervasive threat.[34]

Ukrainian forces reportedly created a tactical kill zone that denies Russian forces from using vehicles within 20 to 25 kilometers of the front line or using infantry within one kilometer of the front line near Kupyansk — a capability that Ukraine should deepen and expand across the entire theater. A Ukrainian drone unit reported on January 20 that Ukrainian forces created a kill zone using unmanned systems near Kupyansk that can destroy up to 88 percent of Russian forces before they approach Ukrainian positions.[35] The unit reported that unmanned systems deny Russian infantry movement and maneuver within one kilometer of the frontline and deny Russian vehicles and mechanized equipment movement and maneuver within a range equal to or greater than 20 to 25 kilometers from the front line. ISW assesses that Ukrainian forces could likely deny Russian advances and enable Ukrainian counterattacks across the theater if Ukrainian forces can replicate the reported effects achieved in Kupyansk across the entirety of the theater, and at greater operational depths, such that Ukrainian forces deny Russian infantry from maneuvering within even deeper sections of the front line. Ukraine could significantly degrade the effectiveness of Russian infiltration tactics if Ukrainian forces deny Russian forces from operating vehicles within 50 + kilometers of the front line, thereby forcing the Russian infantry to infiltrate greater and untenable distances on foot, for example.

Russian forces are using training missiles to strike ground targets in Ukraine, possibly by equipping them with live warheads. Ukrainian sources reported that Russian forces struck ground targets in Ukraine with RM-48U surface-to-air training missiles for the first time on January 19 to 20, which Ukrainian sources characterized as an "ersatz ballistic missile."[36] RM-48U missiles are decommissioned 5V55 and 48N6 surface-to-air missiles for S-300/400 air defense systems that Russian forces have modified for training purposes. Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) told The New Voice of Ukraine (NV) that Russia had over 400 RM-48U missiles stockpiled as of December 1, 2025.[37] Ukrainian outlets noted that it is unclear if Russian forces used the decoy version of the RM-48U missile in the January 20 strike or a missile with a live warhead.[38] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces conducted tests of surface-to-surface missiles for the 51P6 launcher of the S-400 system at the Kapustin Yar launch site in Astrakhan Oblast in October 2023, claiming these missiles have a higher range and accuracy than the "outdated" 5V55 missiles Russia launches at ground targets from the S-300 system.[39] Russia has long used S-300 and S-400 surface-to-air missiles to strike ground targets in Ukraine, particularly against Kharkiv City, and Russia switching to modifying a training missile rather than using existing missiles in stockpiles indicates that Russia may be running low on its S-300 and S-400 missile stockpiles, given their frequent and unconventional usage in Ukraine.[40]

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky appointed Colonel Pavlo Yelizarov as the new deputy commander of Ukraine’s Air Force on January 20. Zelensky noted that Yelizarov will assist in integrating a new air defense approach encompassing mobile fire groups, interceptor drones, and other light air defense capabilities.[41] Ukrainian Defense Minister Mykhailo Fedorov stated that Yelizarov will be responsible for developing Ukraine's drone interception capabilities in order to create an "anti-drone dome" protecting Ukraine.[42] Yelizarov previously served as the commander of the Lasar Group, a Ukrainian National Guard drone unit reportedly responsible for 20 percent of all Ukrainian strikes against Russian tanks.[43]

Key Takeaways:

• Russian strikes against Ukrainian energy infrastructure cut power to electrical substations powering the Chornobyl Nuclear Power Plant on January 20, consistent with a recent warning from Ukrainian military intelligence.
• Russia downplayed the impact of Russian strikes on the Chornobyl NPP, even as Russia continues to pose increasing threats to all of Ukraine's NPPs.
• Ulyanov is deliberately ignoring the context of this power outage amid the systemic threat and damages that Russia has caused to Ukrainian NPPs throughout the course of the war.
• Russian missile and drone strikes overnight on January 19 to 20 significantly damaged additional energy infrastructure throughout Ukraine, particularly Kyiv City.
• Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov reiterated the Kremlin's commitment to its original war demands against the background of expected peace talks at the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland on January 20, and falsely accused Ukraine of beginning the war by attacking Russia.
• Drone operators of the Russian Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies are increasingly conducting mid-range strikes against Ukraine's high value, Western-provided air defenses and rocket launchers.
• Ukrainian forces reportedly created a tactical kill zone that denies Russian forces from using vehicles within 20 to 25 kilometers of the frontline or using infantry within one kilometer of the frontline near Kupyansk — a capability that Ukraine should deepen and expand across the entire theater.
• Russian forces are using training missiles to strike ground targets in Ukraine, possibly by equipping them with live warheads.
• Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky appointed Colonel Pavlo Yelizarov as the new deputy commander of Ukraine’s Air Force on January 20.
• Russian forces recently advanced in northern Kharkiv Oblast and near Pokrovsk.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.    

• Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
• Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis
• Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
• Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
• Significant Activity in Belarus

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Ukrainian military sources provided additional battle damage assessments (BDA) of recent Ukrainian strikes against energy infrastructure in Russia. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on January 19 that a recent Ukrainian strike against the Tuapse Oil Refinery in Krasnodar Krai destroyed the enterprise’s bulk terminal.[44] The Ukrainian General Staff also reported that a recent Ukrainian strike, likely referring to Ukraine's overnight January 6 to 7 strike, against the Oskolneftesnab oil depot near Kotel, Belgorod Oblast (about 90 kilometers from the frontline) destroyed one and damaged six RVS-1000 storage tanks.[45]

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in Sumy Oblast along the international border)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Sumy Oblast on January 20 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked in Kursk and Sumy oblasts, including north of Sumy City near Oleksiivka, northeast of Sumy City near Yunakivka and Sadky and toward Mala Korchakivka, and southeast of Sumy City near Hrabovske and Komarivka, on January 19 and 20.[46]

A Ukrainian brigade posted footage on January 20 showing Ukrainian interceptor drones down a Russian strike and reconnaissance Forpost drone carrying a modified KAB-20 aerial bomb over Sumy Oblast.[47]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian Chechen 204th Akhmat Spetsnaz Regiment are striking Ukrainian forces in Lisne (northwest of Sumy City).[48]

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border to create a defensible buffer zone with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Russian forces recently advanced in northern Kharkiv Oblast.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on January 20 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in eastern Vovchansk (northeast of Kharkiv City).[49] Available video evidence indicates that Russian forces also advanced in southeastern and eastern Vovchansk and that the Russian forward edge of the battle area (FEBA) in Vovchansk is further southeast than ISW previously assessed.[50]

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced along the border in Kharkiv Oblast into northern Nesterne and south of Dehtyarne (both northeast of Kharkiv City).[51] ISW continues to assess that these small-scale cross-border attacks in previously dormant frontline areas in northern Ukraine are part of Russia’s ongoing cognitive warfare campaign to try and convince the West that the front lines in Ukraine are collapsing.[52]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk, Prylipka, Starytsya, Vovchanski Khutory, Starytsya, Kruhle, Dehtyarne, Lyman, Vilcha, and Nesterne and toward Hrafske and Izbytske on January 19 and 20.[53]

Ukrainian Joint Forces Task Force Spokesperson Colonel Viktor Trehubov reported on January 20 that Russian forces continue attempts to probe Ukrainian defenses along the international border, including near Sotnytskyi Kozachok (northwest of Kharkiv City), similar to how Russian forces advanced into Hrabovske in Sumy Oblast in December 2025.[54] Trehubov noted that Russian forces are not evacuating casualties, regardless of whether it's a light, heavy, or mortally wounded servicemember. The head of a section of an unspecified Ukrainian battalion operating in the south Slobozhansk direction reported on January 20 that Russian forces in the battalion’s area of responsibility (AoR) recently reused previous tactics of highly attritional infantry-led assaults in large groups, simultaneously attacking from different directions without preparation.[55] The section head stated that Russian assault groups are ill-equipped and lack basic necessities like camouflage gear.

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 83rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (69th Motorized Rifle Division, 6th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) reportedly continue to operate in the Kharkiv direction.[56]

Neither Ukrainian nor Russian sources reported ground activity in the Velykyi Burluk direction on January 19 and 20.

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Oskil River (Russian objective: Cross the Oskil River in Kharkiv Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on January 20 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked near and within Kupyansk itself; north of Kupyansk toward Holubivka; east of Kupyansk toward Petropavlivka, Podoly, and Kucherivka; and southeast of Kupyansk near Stepova Novoselivka and Pishchane and toward Kurylivka on January 19 and 20.[57] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked from Sobolivka (west of Kupyansk).[58]

Order of Battle: Artillery and other elements of the Russian 68th Motorized Rifle Division (6th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Leningrad Military District [LMD]), including its 121st Motorized Rifle Regiment, are reportedly operating in and around Kupyansk.[59] Elements of the 47th Tank Division (1st Guards Tank Army [GTA], Moscow Military District [MMD]) are reportedly operating near Pishchane.[60]

Russian forces continued offensive operations southeast of Borova near Shandryholove, Novoyehorivka, Olhivka, and Tverdokhlibove on January 19 and 20 but did not advance.[61]

Ukrainian forces continued their mid-range strike campaign against Russian military targets in occupied Luhansk Oblast between January 17 and 19. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on January 19 that Ukrainian forces destroyed a drone unit of the Russian 144th Motorized Rifle Division (20th CAA, MMD) in occupied Novokrasnyanka (roughly 25 kilometers from the frontline).[62]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Slovyansk direction on January 20 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northwest of Lyman near Novoselivka; northeast of Lyman near Kolodyazi and Zarichne; southeast of Lyman near Dibrova and Ozerne; northeast of Slovyansk near Dronivka and Platonivka; and southeast of Slovyansk near Bondarne on January 19 and 20.[63]

Order of Battle: Drone operators and other elements of the Russian 123rd Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 2nd Luhansk People's Republic Army Corps [LNR AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating west of Siversk and striking Ukrainian transport vehicles moving toward Slovyansk.[64] Elements of the 7th Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd CAA) reportedly continue to operate near Siversk and Zakitne (northeast of Slovyansk).[65]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area on January 20 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked near Kostyantynivka itself; north of Kostyantynivka toward Pryvillya; east of Kostyantynivka near Predtechyne; southeast of Kostyantynivka near Pleshchiivka; south of Kostyantynivka near Ivanopillya, Shcherbynivka, and Kleban-Byk and toward Berestok;  southwest of Kostyantynivka near Yablunivka and Stepanivka; west of Kostyantynivka toward Illinivka; south of Druzhkivka near Rusyn Yar; and southwest of Druzhkivka toward Sofiivka on January 19 and 20.[66]

An officer of a Ukrainian drone battalion operating in the Kostyantynivka direction reported that Russian forces are scaling up the use of drone ambushes in this direction and are heavily targeting Ukrainian logistics.[67]

The Ukrainian Donetsk Oblast Prosecutor's Office reported that Russian forces struck Druzhkivka with six FAB-250 guided glide bombs on January 20, injuring four civilians.[68]

Order of Battle: First-person view (FPV) drone operators of the Russian 4th Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd CAA, SMD) are striking Ukrainian forces in Ivanopillya.[69] FPV drone operators of the 1194th Motorized Rifle Regiment (4th Motorized Rifle Brigade) are striking Ukrainian forces in Kostyantynivka.[70] Elements of the Chechen 78th Sever-Akhmat Motorized Rifle Regiment (42nd Motorized Rifle Division, 58th CAA, SMD) and the 255th Motorized Rifle Regiment (20th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA, SMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces in Kostyantynivka.[71] Drone operators of the Smuglyanka Detachment and Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Kindrativka (northwest of Kostyantynivka).[72] FPV drone operators of the 68th Reconnaissance Battalion (20th Motorized Rifle Division) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Druzhkivka and Raiske (southwest of Druzhkivka).[73] Drone operators of the 57th Spetsnaz Company (8th CAA) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Novopavlivka, Torske, and Pavlivka (all southwest of Druzhkivka).[74] Drone operators of the 238th Artillery Brigade (8th CAA) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Novohryhorivka (southwest of Druzhkivka).[75]

Russian forces continued offensive operations east of Dobropillya near Novyi Donbas and southeast of Dobropillya near Toretske and Zapovidne on January 19 and 20 but did not advance.[76]

Order of Battle: Drone operators and artillery crews of the Russian 150th Motorized Rifle Division (8th CAA) are reportedly operating in the Dobropillya tactical area.[77]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Pokrovsk direction.

Assessed Russian advance: Geolocated footage published on January 19 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced into southeastern Hryshyne (northwest of Pokrovsk).[78]

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced north of Pokrovsk itself and northwest of Udachne (southwest of Pokrovsk).[79]

Russian forces attacked near and within Pokrovsk itself; north of Pokrovsk near Bilytske and Rodynske; northeast of Pokrovsk near Chervonyi (Krasnyi) Lyman; east of Pokrovsk near Myrnohrad; southwest of Pokrovsk near Kotlyne, Udachne, and Molodetske; and northwest of Pokrovsk near Hryshyne on January 19 and 20.[80]

A deputy commander of a Ukrainian battalion operating in the Pokrovsk direction reported on January 20 that Russian forces continue constant infiltration missions in the brigade's area of responsibility (AoR).[81] The Ukrainian deputy commander assessed that Russian forces may soon conduct mechanized assaults as the ground is frozen solid, which is more conducive to mechanized maneuver than the mud previously prevalent in the area.

A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger acknowledged that Ukrainian forces still hold limited positions within northern Pokrovsk.[82] The milblogger claimed that Russian forces are attempting to gain a foothold on the eastern outskirts of Hryshyne, where fighting is the heaviest.

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 56th Separate Spetsnaz Battalion are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Bilytske.[83] Drone operators of the Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies and the Vega Spetsnaz Detachment (24th Spetsnaz Brigade, Russian General Staff's Main Intelligence Directorate [GRU]) reportedly continue operating in the Pokrovsk direction.[84]

Russian forces continued offensive operations near Novopavlivka itself, southeast of Novopavlivka near Horikhove, and south of Novopavlivka near Dachne and Filiya on January 19 and 20 but did not advance.[85]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Oleksandrivka direction on January 20 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked southeast of Oleksandrivka near Verbove and Krasnohirske on January 19 and 20.[86]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Hulyaipole direction on January 20 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked near Hulyaipole itself; northwest of Hulyaipole near Svyatopetrivka and Ternuvate; north of Hulyaipole near Dobropillya, Zelene, Yehorivka, and Varvarivka; and west of Hulyaipole toward Zaliznychne on January 19 and 20.[87] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Tsvitkove (northwest of Hulyaipole), Staroukrainka (west of Hulyaipole), and Zaliznychne.[88]

Order of Battle: Drone operators and artillery elements of the Russian 14th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff's Main Directorate [GRU]), the 218th Tank Regiment (127th Motorized Rifle Division, 5th CAA, EMD), and of the 305th Artillery Brigade (5th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions in Zaporizhia Oblast, likely eastern Zaporizhia Oblast.[89] Aviation elements of the 11th Air Force and Air Defense Army (Russian Aerospace Forces [VKS], EMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Verkhnya Tersa and Vozdvyzhivka (both northwest of Hulyaipole).[90]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on January 20 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces marginally advanced east of Shcherbaky (west of Orikhiv).[91]

Russian forces attacked west of Orikhiv near Stepnohirsk, Prymorske, and Shcherbaky and northwest of Orikhiv near Lukyanivske, Novoboikivske, and Novoyakovlivka and toward Richne on January 19 and 20.[92]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 7th Airborne (VDV) Division, including its 247th VDV Regiment, are reportedly operating in Zaporizhia Oblast, including near Stepnohirsk.[93] Elements of the 71st Motorized Rifle Regiment (42nd Motorized Rifle Division, 58th CAA, Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Novodanylivka (south of Orikhiv).[94] Drone operators of the Viking Drone Detachment and of the Valkiriya Special Detachment (4th Military Base, 58th CAA, SMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions and intercepting Ukrainian drones in western Zaporizhia Oblast.[95]

Russian forces continued limited ground attacks in the Kherson direction on January 20 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked in the Kherson direction, including east of Kherson City near the Antonivskyi Bridge, on January 19 and 20.[96]

Order of Battle: First-person view (FPV) drone operators of the Russian 98th VDV Division reportedly continue to operate in the Kherson direction.[97]

Ukrainian forces continued their mid-range strike campaign against Russian military targets in occupied Crimea on the night of on January 19 and 20. The Ukrainian Navy reported on January 20 that Ukrainian forces struck an unspecified military airfield in occupied Crimea.[98]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

See topline text for reports on Russian long-range strikes against Ukraine.

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

Nothing significant to report.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.