Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, January 2, 2026

Assessment as of January 2: 9:30 PM ET

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Russian officials accused Ukraine of conducting a strike against a hotel and cafe in occupied Khorly, Kherson Oblast, that reportedly killed at least 28 people and injured at least 50, and called for the intensification of Russia's war efforts, including its campaign of strikes against Ukrainian civilian infrastructure.[i] Russian occupation authorities claimed that about 100 people had gathered at the cafe and hotel for New Year celebrations when three Ukrainian drones struck the cafe and hotel minutes apart just after midnight on January 1, causing a fire that trapped people inside the building.[ii] Occupation authorities and Russian sources claimed that five Ukrainian drones continued to fly overhead following the strike, preventing first responders from immediately responding.[iii] Russian and occupation officials claimed that there were no military personnel at the cafe and hotel at the time of the strike or military targets nearby and accused Ukraine of deliberately targeting civilians.[iv] Former Russian space agency Roscosmos head and Zaporizhia Oblast occupation senator Dmitry Rogozin claimed that soldiers and medics of the 4th company of the BARS-Sarmat Special Purpose Center military were in Khorly at the time of the strike and provided assistance, however.[v] Occupation authorities claimed that at least one of the drones had a payload of 10 to 20 kilograms of trinitrotoluene (TNT) and later claimed that at least one drone had an incendiary warhead that caused a massive fire.[vi] Kherson Oblast occupation head Vladimir Saldo briefed Russian President Vladimir Putin on the strike and its aftermath on January 1.[vii] Russian authorities and media published images showing fragments of a drone that allegedly struck the cafe and hotel.[viii] Geolocated footage published on January 1 shows a fire at the cafe and hotel, and Russian authorities published additional images showing widespread destruction at the site of the fire.[ix]

Ukraine rejected Russian claims that it targeted civilians in occupied Khorly. Ukrainian General Staff Spokesperson Captain Dmytro Lykhovyi responded to the Russian claims on January 1, stating that Russian political and military leadership is spreading disinformation and false statements.[x] Lykhovyi stated that the Ukrainian General Staff published an "exhaustive" list of strikes that Ukrainian forces conducted against areas in Russia and occupied Ukraine overnight on December 31 to January 1, and this list did not include any strikes against occupied Kherson Oblast.[xi] An anonymous source in Ukraine's defense forces told AFP in response to a question about the Khorly strike on January 2 that Ukraine did conduct a strike but that Ukrainian forces targeted a military gathering that had been closed to civilians.[xii] A local Crimea-based Telegram account reported on January 1 that Russian soldiers, their families, and local occupation officials were at the hotel and cafe at the time of the strike.[xiii] The available footage of the fire is sufficient for ISW to assess that there was very likely a strike that significantly damaged the cafe and hotel in occupied Khorly, though ISW is not prepared to assess the intended target of the strike. ISW has observed no statements or evidence to assess that the strike was a Russian false flag operation.

The strike against occupied Khorly reportedly killed Russian occupation officials. Russian authorities have published the names of 12 people killed at the hotel and cafe as of this report, and at least three are tied to the Russian occupation administration.[xiv] BBC's Russia service reported on January 2 that Sergei Bogan, who died in the strike, is the former head of the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) in occupied Kalanchak, Kherson Oblast (a larger settlement about 16 kilometers north of Khorly) and that his wife is a current member of the Nova Kakhovka occupation administration.[xv] It is currently unclear if Bogan's wife was also at the Khorly cafe and hotel at the time of the strike. The BBC reported that the strike also killed Mikhail Voloshko, the head of the Kalanchak occupation administration's information technology department, and Iryna Dyagileva, who previously served as an occupation election commissioner in occupied Crimea and has since run for office in the occupation government.[xvi] The strike also killed Makhmud Admisayev, who reportedly frequently travelled between Russia and occupied Crimea with a school official of occupied Havrylivka, Kherson Oblast.[xvii] The strike also killed the owner of the cafe and hotel, who reportedly began collaborating with Russian occupation officials in 2023.[xviii] Available information about the remainder of the identified victims is limited as of this report.

Russian officials seized on the Khorly strike to call for the intensification of Russia's years-long intensive strike campaign against Ukrainian critical infrastructure. Russian officials responded to the Khorly strike on January 1 and 2 around a few common themes: that the strike only strengthens Russia's commitment to rapidly achieving its war goals, which include unseating the Ukrainian government and that Ukraine would use a potential ceasefire to plan more strikes.[xix] Russian officials called on Russia to strike Ukrainian critical infrastructure in response, absurdly claiming that Russia has been abstaining from such strikes and never hits civilian objects.[xx] Russia has been conducting a long-range strike campaign that purposefully targets Ukrainian civilian and energy infrastructure and disproportionately impacts civilians throughout the war and has intensified these strikes in recent months.[xxi] Russian forces launched over 54,000 long-range drones and over 1,900 missiles against Ukraine just in 2025 and adapted these weapons to inflict maximum damage, which has increased damage against civilian areas and civilian casualties.[xxii] The Kremlin may secondarily intend to use the Khorly strike as justification for its continued lack of engagement in the peace process.

Ukraine warned that Russia is likely preparing a false flag operation that will inflict significant casualties to disrupt ongoing peace negotiations. The Ukrainian Foreign Intelligence Service (SZRU) reported on January 1 that the Kremlin is preparing large scale false flag attacks, likely on the eve of or during Orthodox Christmas (January 6 and 7), at a religious building or other symbolic location in Russia or occupied Ukraine to disrupt US-led peace negotiations.[xxiii] The SZRU reported that the Kremlin has been spreading new false claims to prepare Russians and foreign audiences for further escalation, following the alleged attempt to strike on Putin's residence on the night of December 28 to 29. The SZRU noted that Russia will likely conduct the attack from a frontline location and plans to use fragments of Western-made drones as manufactured evidence of Ukraine's supposed involvement.

The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) continues to present alleged evidence to support its claim that Ukrainian drone strikes targeted Russian President Vladimir Putin’s residence in Novgorod Oblast on the night of December 28 to 29 but this evidence remains unpersuasive. The Russian MoD published footage on January 1 showing Russian General Staff’s Main Directorate (GRU) Head Admiral Igor Kostyukov handing over supposed route data and a flight controller of a drone that allegedly targeted Putin's residence to the US military attaché at the US Embassy in Russia.[xxiv] Kostyukov claimed that Russia decoded the alleged Ukrainian drone's data, "unequivocally" confirming that Ukraine targeted Putin's residence.[xxv] The circumstances of the alleged December 28 to 29 strike continue not to conform to the pattern of observed evidence that typically follows Ukrainian deep strikes, and the Kremlin's continued claims and presentations of alleged evidence continue not to account for these discrepancies.[xxvi]

Ukraine announced on January 1 that it received and deployed two more Patriot air defense systems to protect Ukrainian cities and critical infrastructure following recent agreements with Germany.[xxvii] Patriot air defense systems remain Ukraine’s only air defense systems capable of reliably downing Russian ballistic missiles. ISW continues to assess that a denser Ukrainian air defense umbrella, including additional Patriot systems, would degrade Russia’s ability to conduct successful long-range strikes.[xxviii]

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky announced several personnel changes within the Ukrainian government and military on January 2. Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Head Lieutenant General Kyrylo Budanov stated that he has accepted Zelensky's offer to head the Office of the Ukrainian President.[xxix] Zelensky stated that Ukrainian Foreign Intelligence Service (SZR) Head Oleh Ivashchenko would replace Budanov as the GUR head.[xxx] Zelensky also announced that Serhiy Deineko is stepping down from his position as head of Ukraine’s State Border Service but will continue to work within the Ministry of Internal Affairs.[xxxi] Zelensky stated that Ukrainian Internal Affairs Minister Ihor Klymenko will propose candidates to replace Deinenko.

Finnish and Estonian authorities reported damage to an undersea communications cable between Estonia and Finland that may be due to deliberate cutting on December 31.[xxxii] Estonian authorities reported that the damage site is located within the Estonian exclusive economic zone (EEZ) and that a cargo vessel had been travelling in the area at the time the damage occurred.[xxxiii] Finnish Border Guards located and intercepted the Fitburg cargo ship and have since arrested at least two crewmembers and interviewed the remainder under suspicion of deliberately damaging the undersea cable.[xxxiv] Albros Shipping & Trading, a Turkish company based in Istanbul, manages the Fitburg, which was traveling from St. Petersburg, Russia, to Haifa, Israel, under the flag of Saint Vincent and the Grenadines when Finnish authorities intercepted it.[xxxv] Finnish authorities reported that the Fitburg was carrying illegal Russian steel products.[xxxvi] Estonian Central Criminal Police Chief Leho Lauri reported on January 1 that Estonia and Finland will form an international investigations team in response to the December 31 cable event.[xxxvii] Finnish authorities have not officially attributed the damage to any specific actor. The December 31 cable incident comes against the backdrop of Russia's intensifying “Phase Zero” campaign to destabilize Europe, undermine North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)’s cohesion, and set the political, informational, and psychological conditions for a potential future Russian war against NATO.[xxxviii]

Key Takeaways:

• Russian officials accused Ukraine of conducting a strike against a hotel and cafe in occupied Khorly, Kherson Oblast, that reportedly killed at least 28 people and injured at least 50, and called for the intensification of Russia's war efforts, including its campaign of strikes against Ukrainian civilian infrastructure.
• Ukraine rejected Russian claims that it targeted civilians in occupied Khorly.
• The strike against occupied Khorly killed Russian occupation officials.
• Russian officials seized on the Khorly strike to call for the intensification of Russia's years-long intensive strike campaign against Ukrainian critical infrastructure.
• Ukraine warned that Russia is likely preparing a false flag operation that will inflict significant casualties to disrupt ongoing peace negotiations.
• The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) continues to present alleged evidence to support its claim that Ukrainian drone strikes targeted Russian President Vladimir Putin’s residence in Novgorod Oblast on the night of December 28 to 29, but this evidence remains unpersuasive.
• Ukraine announced on January 1 that it received and deployed two more Patriot air defense systems to protect Ukrainian cities and critical infrastructure following recent agreements with Germany.
• Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky announced several personnel changes within the Ukrainian government and military on January 2.
• Finnish and Estonian authorities reported damage to an undersea communications cable between Estonia and Finland that may be due to deliberate cutting on December 31.
• Russian forces recently advanced in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area and in western Zaporizhia Oblast.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.  

• Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
• Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis
• Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
• Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
• Significant Activity in Belarus

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Ukrainian forces continued their long-range strike campaign against Russian oil and military infrastructure between December 31 and January 2. The Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) published footage on January 1 and geolocated on the same day showing Ukrainian drone strikes on the Ilsky Oil Refinery in Lyudinovo, Krasnodar Krai and on the Almetyevsk Oil Refinery in Tatarstan.[xxxix] The USF reported that the Ilsky Oil Refinery has a production capacity of 6.6 million tons of oil per year and supplies the Russian military. Ukrainian USF Commander Major Robert “Magyar” Brovdi reported on January 1 that Ukrainian forces also struck two concentration points and a fuel and ammunition depot of the Russian 69th Motorized Rifle Division (6th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) and the 283rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (144th Motorized Rifle Division, 20th CAA, Moscow Military District [MMD]) near Valuyki, Belgorod Oblast.[xl] Geolocated footage published on January 2 shows fires at the Novokuybyshevsk Oil Refinery in Samara City, Samara Oblast, after a likely Ukrainian drone strike.[xli]

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in northern Ukraine along the international border)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in Sumy Oblast on January 1 and 2 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced north of Mala Korchakivka and Kindrativka (both north of Sumy City).[xlii]

Russian forces attacked in Kursk and Sumy oblasts, including north of Sumy City toward Kindrativka and southeast of Sumy City near Hrabovske on December 31 and January 1 to 2.[xliii] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Hrabovske.[xliv]

Ukrainian State Border Service Spokesperson Colonel Andriy Demchenko reported on January 2 that Russian forces have reduced their activity in the Sumy direction and are only attacking in small infantry groups.[xlv] The spokesperson of a Ukrainian border guard detachment operating in northern Sumy Oblast reported on January 2 that Ukrainian forces have maintained their positions in Varachyne (north of Sumy City) for the last year and that Russian forces have not advanced in the detachment's area of responsibility (AoR).[xlvi] The spokesperson added that Russian forces cannot use drones because of the changing weather but are trying to accumulate forces for attacks in groups of two to three. The spokesperson noted that Russian forces are more easily visible in winter weather. A Russian milblogger reportedly affiliated with the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces claimed on January 2 that Russian forces are using drones less in the Sumy direction due to snowy conditions but continue to strike Ukrainian forces with artillery.[xlvii]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 34th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (49th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating near Hrabovske.[xlviii] Drone operators of the 217th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (98th VDV Division) and 104th VDV Regiment (76th VDV Division) are reportedly striking Ukrainian equipment in Sumy Oblast.[xlix] Drone operators and other elements of the 15th Tank Regiment (69th Motorized Rifle Division, 6th CAA, Leningrad Military District [LMD]); Chechen Akhmat Spetsnaz Kashtan, Gorets, and Pitersky Detachments; and Chechen Akhmat Spetsnaz Press Detachment (204th Akhmat Spetsnaz Regiment) are reportedly operating in Sumy Oblast.[l]

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on January 1 and 2 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced in Vovchanski Khutory (northeast of Kharkiv City).[li]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk, Vovchanski Khutory, Starytsya, Buhruvatka, Prylipka, Lyman, and Vilcha, and toward Izbytske on December 31-January 2.[lii] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Lyman and Vilcha.[liii]

The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Vovchansk direction reported on January 2 that Ukrainian forces maintain positions in Vovchansk, despite Russian claims that Russian forces seized the settlement.[liv] The spokesperson reported that Russian forces have stopped using heavy equipment and are attacking exclusively with small infantry groups of two to three soldiers that then try to consolidate positions. The spokesperson reported that Russian forces are constantly replenishing their units with personnel and are not directly attacking settlements but are instead using infiltration tactics to try to break through in small groups from the flanks and to enter forested areas.

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian Chechen Zapad-Akhmat Battalion (reportedly of the Southern Military District [SMD]), the Russian 128th Motorized Rifle Brigade (44th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]), and the Chechen Kurchaloyevsky Raion Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) department are reportedly operating near Vovchanski Khutory.[lv]

Russian forces conducted offensive operations north of Velykyi Burluk near Dehtyarne, northeast of Velykyi Burluk near Ambarne and toward Dovhenke, and southeast of Velykyi Burluk near Dvorichanske and toward Obukhivka on December 31-January 2 but did not advance.[lvi]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on January 1 and 2 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked near Kupyansk itself; north of Kupyansk near Kutkivka and toward Petro-Ivanivkanortheast of Kupyansk near Krasne Pershe and Fyholivka and toward Novovasylivka; east of Kupyansk near Petropavlivka; and southeast of Kupyansk near Kurylivka and Hlushkivka on December 31 and January 1 to 2.[lvii] Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked in Kupyansk and near Blahodativka and Nechvolodivka (both west of Kupyansk).[lviii]

Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported on January 1 that elements of the Russian 121st and 122nd motorized rifle regiments (both of the 68th Motorized Rifle Division, 6th CAA, LMD) are unable to free remnants of the Russian assault groups surrounded in the Kupyansk direction due to significant losses.[lix] Ukrainian military observer Yuriy Butusov reported on December 31 that Ukrainian forces are clearing Kupyansk house by house but that Russian drones are complicating Ukrainian movements.[lx]

A Russian milblogger claimed on December 31 that Ukrainian forces are leveraging snowy weather that degrades Russian drones to bring reinforcements into Kupyansk.[lxi] Another Russian milblogger claimed on December 31 that Ukrainian forces have completely surrounded Russian forces in Kupyansk and cut off Russian logistics to the forward assault units.[lxii]

Order of Battle: Drone operators and other elements of the Russian 27th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (1st Guards Tank Army [GTA], MMD) are reportedly operating near Kupyansk.[lxiii] Elements of the 352nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (11th Army Corps [AC], LMD) and of the 47th Tank Division (1st GTA) are reportedly operating in the Kupyansk direction.[lxiv]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Borova near Novoplatonivka and Bohuslavka; east of Borova near Shyikivka; and southeast of Borova near Novovodyane and Novoyehorivka on December 31 and January 1 to 2.[lxv]

Ukrainian forces recently maintained positions or advanced in the Slovyansk-Lyman direction.

Refinement of area under Russian claims: Geolocated footage published on January 1 shows elements of the Russian Black Mamba Assault Detachment of the 252nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (3rd Motorized Rifle Division, 20th CAA, MMD) shelling Ukrainian forces in northeastern Drobysheve (northwest of Lyman), an area where Russian sources claimed that Russian forces maintained a presence.[lxvi]

Russian forces attacked northwest of Lyman near Novoselivka and Drobysheve; north of Lyman near Stavky; northeast of Lyman near Kolodyazi and Myrne; and east of Lyman near Zarichne on December 31 and January 1 to 2.[lxvii]

The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Lyman direction reported on January 1 that Russian forces are suffering heavy losses in the Lyman direction and personnel shortages.[lxviii]

Order of Battle: Russian Dikaya Division of Donbass (Russian Volunteer Corps) is reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Slovyansk with Grad MLRS.[lxix]

Ukrainian forces continued their mid-range strike campaign against Russian military targets in occupied Luhansk Oblast on the night of December 31 to January 1. Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) Commander Major Robert “Magyar” Brovdi reported on January 1 that Ukrainian forces struck a fuel and lubricant storage in occupied Rovenky (roughly 120 kilometers from the frontline).[lxx]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Siversk direction on January 1 and 2 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked near Siversk itself; northwest of Siversk near Yampil and Zakitne; northeast of Siversk near Serebryanka; south of Siversk near Pereizne; and southwest of Siversk near Riznykivka and Sakko i Vantsetti on December 31 and January 1 to 2.[lxxi]

Order of Battle: Geolocated footage published on December 31, but likely from an earlier date, indicates that elements of the Russian 85th Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 2nd Luhansk People's Republic Army Corps [LNR AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) were striking Ukrainian positions southeast of Pazeno (southwest of Siversk) at an unspecified previous date.[lxxii]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on December 29 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced along Pravoberezhna Street in southern Kostyantynivka.[lxxiii] Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated on January 1 that Russian forces have broken through to southeastern Kostyantynivka near Ostrovskoho Street, which runs parallel to Pravoberezhna Street.[lxxiv] Geolocated footage published on January 1 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced northwest of Oleksandro-Kalynove (south of Kostyantynivka).[lxxv]

Assessed Russian infiltrations: Geolocated footage published on January 1 shows Ukrainian forces striking a Russian servicemember north of Predtechyne (east of Kostyantynivka).[lxxvi] Additional geolocated footage published on January 2 shows Russian servicemembers raising a Russian flag in central Mayske (northeast of Kostyantynivka).[lxxvii] ISW assesses that these were Russian infiltration missions that did not change control of terrain or the forward edge of the battle area (FEBA) in these areas.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced east of Berestok (south of Kostyantynivka) and west of Pleshchiivka (southeast of Kostyantynivka).[lxxviii]

Russian forces attacked near and within Kostyantynivka itself; northeast of Kostyantynivka near Minkivka and Mayske; east of Kostyantynivka near Predtechyne; southeast of Kostyantynivka near Oleksandro-Shultyne and Pleshchiivka; south of Kostyantynivka near Shcherbynivka, Ivanopillya, and Kleban-Byk; southwest of Kostyantynivka near Yablunivka and toward Stepanivka; south of Druzhkivka near Rusyn Yar and toward Mykolaipillya; and southwest of Druzhkivka near Sofiivka and toward Torske on December 31 and January 1 to 2.[lxxix]

Mashovets stated that Russian forces are trying to consolidate on the southeastern outskirts of Kostyantynivka and are fighting to consolidate their positions in Predtechyne and Oleksandro-Shultyne.[lxxx] Mashovets stated that elements of the Russian 72nd Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd AC, under the operational control of the Southern Grouping of Forces) are attacking from near Bila Hora (southeast of Kostyantynivka) and that elements of the 6th Motorized Rifle Division (3rd AC) are attacking from Predtechyne along the T-0504 Bakhmut-Kostyantynivka highway. Mashovets reported that at least two groups, each with six to seven drone operators from the 16th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff's Main Directorate [GRU]), arrived in the Kostyantynivka direction recently. The commander of a Ukrainian drone battalion operating in the Kramatorsk direction stated on January 1 that Russian forces continue small group infiltrations.[lxxxi] The commander stated that snowy weather makes it difficult for Russian forces to see land mines and easier for Ukrainian forces to visibly identify Russian soldiers, even those in anti-thermal imaging cloaks. A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces recently seized most of Mayske and that scattered Ukrainian groups remain on the northern outskirts of the settlement despite the Russian Ministry of Defense's (MoD) claim on September 27 that Russian forces seized the settlement.[lxxxii] The milblogger complained that Russian forces have been submitting reports falsifying Russian advances on the northern flank of the Kostyantynivka direction. Kostyantynivka Municipal Military Administration Head Serhiy Horbynov reported on January 2 that Russian forces conducted a drone strike against a vehicle evacuating civilians within Kostyantynivka, injuring three people.[lxxxiii]

Order of Battle: Loitering munitions operators of the Russian 57th Spetsnaz Company (8th CAA, SMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces in Sofiivka and Toretske (southwest of Druzhkivka).[lxxxiv] First-person view (FPV) drone operators of the 68th Separate Reconnaissance Battalion of the 20th Motorized Rifle Division (8th CAA) are reportedly striking Ukrainian vehicles near Raiske (south of Druzhkivka).[lxxxv] Drone operators of the 58th Separate Spetsnaz Battalion (unofficially designated the Okhotnik [Hunter] Spetsnaz Detachment) (51st CAA, formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic [DNR] AC, SMD) and elements of the 1442nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (6th Motorized Rifle Division, 3rd AC) are reportedly operating in the Kostyantynivka direction.[lxxxvi]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Dobropillya direction on January 1 and 2 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked east of Dobropillya near Nove Shakhove and toward Kucheriv Yar on December 31 and January 1 to 2.[lxxxvii]

Order of Battle: FPV drone operators of the Russian 150th Motorized Rifle Division (8th CAA, SMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Dobropillya.[lxxxviii] Elements of the 61st Separate Naval Infantry Brigade (Northern Fleet) are reportedly operating near Shakhove (east of Dobropillya).[lxxxix]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction on January 1 and 2 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced northwest of Sukhetske (northeast of Pokrovsk) and north and west of Rodynske (north of Pokrovsk).[xc]

Russian forces attacked near and within Pokrovsk itself; north of Pokrovsk near Bilytske and Rodynske; northeast of Pokrovsk near Chervonyi (Krasnyi) Lyman and Zatyshok; east of Pokrovsk near Myrnohrad; southwest of Pokrovsk near Udachne, Kotlyne, Molodetske, and Novopidhorodne; west of Pokrovsk toward Serhiivka; and northwest of Pokrovsk near Hryshyne on December 31 and January 1 to 2.[xci]

Ukraine's Eastern Group of Forces reported on January 1 that Ukrainian forces control Molodetske.[xcii] A spokesperson of the Ukrainian 7th Rapid Reaction Corps of the Air Assault Forces reported on January 1 that Ukrainian forces maintain control over central and northern Myrnohrad.[xciii] The spokesperson stated that small Russian groups are trying to infiltrate central Myrnohrad from several directions at once. The Ukrainian 7th Corps reported on January 2 that Russian forces, including elements of the 76th Airborne (VDV) Division, attempted to accumulate forces and over 30 light vehicles, including motorcycles, buggies, and vehicles, along the T-0515 Shevchenko-Pokrovsk highway to attack Hryshyne.[xciv] The spokesperson of a Ukrainian drone battalion operating in the Pokrovsk direction reported on January 1 that the Russian force grouping in the area is about 150,000 personnel, including well-equipped and well trained drone specialists - possibly referring to the Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies.[xcv] The chief of staff of a Ukrainian artillery reconnaissance battalion operating in the Pokrovsk direction reported on January 1 that Russian forces are attacking in small infantry groups, including sometimes with single soldiers or with armored vehicles.[xcvi] The deputy commander of a Ukrainian battalion operating in the Pokrovsk direction reported on January 1 that the "kill zone" (an area of elevated drone strike risk) is five to 20 kilometers wide on both sides.[xcvii] The deputy commander stated that small Russian groups of one to four personnel are trying to move between basements and that recent weather conditions of frost and snow and less fog make it more difficult for Russian forces to conduct infiltration missions, as flight conditions are better for Ukrainian reconnaissance drones.[xcviii] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces control Sukhetske and western Zatyshok.[xcix] Another Russian milblogger claimed that most of Sukhetske is a contested "gray zone."[c]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 5th Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA, SMD) reportedly continue to operate in Myrnohrad.[ci] Elements of the 9th Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA) and drone operators of its 60th Separate Motorized Rifle Battalion (also known as the Somalia Battalion) are reportedly operating in Rodynske.[cii] Artillery elements of the 385th Artillery Brigade (2nd CAA, Central Military District [CMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Pokrovsk.[ciii] Elements of the 74th Motorized Rifle Brigade (41st CAA, CMD) are reportedly operating in the Pokrovsk direction.[civ] Drone operators of the 80th Sparta Separate Reconnaissance Battalion (51st CAA, SMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian vehicles near Myrne and Vasylivka (both northwest of Pokrovsk).[cv]

Russian forces continued offensive operations near Novopavlivka itself and south of Novopavlivka near Filiya on January 1 and 2 but did not advance.[cvi]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Oleksandrivka direction on January 1 and 2 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northeast of Oleksandrivka near Andriivka-Klevtsove and Zelenyi Hai; east of Oleksandrivka near Oleksandrohrad; and southeast of Oleksandrivka near Vyshneve and Vorone on December 31 and January 1 to 2.[cvii]

Ukrainian forces continued their mid-range strike campaign against Russian military targets in occupied Donetsk Oblast on the night of December 31 to January 1. The Ukrainian General Staff and Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) reported that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian Shahed warehouse in occupied Donetsk City (roughly 40 kilometers from the frontline); and TOR-M2 air defense system in occupied Shevchenko (roughly 50 kilometers from the frontline); and a Russian 51st CAA (SMD) fuel and lubricants depot and command post in occupied Ilyovaisk (roughly 65 kilometers from the frontline).[cviii] Ukraine's Special Operations Forces (SSO) reported that Ukrainian forces also destroyed an assault detachment command post of the Russian 68th Tank Regiment (150th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA, SMD) in occupied Avdiivka (roughly 30 kilometers from the frontline).[cix]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Hulyaipole direction between December 31 and January 2 but did not advance.

Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on December 30 shows Ukrainian forces clearing Russian positions from central Dobropillya (north of Hulyaipole).[cx] ISW previously did not extend Russian advances or Russian claims to these areas, given the lack of available video evidence that would have indicated that Russian forces maintained a presence in central Dobropillya. ISW assesses that the event did not occur in the previous seven days, given that there is no evidence of snow on the ground in the footage, though commercially available satellite imagery indicates that it snowed in Dobropillya in the previous seven days.

Russian forces attacked near Hulyaipole itself; north of Hulyaipole near Dobropillya and Zelene; northeast of Hulyaipole near Solodke, Rybne, Pryvillya, and Zlahoda; and west of Hulyaipole toward Zaliznychne on December 31 and January 1 to 2.[cxi]

The commander of a Ukrainian assault regiment reported on December 31 that Russian forces consolidated positions on the southern and northeastern outskirts of Hulyaipole but that Ukrainian forces had blocked all logistics routes that Russian forces had used to infiltrate into the town.[cxii] A source reportedly affiliated with Ukrainian military intelligence reported that both Russian and Ukrainian forces are operating within Hulyaipole and that neither side has full control.[cxiii] A source in Ukraine’s Security Service (SBU) told CNN on January 1 that the situation in the Hulyaipole direction remains tense and that Russian forces outnumber Ukrainian forces in manpower and equipment.[cxiv]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 57th and 60th separate motorized rifle brigades (both of the 5th CAA, Eastern Military District [EMD]) are striking Ukrainian positions in central Hulyaipole and Tsvitkove (northwest of Hulyaipole).[cxv] Elements of the 11th Air Force and Air Defense Army (Russian Aerospace Forces [VKS] and EMD) are striking Ukrainian positions near Zaliznychne.[cxvi] Elements of the 189th Motorized Rifle Regiment (35th CAA, EMD) are reportedly operating in eastern Zaporizhia Oblast.[cxvii]

Russian forces recently advanced in western Zaporizhia Oblast.

Assessed Russian advances: Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets and a source reportedly affiliated with Ukrainian military intelligence reported on December 31 and January 1 that Russian forces bypassed Stepnohirsk (west of Orikhiv) to the west along the road to Hryhorivka (north of Stepnohirsk) and to the east along the road to Lukyanivske (northeast of Stepnohirsk).[cxviii] Mashovets reported that Russian forces reached the Ukrainian defensive line along the Konka River near Prymorske (west of Orikhiv).[cxix] Russian and Ukrainian sources indicated that Russian forces have not yet seized Stepnohirsk or Prymorske, however.[cxx]

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced within and northeast of Mala Tokmachka (southeast of Orikhiv).[cxxi]

Russian forces attacked southeast of Orikhiv near Bilohirya and west of Orikhiv near Plavni, Prymorske, and Stepnohirsk on December 31 and January 1 to 2.[cxxii]

Order of Battle: Mashovets reported that elements of the Russian 19th Motorized Rifle Division (58th CAA, Southern Military District [SMD]) and elements of the 108th and 247th Airborne (VDV) regiments (both 7th VDV Division) are attacking from Prymorske toward Richne (northeast of Prymorske) and on both flanks of Stepnohirsk.[cxxiii] Elements of the 31st Separate VDV Brigade are reportedly operating near Lukyanivske.[cxxiv] Elements of the Nemets group of the 3rd Assault Company of the 291st Motorized Rifle Regiment (42nd Motorized Rifle Division, 58th CAA) and 4th Military Base (58th CAA) reportedly continue to operate in the Zaporizhia direction[cxxv]

Geolocated footage published on January 29 shows a Ukrainian MiG-29 aircraft striking a Russian bridge over the Kinska River south of Bilohirya.[cxxvi]

Russian forces continued limited offensive operations in the Kherson direction on January 1 and 2 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked east of Kherson City near the Antonivskyi Bridge on December 31 and January 1 to 2.[cxxvii]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Kasper group of the Russian 18th CAA are reportedly striking critical infrastructure in Kherson City.[cxxviii] Elements of the Russian 98th VDV Division are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Antonivka (east of Kherson City) and areas northeast of Kherson City.[cxxix]

Ukrainian forces continued their mid-range and long-range strike campaign against military and energy infrastructure in occupied areas of southern Ukraine. Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) Commander Major Robert “Magyar” Brovdi reported on January 1 that Ukrainian forces struck a KASTA-2E2 airspace control radar system and a radar station that assists with drone and missile launches near occupied Hvardiiske, Crimea, and the Balashivka substation near occupied Balashivka, Zaporizhia Oblast (about 40 kilometers south of Orikhiv).[cxxx]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Russian forces conducted a series of drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of December 31 to January 1. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 205 Shahed-type, Gerbera-type, and other drones – of which about 130 were Shahed-type drones – from the directions of Oryol, Bryansk, and Kursk cities; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; occupied Cape Chauda and Hvardiiske, Crimea; and occupied Donetsk Oblast.[cxxxi] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces had downed 176 drones as of 0830 January 1 local time and that 24 drones hit 15 locations. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces struck energy, medical, and residential infrastructure in Volyn, Odesa, Chernihiv, Kharkiv, and Zaporizhia oblasts.[cxxxii] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky noted that Russian strikes caused power outages in Volyn, Odesa, and Chernihiv oblasts.[cxxxiii] Ukraine’s largest private energy company, DTEK, reported that Russian forces destroyed two DTEK facilities that supply electricity to parts of Odesa City.[cxxxiv]

Russian forces conducted a series of drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of January 1 to 2. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 116 Shahed-type, Gerbera-type, and other drones – of which about 70 were Shahed-type drones – from the directions of Kursk, Oryol, and Bryansk cities; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Shatalovo, Smolensk Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; and occupied Cape Chauda, Crimea.[cxxxv] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces had downed 86 drones as of 0830 January 2 local time, that 27 drones hit 23 locations, and that drone debris fell on two locations. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces struck residential and civilian infrastructure in Chernihiv and Dnipropetrovsk oblasts.[cxxxvi] Ukrainian officials also reported on January 2 that two Russian Iskander-M ballistic missiles struck medical, residential, and civilian infrastructure in Kharkiv City, injuring at least 30 civilians.[cxxxvii]

Russian strikes are increasingly targeting port and energy infrastructure in Odesa Oblast to damage Ukraine's ability to export goods through the Black Sea. The Wall Street Journal (WSJ) reported on December 31 that Russian strikes in December 2025 heavily targeted Odesa City, a hub for Ukrainian grain exports, and damaged infrastructure, storage reservoirs, and power grids.[cxxxviii] The WSJ reported that Zelensky stated on December 30 that Russia aims to "cut off Odesa City in terms of infrastructure" and reduce Ukraine's export capabilities through the Black Sea. Ukraine's Ministry of Development of Communities and Territories reported that Ukraine exports roughly 90 percent of its agricultural produce by sea and that six ports in Odesa Oblast handled about 76 million tons of cargo from January to November 2025. The WSJ noted that Odesa City produces limited electricity, so it relies on external power supplies. The Kremlin has been seeking to impose a de facto blockade on Ukrainian ports since withdrawing from the 2022-2023 Black Sea Grain Initiative, which allowed cargo ships to sail between ports in Odesa Oblast and the Bosphorus Strait without fear of Russian strikes.[cxxxix] Moscow likely aimed to use the Black Sea Fleet (BSF) to deter Ukrainian and international maritime activity in the Black Sea without having to enforce an actual blockade, but Ukraine’s missile and drone strike campaign starting in June 2023 has largely driven the BSF from the western Black Sea.[cxl] Russian forces are using long-range strike capabilities to disrupt Ukraine's Black Sea activity to offset the damage to the BSF. ISW recently observed that Russian forces have also been striking Ukrainian logistics lines in Odesa Oblast with various air launched munitions, including glide bombs, highlighting Ukraine’s urgent need for a well provisioned and diverse air defense umbrella.[cxli]

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

Nothing significant to report.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.