Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, January 19, 2026

Data cutoff: 11:30am on January 19

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The Kremlin reportedly established a list of the top five State Duma candidates to represent the Kremlin’s United Russia ruling party in the September 2026 State Duma elections. Three sources told Russian outlet RBK on January 19 that the Russian Presidential Administration’s office and ruling United Russia Party decided on the top five leaders to represent United Russia in the September 2026 State Duma elections: Russian Security Council Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, Russian Yunarmia Chief of the General Staff Captain Vladislav Golovin,  Maryana Lysenko (a prominent Russian doctor who led City Clinical Hospital No. 52 and received the title of Hero of Labor for her work combatting the COVID-19 pandemic in Russia), and Kremlin-coopted and Kremlin-awarded Russian milblogger Yevgeny Poddubny.[i] The candidates in these recurring lists historically have been domestically popular political figures who hold prominent positions in the Russian political sphere, including other senior government posts, and who will likely decline their parliamentary seats in favor of retaining their more powerful or lucrative positions that they currently occupy.

Putin’s reported platforming of hardline pro-war public figures highlights a Kremlin effort to present pro-war figures as the role models who embody Russia’s informal state ideology and political priorities going into 2026. The list is not officially confirmed and is not final. The final unified federal list can contain up to 15 candidates, however the ballot will only list the first five candidates representative of the United Russia Party's, and thereby Russian President Vladimir Putin's, political agenda.[ii] RBK’s sources indicated that Putin decides on the final list of candidates himself.[iii] RBK reported that Medvedev, who frequently represents fringe Kremlin positions and has previously issued veiled and overt nuclear threats aimed at Europe and the United States, will likely rank first on the list.[iv]

Medvedev’s position on the list is noteworthy. Medvedev has threatened Europe with language that directly mirrors the Kremlin’s false justifications for its invasion of Ukraine.[v] Medvedev also staunchly continues to support Putin’s war in Ukraine, frequently parroting Kremlin narratives to justify the continuation of the war.[vi] Medvedev’s reported position on the United Russia list suggests that Medvedev’s bellicose public statements — including those threating Europe and the United States — are representative of the Kremlin’s promoted messaging, rather than his own idiosyncratic inflammatory remarks. Lavrov similarly is a pro-war ally of Putin, frequently justifying Russia’s war in Ukraine and invoking the ”root causes” of the war (a term that the Kremlin has long used as shorthand to mean its original maximalist war justifications and demands).[vii] Lavrov recently claimed that a peace settlement to Russia's war in Ukraine needs to resolve the issue of those living in Novorossiya — an invented region that Kremlin officials often claim is “integral” to Russia and that includes  all of eastern and southern Ukraine, including those that Russia has not illegally annexed.[viii] The reported list also notably includes a Russian milblogger that was not fully Kremlin-controlled prior to Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 – Yevgeny Poddubny. The Kremlin coopted Poddubny in December 2022 and has since used him to disseminate official narratives in the Russian ultranationalist information space.[ix] The reported inclusion of Poddubny on the list indicates Putin's commitment to the continued militarization of Russian society and the preparation of the domestic audience for a protracted war in Ukraine and potential future war with NATO.[x] It is unclear how these five individuals are related to Putin’s announced “Year of the Unity of the Peoples of Russia ” which Putin stated would be a major focus in 2026.[xi] Pro-war politics may in fact supersede the thematic focus over the Year of the Unity of the Peoples of Russia in 2026.

The list, if genuine, suggests that Putin is attempting to further cement a pro-war ideological vanguard in Russian political life by platforming public figures who push Putin's war and larger pro-war political agenda. RBK characterized Lavrov and Medvedev as domestically popular, with sources reportedly claiming that Medvedev is especially popular with the Russian cleavage that prefers “to vote for the government."[xii] RBK similarly amplified Kremlin-controlled domestic polling that positions Lavrov as “one of the most popular politicians in Russia.” The candidates strongly endorse Russia’s war in Ukraine, aggressive and hawkish rhetoric toward Europe, and nationalistic messaging that encourages Russian society to rally around the Kremlin line. The reported list is not indicative of Russian Duma election results, but is noteworthy as it offers Putin an opportunity to publicly define early in the year his political and ideological positions that all Russians should emulate. Most if not all of the five mentioned candidates will likely waive their positions, so the list is a symbolic representation of Putin’s endorsement of their public support of the war, and another indicator that Putin continues to condition Russian society for protracted war against Ukraine and possibly NATO.

Russia reportedly has begun using unmanned ground vehicles (UGVs) equipped with thermobaric artillery launchers to adapt artillery to current drone-dominated battlefield conditions. A Ukrainian-telegram channel published footage on January 19 that shows Russian forces testing the Malvina-M — the first Russian unmanned ground vehicle (UGV) equipped with thermobaric artillery.[xiii] Ukrainian defense outlet Militarnyi reported on January 19 that Russian engineers integrated 220mm guide rails from the TOS-1A Solntsepek thermobaric artillery system with the Malvina-M UGV.[xiv] Thermobaric weapons, also known as vacuum or aerosol bombs, are a specialized type of explosive munition that generates a significant overpressure explosion and extreme heat by dispersing and igniting an aerosol cloud of explosives while sucking out the surrounding oxygen.[xv] Traditional thermobaric artillery systems are effective in destroying fortified structures such as entrenched infantry positions and bunkers. Russia’s principal thermobaric artillery launcher, the TOS-1A, is a large, expensive, relatively slow-moving vehicle on a tank chassis with a short firing range that requires Russian forces to bring the system within about six kilometers of the frontline, making them highly susceptible to Ukrainian drones. Russia's integration of thermobaric artillery onto UGV platforms could allow Russian forces to conceal and launch thermobaric artillery much closer to the frontline and mitigate factors that degrade the effectiveness of traditional heavy thermobaric artillery systems.

Key Takeaways:

• The Kremlin reportedly established a list of the top five State Duma candidates to represent the Kremlin’s United Russia ruling party in the September 2026 State Duma elections.
• Putin’s reported platforming of hardline pro-war public figures highlights a Kremlin effort to present pro-war figures as the role models who embody Russia’s political priorities going into 2026.
• The list, if genuine, suggests that Putin is attempting to further cement a pro-war ideological vanguard in Russian political life by platforming public figures who push Putin's war and larger pro-war political agenda.
• Russia reportedly has begun using unmanned ground vehicles (UGVs) equipped with thermobaric artillery launchers to adapt artillery to current drone-dominated battlefield conditions.
• Russian forces have reportedly split the grouping operating in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area into two tactical groups: the Dzerzhinsk (the Russian name for Toretsk) and Bakhmut tactical groups.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area. Russian forces recently advanced in Sumy and Kharkiv oblasts and near Slovyansk.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.    

• Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
• Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis
• Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
• Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
• Significant Activity in Belarus

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Ukrainian forces reportedly struck the Saratov Oil Refinery overnight on January 18 to 19. A Ukrainian OSINT source reported on January 19 that Ukrainian forces struck the Saratov Oil Refinery and published footage of an explosion, reportedly at the refinery.[xvi] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces downed 29 Ukrainian drones over Saratov Oblast overnight.[xvii]  

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in Sumy Oblast along the international border)

Russian forces recently marginally advanced across the international border southeast of Sumy City.

Assessed Russian advance: Geolocated footage published on January 19 indicates that Russian forces recently marginally advanced across the border and entered northern Vysoke (southeast of Sumy City).[xviii]

Russian forces attacked in the Sumy and Kursk directions, including north of Sumy City near Kindrativka and northeast of Sumy City near Varachyne, Yunakivka, and Sadky and toward Mala Korchakivka, on January 18 and 19.[xix]

Russian forces still maintain positions gained in a cross-border attack into Sumy Oblast in part due to winter weather inhibiting Ukrainian drone operations. Ukrainian Joint Forces Task Force Spokesperson Colonel Viktor Trehubov stated on January 19 that the situation near Hrabovske (southeast of Sumy City on the international border) is a "headache" for Ukrainian forces.[xx] Trehubov stated that Russian forces are able to maintain positions into Hrabovske and can conduct logistics as Ukrainian drone operations are reduced. Trehubov reported that winter weather complicates Ukrainian drone operations, as freezing temperatures freeze fiber optic cables while wind and snow deprive drones of the ability to properly identify targets. Russian forces seized Hrabovske as of December 21.[xxi] Geolocated footage published on January 19 indicates that Russian forces still hold positions in southern Hrabovske, consistent with Trehubov's reporting.[xxii]

Russian forces appear to be conducting battlefield air interdiction (BAI) efforts against Sumy Oblast. Geolocated footage published on January 19 shows a Russian long-range Geran strike drone hitting a railway bridge over the Seym River north of Lysohubivka, Sumy Oblast (about 80 kilometers from the frontline, northwest of Sumy City near the Sumy-Chernihiv Oblast administrative border).[xxiii] This is at least the second Russian strike against a bridge in Sumy Oblast since January 1.[xxiv] Russian BAI efforts constitute strikes against Ukrainian logistics lines at an operational depth (from about 25 to over 100 kilometers from the frontline) over a period of weeks to months to degrade Ukraine's ability to supply and therefore hold its defensive positions, enabling Russian advances at a later date.[xxv] Russian forces have notably integrated BAI efforts into campaigns elsewhere on the frontline, most successfully in the Pokrovsk and Hulyaipole directions, and may intend to use these strikes as part of a broader campaign to set conditions for future intensified offensive operations in Sumy Oblast.[xxvi] ISW has not yet observed other indicators that Russian forces are preparing for a new offensive into Sumy Oblast at the near term, such as redeploying forces capable of supporting a new offensive push. Russian forces have recently conducted a campaign to portray limited cross-border attacks into the Sumy Oblast border area as part of a broader offensive to achieve informational effects rather than battlefield effects, but it is unclear whether positions gained in these attacks would support a new future Russian offensive.[xxvii]

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border to create a defensible buffer zone with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Russian forces recently advanced in northern Kharkiv Oblast.

Assessed Russian advances: Footage published on January 16 and geolocated on January 19 indicates that Russian forces likely seized Dehtyarne (northeast of Kharkiv City).[xxviii]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Kharkiv City near Prylipka, Vovchanski Khutory, Kruhle, Nesterne, Dehtyarne, Vovchansk, and Starytsya and toward Symynivka, Izbytske, and Hrafske on January 18 and 19.[xxix] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked and entered eastern Lyman (northeast of Kharkiv City).[xxx]

The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in northern Kharkiv Oblast reported on January 19 that Russian forces are constantly assaulting Ukrainian positions near Vovchansk and are relying on vehicles to bring additional reinforcements to the frontline.[xxxi] Ukrainian Joint Forces Task Force Spokesperson Colonel Viktor Trehubov reported on January 19 that Russian forces are searching for weak spots in Ukrainian defenses along the border in Kharkiv Oblast and are attempting to advance in new areas, including near Dehtyarne.[xxxii] Trehubov reported that Russian forces are trying to seize settlements on the flanks of Vovchansk, bypassing the town itself. A Russian milblogger posted footage on January 19 purportedly showing a Russian Tornado multiple launch rocket system (MLRS) strike against the 330kV substation in Kharkiv City.[xxxiii]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian Chechen Akhmat Spetsnaz Vakha Battalion, the 245th Motorized Rifle Regiment (47th Tank Division, 1st Guards Tank Army [GTA], Moscow Military District [MMD]), the Federal Security Service (FSB) Special Purpose Center, and the FSB Oktyabrsky Command Post are reportedly operating in northern Kharkiv Oblast.[xxxiv]

Russian sources claimed that Russian forces attacked northeast of Velykyi Burluk near Milove and Khatnie on January 19.[xxxv]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Oskil River (Russian objective: Cross the Oskil River in Kharkiv Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on January 19 but did not make confirmed advances.

Assessed Russian infiltrations: Geolocated footage published on January 19 shows Ukrainian forces striking Russian forces south of Pishchane (southeast of Kupyansk) after what ISW assesses was a Russian infiltration mission that did not change the control of terrain or the forward edge of the battle area (FEBA) at this time.[xxxvi]

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces surrounded Pishchane.[xxxvii]

Russian forces attacked in and near Kupyansk itself; north of Kupyansk toward Holubivka; east of Kupyansk toward Petropavlivka, Podoly, and Kucherivka; southeast of Kupyansk near Stepova Novoselivka and Pishchane and toward Kurylivka; and south of Kupyansk near Kupyansk-Vuzlovyi on January 18 and 19.[xxxviii] A Russian milblogger reportedly affiliated with the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked in Kupyansk.[xxxix]

Ukrainian Joint Forces Task Force Spokesperson Colonel Viktor Trehubov reported on January 19 that 15 Ukrainian battalions are not surrounded in Kupyansk-Vuzlovyi – contrary to Russian President Vladimir Putin’s claims.[xl]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Borova near Borivska Andriivka; southeast of Borova near Shandryholove; and south of Borova near Oleksandrivka on January 18 and 19.[xli]

Ukrainian forces continued their mid-range strike campaign against Russian military targets in occupied Luhansk Oblast between January 17 and 19. Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) Commander Major Robert “Magyar” Brovdi reported on January 19 that Ukrainian forces struck a drone warehouse of the Russian 51st Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic Army Corps [DNR AC], Southern Military District [SMD] in occupied Novokrasnyanka (roughly 33 kilometers behind the frontline) using FP-2 drones.[xlii]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)

Russian forces recently advanced in the Slovyansk direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on January 19 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced east of Lyman itself.[xliii] Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported on January 15 that Russian forces advanced about five kilometers west of Zarichne (east of Lyman), and geolocated footage published on January 19 shows Russian forces operating in northwestern Zarichne.[xliv] The preponderance of available textual and visual evidence from Ukrainian and Russian sources therefore indicates that Russian forces have likely seized Myrne (northeast of Lyman), Zarichne, Yampolivka, and Torske (all east of Lyman) and advanced in the fields west and southwest of Zarichne at a prior date.[xlv] ISW will continue to refine and update its assessment as more information becomes available.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced near Pryshyb (northwest of Lyman).[xlvi]

Russian forces attacked near Lyman itself; northwest of Lyman near Stavky and Novoselivka; northeast of Lyman near Kolodyazi and Zarichne; southeast of Lyman near Dibrova, Ozerne, and Yampil; northeast of Slovyansk near Zakitne; east of Slovyansk near Siversk and Riznykivka; and southeast of Slovyansk near Pazeno and toward Rai-Oleksandrivka on January 18 and 19.[xlvii]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 7th Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 2nd Luhansk People's Republic Army Corps [LNR AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating near Siversk and Zakitne.[xlviii] Drone operators of the Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies and Reconnaissance elements of the 752nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (3rd Motorized Rifle Division, 20th CAA, Moscow Military District [MMD]) are reportedly operating in the Lyman direction.[xlix]

Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area.

Assessed Ukrainian advance: Geolocated footage published on January 19 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced in central Ivanopillya (south of Kostyantynivka).[l]

Assessed Russian advances: A preponderance of recent geolocated footage indicates that Russian forces have likely seized Stupochky and Predtechyne (both east of Kostyantynivka) on a prior date not within the past day.[li]

Assessed Russian infiltration: Geolocated footage published on January 19 shows a Russian servicemember operating north of Predtechyne in what ISW assesses was an infiltration mission that did not change the forward edge of the battle area (FEBA) north of Predtechyne.[lii]

Unconfirmed claims: The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces seized Novopavlivka (southwest of Druzhkivka).[liii] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced toward Illinivka (west of Kostyantynivka) and along the Siverskyi Donets–Donbas Canal near Novomarkove (northeast of Kostyantynivka).[liv]

Russian forces attacked near Kostyantynivka itself; northeast of Kostyantynivka toward Maiske and Markove; north of Kostyantynivka toward Pryvillya and Virolyubivka; south of Kostyantynivka near Kleban-Byk, Shcherbynivka, and Ivanopillya and toward Berestok; southeast of Kostyantynivka near Oleksandro-Shultyne; southwest of Kostyantynivka near Yablunivka and Stepanivka; west of Kostyantynivka toward Illinivka; south of Druzhkivka near Rusyn Yar; and southwest of Druzhkivka toward Novopavlivka, Torske, and Sofiivka on January 18 and 19.[lv]

Russian forces have reportedly split the grouping operating in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area into two tactical groups: the Dzerzhinsk (the Russian name for Toretsk) and Bakhmut tactical groups. Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated that the Dzerzhinsk and Bakhmut tactical groups intend to complete the seizure of Kostyantynivka and advance on Kramatorsk from the south and southeast, respectively.[lvi] Mashovets reported that the Russian military command tasked the Dzerzhinsk Tactical Group with advancing on the western flank of Kostyantynivka to seize the western half of the city while the Bakhmut Tactical Group will attempt the same on the eastern flank.[lvii]

Mashovets stated that the Dzerzhinsk Tactical Group is composed of disparate SMD elements under the operational control of different force groupings across the theater, including: 3rd CAA, 8th CAA, 3rd AC (all under the operational control of the Southern Grouping of Forces), 49th CAA, 58th CAA (both under the operational control of the Dnepr Grouping of Forces), and 51st CAA (formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic [DNR] AC, under the operational control of the Central Grouping of Forces); and additional naval infantry and BARS (Russian Army Combat Reserve) elements.[lviii] Mashovets stated that the Bakhmut Tactical Group is composed of significantly less forces, including three regiments of the Russian mobilization reserve under the operational control of the 6th Motorized Rifle Division (3rd AC), a tank regiment of the 6th Motorized Rifle Division, and a brigade of the 3rd AC.[lix]

Mashovets reported that the Russian military command redeployed elements of the 70th Motorized Rifle Division (18th CAA, SMD) to the Kostyantynivka-Chasiv Yar area in December 2025 to replace elements of the 98th Airborne (VDV) Division, which redeployed to Kherson Oblast in Fall 2025.[lx]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 70th Motorized Rifle Division are operating in the Chasiv Yar direction.[lxi] Drone operators of the 4th Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd CAA) are striking Ukrainian forces in Kostyantynivka and Ivanopillya.[lxii] Loitering munition operators of the 238th Artillery Brigade (8th CAA) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Raiske and Novoselivka (both southwest of Druzhkivka).[lxiii] Drone operators of the 68th Separate Reconnaissance Battalion (20th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Mykolaipillya (south of Druzhkivka).[lxiv]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Dobropillya tactical area on January 19 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northeast of Dobropillya toward Kucheriv Yar, east of Dobropillya near Toretske and toward Novyi Donbas, and southeast of Dobropillya near Zapovidne on January 18 and 19.[lxv]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction on January 19 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked near and within Pokrovsk itself; northwest of Pokrovsk near Hryshyne; north of Pokrovsk near Rodynske; northeast of Pokrovsk near Zatyshok and Chervonyi (Krasnyi) Lyman; east of Pokrovsk near Myrnohrad; southwest of Pokrovsk near Kotlyne, Udachne, and Molodetske; and west of Pokrovsk toward Serhiivka on January 18 and 19.[lxvi] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked toward Rodynske and Sukhetske (northeast of Pokrovsk).[lxvii]

Ukrainian Ground Forces Commander Colonel General Oleksandr Syrskyi reported on January 18 that Ukrainian forces held positions in Pokrovsk and retook up to 98 square kilometers of territory in and near Pokrovsk in late 2025.[lxviii] Syrskyi reported that Ukrainian forces will continue to hold positions and retake territory in Pokrovsk in 2026. The Ukrainian 7th Rapid Reaction Corps of the Air Assault Forces reported on January 19 that Russian forces continue to attempt small group infiltrations towards Hryshyne because they are unable to mass enough troops to conduct a direct assault.[lxix] The corps reported that Ukrainian forces are halting the advance of Russian forces in northern Myrnohrad. The commander of a Ukrainian battalion operating in the Pokrovsk direction reported on January 19 that Russian forces are continuing to attack in small groups of one to three in the Pokrovsk direction and that the Russian military command forces Russian forces to continue to attack until a given Russian regiment is rendered combat ineffective.[lxx] The officer of a Ukrainian regiment operating in the Pokrovsk direction likewise stated on January 19 that Russian prisoners of war (POWs) report that Russian forces summarily execute Russian soldiers who retreat without orders.[lxxi] The officer reported that Russian forces continue to exploit bad weather to infiltrate through Ukrainian positions, but Ukrainian forces are maintaining rotations, establishing additional groups, and have the situation in Pokrovsk under control. ISW continues to assess that Russian forces will eventually seize Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad following a 22-month campaign, though Ukrainian forces maintain some tactical positions in the Pokrovsk pocket for the time being.

Order of Battle: Drone operators and other elements of the Russian 5th Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA), 55th Naval Infantry Division (Pacific Fleet) (newly formed from the 155th Naval Infantry Brigade), and 76th Airborne (VDV) Division are reportedly operating in the Pokrovsk direction.[lxxii]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Novopavlivka direction on January 19 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked near Novopavlivka itself, southeast of Novopavlivka near Horikhove, and south of Novopavlivka near Filiya on January 18 and 19.[lxxiii]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Oleksandrivka direction on January 19 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northeast of Oleksandrivka near Ivanivka and southeast of Oleksandrivka near Verbove and Krasnohirske on January 18 and 19.[lxxiv]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 16th Radiation, Chemical, and Biological Defense Brigade (Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly operating in the Vremivka (Oleksandrivka) direction.[lxxv]

Ukrainian forces continued their medium-range strike campaign against Russian military targets and energy infrastructure in occupied Donetsk Oblast on the night of January 18 to 19. Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) Commander Major Robert “Magyar” Brovdi reported on January 19 and published geolocated footage on January 19 showing Ukrainian forces striking several targets in occupied Donetsk Oblast, including a drone warehouse in occupied Donetsk City (roughly 45 kilometers behind the frontline), the Karavan traction power substation near occupied Andriivka (roughly 98 kilometers behind the frontline) and the Sartana-Tranzitna and Azovska power substations in occupied Mariupol (roughly 103 to 108 kilometers from the frontline).[lxxvi]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Hulyaipole direction on January 19 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked near and within Hulyaipole itself; northwest of Hulyaipole near Bratske and toward Svyatopetrivka, Vozdvyzhivka, and Ternuvate; north of Hulyaipole near Zelene, Varvarivka, Dobropillya, Nove Zaporizhzhia, Radisne, and Yehorivka; and northeast of Hulyaipole near Solodke on January 18 and 19.[lxxvii] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked from Ternuvate, Vozdvyzhivka, Tsvitkove (northwest of Hulyaipole), and Staroukrainka (west of Hulyaipole) and near Zaliznychne (west of Hulyaipole).[lxxviii]

Ukrainian Southern Defense Forces Spokesperson Colonel Vladyslav Voloshyn reported on January 19 that the situation near Hulyaipole, Zelene, and Varvarivka remains tense as Russian forces continue attempts to envelop Hulyaipole from the north and south.[lxxix] Voloshyn added that Russian forces are intensifying attacks to push Ukrainian forces from positions in the northern, northeastern, and southern outskirts of Hulyaipole. Voloshyn noted that Russian forces are intensifying airstrikes in the direction and launched 35 KAB guided glide bombs against Zaliznychne on January 18 alone.

A Ukrainian regimental commander operating in the Hulyaipole direction reported on January 18 that Russian forces are increasing their use of horses and have conducted four attempts to attack on horses in pairs within the regiment’s area of responsibility (AoR).[lxxx]

Order of Battle: Assault elements of the Russian 57th Motorized Rifle Brigade (5th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly operating west of Hulyaipole.[lxxxi] KVN fiber optic first-person view (FPV) drone operators of the 305th Artillery Brigade (5th CAA) and armored elements of the 218th Tank Regiment (127th Motorized Rifle Division, 5th CAA) reportedly continue to operate in the Zaporizhia direction.[lxxxii]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on January 19 but did not advance.

Unconfirmed claims: The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on January 19 that Russian forces seized Pavlivka (northwest of Orikhiv).[lxxxiii] A Russian milblogger claimed on January 19 that Russian forces seized over 20 percent of Pavlivka, contrary to the Russian MoD’s claim.[lxxxiv] Russian milbloggers first claimed the seizure of Pavlivka on January 16.[lxxxv]

Russian forces attacked west of Orikhiv near Stepove, Plavni, Mali Shcherbaky, and Shcherbaky and northwest of Orikhiv near Lukyanivske and toward Pavlivka, Novoyakovlivka, and Novoboykivske on January 18 and 19. [lxxxvi]

A Russian milblogger claimed on January 19 that Russian forces are unable to consolidate positions in Stepove, Mali Shcherbaky, and Shcherbaky as all buildings within these settlements have been destroyed and that the open terrain of fields and burned windbreaks in the area makes it difficult for Russian forces to advance.[lxxxvii]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 328th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (104th VDV Division) are striking Ukrainian positions southeast of Lukyanivske.[lxxxviii] Drone operators and other elements of the 7th VDV Division and the 239th Separate Reconnaissance Battalion (19th Motorized Rifle Division, 58th CAA, Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating in Zaporizhia Oblast.[lxxxix]

Neither Ukrainian nor Russian sources reported ground activity in the Kherson direction on January 19.

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian Dnepr Reconnaissance and Assault Brigade (Russian Volunteer Corps) and the 98th VDV Division are reportedly operating in the Kherson direction.[xc]

Ukrainian sources provided footage of long-range strikes against Russian military targets in occupied Crimea during 2025. Ukraine’s Security Service (SBU) published on January 19 footage of SBU drone operators striking Russian air defense systems and radars in occupied Crimea worth a total of $4 million during 2025.[xci] A Ukrainian OSINT Telegram channel geolocated footage of Ukrainian forces striking a 96L6E radar system of an S-400 air defense system on the night of December 17 to 18, 2025, to occupied Belbek airfield (about 227 kilometers from the frontline), footage of Ukrainian forces striking a radar dome and 55Zh6U Nebo-U radar system on an unspecified date to south of occupied Feodosiya (about 248 kilometers from the frontline), and footage of Ukrainian forces striking two Pantsir air defense systems on an unspecified date to occupied Hvardiiske airbase (about 199 kilometers from the frontline).[xcii]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Russian forces conducted a series of drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of January 18 to 19. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 145 Shahed-type, Gerbera-type and other drones — of which 90 were Shahed-type drones — from the directions of Kursk and Oryol cities; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; occupied Cape Chauda, Crimea; and occupied Donetsk City.[xciii] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 126 drones, that 13 drones struck 12 locations, and that drone debris impacted five locations. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces struck civilian, industrial, and energy infrastructure in Chernihiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Kharkiv, Kyiv, and Odesa oblasts.[xciv]

The CEO of YASNO, a subsidiary of Ukraine's largest private energy company, DTEK, Serhii Kovalenko, announced on January 18 that Russian strikes on Ukrainian energy infrastructure caused Kyiv Oblast to experience its longest power outage to date, with electricity unavailable from 10 and up to 16 hours per day.[xcv]

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

Nothing significant to report.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.