4 hours ago

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, January 18, 2026

Assessment as of January 18: 2:30pm ET

Data cutoff: 10:45am on January 18

 

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

For more information on ISW's map methodology, please view our statement here.

 

Russian forces are reportedly preparing to conduct long-range strikes against substations powering Ukraine’s nuclear power plants. Ukraine’s Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky warned on January 17 that Russia is considering strikes on electricity transmission substations on which Ukrainian nuclear power plants depend to operate.[1] The GUR stated that Russia seeks to disconnect the nuclear power plants from Ukraine's energy grid, leaving Ukrainian civilians without electricity and heat. Recent Russian strikes have threatened Ukrainian-controlled nuclear power plants. International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Director General Rafael Grossi reported on January 16 that military activity damaged an electrical substation critical to Chornobyl Nuclear Power Plant operations over the past week (roughly since January 12).[2] Grossi stated that IAEA teams have reported military activities or air raid alarms at all five nuclear sites in Ukraine over the past week. Zelensky stated on January 16 that Ukraine needs about 18 gigawatts of power to meet domestic consumption needs in the winter but that Ukraine's power generation capacity can currently only produce 11 gigawatts of power — a number that would likely decrease significantly should Russian strikes disconnect one or more Ukrainian nuclear power plants from the energy grid.[3]

This warning comes as Russia continues its long-range strike campaign against Ukrainian energy infrastructure, resulting in widespread blackouts. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 201 Shahed-type, Gerbera-type, and other drones — of which 120 were Shahed-type drones —from the directions of Kursk and Oryol cities; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; occupied Cape Chauda, Crimea; and occupied Donetsk City on the night of January 17 to 18.[4] Ukrainian officials indicated that 30 Russian drones struck 15 locations, including critical infrastructure in Kharkiv and Zaporizhzhia cities and in Odesa Oblast.[5] Ukrainian Energy Minister Denys Shmyhal reported on January 16 that Russian forces have struck every power plant in Ukraine since February 2022 and have inflicted 612 total strikes on Ukraine’s energy infrastructure.[6] Shmyhal noted that problems with energy are the most severe in Kyiv City and in Kyiv, Odesa, Dnipropetrovsk, Kharkiv, and other frontline oblasts.[7] Kyiv City Mayor Vitaliy Klitschko stated that Kyiv City only has half the electricity that it needs and called on residents to leave the city if possible.[8] ISW continues to assess that Russia has been attempting to split Ukraine’s energy grid and create energy islands that are cut off from Ukraine’s electricity generation, deliveries, and transmission systems.[9] ISW has also observed reports that Russian forces are striking Ukraine’s energy grid in an effort to divide it into two parts along an east-west divide.[10] Russia's continued devastating strike campaign against Ukrainian energy infrastructure emphasizes Ukraine's urgent need for additional air defense systems and munitions, particularly amid reports that Russia's campaign may soon turn toward nuclear power plants in the dead of winter.

Russian state media amplified a Kremlin-affiliated former Ukrainian politician’s statements to prepare the Russian domestic populace for the Kremlin's rejection of peace in the near-team amid ongoing US, Ukrainian, and European negotiations. Kremlin-affiliated former Ukrainian Verkhovna Rada Deputy Viktor Medvedchuk — a close personal ally of Russian President Vladimir Putin, whom Putin initially wanted to install in place of Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky following Russia’s 2022 full-scale invasion — claimed in an interview with Kremlin newswire TASS on January 18 that “there will be no peace in Ukraine in 2026."[11] Medvedchuk also reiterated claims that "time is on the Kremlin's side" and emphasized the Kremlin's commitment to achieving its original war aims without negotiating with Ukraine. Medvedchuk also reiterated the Kremlin’s longstanding rhetoric falsely framing Russia's invasion of Ukraine as a war against the West, claiming that the Ukrainian government is illegitimate, and rejecting Ukrainian elections (which the Kremlin itself has demanded to secure a peace deal) on anything but Russia's terms.[12] Putin and Kremlin officials have repeatedly used these rhetorical lines to emphasize Russia’s commitment to its original war aims and its theory of victory that maintains that the Russian military and economy can outlast Ukraine and Western support for Ukraine — a theory the West can help disprove with support to Ukraine.[13] The Kremlin uses Medvedchuk to make more extreme statements than Putin and Kremlin officials themselves make through a voice claiming to represent Ukraine. The Kremlin is likely using Medvedchuk's January 18 interview to justify Russia’s rejection of peace efforts to resolve its war in Ukraine. Medvedchuk’s statements come against the backdrop of ongoing US-European Union-Ukraine peace talks to develop a peace plan and the most recent round of Ukraine-US talks in Miami on January 16.[14] ISW continues to assess that the Kremlin likely intends to reject outright any peace proposal that does not acquiesce to Russia's full demands, including terms that result from the recent negotiations.[15]

Key Takeaways:

  • Russian forces are reportedly preparing to conduct long-range strikes against substations powering Ukraine’s nuclear power plants.
  • This warning comes as Russia continues its long-range strike campaign against Ukrainian energy infrastructure, resulting in widespread blackouts.
  • Russian state media amplified a Kremlin-affiliated former Ukrainian politician’s statements to prepare the Russian domestic populace for the Kremlin's rejection of peace in the near-team amid ongoing US, Ukrainian, and European negotiations.
  • Russian forces recently advanced in western Zaporizhia Oblast.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.    

  • Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
  • Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis
  • Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
  • Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
  • Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
  • Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
  • Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
  • Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
  • Significant Activity in Belarus

 

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Nothing significant to report.

 

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in Sumy Oblast along the international border)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Sumy Oblast on January 17 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked in Kursk and Sumy oblasts, including north of Sumy City near Andriivka, Oleksiivka, and Varachyne on January 17 and 18.[16]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian Smuglyanka Detachment are reportedly conducting glide bomb strikes against Ukrainian positions near Khrapivshchyna (northeast of Sumy City).[17]

 

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border to create a defensible buffer zone with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on January 18 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced in central Hrafske and Symynivka (both northeast of Kharkiv City).[18]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk, Vovchanski Khutory, Zybyne, Vilcha, Starytsya, Prylipka, Hrafske and toward Nesterne, Dehtyarne, and Kruhle on January 17 and 18.[19]

A Russian milblogger claimed on January 18 that Russian forces are using Molniya fixed-wing “mothership” drones to extend the range of first-person view (FPV) strike drones beyond Kharkiv City to almost 50 kilometers from the frontline.[20]

Russian forces continued offensive operations northeast of Velykyi Burluk toward Chuhunivka on January 17 and 18 but did not advance.[21]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Oskil River (Russian objective: Cross the Oskil River in Kharkiv Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on January 18 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked in Kupyansk itself; east of Kupyansk toward Petropavlivka, Podoly, and Kucherivka; and southeast of Kupyansk toward Pishchane and Kurylivka on January 17 and 18.[22] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Kindrashivka and Radkivka (both north of Kupyansk).[23]

Russian milbloggers continue to push back against the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD)’s fabricated claims about the situation in the Kupyansk direction. A Russian milblogger claimed on January 17 that Russian forces are seizing settlements “on credit,” meaning that Russian commanders on the ground are sending reports of false seizures up through the chain of command.[24] The milblogger claimed that these false claims are reaching the highest levels of the Russian military and political leadership and noted that these false reports are most prominent near Kupyansk. Russian milbloggers have been increasingly refuting the Russian military commands' persistent false claims that Russian forces retook Kupyansk, despite ample geolocated evidence to the contrary.[25]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Borova direction on January 18 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northeast of Borova near Bohuslavka and Borivska Andriivka; south of Borova towards Oleksandrivka; and southeast of Borova toward Novoserhiivka on January 17 and 18.[26]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)

Ukrainian forces recently maintained positions or advanced in the Slovyansk direction.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces seized Ozerne (southeast of Lyman) and south of Riznykivka (east of Slovyansk).[27]

Refinement of areas under Russian claims: Geolocated footage published on January 15 shows Russian forces striking Ukrainian positions south of Riznykivka (east of Slovyansk) - an area where Russian sources claimed that Russian forces maintained a presence. [28]

Russian forces attacked near Lyman itself; northwest of Lyman near Stavky; northeast of Lyman near Zarichne, Drobysheve, and Myrne; southeast of Lyman near Dibrova, Ozerne, and Yampil; northeast of Slovyansk near Zakitne; east of Slovyansk near Riznykivka and Svyato-Pokrovske and toward Kryva Luka and Kalenyky; and southeast of Slovyansk near Nykyforivka and Vasyukivka on January 17 and 18.[29] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Ozerne, Zakitne, Svyato-Pokrovske, and Riznykivka.[30]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 88th Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 2nd Luhansk People’s Republic Army Corps [LNR AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) are striking Ukrainian positions south of Riznykivka.[31] Elements of the 123rd Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd CAA) are reportedly operating in Svyato-Pokrovske.[32] First-person view (FPV) drone operators and other elements of the 7th Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd CAA) reportedly continue to operate in and around Siversk and Zakitne.[33]

Ukrainian forces recently advanced or maintained positions in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed on January 17 that Russian forces seized Minkivka (northeast of Kostyantynivka).[34] Ukraine’s Eastern Group of Forces refuted these Russian claims and reported on January 18 that Ukrainian forces control Minkivka.[35] Russian milbloggers also claimed that Russian forces advanced northeast of west of Pryvillya (north of Kostyantynivka).[36]

Refinement of areas under Russian claims: Geolocated footage published on January 18 shows Ukrainian forces operating on the southeastern outskirts of Illinivka (south of Kostyantynivka) - an area where Russian sources claimed that Russian forces maintained a presence.[37]

Russian forces attacked near and within Kostyantynivka itself; north of Kostyantynivka near Virolyubivka and toward Tykhonivka; northeast of Kostyantynivka near Minkivka, Markove, Novomarkove, Zaliznyanske, Bondarne, and Maiske; southeast of Kostyantynivka near Oleksandro-Shultyne; south of Kostyantynivka near Ivanopillya, Illinivka, Berestok and Shcherbynivka; southwest of Kostyantynivka near Stepanivka; south of Druzhkivka near Rusyn Yar; and southwest of Druzhkivka near Sofiivka and toward Torske on January 17 and 18.[38] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked from Novodmytrivka (north of Kostyantynivka).[39]

The commander of a Ukrainian drone battalion operating in the Kostyantynivka direction reported on January 17 that Russian forces are conducting motorized assaults to bypass Kostyantynivka and cut off Ukrainian logistics into the town.[40] The commander stated that Russian forces are also attempting to infiltrate into Kostyantynivka itself on motorcycles. The commander stated that Russian forces in the Kostyantynivka direction are interdicting Ukrainian logistics with fiber-optic drones and radio-controlled first-person view (FPV) drones.

Order of Battle: FPV drone operators of the Russian 68th Separate Reconnaissance Battalion of the 20th Motorized Rifle Division (8th CAA, SMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian antennas and ammunition depots in Raiske (southwest of Druzhkivka) and Novoandriivka (west of Druzhkivka).[41] FPV drone operators of the 238th Artillery Brigade (8th CAA) reportedly continue to strike Ukrainian positions in the Kostyantynivka direction.[42]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Dobropillya tactical area on January 18 but did not make confirmed advance.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces seized Novyi Donbas (east of Dobropillya).[43]

Russian forces attacked east of Dobropillya near Novyi Donbas and southeast of Dobropillya near Zapovidne on January 17 and 18.[44]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 150th Motorized Rifle Division (8th CAA, SMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces in the Dobropillya direction.[45] Anti-aircraft and artillery elements of the 61st Separate Naval Infantry Brigade (Northern Fleet) are reportedly intercepting Ukrainian drones in the Dobropillya direction.[46]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction on January 18 but did not make confirmed advances.

Assessed Russian infiltrations: Geolocated footage published on January 17 shows Ukrainian forces striking Russian forces in central Myrnohrad (east of Pokrovsk) and east of Hryshyne (northwest of Pokrovsk) after what ISW assesses were both Russian infiltration missions that did not change the control of terrain or the forward edge of the battle area (FEBA) at this time.[47]

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced east and south of Hryshyne and north of Udachne (southwest of Pokrovsk).[48]

Russian forces attacked near and within Pokrovsk itself; northwest of Pokrovsk near Hryshyne; north of Pokrovsk near Rodynske and Bilytske; northeast of Pokrovsk near Sukhetske and Chervonyi (Krasnyi) Lyman; east of Pokrovsk near Myrnohrad and Rivne; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Kotlyne, Udachne, and Molodetske on January 17 and 18.[49]

A Ukrainian drone battalion commander operating in the Pokrovsk direction reported on January 18 that Russian forces are continue assaulting in small fireteams of two to three servicemembers despite frost and snow.[50] The drone battalion commander stated that both Russian and Ukrainian forces are attempting to adapt to snowy conditions, as snow allows both Russian and Ukrainian drone operators to track footprints, and are also trying to avoid leaving detectable heat signatures. The drone battalion commander noted that Russian forces are not actively using heavy equipment but are continuing to attack using light equipment and even utilizing horses in some areas adjacent to the battalion's area of responsibility (AoR).

Order of Battle: Drone and artillery elements of the Russian 177th Separate Naval Infantry Regiment (Caspian Flotilla) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces in the Pokrovsk direction.[51]

Russian forces continued offensive operations near Novopavlivka itself and south of Novopavlivka near Filiya on January 17 and 18 but did not advance.[52]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Oleksandrivka direction on January 18 but did not make confirmed advances.

Assessed Russian infiltrations: Geolocated footage published on January 14 and 17 shows Russian servicemembers assaulting Ukrainian positions north of Ivanivka (northeast of Oleksandrivka) during what ISW assesses was a Russian infiltration mission that did not change control of terrain or the FEBA.[53]

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced in eastern Ivanivka.[54]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Oleksandrivka near Ivanivka and Zelenyi Hai and southeast of Oleksandrivka near Vyshneve and Sosnivka on January 17 and 18.[55]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Hulyaipole direction on January 18 but did not make confirmed advances.

Assessed Russian infiltrations: Geolocated footage published on January 17 shows Ukrainian forces striking Russian positions near the T-0814 Hulyaipole-Tavriiske road in western Hulyaipole after what ISW assesses was a Russian infiltration mission that did not change control of terrain or the forward edge of battle area (FEBA).[56]

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced northwest of Svyatopetrivka (northwest of Hulyaipole).[57]

Russian forces attacked near and within Hulyaipole itself; north of Hulyaipole near Dobropillya, Varvarivka, Zelene, Nove Zaporizhzhia, and Radisne; northeast of Hulyaipole near Solodke and Zlahoda; and south of Hulyaipole near Dorozhnyanka on January 17 and 18.[58] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Pryluky (northwest of Hulyaipole).[59]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 37th Motorized Rifle Brigade (36th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Eastern Military District [EMD]) are intercepting Ukrainian drones over areas northwest of Solodke.[60] Drone operators of the 38th Motorized Rifle Brigade (35th CAA, EMD) reportedly continue to strike Ukrainian forces near Hulyaipole.[61] Elements of the 218th Tank Regiment (127th Motorized Rifle Division, 5th CAA, EMD) are reportedly operating in Zaporizhia Oblast, likely eastern Zaporizhia Oblast.[62]

Russian forces recently advanced in western Zaporizhia Oblast.

Assessed Russian advance: Geolocated footage published on January 18 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced east of Shcherbaky (west of Orikhiv).[63]

Assessed Russian infiltration: Geolocated footage published on January 18 shows Russian forces operating on the eastern outskirts of Prymorske (west of Orikhiv) in what ISW assesses was an infiltration event that did not change the FEBA at this time.[64]

Russian forces attacked west of Orikhiv near Stepnohirsk, Plavni, and Prymorske and northwest of Orikhiv near Lukyanivske and toward Novoyakovlivka, Pavlivka, and Novoboikivske on January 17 and 18.[65]

Geolocated footage published on January 18 shows Russian forces conducting a Geran drone strike against Zaporizhzhia City (roughly 17 kilometers from the frontline).[66]

Order of battle: Drone operators and other elements of the Russian 108th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (7th VDV Division) and the 104th VDV Division are reportedly operating in the Zaporizhia direction.[67]

Likely Ukrainian forces conducted a mid-range drone strike against Russian energy infrastructure in occupied Zaporizhia Oblast. Geolocated footage published on January 17 shows explosions at a 330-kilovolt substation in occupied Melitopol following a likely Ukrainian drone strike.[68] Ukrainian defense outlet Militarnyi reported on January 17 that footage indicates that drones struck the electrical substation, causing fires and a large-scale power outage in occupied Zaporizhia Oblast.[69]

Russian forces continued limited ground attacks in the Kherson direction on January 18 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked east of Kherson City toward the Antonivskyi bridge on January 18.[70]

A Russian milblogger who frequently reports on the situation in the Kherson direction reported that weather conditions are abnormally cold, creating a dire situation for Russian personnel who are in positions close to the Dnipro River or otherwise within range of Ukrainian artillery fires and were unable to adequately prepare.[71] The milblogger warned about a possible surge in respiratory infections among Russian personnel as a result of these conditions.

Order of Battle: Drone operators and other elements of the Russian 98th VDV Division, including its 331st VDV Regiment, reportedly continue to operate in the Kherson direction.[72]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

See topline text for reports on Russian long-range strikes against Ukraine.

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

Nothing significant to report.

 

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.


[1] https://t.me/DIUkraine/7702; https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/17671; https://suspilne.media/1215954-zelenskij-poperediv-pro-pidgotovku-novih-masovanih-udariv-rf-ta-zaklikav-posiliti-ppo/ dot ; https://www.president dot gov.ua/news/zaraz-vid-rozvidki-mayemo-informaciyu-sho-rosiyani-gotuyutsy-102465; https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/17677

[2] https://www.iaea dot org/newscenter/pressreleases/update-337-iaea-director-general-statement-on-situation-in-ukraine

[3] https://www.radiosvoboda dot org/a/news-spozhyvannya-enerhetyka-zelenskyy/33650740.html

[4] https://t.me/kpszsu/52889

[5] https://t.me/kpszsu/52889 ; https://t.me/ivan_fedorov_zp/31876; https://t.me/zoda_gov_ua/54783; https://t.me/zoda_gov_ua/54785; https://t.me/ivan_fedorov_zp/31885; https://www.facebook.com/share/p/1ZhLHNUGxh/; https://t.me/odeskaODA/13641; https://suspilne dot media/odesa/1216632-ataka-rf-na-energeticnu-infrastrukturu-odesini-postrazdalih-nemae/; https://t.me/synegubov/19595

[6] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-16-2026/; https://suspilne dot media/1215264-v-ukraini-ne-zalisilos-elektrostancij-aki-bi-ne-zaznali-udariv-smigal/; https://www.facebook.com/dshmyhal/posts/pfbid032uEgat4AEpnt3Srx327gB8eYYNHbrwLZAJJ5dFXSfHUzzbZWxFxLUT6gp8ZwuWHgl?__cft__[0]=AZYr4SF6VqYuARpKbqS3_7_UryfCuWN2sJGIyRdbPye0aVRGbFt4P05FIkMbhSMCxqRZdt2m8pDo1W_Vx-UhfDnsRmXhomRwzdHihogHtanWiXAIXU8oqyQR6pIVYnmbhOhEfK_7nOwSXJD1p8XOiTiSt8Ifxa9TXjewioDuDg7TWQ&__tn__=%2CO%2CP-R

[7] https://t.me/energyofukraine/5891 ; https://suspilne dot media/1216356-u-minenergo-rozpovili-pro-situaciu-v-energetici/; https://t.me/kyivoda/41415 

[8] https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/kyiv-has-only-half-electricity-it-needs-mayor-says-2026-01-16/

[9] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-15-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-19-2025/

[10] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-15-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-21-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-16-2025/; https://www.facebook.com/volodimir.omel.cenko.311520/posts/pfbid02cCAEEUoNMX5VhgjRBPhYVz8ZXekjNBvaHA4J3Fq7dEUaWbazYjwVt1r6XDUkXpvbl

[11] https://tass dot ru/interviews/26178063; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-15-2025/

[12] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-16-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-19-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-19-2025; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-29-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-28-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-25-2025/

[13] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-22-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-9-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-19-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment_7-6/

[14] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-17-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-28-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-26-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-24-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-22-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-25-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-24-2025; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-23-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-22-2025/

[15] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-14-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-8-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-28-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-27-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-26-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-24-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-26-2025/

[16] https://t.me/dva_majors/86734; https://t.me/wargonzo/31745; https://t.me/severnnyi/6375

[17] https://t.me/dva_majors/86726 

[18] https://t.me/z_arhiv/33242

[19] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/33927; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/33902; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/33900; https://t.me/Joint_Forces_Task_Force/19917; https://t.me/wargonzo/31745; https://t.me/severnnyi/6375

[20] https://t.me/rybar/76817; https://t.me/icpbtrubicon/967

[21] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/33900; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/33902; https://t.me/Joint_Forces_Task_Force/19917

[22] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/33927; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/33902; https://t.me/Joint_Forces_Task_Force/19917; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/33900; https://t.me/wargonzo/31745

[23] https://t.me/wargonzo/31745

[24] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/70111

[25] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-16-2026/; https://t.me/dva_majors/86734

[26] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/33927; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/33902; https://t.me/Joint_Forces_Task_Force/19917; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/33900; https://t.me/wargonzo/31745; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/38653

[27] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/70113 ; https://t.me/rybar/76805; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/107673

[28] https://x.com/ChaMapping/status/2012848556240224667; http://t.me/shock3OA/4552   

[29] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/33927; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/33902; https://t.me/Joint_Forces_Task_Force/19917; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/33900; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/107673; https://t.me/rybar/76805; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/38653; https://t.me/wargonzo/31745

[30] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/38653; https://t.me/rybar/76805

[31] https://x.com/ChaMapping/status/2012848556240224667;  http://t.me/shock3OA/4552

[32] https://t.me/rybar/76805 

[33] https://t.me/motopatriot78/47661; https://t.me/motopatriot78/47668; https://t.me/motopatriot78/47678; https://t.me/sashakots/59174

[34] https://t.me/yurasumy/26530  

[35] https://www.facebook.com/EastAFU/posts/pfbid0a1AwZTqyb7kvbhUzcEEEJSFTFENz5Xk1J8T7ABZn6eGjcopTg9wCDoqXPstrjMDAl

[36] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/194792; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/70113

[37] https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/2012786293504139299; https://t.me/SouthernRepublic/30137 

[38] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/33927; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/33902; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/33900; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/70113\; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/38638; https://t.me/wargonzo/31745; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/38653  

[39] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/38638 

[40] https://suspilne dot media/donbas/1216408-rosijski-vijskovi-hocut-vzati-misto-u-klesni-voni-takoz-namagalis-zaskociti-u-kostantinivku-na-motociklah/

[41] https://t.me/nm_dnr/14910

[42] https://t.me/nm_dnr/14911 

[43] https://t.me/z_arhiv/33245

[44] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/33927 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/33902; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/33900

[45] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/107700

[46] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/38641

[47] https://x.com/jkmncz/status/2012639544970006883; https://t.me/argus38/755 ; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/11030 ; https://t.me/official55oabr/103

[48] https://t.me/zovpobedy/16889; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/194806; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/194792

[49] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/33927 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/33902; https://www.facebook.com/EastAFU/posts/pfbid0a1AwZTqyb7kvbhUzcEEEJSFTFENz5Xk1J8T7ABZn6eGjcopTg9wCDoqXPstrjMDAl ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/33900 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/38641 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/31745

[50] https://suspilne dot media/donbas/1216674-ak-zminilisa-boi-za-pokrovsk-pri-morozi-do-20-rozasnenna-oboronca-iz-68-oebr/

[51] https://t.me/mod_russia/60385

[52] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/33927; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/33902; https://www.facebook.com/EastAFU/posts/pfbid0a1AwZTqyb7kvbhUzcEEEJSFTFENz5Xk1J8T7ABZn6eGjcopTg9wCDoqXPstrjMDAl; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/33900

[53] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/11034; https://t.me/btr80/34758; https://t.me/btr80/34846

[54] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/194792

[55] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/33927; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/33902; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/33900

[56] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/11032; https://t.me/feniksdpsu/1577 

[57] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/194792

[58] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/33927; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/33902; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/33900

[59] https://t.me/rusich_army/27862

[60] https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/2012827275964915751; https://t.me/baykalkaspiy/391

[61] https://t.me/voin_dv/18394

[62] https://t.me/dva_majors/86730

[63] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/11042; https://www.facebook.com/share/v/1C5CaZJbnR/

[64] https://x.com/Bielitzling/status/2012939122713755889; https://t [dot] me/rubak_vyriy/135

[65] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/33927 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/33902 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/33900 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/31745 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/86734 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/47692 

[66] https://t.me/Osintpen/2401; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/11040; https://t.me/The_Wrong_Side/27717;

[67] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/38635 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/38632 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/38637 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/38644

[68] https://x.com/neonhandrail/status/2012738537691746532; https://t.me/ASupersharij/50556; https://x.com/bayraktar_1love/status/2012606165490794880

[69] https://militarnyi dot com/uk/news/drony-vyvely-z-ladu-energetychnu-infrastrukturu-na-okupovanij-terytoriyi-zaporizhzhya/

[70] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/33902

[71] https://t.me/osvedomitell_alex/32170

[72] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/38635 ; https://t.me/rodnaya98vdd; https://t.me/osvedomitell_alex/32167 ; https://t.me/rodnaya98vdd/3121; https://t.me/osvedomitell_alex/32166

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