Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, January 13, 2026

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Russian strikes caused significantly more civilian casualties in Ukraine in 2025 compared to previous years. Bloomberg reported on January 12 that a comprehensive assessment by unspecified European governments found that Russian strikes killed roughly 2,400 Ukrainian civilians and injured almost 12,000 in 2025 — nearly a 30 percent increase from 2024.[1] The report noted that Russian strikes killed over 2,000 civilians (about 83 percent of the total 2025 deaths) after US President Donald Trump's March 2025 phone call with Russian President Vladimir Putin, in which they agreed to start talks toward a ceasefire, and that Russian strikes killed over 220 of these civilians after the initial reports about the 28-point peace plan in November 2025. The UN Human Rights Monitoring Mission in Ukraine (HRMMU) similarly reported on January 12 that conflict-related violence in Ukraine killed 2,512 civilians and injured 12,142 in 2025 — 31 percent higher than in 2024 and 70 percent higher than 2023.[2] The UN HRMMU noted that Russian strikes against Ukrainian-controlled areas caused 97 percent of the total civilian casualties in 2025. The UN HRMMU reported that Russia conducted its deadliest individual strike of 2025 on November 19 against Ternopil City, which killed at least 28 and injured at least 99.

Russia dramatically increased the size, scale, and destructiveness of its strike packages throughout 2025, which likely contributed to the increase in civilian casualties. Russian forces only launched three strike packages containing over 200 projectiles in 2024, with the largest consisting of 287 projectiles in December 2024.[3] In contrast, Russian forces launched 42 strike packages containing over 300 projectiles in 2025, with the largest comprised of 823 projectiles in September 2025.[4] Bloomberg noted that the European government report found that Russian strikes have killed roughly 15,000 civilians and injured more than 40,000 since the start of the full-scale invasion in February 2022.[5] Ukrainian Ground Forces Commander Colonel General Oleksandr Syrskyi reported on January 13 that Russian forces have launched over 13,300 missiles and 142,300 drones against Ukraine since the start of the full-scale invasion.[6] Russia has been able to dramatically increase the size and frequency of its strike packages by scaling up production with support from partners such as North Korea, Iran, and the People's Republic of China (PRC).[7] The makeup of Russian strike packages and Russian strike tactics have also increased civilian harm, as ISW previously reported.[8]

Russian forces conducted a series of missile and drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of January 12 to 13 that significantly damaged energy infrastructure throughout Ukraine and hit a postal terminal in Kharkiv Oblast. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 18 Iskander-M ballistic missiles/S-300 air defense missiles from Kursk, Bryansk, and Voronezh oblasts and seven Iskander-K cruise missiles from Kursk and Belgorod oblasts.[9] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces also launched 293 Shahed-type, Gerbera-type, and other drones — of which about 200 were Shahed-type drones — from the directions of Oryol and Kursk cities; Shatalovo, Smolensk Oblast; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; and occupied Kacha, Crimea. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that the Russian ballistic missiles targeted Kharkiv, Zaporizhia, Dnipropetrovsk, and Kyiv oblasts and that Ukrainian forces downed two Iskander-M/S-300 missiles, five Iskander-K missiles, and 240 drones as of 0930 local time on January 13. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that an unspecified number of missiles and 48 drones struck 24 locations. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces struck residential, educational, railroad, port, and energy infrastructure in Dnipropetrovsk, Zhytomyr, Zaporizhia, Kyiv, Odesa, Sumy, Kharkiv, and Donetsk oblasts.[10] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated that Russian strikes largely targeted energy generation infrastructure and substations.[11] Ukraine’s largest private energy company, DTEK, reported that Russian strikes significantly damaged two power facilities in Odesa City, leaving 46,000 families without power.[12] Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces struck a postal terminal in Kharkiv Oblast with two missiles and then four drones, killing four civilians.[13] Russian forces often launch no or few missiles for multiple days in a row before launching strike packages with a significant quantity of missiles, likely stockpiling their missiles between strike series in order to launch larger strike packages to maximize damage against Ukraine.[14] Zelensky warned on January 12 that Ukrainian intelligence has information that Russian forces are preparing a new massive drone and missile strike, possibly in the coming days.[15] Zelensky noted that Russian forces are trying to take advantage of the cold weather in Ukraine, likely to maximize the consequences of strikes on the Ukrainian energy grid. Zelensky similarly warned about a new massive Russian strike on the afternoon of January 8 before the Russian Oreshnik ballistic missile strike on Lviv Oblast on the night of January 8 to 9.[16]

Ukrainian officials reported on January 12 that Russian drones also struck two vessels in the Black Sea — a Panamanian-flagged civilian vessel waiting to enter the port of Chornomorsk, Odesa Oblast, and a San Marino-flagged dry cargo ship that was leaving the port.[17] The Russian Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies posted geolocated footage on January 12 showing drone strikes against two cargo ships near Odesa City. Russian milbloggers claimed that Rubikon elements struck the two foreign-flagged ships with BM-35 strike drones.[18] Rubikon elements conducted drone strikes against a Ukrainian helicopter in Poltava Oblast and a transport aircraft in Mykolaiv Oblast in late December 2025, demonstrating how Rubikon is becoming increasingly involved in strikes in the Ukrainian rear.[19]

Russia continues to scale up the production and innovation of inexpensive strike drones that have succeeded in generating favorable battlefield effects for Russian forces. Russian forces have recently begun equipping Molniya-2 fixed-wing first-person view (FPV) drones with Starlink satellite systems, which has dramatically increased their battlefield efficiency.[20] Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported on January 13 that Russia has heavily invested in the production of Molniya-2 variants, but that reports that Russia spent over $1 billion to produce over 900,000 such drones from January to August 2025 are exaggerated by at least double.[21] Mashovets noted that the Molniya-2 drone is resistant to electronic warfare (EW) jamming, is sometimes equipped with Starlink terminals, and has a favorable price to performance ratio for Russian forces. Russia's Rubikon Center for Unmanned Technologies began employing Starlink-enabled Molniya-2 variants in December 2025, reportedly increasing the range of this drone variant to over 230 kilometers compared to 50 kilometers (the range of Molinyas operating on a mobile network).[22] Russia has been expanding and scaling drone production and adaptation to support its ongoing efforts to generate battlefield air interdiction (BAI) effects across the frontline.[23] Russia's BAI campaign involves strikes against important logistics targets in the Ukrainian near- and operational-rear, including roads, railways, and bridges, to facilitate subsequent Russian offensive operations in the weeks and months that follow by degrading Ukraine’s ability to sustain its frontline forces.[24] Russian technological adaptations have facilitated recent Russian advances, and Russia will likely continue to focus on scaling the production of inexpensive drones that have proven effective in the current battlespace.

Russian forces are struggling with other technological aspects of the battlespace, however, including with the effectiveness of some guided artillery munitions. Mashovets reported that current success rate of Russia's Krasnopol guided artillery munitions was around 50 percent as of November 2025, compared to 66 to 67 percent in 2022 when Russian forces first began widely using Krasnopols, and a peak effectiveness of over 70 percent at an unspecified time.[25] Mashovets noted that there are several variables limiting the effectiveness of this munition on the frontline. Mashovets reported that Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) jamming is responsible for 75 to 80 precent of Krasnopol guidance system failures or guidance system instability. Mashovets noted that Krasnopol crews cannot conduct reconnaissance on the ground under threat of Ukrainian drone strikes, and that drone spotting for Krasnopol strikes is also ineffective and can contribute to premature detonation. Mashovets stated that most munition targeting systems are also not optimized for terrain obstacles including heavy vegetation and dense urban areas.[26] Mashovets noted that the Krasnopol-D variant can conduct strikes in suboptimal terrain conditions but that the Russian military command heavily restricts the use of these munitions to frontline areas where Russian forces are focusing on offensive operations. Russian forces have sought to improve the Krasnopol munition's ability to operate under suboptimal weather, terrain, and EW conditions, but Mashovets' January 13 report indicates that Russia has failed to implement these improvements at the scale necessary to increase the munition's overall performance in the current battlespace environment.[27]

Western sanctions on aircraft components will likely continue to constrain Russia's ability to produce military aircraft. Russia plans to significantly replenish the Russian Aerospace Forces (VKS) in 2026 to both replace losses and further enhance VKS capabilities, but will likely struggle to achieve replenishment or modernization at scale.[28] Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin stated in July 2025 that the Russian government planned to allocate at least 765 billion rubles ($9.6 billion) for fixed-wing and rotary-wing aircraft production from 2026 to about 2031.[29] Mashovets reported on January 13 that the VKS hopes to receive 82 aircraft and 84 helicopters in 2026, including two Tu-169M2 strategic bombers; seven Il-78 aerial refueling aircraft; 47 tactical fighter airframes, including 13 Su-57 steals, two Su-30SM2s, 17 Su-35Ss, and 15 Su-34NVO frontline bombers; 26 training aircraft; 59 attack helicopters, including 20 Ka-52Ms, 34 Mi-28NMs, five Ka-35s, and one land version of the Ka-31 naval military helicopter; and 25 transport and combat helicopters.[30] Russia has struggled to produce, repair, and modernize its military aircraft throughout the war, amid ongoing sanctions, persistent quality issues, and manufacturing delays, however.[31] Russian aircraft also heavily rely on foreign components, which Russia attempts to import in violation of Western sanctions through various smuggling schemes that have high volatility.[32] Mashovets also noted that financial factors and crises in related industries cause great variability in aircraft production speed.[33] Russia will therefore likely struggle to meet these production goals in 2026 amidst ongoing Western sanctions. ISW has previously assessed that Russia may deprioritize the aircraft industry to prioritize other areas of the Russian defense production, such as drones and weapons needed on the battlefield in Ukraine.[34] If Russia does prioritize other sectors of defense production, its ability to fulfil VKS production and replenishment will likely be greatly hindered.

Ukrainian forces continued their long-range strike campaign against Russian defense industrial and energy assets. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces used an unspecified Ukrainian-made missile to strike the Atlant Aero drone production facility in Taganrog, Rostov Oblast on the night of January 12 to 13.[35] The Ukrainian General Staff reported a fire at the Atlant Aero enterprise, which designs, manufactures, and tests Molniya fixed-wing drones and components for Orion reconnaissance drones. Geolocated footage published on January 13 shows a fire near the drone facility in Taganrog.[36] Russian opposition outlet Astra reported that locals speculated that Ukrainian forces also hit the Beriev Aircraft Repair Plant in Taganrog.[37] Rostov Oblast Governor Yury Slyusar claimed that Russian forces destroyed seven drones over Taganrog and Krasnosulinsky Raion, and that drone debris damaged an industrial facility, residential buildings, gas lines, and vehicles in Taganrog.[38]

Ukrainian Center for Countering Disinformation Head Lieutenant Andriy Kovalenko, who frequently reports on successful Ukrainian strikes, stated on January 12 that a strike caused a fire at the Oryol thermal power plant (TPP) in Oryol City.[39] A Ukrainian source posted footage showing a fire at the Oryol TPP, and Ukrainian defense outlet Militarnyi reported that the footage of the smoke and bright burning color indicates damage to industrial infrastructure, likely a power unit or an auxiliary system.[40] Militarnyi noted that the Oryol TPP supplies energy to Oryol City and nearby military facilities.

Unidentified drones struck multiple oil tankers off the Russian coast in the Black Sea. Western outlets and Russian opposition sources reported on January 13 that drones struck two oil tankers sailing in the Black Sea toward the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC) terminal near Novorossiysk, Krasnodar Krai.[41] The drones reportedly struck the Kazakh-chartered Matilda tanker and the Delta Harmony, a tanker under the management of Greek company Delta Tanker.[42] The drone strikes reportedly caused minimal damage to the tankers and caused no injuries. Reuters reported that Delta Tankers stated that earlier reports from industry sources that the strikes hit another of its tankers were untrue, and Greek company TMS similarly denied reports that drones hit one of its tankers.[43] The actor involved in the drone strikes is unclear.

The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) reportedly dismissed Russian Navy Deputy Commander for Coastal and Ground Forces Lieutenant General Sukhrab Akhmedov. Russian sources claimed on January 13 that the Russian MoD removed Akhmedov from his post.[44] Akhmedov previously commanded the Russian 155th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet) and later the 20th Combined Arms Army (CAA, Moscow Military District [MMD]).[45] The Russian military command reportedly removed Akhmedov from his command of the 20nd CAA in May 2024 following Russian information space complaints about his command of the highly attritional assaults near Vuhledar, Donetsk Oblast in Winter 2022-2023 as 155th Naval Infantry Brigade commander and additional complaints about his role in a Ukrainian strike against a Russian rear area near Kreminna, Luhansk Oblast in Summer 2023 that resulted in significant casualties.[46] Russian milbloggers claimed that Akhmedov was dismissed from his most recent position due to failed Russian mechanized assaults in the Dobropillya tactical area that resulted in heavy casualties in December 2025.[47] One Russian milblogger claimed that Akhmedov oversaw elements of the 55th and 155th naval infantry brigades (both of the Pacific Fleet) and 810thth Naval Infantry Brigade (Black Sea Fleet) when they suffered heavy losses in northern Sumy Oblast.[48] Russian forces exploited a tactical breakthrough toward Dobropillya in August 2025 and seized a narrow salient that they failed to hold, and Ukrainian forces have since recaptured much of this territory.[49]

Key Takeaways:

• Russian strikes caused significantly more civilian casualties in Ukraine in 2025 compared to previous years.
• Russia dramatically increased the size, scale, and destructiveness of its strike packages throughout 2025, which likely contributed to the increase in civilian casualties.
• Russian forces conducted a series of missile and drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of January 12 to 13 that significantly damaged energy infrastructure throughout Ukraine and hit a postal terminal in Kharkiv Oblast.
• Russia continues to scale up the production and innovation of inexpensive strike drones that have succeeded in generating favorable battlefield effects for Russian forces.
• Russian forces are struggling with other technological aspects of the battlespace, however, including with the effectiveness of some guided artillery munitions.
• Western sanctions on aircraft components will likely continue to constrain Russia's ability to produce military aircraft.
• Ukrainian forces continued their long-range strike campaign against Russian defense industrial and energy assets.
• Unidentified drones struck multiple oil tankers off the Russian coast in the Black Sea.
• The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) reportedly dismissed Russian Navy Deputy Commander for Coastal and Ground Forces Lieutenant General Sukhrab Akhmedov.
• Russian forces recently advanced near Borova, in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area, and in western Zaporizhia Oblast.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

• Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
• Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis
• Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
• Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
• Significant Activity in Belarus

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

See topline text.

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in Sumy Oblast along the international border)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Sumy Oblast on January 13 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked in Sumy Oblast, including north of Sumy City near Kindrativka, northeast of Sumy City near Yunakivka, and southeast of Sumy City near Hrabovske, on January 12 and 13.[50]

A Russian milblogger reportedly affiliated with the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces claimed that elements of the Russian 22nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (72nd Motorized Rifle Division, 44th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) have been unsuccessfully attacking near Oleksandriya (northeast of Sumy City) for three days to try to create another "flashpoint" in Sumy Oblast similar to recent Russian attacks near Hrabovske.[51]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 106th Airborne (VDV) Division and the Chechen Akhmat Spetsnaz Aida Detachment are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces in Sumy Oblast.[52]

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border to create a defensible buffer zone with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on January 13 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk, Starytsya, Lyman, Vovchanski Khutory, Prylipka, and Dehtyarne and toward Kruhle, Ternova, and Hrafske on January 12 and 13.[53] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked south of Vovchansk and near Lyman.[54]

The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the South Slobozhansk (northern Kharkiv Oblast) direction stated that Russian forces reduced the number of attacks in the first few days of 2026 but have since increased the number to up to 15 to 16 attacks per day.[55] The spokesperson stated that Ukrainian forces near Vovchansk are using fiber optic drones to expand the "kill zone" (an area of elevated drone strike risk) to target Russian artillery in Belgorod Oblast.[56] The spokesperson stated that Russian forces have responded by installing anti-drone nets to protect the artillery.

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian Chechen Zapad-Akhmat Battalion (reportedly of the Southern Military District [SMD]); the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) from Kurchaloyevsky Raion, Republic of Chechnya; and the 82nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (69th Motorized Rifle Division, 6th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Lyman.[57] Lancet loitering munition operators of the 244th Artillery Brigade (11th Army Corps [AC], LMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces in Kharkiv Oblast.[58] Drone operators of the 245th Motorized Rifle Regiment (47th Tank Division, 1st Guards Tank Army [GTA], Moscow Military District [MMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near the Russian border in Kharkiv Oblast.[59]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Velykyi Burluk near Ambarne, Milove, and Khatnie and east of Velykyi Burluk toward Obukhivka on January 12 and 13 but did not advance.[60]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Oskil River (Russian objective: Cross the Oskil River in Kharkiv Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on January 13 but did not advance.

Assessed Ukrainian advances: A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger acknowledged on January 13 that Ukrainian forces liberated Kurylivka (southeast of Kupyansk) and Kucherivka (east of Kupyansk) on a prior unspecified date, maintain control over most of Petropavlivka, and advanced in western and eastern Podoly (both east of Kupyansk).[61]

Assessed Russian infiltrations: A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger indicated on January 13 that Russian forces are operating in the Milk Canning Plant in eastern Kupyansk in what ISW assesses is an infiltration mission that did not change the control of terrain or forward edge of the battle area (FEBA).[62]

Russian forces attacked near Kupyansk itself; west of Kupyansk toward Myrove; east of Kupyansk toward Podoly and Petropavlivka; and southeast of Kupyansk toward Pishchane and Kurylivka on January 12 and 13.[63]

A Ukrainian regimental commander operating in the Kupyansk direction reported on January 13 that Ukrainian forces seized the tactical initiative in the Kupyansk direction and hold a bridgehead on the east (left) bank of the Oskil River.[64] The commander reported that Russian forces are striking the crossings across the Oskil River with 20 to 40 KAB guided glide bombs per day, as well as fiber optic and Molniya drones and multiple launch rocket system (MLRS) and tube artillery, but that Ukrainian forces are maintaining the bridgehead. The commander further noted that Russian forces are suffering significant manpower and armored vehicle losses due to bad weather conditions. The commander stated that Ukrainian forces are blocking Russian efforts to advance from the northern outskirts of Kupyansk and have cut off logistics for Russian forces in Kupyansk, forcing Russian troops to conduct resupply missions with drones The commander noted that Ukrainian forces contained Russian forces to the left bank of the Oskil River near Holubivka thereby limiting Russian infiltration attempts to the right (west) bank of Kupyansk.

A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian troops entered Podoly from the direction of Synkivka (north of Podoly) during a recent infiltration mission.[65]

Ukrainian Joint Forces Task Force Spokesperson Colonel Viktor Trehubov reported on January 13 that several dozen Russian servicemembers in Kupyansk are cut off from reinforcements and have a limited supply of food and ammunition as poor weather conditions are inhibiting drone resupply missions.[66]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 68th Motorized Rifle Division (6th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) are striking Ukrainian positions west of Kupyansk-Vuzlovyi (south of Kupyansk).[67] Drone operators of the 375th Separate Anti-Tank Artillery Battalion of the 47th Tank Division (1st Guards Tank Army [GTA], Moscow Military District [MMD]) and of the Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies; artillery elements of the 82nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (69th Motorized Rifle Division, 6th CAA); and elements of the 352nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (11th Army Corps [AC], LMD) are reportedly operating in the Kupyansk direction.[68]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Borova direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Footage published on January 12 and geolocated on January 13 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced east of Nova Kruhlyakivka (northeast of Borova).[69]

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced southeast of Nova Kruhlyakivka, in northern Novoyehorivka, and northeast of Hrekivka (both southeast of Borova).[70]

Russian forces attacked near Borova itself; northeast of Borova near Borivska Andriivka; south of Borova toward Vovchyi Yar and Oleksandrivka; and southeast of Borova near Cherneshchyna on January 12 and 13.[71]

Order of Battle: Artillery elements of the Russian 288th Artillery Brigade (1st GTA) are shelling Ukrainian positions southeast of Kolisnykivka (northeast of Borova).[72]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Slovyansk direction on January 13 but did not make confirmed advances.

Assessed Russian infiltrations: Geolocated footage published on January 13 shows Russian forces operating on the left (east) bank of the Siverskyi Donets River southwest of Drobysheve (northwest of Lyman) in what ISW assesses was a Russian infiltration mission that did not change control of terrain or the forward edge of battle area (FEBA).[73]

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces marginally advanced along the T-0514 highway south of Lyman and advanced southwest of Stavky (north of Lyman), in central Zakitne (northeast of Slovyansk), north of Pazeno, and in southeastern Nykyforivka (both southeast of Slovyansk).[74]

Russian forces attacked near and toward Lyman itself; northwest of Lyman near Novoselivka and Yarova and toward Drobysheve; north of Lyman near Ridkodub and toward Stavky; east of Lyman near Zarichne; southeast of Lyman near Yampil; north of Slovyansk near Svyatohirsk; northeast of Slovyansk near Zarichne and Zakitne; east of Slovyansk near Svyato-Pokrovske, Riznykivka, and Platonivka; and southeast of Slovyansk near Dronivka, Pazeno, Khromivka, and Fedorivka on January 12 and 13.[75]

The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Slovyansk direction reported that Russian forces are using small group infiltration tactics to attack near Riznykivka and toward Mykolaivka and Rai-Oleksandrivka (all east of Siversk), but that Ukrainian forces have not observed indicators of Russian preparations for any large-scale operations.[76] The spokesperson reported that Russian forces are committing reserves to sustain a four-battalion rotation system, keeping three battalions engaged on the front while holding one battalion in reserve and ready to replace battalions rendered combat ineffective.[77]

The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Lyman direction reported on January 13 that Russian forces in this direction have a significant manpower advantage and are assaulting Ukrainian positions in small groups despite unfavorable weather conditions while wearing snowsuits.[78] The spokesperson further reported that Russian forces are interdicting Ukrainian logistics using drones while also relying on windy and cold weather to advance.

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 7th Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 2nd Luhansk People's Republic Army Corps [LNR AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating near Zakitne and Siversk (east of Slovyansk).[79] Elements of the 752nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (3rd Motorized Rifle Division, 20th CAA, Moscow Military District [MMD]) reportedly continue to operate in the Lyman direction.[80]

Ukrainian and Russian forces recently advanced in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area.

Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on January 12 shows Ukrainian forces raising a Ukrainian flag in central Mayske (north of Kostyantynivka), indicating that Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the area.[81]

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on January 12 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in southeastern Kostyantynivka.[82]

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced near Kostyantynivka itself, Berestok (south of Kostyantynivka), Stepanivka (southwest of Kostyantynivka), and Sofiivka and toward Novopavlivka and Pavlivka (all southwest of Druzhkivka).[83]

Refinement of areas under Russian claims: Geolocated footage published on January 12 shows two Ukrainian servicemembers raising a Ukrainian flag in central Mayske (north of Kostyantynivka), an area where Russian sources previously claimed that Russian forces maintained positions.[84]

Russian forces attacked near Kostyantynivka itself; north of Kostyantynivka near Markove, Mayske, and Virolyubivka and toward Pryvillya; east of Kostyantynivka near Stupochky and Oleksandro-Shultyne; southeast of Kostyantynivka near Pleshchiivka, Ivanopillya, and Shcherbynivka; south of Kostyantynivka toward Berestok; southwest of Kostyantynivka near Yablunivka and toward Stepanivka; south of Druzhkivka near Rusyn Yar; and southwest of Druzhkivka near Sofiivka and toward Novopavlivka on January 12 and 13.[85]

The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area reported that Russian forces are attempting to exploit poor weather conditions and accumulate forces to increase pressure on Chasiv Yar (northeast of Kostyantynivka). [86]

Order of Battle: First-person view (FPV) drone operators of the Russian 150th Motorized Rifle Division (8th CAA, SMD) are striking Ukrainian drone control centers near Pavlivka.[87] KVN fiber-optic FPV drone operators of the 4th Assault Battalion of the 103rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (150th Motorized Rifle Division) are striking Ukrainian positions on the southern outskirts of Berestok.[88] Elements of the 1st Volki Volunteer Reconnaissance-Assault Brigade (Russian Volunteer Corps) reportedly continue to operate in the Kostyantynivka direction.[89]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Dobropillya tactical area on January 13 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced near Ivanivka (southeast of Dobropillya) and toward Kucheriv Yar (northeast of Dobropillya) and Vilne (east of Dobropillya).[90]

Russian forces attacked near Dobropillya itself; northeast of Dobropillya toward Kucheriv Yar; east of Dobropillya near Novyi Donbas and Shakhove: and southeast of Dobropillya near Zapovidne on January 12 and 13.[91]

Order of Battle: Drone operators and artillery elements of the Russian 150th Motorized Rifle Division are striking Ukrainian positions in Toretske (east of Dobropillya).[92]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction on January 13 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced north of Pokrovsk.[93]

Russian forces attacked near and within Pokrovsk itself; northwest of Pokrovsk near Hryshyne; north of Pokrovsk near Rodynske and toward Bilytske; northeast of Pokrovsk near Sukhetske and Fedorivka; east of Pokrovsk near Myrnohrad; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Kotlyne, Udachne, and Molodetske on January 12 and 13.[94] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Rodynske and Bilytske.[95]

The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Pokrovsk direction reported on January 13 that Russian forces continue to use small group infiltration tactics but are attacking less frequently due to poor weather conditions.[96] The spokesperson reported that Ukrainian forces continue to hold northern Myrnohrad despite intense Russian KAB guided glide bomb strikes. The Ukrainian 7th Rapid Reaction Corps of the Air Assault Forces reported on January 13 that Ukrainian forces have been using artillery and drone strikes to interdict the T-0515 Pokrovsk-Shevchenko road, a key Russian ground line of communication (GLOC), since Fall 2025.[97]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 27th Motorized Rifle Division (2nd CAA, Central Military District [CMD]) are reportedly operating north of Pokrovsk.[98] Elements of the 9th Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA, formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic [DNR] AC, SMD) are reportedly operating near Rodynske.[99] Drone operators and other elements of the 14th Artillery Brigade (51st CAA) and 30th Motorized Rifle Brigade (2nd CAA) are reportedly operating in the Pokrovsk direction.[100]

Russian forces continued offensive operations near Novopavlivka itself and south of Novopavlivka near Filiya on January 12 and 13 but did not advance.[101]

Russian forces continued offensive operations northeast of Oleksandrivka toward Ivanivka and southeast of Oleksandrivka near Verbove on January 12 and 13 but did not advance.[102]

Ukrainian forces continued their mid-range strike campaign against Russian military targets in occupied Donetsk Oblast on the night of January 12 to 13. Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) Commander Major Robert “Magyar” Brovdi reported on January 13 that Ukrainian forces struck the Myrna and Azovska power substations near occupied Mariupol (approximately 175 kilometers from the front line).[103] Geolocated imagery posted on January 13 shows a large fire at the Myrna substation.[104]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Hulyaipole direction on January 13 but did not make confirmed advances.

Russian forces attacked near and within Hulyaipole; northwest of Hulyaipole near Pryluky and Olenokostyantynivka and toward Ternuvate and Vozdvyzhivka; north of Hulyaipole near Varvarivka, Yehorivka, Dobropillya, and Nove Zaporizhzhia; and northeast of Hulyaipole near Zlahoda, Rybne, and Solodke on January 12 and 13.[105] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked toward Hulyaipole.[106]

A Ukrainian regiment operating in the Hulyaipole direction published geolocated footage on January 12 and reported that Ukrainian forces recently repelled a reduced platoon-size Russian mechanized assault in Varvarivka and killed about 20 Russian infantry.[107] The regiment reported that Russian forces attempted to exploit poor weather conditions to conduct the assault.

A Russian milblogger reportedly affiliated with the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces claimed on January 13 that the Russian military command redeployed elements of the depleted Russian 186th Motorized Rifle Regiment (Territorial Control) (Eastern Military District [EMD]) from the Sumy direction to the area of responsibility (AoR) of the Russian 29th Combined Arms Army (CAA, EMD) (likely the Hulyaipole direction) in November 2025.[108] The milblogger claimed that the Russian military command desires to merge the regiment fully into the Russian 36th Motorized Rifle Brigade (29th CAA) to conceal the scale of its prior losses. The milblogger further claimed that the military command of the 29th CAA does not offer leave to Russian servicemembers.

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 1466th Motorized Rifle Regiment (127th Motorized Rifle Division, 5th CAA, EMD) are striking Ukrainian forces east of Zaliznychne (west of Hulyaipole).[109] Elements of the 11th Air Force and Air Defense Army (Russian Aerospace Forces [VKS] and EMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions in Zaliznychne.[110] Drone operators of the 14th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff's Main Directorate [GRU]) reportedly continue to operate in Zaporizhia Oblast.[111]

Russian forces recently advanced in western Zaporizhia Oblast.

Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on January 12 indicates that Ukrainian forces advanced northeast of Stepnohirsk (west of Orikhiv).[112] The footage indicates that Russian forces advanced northeast of Stepnohirsk on a prior date. ISW assesses that this change did not occur in the past 24 hours.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on January 13 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced northeast of Stepove (west of Orikhiv).[113]

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced northeast of Stepnohirsk. [114]

Refinement of areas under Russian claims: Geolocated footage published on January 12 shows Ukrainian forces operating in central Stepnohirsk in an area where Russian sources previously claimed that Russian forces maintained positions.[115]

Russian forces attacked southwest of Orikhiv near Mali Shcherbaky, west of Orikhiv near Prymorske and Stepnohirsk, and northwest of Orikhiv near Lukyanivske and toward Pavlivka, Novoyakovlivka, and Mahdalynivka on January 12 and 13.[116] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked from Stepnohirsk.[117] The milblogger claimed that significant portions of Prymorske are a contested ”gray zone.”

The Ukrainian General Staff reported on January 13 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian troop concentration near occupied Lyubimivka overnight on January 12 to 13.[118] It is unclear whether the Ukrainian General Staff is referring to the occupied Lyubimivka southwest of Orikhiv and roughly 23 kilometers from the frontline or the occupied Lyubimivka southwest of occupied Tokmak and roughly 45 kilometers from the frontline.

A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger questioned on January 12 the Russian MoD’s claim that Russian forces seized Novoboikivske (northwest of Orikhiv), noting that the Russian MoD claimed the seizure of Lukyanivske (just southwest of Novoboikivske) before Russian forces consolidated positions in the settlement.[119] The milblogger further stated that Ukrainian forces continue to control Novodanylivka (south of Orikhiv) and most of Mala Tokmachka (southeast of Orikhiv) and that most of Bilohirya (southeast of Orikhiv) is a contested ”gray zone,” contrary to previous Russian claims that Russian forces seized these settlements.[120] The milblogger assessed that Russian forces’ failure to seize settlements on the approaches to Orikhiv itself indicates that Russian forces will be unable to conduct a direct assault on Orikhiv itself in the near future.

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 328th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (104th VDV Division) are striking Ukrainian vehicles in Mahdalynivka.[121] Drone operators of the 1st Kuban Battalion of 392nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (19th Motorized Rifle Division, 58th CAA, Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian equipment near Pavlivka.[122] Drone operators of the Shaman detachment of the 1455th Motorized Rifle Regiment (reportedly of the 42nd Motorized Rifle Division, 58th CAA) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions on the approaches to Orikhiv.[123] Assault elements of the 70th Motorized Rifle Regiment (42nd Motorized Rifle Division) are reportedly operating in Mala Tokmachka.[124] Drone operators of the 108th VDV Regiment (7th VDV Division) reportedly continue to operate in the Zaporizhia direction.[125]

Ukrainian forces continued their mid-range strike campaign against Russian military targets in occupied Zaporizhia Oblast on the night of January 12 and 13. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on January 13 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian Tor air defense system near occupied Chereshneve (southeast of Hulyaipole and about 60 kilometers from the frontline), a Tunguska self-propelled anti-aircraft gun near occupied Podsporye (about 95 kilometers from the frontline), and a P-18-2 Prima radar station near occupied Lozuvatka (about 82 kilometers from the frontline) overnight.[126]

Russian forces continued limited ground assaults in the Kherson direction on January 13 but did not advance.

Russian forces continued limited ground assaults east of Kherson City near the Antonivskyi Bridge on January 13.[127]

Order of Battle: First-person view (FPV) drone operators of the Russian 98th VDV Division reportedly continue to strike Ukrainian forces in the Kherson direction.[128]

Ukrainian forces continued their mid-range strike campaign against Russian military targets in occupied Crimea overnight on January 12 to 13. Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) Commander Major Robert “Magyar” Brovdi reported on January 13 that Ukrainian forces struck an artillery ammunition depot in occupied Ovrazhky, Crimea (approximately 300 kilometers from the front line).[129] Geolocated footage published on January 13 shows the damaged remains of the depot.[130]

Ukrainian forces' unmanned surface vessel (USV) strikes continue to hinder Russian naval operations in the Black and Azov seas. Ukrainian Navy Spokesperson Captain Third Rank Dmytro Pletenchuk reported on January 13 that Russian forces have minimized their presence in the Black and Azov seas due to the effectiveness of Ukrainian USV strikes, allowing vessels to continue to use the Ukrainian Grain Corridor.[131] Pletenchuk noted, however, that Russian forces continue to launch missiles at Ukrainian forces from occupied Crimea. Pletenchuk reported that Russian forces are struggling to counter Ukrainian USV strikes against their Black Sea Fleet bases after Ukrainian forces successfully struck the Russian submarine base in Novorossiysk, Krasnodar Krai, on the night of December 14 to 15.[132]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

See topline text.

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

Nothing significant to report.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.