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February 07, 2026
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, February 7, 2026
Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.
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Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.
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Russia launched another massive strike against Ukrainian energy infrastructure overnight on February 6 to 7 and specifically targeted substations that support Ukrainian nuclear power plants (NPPs). The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 408 drones and 39 missiles against Ukraine overnight – the second Russian strike of over 400 projectiles since the brief moratorium on energy infrastructure strikes between about January 29 and February 1.[i] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 21 Kh-101 cruise missiles; two Zirkon/Onyx anti-ship missiles; 16 Kalibr cruise missiles; and 408 Shahed-type, Gerbera-type, Italmas-type, and other drones — of which roughly 250 were Shaheds. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian air defenses downed 382 drones and 24 missiles, that 13 missiles and 21 drones struck 19 locations, and that downed debris fell on three locations. Ukrainian officials reported that drones and missiles struck energy infrastructure, including thermal power plants (TPPs) and substations, in Volyn, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Rivne, and Vinnytsia oblasts.[ii] Ukrainian Minister of Energy Denys Shmyhal reported that Russian forces struck the 750 kV and 330 kV substations that form the backbone of Ukraine's energy grid, the Burshtyn TPP in Ivano-Frankivsk Oblast, and the Dobrotvir TPP in Lviv Oblast.[iii] Ukrainian state energy operator Ukrenergo reported that Russian forces struck key high-voltage substations that support the reactors at NPPs, forcing Ukraine to reduce its energy output and increasing the duration of emergency power outages across the country.[iv] Ukrainian officials reported that Russian strikes also left 600,000 subscribers without power in Lviv Oblast, completely cutting heating and water supply to Burshtyn, Ivano-Frankivsk Oblast.[v]

Russia used the temporary moratorium on energy infrastructure strikes to stockpile drones and missiles for devastating strikes on the nights of February 2 to 3 and February 6 to 7. The February 2 to 3 strike used 71 missiles and 450 drones during some of the coldest temperatures Ukraine has endured all winter.[vi] The Kremlin has attempted to portray Russia's adherence to the short energy infrastructure strikes moratorium as an indicator of Russia's interest in good-faith negotiations.[vii] The fact that Russia conducted two sets of strikes with over 400 projectiles within six days of the lapse of the energy strikes moratorium demonstrates the Kremlin's determination to maximize the suffering of Ukrainian civilians and unwillingness to de-escalate the war or seriously advance the US initiated peace negotiations. Russia instead used the moratorium to its advantage, maximizing damage against Ukraine's collapsing energy grid in the dead of winter. Russian forces have also modified their drones and missiles to inflict more damage, including by equipping Shahed drones with mines and cluster munitions, and such measures have disproportionately affected civilian and energy infrastructure.[viii] Russia’s increasingly large strike packages continue to highlight the critical importance of Western assistance in bolstering Ukraine’s air defense capabilities, both with US-made Patriot air defense systems that can effectively counter Russian ballistic missiles and other forms of air defense for a diverse, well-equipped air defense umbrella.[ix]
The United States is reportedly pushing Ukraine to expedite the negotiation process and agree to a peace agreement while Russia is actively delaying negotiations and rejecting any agreement that does not amount to the complete capitulation of Ukraine. Three sources familiar with the matter told Reuters on February 6 that US and Ukrainian negotiators discussed a goal for Russia and Ukraine to agree on a peace deal by March 2026.[x] The sources stated that US officials called for Ukraine to hold a national referendum on a peace agreement, reportedly as soon as May 2026. The sources indicated that Ukrainian voters would vote on any proposed deal through a referendum and would simultaneously vote in national elections. One source stated that the United States is “in a hurry” to organize an election. Reuters noted that Ukrainian election authorities have projected that it would take roughly six months to change legislation and organize an election under the current conditions. The Kremlin has also repeatedly refused to commit to a ceasefire long enough to permit voting.[xi] US pressure on Ukraine to plan for a vote on a peace agreement soon would be odd considering that the sides reportedly remain far apart on central issues and that the Kremlin continues to refuse compromises offered by both the United States and Ukraine.
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky told journalists on February 7 that Ukraine agreed to a US-proposed meeting in the United States, likely in Miami, Florida, in one week (around February 12).[xii] Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov stated that ”there was no talk about” a meeting in the United States and responded ”no” when asked about whether it is possible to participate in another round of peace negotiations in the United States.[xiii] Russian officials have continuously rejected offers for trilateral negotiations and negotiations at the leadership level to end the war and have continuously set conditions to justify further rejections immediately around the February 4 to 5 Abu Dhabi talks.[xiv] The Kremlin continues to show no willingness to compromise for good-faith peace negotiations or any indication that it will accept anything less than a full Russian victory in Ukraine.[xv]
Russian General Staff Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU) First Deputy Head Lieutenant General Vladimir Alekseyev is reportedly alive following a February 6 assassination attempt.[xvi] Russian state media outlet TASS reported on February 7 that Alekseyev regained consciousness after a surgery and that his injuries are no longer life-threatening.[xvii] A source close to the investigation claimed to Russian business outlet Kommersant that authorities detained two suspects in the assassination attempt, including the suspected shooter.[xviii]
Key Takeaways:
- Russia launched another massive strike against Ukrainian energy infrastructure overnight on February 6 to 7 and specifically targeted substations that support Ukrainian nuclear power plants (NPPs).
- Russia used the temporary moratorium on energy infrastructure strikes to stockpile drones and missiles for devastating strikes on the nights of February 2 to 3 and February 6 to 7.
- The United States is reportedly pushing Ukraine to expedite the negotiation process and agree to a peace agreement while Russia is actively delaying negotiations and rejecting any agreement that does not amount to the complete capitulation of Ukraine.
- Russian General Staff Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU) First Deputy Head Lieutenant General Vladimir Alekseyev is reportedly alive following a February 6 assassination attempt.
- Russian forces recently advanced in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area and near Pokrovsk.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.
- Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
- Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis
- Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
- Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
- Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
- Significant Activity in Belarus
Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
Ukrainian forces struck Russian military and defense industrial targets overnight on February 6 to 7. Sources in Ukraine's Security Service (SBU) told Ukrainian broadcaster Suspilne that Ukrainian forces struck a research plant in Tver Oblast that produces components for diesel fuel, aviation kerosene, and fuel components for the Kh-55 and Kh-101 missiles.[xix] Ukrainian Center for Countering Disinformation Head Lieutenant Andriy Kovalenko indicated that Ukrainian forces struck the Redkinsky Research Plant in Tver Oblast, and geolocated footage shows a fire and explosions at the Redkinsky plant.[xx] Tver Oblast Acting Governor Vitaly Korolev acknowledged that a drone strike caused a fire at a facility in Konakovo Raion, Tver Oblast, but claimed that the strike did not damage the facility's production capacity.[xxi] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces also struck a Russian force concentration near Dronovka, Belgorod Oblast (along the international border southeast of Sumy City) and the Balashovo oil depot in Saratov Oblast overnight on February 6 to 7.[xxii]
Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in Sumy Oblast along the international border)
Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Sumy Oblast on February 7 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked in Kursk and Sumy oblasts, including north of Sumy City near Kindrativka, northeast of Sumy City near Yunakivka and toward Myropillya, and southeast of Sumy City near Hrabovske and Pokrovka, on February 6 and 7.[xxiii]
Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 217th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (98th VDV Division) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces in Sumy Oblast.[xxiv]
Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border to create a defensible buffer zone with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)
Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on February 7 but did not advance.
Russian forces attacked northeast of Kharkiv City near Zelene, Starytsya, Vovchanski Khutory, Vovchansk, Prylipka, Hrafske, and Symynivka on February 6 and 7.[xxv]
The Kharkiv Oblast Prosecutor’s Office reported on February 6 that Russian forces killed one civilian and injured two more with a drone in Tsupivka (north of Kharkiv City).[xxvi]
Order of Battle: First-person view (FPV) drone operators of the Russian 1431st Motorized Rifle Regiment (11th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]), the 245th Motorized Rifle Regiment (47th Tank Division, 1st Guards Tank Army [GTA], Moscow Military District [MMD]), and unspecified elements of the Chechen Akhmat Spetsnaz, Federal Security Service (FSB), and Rosgvardia are striking Ukrainian forces southwest of Svitlychne (northeast of Kharkiv City).[xxvii]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Velykyi Burluk direction on February 7 but did not make confirmed advances.
Unconfirmed claims: The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on February 7 that Russian forces seized Chuhunivka (northeast of Velykyi Burluk).[xxviii] The Russian Northern Grouping of Forces credited elements of the 83rd and the 344th motorized rifle regiments (both of the 69th Motorized Rifle Division, 6th Combined Arms Army [CAA], LMD) with the claimed seizure of Chuhunivka.[xxix]
Russian forces attacked southeast of Velykyi Burluk near Dvorichanske on February 7.[xxx]
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Oskil River (Russian objective: Cross the Oskil River in Kharkiv Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued limited offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on February 7 but did not advance.

Assessed Russian infiltration: Geolocated footage published on February 6 indicates that Russian forces have a presence in northwestern Kupyansk in what ISW assesses is likely an infiltration mission that did not change the forward edge of the battle area (FEBA).[xxxi]
Russian forces attacked northeast of Kupyansk toward Fyholivka; north of Kupyansk near Kutkivka; east of Kupyansk near Petropavlivka; and southeast of Kupyansk near Pishchane on February 6 and 7.[xxxii]
Russian forces continued limited offensive operations in the Borova direction on February 7 but did not advance.

Assessed Russian infiltration: Geolocated footage published on February 6 shows Russian forces in eastern Bohuslavka (northeast of Borova) in what ISW assesses is likely an infiltration mission that did not change the forward edge of the battle area (FEBA).[xxxiii]
Refinement of areas under Russian claims: Geolocated footage published on February 6 shows Ukrainian forces in central Borivska Andriivka (east of Borova) in an area where Russian sources previously claimed that Russian forces held a presence.[xxxiv]
Russian forces attacked east of Borova near Kopanky, southeast of Borova near Serednie and Novoyehorivka, and south of Borova near Oleksandrivka on February 6 and 7.[xxxv]
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)


Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Slovyansk direction on February 7 but did not advance.
Russian forces attacked near and within Lyman itself; northwest of Lyman near Novoselivka and Sosnove; north of Lyman near Drobysheve and Stavky; east of Lyman near Zarichne and Yampil; northeast of Slovyansk near Dronivka, Zakitne, and Platonivka; east of Slovyansk toward Riznykivka and Kryva Luka; and southeast of Slovyansk near Vasyukivka on February 6 and 7.[xxxvi]
Russian forces recently advanced in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on February 6 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced north of Yablunivka (southwest of Kostyantynivka).[xxxvii] Geolocated footage published on February 2 indicates that Russian forces advanced in southwestern Stepanivka (southwest of Kostyantynivka).[xxxviii] ISW assesses that this change did not occur within the last 24 hours.
Russian forces attacked near Kostyantynivka itself; north of Kostyantynivka near Markove; northeast of Kostyantynivka near Orikhovo-Vasylivka and Minkivka; southeast of Kostyantynivka near Pleshchiivka, Shcherbynivka, and Ivanopillya; south of Kostyantynivka near Berestok; southwest of Kostyantynivka near Illinivka and Stepanivka; east of Druzhkivka near Maiske; south of Druzhkivka near Rusyn Yar; and southwest of Druzhkivka near Sofiivka and Novopavlivka on February 6 and 7.[xxxix]
The Ukrainian General Staff reported on February 7 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian drone control point near Mykolaivka, a manpower concentration near Chasiv Yar (both northeast of Kostyantynivka), and a multiple launch rocket system (MLRS) near Poltavka (south of Druzhkivka) between February 5 and 7.[xl]
The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area reported on February 7 that Russian assault troops near Chasiv Yar suffer from low morale and are surrendering to Ukrainian forces in relatively large numbers during infiltration missions.[xli] The spokesperson stated that Russian forces include penal recruits and individuals suffering from alcohol abuse. The spokesperson reported that Russian forces employ first-person view (FPV) drones to kill Russian servicemembers who attempt to surrender.
Order of Battle: Assault elements of the Russian 85th Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 2nd Luhansk People's Republic Army Corps [LNR AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) are operating in eastern Bondarne (southeast of Slovyansk).[xlii] Drone operators of the Grachi Detachment of the 346th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff's Main Directorate [GRU]) and artillery elements and first-person view (FPV) drone operators of the Chechen 78Kosth Sever-Akhmat Motorized Rifle Regiment (42nd Motorized Rifle Division, 58th CAA, SMD) are reportedly operating in the Kostyantynivka direction.[xliii] FPV drone operators of the BARS-31 Detachment (Russian Combat Army Reserve) are reportedly operating in the Kramatorsk-Druzhkivka direction.[xliv]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Dobropillya tactical area on February 7 but did not advance.
Russian forces attacked east of Dobropillya near Novyi Donbas, Toretske, and Vilne and northeast of Dobropillya toward Kucheriv Yar on February 6 and 7.[xlv]
Order of Battle: FPV drone operators of the Russian 20th Motorized Rifle Division (8th CAA, SMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Hruzke (northeast of Dobropillya).[xlvi]
Russian forces recently advanced in the Pokrovsk direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on February 6 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in northwestern Pokrovsk.[xlvii]
Russian forces attacked near and within Pokrovsk itself; northwest of Pokrovsk near Hryshyne and toward Novooleksandrivka and Shevchenko; north of Pokrovsk near Rodynske and toward Bilytske; northeast of Pokrovsk near Zatyshok; east of Pokrovsk near Myrnohrad; southwest of Pokrovsk near Kotlyne, Udachne, Molodetske, and Novopidhorodne; and west of Pokrovsk near Serhiivka on February 6 and 7.[xlviii]
Order of Battle: TOS-3 thermobaric artillery elements of the Russian 29th Radiation, Chemical, and Biological Defense Brigade (Central Military District [CMD]) are reportedly operating in the Pokrovsk direction.[xlix]
Russian forces continued offensive operations near Novopavlivka itself and south of Novopavlivka near Dachne and Filiya on February 6 and 7 but did not advance.[l]
Russian forces continued offensive operations northeast of Oleksandrivka near Ivanivka and Zelenyi Hai and southeast of Oleksandrivka near Verbove on February 6 and 7 but did not advance.[li]
Ukrainian forces continued their mid-range strike campaign against Russian military targets in occupied Donetsk Oblast between February 5 to 7. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian Uragan multiple launch rocket system (MLRS) near occupied Novomayorske (roughly 40 kilometers from the frontline) and a Russian repair unit near occupied Yalta (roughly 105 kilometers from the frontline).[lii]
Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Hulyaipole direction on February 7 but did not make confirmed advances.
Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced north of Krynychne (northwest of Hulyaipole) and in central Zaliznychne (west of Hulyaipole).[liii]
Russian forces attacked near Hulyaipole itself; northwest of Hulyaipole near Pryluky, Svyatopetrivka, and Olenokostyantynivka and toward Krynychne and Tsvitkove; north of Hulyaipole near Zelene and Yehorivka; northeast of Hulyaipole near Zlahoda and Pryvillya; south of Hulyaipole near Dorozhnyanka; and west of Hulyaipole near Staroukrainka and Zaliznychne on February 6 and 7.[liv] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Ternuvate, Rizdvyanka, Bratske (all northwest of Hulyaipole), and Zaliznychne.[lv]
Ukrainian Ground Forces Commander Colonel General Oleksandr Syrskyi reported on February 6 that Russian forces have committed elements of four combined arms armies (CAAs) to fighting near Hulyaipole since December 2025.[lvi] An officer of a Ukrainian regiment operating in the Hulyaipole direction reported on February 6 that cold temperatures are hindering Russian drone operations by causing condensation on drones to freeze.[lvii]
The Ukrainian General Staff reported on February 7 that Ukrainian forces struck Russian drone control points near Hulyaipole and Rivnopillya (north of Hulyaipole) and a troop concentration near Dorozhnyanka between February 5 and 7.[lviii]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on February 7 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked west of Orikhiv near Mali Shcherbaky, Prymorske, and Stepnohirsk and northwest of Orikhiv near Pavlivka and Lukyanivske and toward Mahdalynivka on February 6 and 7.[lix]
Syrskyi reported on February 6 that the Orikhiv direction remains largely inactive with Russian forces conducting one to two ground assaults daily.[lx]
Order of Battle: Drone operators and other elements of the Russian 7th Airborne (VDV) Division and the 291st Motorized Rifle Regiment (42nd Motorized Rifle Division, 58th CAA, Southern Military District [SMD]) reportedly continue to operate in Zaporizhia Oblast.[lxi]
Ukrainian forces continued their mid-range strike campaign against Russian military targets in occupied Zaporizhia Oblast on February 5 and 6. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on February 7 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian first-person view (FPV) drone operator training and drone production center near occupied Komysh-Zorya (roughly 45 kilometers behind the frontline) and a logistics depot near occupied Rivne (roughly 65 kilometers behind the frontline).[lxii]
Russian forces continued limited ground assaults in the Kherson direction on February 7 but did not advance.[lxiii]

Order of Battle: Molniya-2 fixed-wing FPV drone operators of the Russian 98th VDV Division reportedly continue to operate in the Kherson direction.[lxiv]
Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)
See topline text.
Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)
Nothing significant to report.
Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

[i] https://t.me/kpszsu/54980 ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-3-2026/
[ii] https://suspilne dot media/ivano-frankivsk/1199084-rf-atakuvala-ivano-frankivsinu-dronami-j-raketami/ ; https://24tv dot ua/masovana-ataka-po-ivano-frankivshhini-martsinkiv-rozpoviv-yakimi_n3004840 ; https://t.me/FastFocus/113376 ; https://t.me/kozytskyy_maksym_official/27970 ; https://suspilne dot media/rivne/1233924-dvoe-ludej-otrimali-poranenna-armia-rf-atakuvala-rivnensinu-7-lutogo/ ; https://t.me/oleksandrkoval_rv/8906 ; https://t.me/oleksandrkoval_rv/8891 ; https://suspilne dot media/lutsk/1233830-v-misti-na-volini-pisla-ataki-bpla-pereboi-zi-svitlom-ta-vodou/
[iii] https://t.me/Denys_Smyhal/12267 ; https://suspilne dot media/1233912-pid-udarom-sogodni-buli-pidstancii-ta-povitrani-linii-i-dvi-tes-smigal-2/; https://x.com/Denys_Shmyhal/status/2020045254490038783
[iv] https://t.me/Ukrenergo/4635
[v] https://t.me/kozytskyy_maksym_official/27970; https://t.me/FastFocus/113376; https://t.me/astrapress/103834
[vi] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-3-2026/
[vii] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-5-2026/
[viii] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-3-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-13-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-31-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-force-generation-technological-adaptations-update-october-9-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-29-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-15-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-2-2025/
[ix] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-3-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-24-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-10-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-2-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-24-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-3-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-26-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-8-2025/; https://isw.pub/UkrWar070425; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-3-2025/
[x] https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/us-aims-march-peace-deal-ukraine-quick-elections-sources-say-2026-02-06/
[xi] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-12-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-3-2025/ ; https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/vladimir-putin-easter-ceasefire-ukraine-rcna201974; https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russias-putin-declares-unilateral-easter-ceasefire-ukraine-2025-04-19/; https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/jan/05/putin-orders-36-hour-truce-in-ukraine-for-orthodox-christmas
[xii] https://suspilne dot media/1234000-zelenskij-ssa-v-oae-vperse-zaproponuvali-peremovnikam-ukraini-ta-rosii-zustritis-u-maami-cerez-tizden/
[xiii] https://ria dot ru/20260206/peskov-2072790203.html
[xiv] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-2-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-1-2025/;
[xv] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-24-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-25-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-1-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-28-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-24-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-23-2025/ ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar081325 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar072725 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar072125 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar05022025 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar051325 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar060125 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar051725 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar062625 https://isw.pub/UkrWar081525 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar081625 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar081725 ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment_6-4/ ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-14-2024
[xvi] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-6-2026/
[xvii] https://t.me/tass_agency/360328
[xviii] https://www.kommersant dot ru/doc/8418811?tg
[xix] https://suspilne dot media/1233776-u-povitranih-silah-gotuut-kadrovi-zmini-evrokomisia-zaproponuvala-20-j-paket-sankcij-1445-den-vijni/?anchor=live_1770460711&utm_source=copylink&utm_medium=ps
[xx] https://x.com/Osinttechnical/status/2020063014712725597?s=20; https://x.com/Osinttechnical/status/2020063019305513147?s=20; https://x.com/Osinttechnical/status/2020063019305513147?s=20; https://t.me/exilenova_plus/16171; https://x.com/NOELreports/status/2020078416381292727?s=20; https://x.com/NOELreports/status/2020026282717716674?s=20; https://t.me/akovalenko1989/10385
[xxi] https://t.me/pul69/25691
[xxii] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/34759
[xxiii] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/34760; https://t.me/dva_majors/87731; https://t.me/severnnyi/6667; https://t.me/wargonzo/32144; https://t.me/dva_majors/87771
[xxiv] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/39471
[xxv] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/34760; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/34738; https://t.me/Joint_Forces_Task_Force/20021; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/34736; https://t.me/dva_majors/87731; https://t.me/wargonzo/32144; https://t.me/severnnyi/6667
[xxvi] https://t.me/prokuratura_kharkiv/26911; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/02/07/okupanty-polyuyut-na-myrnyh-meshkancziv-fpv-dronamy-na-harkivshhyni-vbyly-cholovika/
[xxvii] https://t.me/Osintpen/2517; https://t.me/warriorofnorth/15293; https://t.me/warriorofnorth/15292; https://t.me/Osintpen/2516
[xxviii] https://t.me/mod_russia/60965
[xxix] https://t.me/warriorofnorth/15285
[xxx] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/34738 ; https://t.me/Joint_Forces_Task_Force/20021
[xxxi] https://x.com/Bielitzling/status/2020136316755661015; https://www.facebook.com/reel/1456904749460484
[xxxii] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/34738 ; https://t.me/Joint_Forces_Task_Force/20021; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/34760
[xxxiii] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/11218; https://t.me/craftoriz/502
[xxxiv] https://x.com/ZoamSc2/status/2019898424792084685; https://t.me/vpolezrenia1/10528
[xxxv] https://t.me/wargonzo/32144; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/34738 ; https://t.me/Joint_Forces_Task_Force/20021; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/34736; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/34760
[xxxvi] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/34736; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/34738 ; https://t.me/Joint_Forces_Task_Force/20021 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/34760 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/32144
[xxxvii] https://t.me/Corvus93/269 ; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/2020121349625135487 ; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/2020121353873924579 ; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/2020121324400611633 ; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/2020121358244380867
[xxxviii] https://t.me/Corvus93/268 ; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/2020121345036521900 ; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/2020121324400611633
[xxxix] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/34738 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/34760 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/34736 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/39498
[xl] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/34758 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/34759
[xli] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/02/07/polonenyh-za-tyzhden-bilshe-nizh-za-ves-mynulyj-rik-rosiyany-masovo-zdayutsya-v-polon-pid-chasovym-yarom/
[xlii] https://t.me/Osintpen/2515; https://t.me/shock3OA/4974
[xliii] https://t.me/dva_majors/87734 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/87738 ; https://t.me/RKadyrov_95/6340
[xliv] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/197149
[xlv] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/34736 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/34758 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/34738 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/32144
[xlvi] https://t.me/nm_dnr/14999
[xlvii] https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/2020075150742598004; https://www.instagram.com/stories/gentlemens__team/3826376334897868743/; https://www.instagram.com/stories/gentlemens__team/3826380665852303787/; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/2020075146124448148
[xlviii] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/34760; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/34738 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/34736 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/32144 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/87731
[xlix] https://t.me/milinfolive/165795
[l] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/34760; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/34738 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/34736
[li] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/34738; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/34736
[lii] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/34758 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/34759
[liii] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/70428; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/108843
[liv] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/34760; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/34738; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/34736; https://t.me/wargonzo/32144; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/108843; https://t.me/dva_majors/87731
[lv] https://t.me/dva_majors/87731; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/70428
[lvi] https://suspilne dot media/zaporizhzhia/1233660-u-gulajpoli-trivaut-intensivni-bojovi-dii-sirskij-pro-situaciu-na-linii-frontu-na-zaporizzi/
[lvii] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WY8sDvZdWEA; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/02/06/yedynyj-shlyah-hoch-yakos-pokazuvaty-rezultaty-poblyzu-gulyajpolya-rosiyany-ruhayutsya-v-siri-zony/
[lviii] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/34758; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/34759
[lix] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/34760; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/34738; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/34736; https://t.me/wargonzo/32144
[lx] https://suspilne dot media/zaporizhzhia/1233660-u-gulajpoli-trivaut-intensivni-bojovi-dii-sirskij-pro-situaciu-na-linii-frontu-na-zaporizzi/
[lxi] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/39469; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/39496; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/39482; https://t.me/dva_majors/87757
[lxii] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/34758
[lxiii] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/34760
[lxiv] https://t.me/SALDO_VGA/13329