Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, February 27, 2026

Data cutoff: 12 PM ET on February 27

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Russian forces have likely begun artillery and drone preparation of the battlefield for the anticipated Russian Spring-Summer 2026 offensive against Ukraine’s Fortress Belt in Donetsk Oblast. Russian forces shelled Bilenke (roughly 14 kilometers from the frontline and immediately northeast of Kramatorsk, the northern tip of the Fortress Belt — a series of fortified cities that have constituted the backbone of Ukrainian defenses in Donetsk Oblast since 2014) on February 26 and 27 — the first time that Russian forces have hit Kramatorsk or its suburbs with tube artillery.[1] The artillery strikes against Bilenke likely mark the beginning of Russian artillery preparation ahead of the expected Spring-Summer 2026 Russian offensive. Russian forces will likely begin the ground assault phase of this offensive in the near-term following the artillery preparation phase. Russian forces have also been conducting a the use of air power to strike targets in the frontline’s operational rear (roughly 20 to kilometers from the line of contact) to impact tactical battlefield operations, and Russia has largely been waging its BAI campaign with drone strikes.[2] Geolocated footage published on February 26 shows Russian drone strikes against a civilian cyclist on the H-20 Kostyantynivka-Slovyansk highway northwest of Kostyantynivka and against Ukrainian forces in Oleksiievo-Druzhkivka, both at the south of the Fortress Belt.is the main ground line of communication (GLOC) connecting the cities of the Fortress Belt. Russian forces have been using monthslong BAI campaigns as part of a broader campaign design aimed at degrading Ukrainian defensive capabilities and frontline positions ahead of Russian ground offensives.[4] A Ukrainian servicemember operating in the Slovyansk direction reported on February 26 that the Russian military command is deploying reinforcements to the Slovyansk direction, another indicator that Russia plans to prioritize offensive operations against the Fortress Belt in the near-term.[5] A Russian ground offensive to seize the Fortress Belt will likely be a that would cost the Russian military command significant time, manpower, and resources.[6] Russian forces have so far been unable or unwilling to concentrate the resources required for a decisive offensive operation, particularly against the Fortress Belt.[7]

Russia is reportedly expanding recruitment efforts in higher educational institutions to staff the Russian Unmanned Systems Forces (USF). T reported on February 27 that the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) has expanded its recruitment efforts to at least 95 educational institutions across Russia and pressured students to sign contracts with the MoD during face-to-face meetings at 90 of these institutions.[8] The BBC Russian Service noted that the 95 educational institutions do not include institutions where the Russian MoD is conducting "indirect recruitment," such as opening unmanned systems centers at Russian universities. The Boted that Russian universities are publicizing successful recruitment efforts, likely to entice more students to sign contracts with the MoD. Germany-based Russian opposition outlet Echo reported February 26 that the Russian MoD is recruiting students from at least 57 universities and 13 colleges and technical colleges in 24 federal subjects, including occupied Crimea and has expanded its recruitment campaign to include all students, not just those underperforming academically. Echo noted that the Russian MoD is promising to students that they will only serve in USF units (a preferable military occupation that faces lower risk to life and limb than infantry) but that at least some of the contracts contain language that would allow the MoD to send the recruits to any Russian military unit, not just a USF unit.[9] Echo reported that the Russian MoD is utilizing a ”carrot and stick” tactic by offering benefits including large salaries, a guaranteed single year of service, and also by coercing and threatening students into signing contracts. Russian opposition outlet Meduza reported on February 26 that the Nikolai Lunin Novosibirsk College of Transport Technologies organized a three-day screening of propaganda films about Russians who allegedly "betrayed" Russia because the students had refused to volunteer for military service.[10]ussian forces are increasingly struggling to hit recruitment targets, with Russia's casualty rate outpacing the recruitment rate in January 2026, for the first time since the start of the full-scale invasion.

The Kremlin is continuing to crack down on pro-war information space figures that it cannot fully co-opt or subordinate to state control as part of wider efforts to consolidate the information space under the Kremlin’s control. Russian forcement agencies announced on February 27 that Russian authorities detained Russian news outlet Readovka founder and former editor-in-chief Alexey Kostylev under suspicion of “large-scale fraud.”[13] A spokesperson for the investigation told TASS that Russian authorities suspect Kostylev of embezzling approximately one billion rubles (about $13 million) from the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) during execution of government contracts. Russian opposition media outlets reported that Readovka previously a far-right media outlet that did not have close ties to the Russian government until the outbreak of the war in 2022, at which point the outlet began supporting the war.[15] Russian opposition media outlet Astra amplified reports that Russian forces cut funding for Readovka in March of 2025 and that Andrey Tkachenko, who reportedly has ties with the Kremlin, took over the outlet in March 2025.[16] ISW has previously observed that the Kremlin has a long-running campaign to both co-opt and coerce Russian milbloggers in order to eliminate criticism of the Kremlin and consolidate control over the Russian information space.[17] ISW has not collected evidence that the Kremlin succeeded in co-opting Kostylev, as it did with other prominent milbloggers or Telegram administrators[18] Russian authorities’ detainment of Kostylev is set against the background of other Kremlin crackdowns against the information space such as the throttling of Telegram.[19] ISW has previously assessed that the Kremlin is considerin enacting domestically unpopular measures such as rolling involuntary reserve callups, and the Kremlin is likely setting conditions to repress backlash, especially from the highly influential pro-war sphere.[20]

Swedish Defense Minister Pal Jonson told Swedish outlet SVT on February 26 that the Russian drone approached the Charles de Gaulle while it was docked in Malmo, Sweden on February 25, likely violating Swedish airspace.[23] French General Staff Spokesperson Colonel Guillaume Vernet told Agence France-Presse (AFP) on February 26 that a Swedish system jammed the drone about seven nautical miles (roughly 13 kilometers) from the Charles de Gaulle.[24] Unidentified drones previously overflew a French nuclear submarine base in December 2025.[25] Such drone sightings are part of a pattern of aerial incursions into NATO airspace, possibly with the purpose of reconnoitering known European military bases, equipment, and defense infrastructure.[26] ISW continues to assess that Russia is increasingly engaging in covert and overt attacks against Europe and that ongoing Russian and suspected Russian airspace violations are likely part of Russia’s “Phase Zero” effort — Russia’s broader informational and psychological condition-setting effort that aims to prepare for a possible NATO-Russia war in the future.[27]

Russian forces likely used white phosphorus in Kostyantynivka and may have indiscriminately affected civilian areas in violation of international law. Geolocated footage published on February 27 shows a Russian strike with what appears to be white phosphorus munitions against southwestern Kostyantynivka, Donetsk Oblast.[28] A Ukrainian brigade operating in the Kostyantynivka direction reported that Russian forces used white phosphorus in the strike and immediately after struck the area with a FAB-1500 guided glide bomb.[29] While ISW cannot assess whether the impacted area contained civilians, civilians still remain in Kostyantynivka. The Ukrainian brigade reported that roughly 2,000 civilians remain in Kostyantynivka. Protocol III of the Convention on Conventional Weapons prohibits the use of incendiary weapons, such as white phosphorus, against civilian targets or in areas with concentrations of civilians.[30] Russian forces notably have used white phosphorous and incendiary munitions allegedly in violation of international law in Ukraine before

Key Takeaways:

• Russian forces have likely begun artillery and drone preparation of the battlefield for the anticipated Russian Spring-Summer 2026 offensive against Ukraine’s Fortress Belt in Donetsk Oblast.
• Russia is reportedly expanding recruitment efforts in higher educational institutions to staff the Russian Unmanned Systems Forces (USF).
• emlin is continuing to crack down on pro-war information space figures that it cannot fully co-opt or subordinate to state control as part of wider efforts to consolidate the information space under the Kremlin’s control.
• A Russian drone approached the French aircraft carrier Charles de Gaulle in the Swedish port of Malmo on February 25.
• Russian forces likely used white phosphorus in Kostyantynivka and may have indiscriminately affected civilian areas in violation of international law.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area and near Oleksandrivka. Russian forces recently advanced near Hulyaipole.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.    

• Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
• Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis
• Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
• Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
• Significant Activity in Belarus

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Russian authorities issued a mass missile strike warning for the first time in the war. Russian authorities declared a missile strike alert in at least 13 Russian federal subjects on February 27, including in the republics of Tatarstan, Bashkortostan, Udmurtia, and Chuvashia; Perm Krai; and Rostov, Kursk, Ulyanovsk, Saratov, Penza, Samara, Orenburg, and Sverdlovsk oblasts.[32] Rostov Oblast Governor Yuri Slyusar claimed that debris from downed missiles hit a high-rise building in Taganrog, Rostov Oblast.[33] Kursk Oblast Governor Alexander Khinshtein claimed that a Ukrainian drone strike damaged an energy facility in Belovsky Raion, causing power outages and killing a BARS-Kursk volunteer guarding the facility.[34]

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in Sumy Oblast along the international border)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Sumy Oblast on February 27 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces entered Sopych (northwest of Sumy City and immediately on the international border).[35] ISW continues to assess that these small-scale cross-border attacks in previously dormant frontline areas in northern Ukraine are part of Russia’s ongoing cognitive warfare campaign to try and convince the West that the front lines in Ukraine are collapsing.[36] Another milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced near Yunakivka (northeast of Sumy City).[37]

Russian forces attacked in Sumy and Kursk oblasts, including north of Sumy City near Oleksiivka and Varachyne and northeast of Sumy City near Yunakivka and Novomykolaivka, on February 26 and 27.[38]

Ukrainian Joint Forces Task Force Spokesperson Colonel Viktor Trehubov stated on February 27 that Russian forces still control Hrabovske (southeast of Sumy City) and assessed that Russian forces aim to seize Popivka (north of Hrabovske on the international border) and Pokrovka (northwest of Hrabovske on the international border).[39]

Order of Battle: Artillery elements of the Russian 34th Motorized Rifle Brigade (49th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces in Sumy Oblast.[40]

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border to create a defensible buffer zone with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on February 27 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northeast of Kharkiv City near Kruhle, Vovchansk, Zelene, Hrafske, Nesterne, Okhrimivka, Lyman, Starytsya, Vovchanski Khutory, and Synelnykove and toward Izbytske on February 26 and 27.[41] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Starytsya, Symynivka and Vilcha (northeast of Kharkiv City).[42]

A Russian milblogger reportedly affiliated with the Russian Western Grouping of Forces (operating in the Oskil and Slovyansk directions) claimed that a soldier of the Russian 128th Motorized Rifle Brigade (44th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]; operating in Kharkiv oblast) contacted the milblogger to complain that Russian ammunition restrictions are constraining Russian operations.[43] The soldier complained that the Russian military command is restricting ammunition for artillery, tanks, and first-person view (FPV) drones such that there are times when Russian forces are unable to strike an advancing Ukrainian group. The soldier claimed that his unit also suffers a shortage of portable electronic warfare (EW) and other counter-drone capabilities. The milblogger responded to the soldier, claiming that the Western Grouping of Forces struggles with similar issues.

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Velykyi Burluk direction on February 27 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced near Dvorichanske (southeast of Velykyi Burluk).[44]

Russian forces continued offensive operations northeast of Velykyi Burluk near Chuhunivka on February 26 and 27.[45]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Oskil River (Russian objective: Cross the Oskil River in Kharkiv Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on February 27 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked in Kupyansk itself; east of Kupyansk near Petropavlivka and Kucherivka; south of Kupyansk near Kupyansk-Vuzlovyi; and southeast of Kupyansk near Kurylivka and Pishchane on February 26 and 27.[46]

Russian milbloggers continued to claim that Russian forces are making false claims about their advances near and within Kupyansk to appease Russian political leadership.[47]

Ukrainian Joint Forces Task Force Spokesperson Colonel Viktor Trehubov stated on February 26 that around 20 encircled Russian servicemembers remain in high-rise apartment buildings in Kupyansk.[48]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 45th Artillery Brigade (Moscow Military District [MMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces in Kupyanskyi Raion.[49]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Borova direction on February 27 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked north of Borova near Novoplatonivka and Bohuslavka; northeast of Borova near Kruhlyakivka; southeast of Borova near Chervonyi Stav and Novoyehorivka and south of Borova near Oleksandrivka on February 26 and 27.[50]

Ukrainian forces struck oil infrastructure in occupied Luhansk Oblast on the night of February 26 to 27. The Ukrainian General Staff and Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) reported on February 27 that Ukrainian forces struck the Luhansk oil depot in occupied Luhansk City overnight.[51]  Geolocated footage published on February 26 shows a fire in the vicinity of the oil depot.[52] National Aeronautics and Space Administration Fire Information for Resource Management System (NASA FIRMS) data indicates that there were fires at the oil depot on February 26 and 27.[53]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Slovyansk direction on February 27 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced near Lyman, Staryi Karavan (south of Lyman), Rai-Oleksandrivka, Kryva Luka (both east of Slovyansk), and Fedorivka Druha (southeast of Slovyansk).[54]

n forces attacked near Lyman itself; northwest of Lyman near Novoselivka, Svyatohirsk, Yarova and Sosnove; north of Lyman near Drobysheve and Stavky; northeast of Lyman near Dronivka; east of Lyman near Zarichne and Maslyakivka; southeast of Lyman near Yampil; south of Lyman toward Staryi Karavan; north of Slovyansk near Svyatohirsk; northeast of Slovyansk near Zakitne; east of Slovyansk near Siversk, Kryva Luka, and Riznykivka and toward Rai-Oleksandrivka; and southeast of Slovyansk near Nykyforivka, Bondarne, and Fedorivka Druha on February 26 and 27.[55] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Lipivka (southeast of Siversk).[56]

A Russian milblogger rejected geolocated footage published on February 27 showing a Russian flag hanging from a roof in central Drobysheve as evidence for a purported Russian seizure of the settlement. The milblogger stated that most of the settlement is a contested ”gray zone” due to Russian and Ukrainian drone operations preventing either side from consolidating, and that Ukrainian forces are regularly counterattacking into the settlement.

Order of Battle: First-person view (FPV) drone operators of the Russian 16th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff's Main Directorate [GRU]) are striking Ukrainian forces in western Stavky.

Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area.

Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on February 27 shows Ukrainian servicemembers capturing a Russian servicemember near the Kostyantynivka Train Station in central Kostyantynivka, indicating that Ukrainian forces likely maintain control over the station.[59] Geolocated footage published on February 27 shows Russian forces shelling multiple residential blocks in southern Kostyantynivka which, along with footage of Russian forces striking a Ukrainian-held building in the area published on February 24, indicates that there are likely no Russian positions west of the T-0504 highway in southern Kostyantynivka.[60] Geolocated footage published on February 25 shows Russian forces shelling Ukrainian-held buildings in southern Illinivka (southwest of Kostyantynivka), indicating that there are likely no Russian positions in the area.[61]

Russian forces attacked near Kostyantynivka itself; northeast of Kostyantynivka near Orikhovo-Vasylivka; east of Kostyantynivka near Oleksandro-Shultyne; southeast of Kostyantynivka near Shcherbynivka, Pleshchiivka, and Ivanopillya; south of Kostyantynivka near Illinivka and Berestok; southwest of Kostyantynivka near Stepanivka; northeast of Druzhkivka near Pryvillya, Markove, and Minkivka; south of Druzhkivka near Rusyn Yar and Popiv Yar; and southwest of Druzhkivka near Sofiivka and toward Novopavlivka on February 26 and 27.

Order of Battle: Artillery elements of the Russian 17th High Power Artillery Brigade (3rd Army Corps [AC], under the operational control of the Southern Grouping of Forces) are shelling Ukrainian positions in Oleksiyevo-Druzhkivka (southeast of Druzhkivka).[63] Artillery elements of the 1st Krasnodar Battalion of the 238th Artillery Brigade (8th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) are shelling Ukrainian positions northwest of Toretske (southwest of Druzhkivka) in coordination with Granat-4 drone operators of the brigade‘s reconnaissance and strike battalion.[64] Drone operators of the 4th Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd CAA, formerly 2nd Luhansk People’s Republic [LNR] AC, SMD) are striking Ukrainian forces in northern Ivanopillya.[65] Servicemembers of the 3rd Motorized Rifle Battalion of the 72nd Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd AC, under operational control of the Southern Grouping of Forces) are operating in central Kostyantynivka.[66] Knyaz Vandal Novgorodsky (KVN) fiber optic first-person view (FPV) drone operators of the 13th Rusichi Assault Detachment of the 1194th Motorized Rifle Regiment (4th Motorized Rifle Brigade) are striking Ukrainian positions in southern Kostyantynivka.[67] Elements of the 4th Motorized Rifle Battalion of the 103rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (150th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA, SMD) are striking Ukrainian positions in central Kostyantynivka.[68] FPV drone operators of the 68th Separate Reconnaissance Battalion of the 20th Motorized Rifle Division (8th CAA) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions and equipment near Raiske (southwest of Druzhkivka).[69]

Ukrainian forces continued their frontline strike campaign against Russian military assets in the Russian near rear on the night of February 26 to 27. krainian General Staff reported on February 27 that Ukrainian forces struck Russian fuel and lubricants depots near occupied Novotoretske (roughly six kilometers behind the frontline and southwest of Druzhkivka) and Koptieve (roughly nine kilometers behind the frontline and just southeast of Novotoretske) overnight.[70]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Dobropillya tactical area on February 27 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed on February 27 that Russian forces advanced toward Kucheriv Yar (northeast of Dobropillya).[71]

Russian forces attacked east of Dobropillya near Novyi Donbas and southeast of Dobropillya near Dorozhnie on February 26 and 27.[72]

Order of Battle: First-person view (FPV) drone operators of the Russian 132nd Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA, formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic [DNR] AC, SMD) are striking Ukrainian vehicles in Kucheriv Yar.[73] Artillery elements and drone operators of the 150th Motorized Rifle Division (8th CAA) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces in the Dobropillya direction.[74]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction on February 27 but did not make confirmed advances.

Assessed Russian infiltrations: Geolocated footage published on February 26 shows Ukrainian forces striking a Russian servicemember west of Rodynske (north of Pokrovsk) after what ISW assesses was an infiltration operation that did not change the control of terrain or the forward edge of battle (FEBA).[75]

Russian forces attacked near Pokrovsk itself; northwest of Pokrovsk near Hryshyne; north of Pokrovsk near Rodynske and Bilytske and toward Shevchenko; southwest of Pokrovsk near Kotlyne, Udachne, Molodetske, and Novopidhorodne; and west of Pokrovsk toward Serhiivka on February 26 and 27.[76] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Rodynske and Bilytske.[77]

A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed on February 26 that Ukrainian drone operations are hindering Russian logistics and personnel rotations in the Pokrovsk direction, especially near Hryshyne.[78] The milblogger noted that such interdiction is preventing Russian forces from consolidating positions in Hryshyne.

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 5th Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA) are reportedly operating near Myrnohrad (east of Pokrovsk).[79]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Novopavlivka direction on February 27 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on February 27 that Russian forces seized Bilyakivka (northeast of Novopavlivka).[80]

rces attacked northeast of Novopavlivka near Muravka and south of Novopavlivka near FIliya on February 26 and 27.[81]

Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Oleksandrivka direction.

Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on February 26 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced into eastern Ternove, into northeastern Berezove, and northeast of Krasnohirske (all southeast of Oleksandrivka).[82] The footage also indicates that Ukrainian forces likely liberated Pryvillya and Zlahoda (both northwest of Krasnohirske) on prior dates.[83]

Russian forces attacked southeast of Oleksandrivka near Zlahoda, Orestopil, Oleksandrohrad, Ternove, Vyshneve, and Verbove on February 26 and 27.[84] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Ternove and Voskresenka (southeast of Oleksandrivka).[85]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 14th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff's Main Directorate [GRU]) are striking Ukrainian vehicles northeast of Krasnohirske.[86]

The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Oleksandrivka direction reported on February 26 that the Russian military command concentrated its efforts only on the frontline during attacks in late 2025 to create the impression of advances through flag raisings during small group infiltrations in order to generate informational effects.[87] The spokesperson noted that Russian forces’ resulting failure to establish strongpoints or defensive lines in the near rear contributed to Ukrainian forces’ recent advances during counterattacks in the direction. A servicemember of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the direction reported that the Ukrainian counterattacks on the border between Dnipropetrovsk and Zaporizhia oblasts have also reduced the intensity of Russian assaults in other areas of the Oleksandrivka direction by forcing Russian forces to divert personnel and equipment reinforcements to resist the counterattacks.[88]

Ukrainian forces continued their mid-range strike campaign against Russian military targets in and near occupied Mariupol, Donetsk Oblast overnight on February 26 to 27. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on February 27 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian fuel and lubricants depot near occupied Mariupol (roughly 106 kilometers from the frontline).[89] Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) Commander Major Robert “Magyar” Brovdi reported on February 27 that Ukrainian drone operators struck a Russian Pantsir-S1 air defense system at the Azovstal Steel Plant in occupied Mariupol.[90] Ukrainian Mariupol Mayoral Advisor Petro Andryushchenko reported on February 27 that a Ukrainian strike started a fire at a Russian base in Prymorskyi Raion of occupied Mariupol, wounded at least five Russian servicemembers, and led to the loss of at least five vehicles.[91]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)

Russian forces recently advanced in the Hulyaipole direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on February 27 that shows Ukrainian forces striking a Russian servicemember operating southeast of Zaliznychne (west of Hulyaipole) indicates that Russian forces likely advanced south of Hulyaipole farther than ISW’s previously assessed forward edge of the battle area (FEBA).[92]

Assessed Russian infiltrations: Geolocated footage published on February 26 and 27 shows Russian forces west of Pryluky (northwest of Hulyaipole) and southeast of Zaliznychne, respectively, in what ISW assesses were infiltration missions that did not change the forward edge of the battle area (FEBA) near Pryluky and Zaliznychne.[93]

Russian forces attacked near Hulyaipole itself; northwest of Hulyaipole near Dobropillya, Olenokostyantynivka, Zelene, Svyatopetrivka, and Varvarivka; and west of Hulyaipole near Staroukrainka and Zaliznychne and toward Hirke on February 26 and 27.[94] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Rizdvyanka and Ternuvate (both northwest of Hulyaipole).[95]

Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported on February 27 that the Russian military command is attempting to focus its efforts on breaking through a small area of the Hulyaipole direction rather than advancing on a broad front.[96] Mashovets stated that elements of the 5th Combined Arms Army (CAA, Eastern Military District [EMD]) are trying to break through toward Verkhnya Tersa (northwest of Hulyaipole) and Hulyaipilske (west of Hulyaipole and northeast of Orikhiv). Mashovets noted that the Ukrainian counterattacks on the northern flank of the 5th CAA threaten these Russian efforts as Ukrainian forces have advanced to within 6.7 kilometers of the Hulyaipole-Velyka Novosilka road. Mashovets stated that Russian forces now appear to be focusing on efforts to break through Ukrainian defenses to the Omelnyk-Yehorivka-Chervona Krynytsya area (all west of Hulyaipole and northeast of Orikhiv) from the Hulyaipole direction to envelop Orikhiv. Mashovets noted that the Russian military command would be unable to continue advancing on a wide front without redeploying forces and equipment to the Hulyaipole direction but noted that Russian advances even in this more concentrated effort are limited. Mashovets noted that even if these Russian forces reach the eastern flank of Orikhiv, this Russian effort will likely be disjointed from the Russian advances west of Orikhiv.

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian Martyn Pushkar Detachment are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Zaliznychne, Staroukrainka, and Svyatopetrivka.[97]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on February 27 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northeast of Orikhiv toward Hulyaipilske; east of Orikhiv toward Charivne; northwest of Orikhiv near Mahdalynivka and Lukyanivske and toward Zapasne; and west of Orikhiv near Stepnohirsk on February 27.

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian BARS-8 Khabarovsk Detachment (Russian Combat Army Reserve) and 38th Motorized Rifle Brigade (35th CAA, EMD) striking Ukrainian vehicles in Novoselivka (northeast of Orikhiv).[99] Elements of the 7th Airborne (VDV) Division reportedly continue to operate in the Zaporizhia direction.[100]

Neither Ukrainian nor Russian sources reported ground activity in the Kherson direction on February 27.

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 4th Military Base (58th CAA, Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions and equipment near and within Ponyativka (northeast of Kherson City).[101]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Russian forces conducted a series of drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of February 26 to 27. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 187 Shahed-type, Gerbera-type, Italmas-type, and other drones — including roughly 120 Shahed-type drones — from the directions of Bryansk and Oryol cities; Shatalovo, Smolensk Oblast, Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; and occupied Hvardiiske, Crimea.[102] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 165 drones and that 20 drones struck 14 locations. Ukrainian state energy operator Ukrenergo reported on February 27 that Russian strikes against energy infrastructure caused power outages in Kharkiv, Chernihiv, Sumy, Donetsk, Dnipropetrovsk, and Zaporizhia oblasts.[103] Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces damaged port, energy, medical, residential, educational, and commercial infrastructure in Chernihiv, Odesa, and Kharkiv oblasts.[104]

Ukrainian Defense Minister Mykhailo Fedorov reported on February 27 that the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense introduced an electronic after-action review (AAR) system to analyze Russian airstrikes against Ukraine to increase the effectiveness of Ukrainian air defenses.[105]

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

Nothing significant to report.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.