Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, February 26, 2026

Assessment as of: 7:45 PM ET

Data cutoff: 12:00pm ET on February 26

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Russia launched another massive missile and drone strike against Ukraine on the night of February 25 to 26, primarily targeting energy infrastructure. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 420 drones and 39 missiles against Ukraine overnight – the fourth Russian strike of over 400 projectiles in February 2026.[i] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 11 Iskander-M ballistic missiles/S-300 surface-to-air missiles; 24 Kh-101 cruise missiles; two Zirkon/Onyx anti-ship missiles; two Kh-69 cruise missiles; and 420 Shahed-type, Gerbera-type, Italmas-type, and other drones, of which roughly 280 were Shaheds. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian air defenses downed 374 drones and 32 missiles, that five missiles and 46 drones struck 32 locations, and that downed debris fell on 15 locations. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky reported that Russian forces struck gas infrastructure in Poltava Oblast, electrical substations in Kyiv and Dnipropetrovsk oblasts, and caused additional damage in Chernihiv, Zaporizhia, Kharkiv, Kirovohrad, and Kyiv oblasts and Kyiv City.[ii] Ukraine’s largest energy company, DTEK, reported that Russian overnight strikes targeted a large substation of DTEK subsidiary Odesa Electric Networks, significantly damaging the substation.[iii] DTEK noted that Russian strikes have inflicted ”colossal destruction” on 45 percent of DTEK Odesa’s large substations. Ukrainian First Deputy Minister of Energy Artem Nekrasov reported that Russian overnight strikes left consumers in Dnipropetrovsk, Odesa, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, Poltava, and Kharkiv oblasts without electricity.[iv]

The appearance of ballistic, cruise, and anti-ship missiles in the February 25-26 strike package is reflective of a wider pattern in Russia's strike campaign. Russia has launched strike packages with 25 or more missiles five additional times in February 2026, most recently on February 22. Russian forces often launch no or few missiles for multiple days in a row before launching strike packages with a significantly higher quantity of missiles, likely stockpiling missiles between strike series to maximize damage by launching several missiles alongside a large quantity of drones to overwhelm Ukraine's air defenses.[v] Russian forces have also modified their drones and missiles to inflict more damage, including by equipping Shahed drones with mines and cluster munitions, and such measures have disproportionately affected civilian and energy infrastructure.[vi] Russia also launches these larger strike packages to coincide with the days before and after bilateral and trilateral peace negotiations.[vii] Russia notably launched this most recent strike package on the eve of bilateral US-Ukrainian talks on February 26 in Geneva. Russia’s increasingly large and diverse strike packages continue to highlight the critical importance of Western assistance in bolstering Ukraine’s air defense capabilities, both with high-end US-made Patriot air defense systems that can effectively counter Russian ballistic missiles and other lower-end forms of air defense, for a holistic, well-equipped air defense umbrella.[viii]

The US and Ukraine continue bilateral engagements as part of ongoing peace negotiations. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and US President Donald Trump spoke by phone on February 25 to discuss ongoing negotiations and preparation for upcoming bilateral and trilateral talks.[ix] US and Ukrainian delegations also met in Geneva, Switzerland, on February 26, led by US Special Envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff and former Senior Advisor to the US President Jared Kushner, and Ukrainian Defense Council Secretary Rustem Umerov, respectively.[x] Umerov stated ahead of the talks that parties planned to discuss the proposed prosperity package for Ukraine, mechanisms for economic support and recovery, investment tools, and preparations for the next round of trilateral talks, which will reportedly take place in early March 2026.[xi]

Ukraine's and SpaceX’s efforts to shut off Russian forces’ access to Starlink terminals continues to disrupt Russian drone operations across the frontline. Ukrainian 3rd Army Corps Commander Brigadier General Andriy Biletsky told the Independent on February 26 that Starlink outages have cut the effectiveness of Russia's drone campaign by roughly 20 to 40 percent in the last two weeks.[xii] The Independent noted that Ukrainian forces in the 3rd Army Corps' area of responsibility (AoR), which is roughly 1,300 kilometers long, have retaken territory near Pokrovsk, north of Lyman, and near Hulyaipole since the Starlink block on February 1.[xiii] Biletsky stated that Russian forces will likely partially regain communication capabilities within a month or two through other means, such as satellite communication, but that Russian forces will not likely be able to fully restore the level of efficiency they had with Starlink for the next three to five years. Russian forces had been using Starlink terminals both for frontline communication and to extend drone ranges to strike further into the Ukrainian rear and generate battlefield air interdiction (BAI) effects.[xiv] ISW has observed evidence over the last several weeks that the Starlink block has prevented Russian forces from conducting tactical and mid-range strikes and ground operations at the same tempo and depth as they had been in prior weeks.[xv] Ukrainian forces have also exploited recent Starlink blocks to launch localized counterattacks along the Dnipropetrovsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border and liberate significant territory in southern Ukraine.[xvi] Russian forces are finding workarounds to the block, including by resorting to local SIM cards and relay drones, but these mechanisms have thus far not completely compensated for the loss of Starlink.[xvii]

The People's Republic of China (PRC) remains a critical enabler of Russia's war in Ukraine. Industry sources told Russian business newspaper Vedomosti on February 26 that Russia’s sole domestic optic fiber producer, the Optic Fiber Systems plant in Saransk, Republic of Mordovia, has been offline since Ukrainian drones struck the plant in May 2025.[xviii] The plant reportedly produced roughly four million kilometers of optic fiber annually and supplied roughly 20 Russian cable manufacturers that used the material to produce fiber-optic cables, which Russian forces use on the battlefield. The CEO of a telecommunications news outlet told Vedomosti that the plant disruption has left Russia entirely dependent on the PRC for optical fiber. The industry sources told Vedomosti that the PRC suppliers have increased the price of one kilometer of optical fiber for Russian buyers from 16 yuan ($2.34) at the start of 2025 to 40 yuan ($5.85) in January 2026, a 150 percent increase in one year. Sources noted to Vedomosti that Russian cable manufacturers will likely have to raise their prices due to the supply issues and that this is the main risk to the industry. ISW has not observed evidence that Russian forces are experiencing battlefield fiber optic cable shortages, which may suggest that the PRC's supply of optical fiber is currently sufficient to meet demand. Russian forces may also be using stockpiled cables predating the May 2025 strike. Russian forces also reportedly use fiber-optics for ground communication.[xix] Russian forces have been using fiber-optic cables since Spring 2025 to make drones more resistant to electronic warfare (EW) interference and to extend the range of tactical drones up to 60 kilometers.[xx] ISW continues to assess that the supply of PRC-origin components to Russia has been crucial to the Russian defense industrial base’s ability to adapt, innovate, and continue the war against Ukraine.[xxi]

A Russian fiber-optic first-person view (FPV) drone reached the outskirts of Kharkiv City for the first time on February 25. The Kharkiv Oblast Prosecutor’s Office reported on February 25 that a Russian fiber-optic FPV drone reached Kyivskyi Raion on the northern outskirts of Kharkiv City for the first time.[xxii] The Russian Anvar Spetsnaz Detachment (possibly referring to the BARS-25 Anvar volunteer detachment) published geolocated footage on February 25 showing a Russian fiber-optic drone striking a vehicle traveling along the M-03 highway on the northern outskirts of Kharkiv City, indicating that Russian forces flew another fiber-optic FPV drone as far as roughly 21 kilometers from the international border.[xxiii] Ukrainian Ministry of Defense (MoD) advisor on defense technology and drone and electronic warfare (EW) expert Serhiy “Flash” Beskrestnov noted on February 25 that Russian forces would have had to find a suitable and long ground corridor through which to fly the drone, as the area is densely populated and contains obstacles that could sever fiber-optic wires in flight.[xxiv] Russian forces are now able to conduct fiber-optic FPV strikes against Kharkiv City itself, and such strikes against Ukrainian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) in the area could foreshadow a battlefield air interdiction (BAI) campaign in northern Kharkiv Oblast. Such increases in fiber-optic FPV range will also allow Russian forces to harass civilian populations in Kharkiv City, similarly to how Russian forces have been using tactical drones to make life near the frontline untenable for civilians.[xxv]

Russia is reportedly deploying elements of at least one newly re-formed military unit to the Kupyansk direction. Artillery crews and signalmen of the Russian 68th Separate Command Battalion of the 34th Artillery Division (Moscow Military District [MMD]) are reportedly conducting combat operations in the Kupyansk direction.[xxvi] ISW first observed reports that Russia began re-forming the 34th Artillery Division, a Soviet-era formation, in January 2024 and observed indications in January 2026 that it was actively staffing the division.[xxvii] The 34th Artillery Division may be part of then-Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu's military reforms, which started in late 2022 and early 2023 and aimed in part to reconstitute the MMD and Leningrad Military District (LMD).[xxviii] Russia's deployment of a new unit to the Kupyansk direction is notable as Russian forces are preparing for an expected Spring-Summer 2026 offensive.[xxix] Russian forces may be setting conditions to prioritize offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction at some point during this offensive, though current indications suggest the primary Russian effort will likely focus on the Fortress Belt in Donetsk Oblast.[xxx] Russian forces may also be tapping into operational or strategic reserves to defend against Ukrainian counterattacks in the Kupyansk direction, diverting resources from offensive operations or preparations elsewhere.[xxxi] Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets previously noted that all of the reserves of the Russian Western Grouping of Forces (responsible for the Kupyansk-Borova-Lyman directions, including efforts to advance on Slovyansk from the north) are fighting in the Kupyansk direction and are therefore unable to support Russian offensive operations in the Slovyansk direction.[xxxii] Russia has been unwilling to dedicate sufficient resources to a single, decisive offensive operation, as it would have to redeploy forces from elsewhere on the frontline for such an effort.[xxxiii] The Kremlin seeks to maintain the facade that Russian forces are advancing across all areas of the theater simultaneously – a facade that the Ukrainian counterattacks in the Kupyansk direction or anywhere that Russian forces are not pursuing offensive operations would actively disprove.[xxxiv]

The People's Republic of China (PRC) reportedly issued a warning to Chinese citizens in Russia about a law compelling service in the Russian military. Hong Kong-based media outlet South China Morning Post reported on February 26 that the PRC Consulate in Russia called on Chinese citizens living in Russia to "take note of" a new Russian law requiring male permanent residents under the age of 65 to serve at least one year with the Russian military.[xxxv] The South China Morning Post referenced a Russian November 2025 law that requires foreign citizens and stateless men aged 18 to 65 who are "legally capable" to serve in the Russian military for at least one year to apply for Russian citizenship or a residency permit.[xxxvi] The November 2025 Russian law grants exceptions to Belarusian citizens, men who provide proof that they have already fulfilled the service requirement in the Russian military, and men who provide documentation from Russian military enlistment and recruitment centers that they are unfit for military service. Russian state media notably did not publicize these aspects of the decree at the time.[xxxvii] The PRC consulate reportedly did not directly warn PRC citizens against serving in the Russian military but called on PRC citizens in Russia to "make prudent decisions" to "ensure lawful residency status in Russia."[xxxviii] The PRC consulate's warning is an indicator that the PRC may be concerned that Russia will coerce its citizens living in Russia into military service through this law. Russia has conducted raids against migrants with expired permits or who are undocumented and coerced them into military service under threat of criminal charges or deportation.[xxxix] Forcing foreigners to serve in the Russian military as a condition for a residency permit or citizenship is a significant escalation in its recruitment mechanisms. ISW has recently observed indicators that the Kremlin is preparing for rolling call-ups of its involuntary reserve to mitigate manpower shortages from Russia's slowing recruitment rates.[xl] The PRC consulate's statement may be a supporting indicator that Russia is ready to conduct involuntary reserve call-ups and other coercive force generation mechanisms that could affect its citizens living in Russia.

Key Takeaways:

• Russia launched another massive missile and drone strike against Ukraine on the night of February 25 to 26, primarily targeting energy infrastructure.
• The US and Ukraine continue bilateral engagements as part of ongoing peace negotiations.
• Ukraine's and SpaceX’s efforts to shut off Russian forces’ access to Starlink terminals continues to disrupt Russian drone operations across the frontline.
• The People's Republic of China (PRC) remains a critical enabler of Russia's war in Ukraine.
• A Russian fiber-optic first-person view (FPV) drone reached the outskirts of Kharkiv City for the first time on February 25.
• Russia is reportedly deploying elements of at least one newly re-formed military unit to the Kupyansk direction.
• The PRC reportedly issued a warning to Chinese citizens in Russia about a law compelling service in the Russian military.
• The PRC consulate's warning is an indicator that the PRC may be concerned that Russia will coerce its citizens living in Russia into military service through this law.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical ar Russian forces recently advanced in northern Sumy Oblast, the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area, near Pokrovsk, and in western Zaporizhia Oblast.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.  

• Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
• Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis
• Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
• Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
• Significant Activity in Belarus

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Recent Ukrainian strikes have damaged Russian defense industrial and oil infrastructure. A Ukrainian open-source intelligence (OSINT) project reported on February 26 that Ukraine's February 25 FP-1 long-range drone strike against the PJSC Dorogobuzh chemical plant in Dorogobuzh, Smolensk Oblast, caused a series of explosions in the transport and storage areas for ammonium fertilizers, damaging an overpass and a production facility.[xli] The Ukrainian OSINT project published satellite imagery showing large burn marks at the chemical plant.[xlii] The Ukrainian General Staff confirmed on February 26 that Ukraine's February 20 to 21 strike against the Neftegorsk gas processing plant in Samara Oblast damaged the electric desalination plant, two gas condensate stabilization plants, and two vertical tanks, causing a petroleum leakage.[xliii] The Ukrainian General Staff confirmed that Ukraine's February 20 to 21 strike against the Votkinsk missile plant in the Republic of Udmurtia destroyed its production workshop No. 22.[xliv]

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in Sumy Oblast along the international border)

Russian forces recently marginally advanced in northern Sumy Oblast.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on February 26 indicates that Russian forces recently marginally advanced south of Varachyne (north of Sumy City).[xlv]

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced near Pokrovka (southeast of Sumy City).[xlvi]

Russian forces attacked in Sumy and Kursk oblasts, including north of Sumy City near Oleksiivka and Kindrativka and northeast of Sumy City near Yablunivka, Novomykolaivka, Nova Sich, Yunakivka, Loknya, Mala Korchakivka, Khrapivshchyna, and Myropillya on February 25 and 26.[xlvii] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Andriivka (northeast of Sumy City).[xlviii]

Ukrainian forces continued their frontline strike campaign against Russian military assets in the Russian near rear on the night of February 25 to 26. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian command and observation post near Yasnoye Solntse, Bryansk Oblast (roughly four kilometers from the international border).[xlix]

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border to create a defensible buffer zone with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on February 26 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk, Zelene, Nesterne, Okhrimivka, Lyman, Starytsya, Rybalkyne, Vovchanski Khutory, and Synelnykove on February 25 and 26.[l]

The Kharkiv Oblast Prosecutor’s Office reported on February 25 that Russian forces reached Kyivskyi Raion on the northern outskirts of Kharkiv City for the first time with a fiber-optic FPV drone that flew into a tree.[li] Ukrainian Ministry of Defense (MoD) advisor on defense technology and drone and electronic warfare (EW) expert Serhiy “Flash” Beskrestnov reported on February 25 that these FPV drones pose a significant threat that Ukraine will need to counter through technological adaptation, as traditional electronic warfare (EW) detection methods will not be effective.[lii]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian Black Raven drone detachment (reportedly of the 3rd Motorized Rifle Division, 20th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Moscow Military District [MMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions in the Kharkiv direction.[liii]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Velykyi Burluk direction on February 26 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed on February 25 that Russian forces seized Chuhunivka (southeast of Velykyi Burluk).[liv]

Russian forces continued offensive operations northeast of Velykyi Burluk near Chuhunivka and southeast of Velykyi Burluk near Dvorichanske on February 26.[lv]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Oskil River (Russian objective: Cross the Oskil River in Kharkiv Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Ukrainian forces maintained positions or recently advanced in the Kupyansk direction.

Refinement of areas under Russian claims: Geolocated footage published on February 26 shows Ukrainian forces clearing an area in western Kupyansk where Russian sources had previously claimed that Russian forces maintained positions.[lvi]

Russian forces attacked in Kupyansk itself; east of Kupyansk toward Pishchane; and southeast of Kupyansk toward Kurylivka and Kupyansk-Vuzlovyi on February 25 and 26.[lvii] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Kupyansk, Radkivka (north of Kupyansk), and Sobolivka (west of Kupyansk).[lviii]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Borova direction on February 26 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northeast of Borova near Kruhlyakivka, Bohuslavka, and Boriivska Andriivka; north of Borova toward Novoplatonivka; southeast of Borova near Olhivka, Ridkodub, Novyi Mir, Druzhelyubivka, and Novoserhiivka and toward Novoyehorivka and Chervonyi Stav; and south of Borova near Oleksandrivka and toward Korovii Yar on February 25 and 26.[lix]

A Russian milblogger reportedly affiliated with the Russian Western Grouping of Forces refuted claims that elements of the Russian 2nd Motorized Rifle Division (1st Guards Tank Army [GTA], Moscow Military District [MMD]) seized Bohuslavka and claimed that the division is not advancing.[lx]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Slovyansk direction on February 26 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked near Lyman itself; northwest of Lyman near Novoselivka, Svyatohirsk, Yarova and Sosnove; north of Lyman near Drobysheve and Stavky; northeast of Lyman near Myrne; east of Lyman near Maslyakivka; southeast of Lyman near Ozerne, Yampil and Dibrova; south of Lyman toward Staryi Karavan; northeast of Slovyansk near Zakitne; east of Slovyansk near Kryva Luka, Kalenyky, Platonivka, and toward Rai-Oleksandrivka; and southeast of Slovyansk near Nykyforivka and Bondarne and toward Fedorivka Druha on February 25 and 26.[lxi]

A Ukrainian servicemember operating in the Slovyansk direction reported on February 26 that the Russian military command is deploying reinforcements to the Slovyansk direction, including recently enlisted servicemembers.[lxii] The soldier noted that these servicemembers include ex-convicts motivated by money and their release from prison. The Russian military command’s decision to deploy reinforcements in the Slovyansk direction is consistent with ISW’s assessment that Russian forces will likely prioritize seizing Ukraine’s Fortress Belt in 2026 and may indicate that Russian forces will focus on the Slovyansk direction in a spring offensive.[lxiii]

An officer of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Lyman direction reported on February 26 that Russian forces attempted to use light two-wheeled vehicles to attack in the direction under favorable weather conditions.[lxiv] A Ukrainian servicemember operating in the Slovyansk direction reported on February 26 that Russian heavy bomber and first-person view (FPV) drone drops are insufficient to resupply servicemembers following infiltration missions.[lxv]

Ukrainian and Russian forces recently advanced in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area.

Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on February 25 indicates that Ukrainian forces maintained positions in areas east and south of Kostyantynivka that Russian infiltration groups previously bypassed.[lxvi] Ukrainian forces may not have lost their original positions in these areas.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on February 25 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced north of Kleban-Byk (south of Kostyantynivka) and west of Pleshchiivka (southeast of Kostyantynivka).[lxvii] The footage also indicates that Russian forces likely seized Kleban-Byk itself at a prior date.

Assessed Russian infiltrations: Geolocated footage published on February 25 shows Russian forces shelling Ukrainian positions east of Kostyantynivka, indicating that Russian and Ukrainian positions are intermixed in the area.[lxviii] Geolocated footage published on February 25 shows Ukrainian forces striking Russian forces and positions south of Kostyantynivka, west of Ivanopillya, and west of Pleshchiivka (both southeast of Kostyantynivka), indicating that Russian and Ukrainian positions are also intermixed in these areas.[lxix]

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed on February 26 that Russian forces advanced east of Berestok (south of Kostyantynivka).[lxx]

Refinement of areas under Russian claims: Geolocated footage published on February 25 shows Russian forces striking Ukrainian-held buildings in eastern Kostyantynivka – an area where Russian sources previously claimed that Russian forces maintained positions.[lxxi]

Russian forces attacked near and within Kostyantynivka itself; northeast of Kostyantynivka near Orikhovo-Vasylivka and Minkivka; east of Kostyantynivka near Oleksandro-Shultyne; southeast of Kostyantynivka near Shcherbynivka and Ivanopillya; south of Kostyantynivka near Illinivka and Berestok; southwest of Kostyantynivka near Stepanivka; south of Druzhkivka near Rusyn Yar; and southwest of Druzhkivka near Sofiivka on February 25 and 26.[lxxii]

Order of Battle: First-person view (FPV) drone operators of the Russian 242nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (20th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly intercepting Ukrainian drones near Poltavka and Rusyn Yar (south of Druzhkivka) and Ukrainian communications equipment in Novopavlivka (southwest of Druzhkivka).[lxxiii] Drone operators of the 1008th Motorized Rifle Regiment (6th Motorized Rifle Division, 3rd Army Corps [AC], under operational control of the Southern Grouping of Forces) struck a Ukrainian ammunition depot and positions in eastern Kostyantynivka.[lxxiv] Drone operators of the Chechen 78th Sever-Akhmat Motorized Rifle Regiment (42nd Motorized Rifle Division, 58th CAA, SMD) are striking Ukrainian positions south of Kostyantynivka.[lxxv] Drone operators of the BARS-31 Detachment (Russian Combat Army Reserve) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces in the Kramatorsk-Druzhkivka direction.[lxxvi]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Dobropillya tactical area on February 26 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northeast of Dobropillya toward Kucheriv Yar and southeast of Dobropillya near Dorozhnie on February 26.[lxxvii]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 33rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (20th Motorized Rifle Division) reportedly continue to operate in the Dobropillya tactical area.[lxxviii]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Pokrovsk direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on February 26 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in southern Hryshyne (northwest of Pokrovsk).[lxxix]

Russian forces attacked near Pokrovsk itself; northwest of Pokrovsk near Hryshyne and toward Novooleksandrivka and Shevchenko; north of Pokrovsk near Rodynske and toward Bilytske; southwest of Pokrovsk near Kotlyne, Udachne, and Molodetske and toward Novopidhorodne; and west of Pokrovsk toward Serhiivka on February 25 and 26.[lxxx] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Hryshyne.[lxxxi]

Ukrainian forces continued their frontline strike campaign against Russian military assets in the Russian near rear on the night of February 25 to 26. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian manpower concentration near Rodynske (roughly 830 meters from the front line).[lxxxii]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Novopavlivka direction on February 26 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed on February 26 that Russian forces advanced between Novopidhorodne and Novomykolaivka (both northeast of Novopavlivka).[lxxxiii]

Russian forces attacked near Novopavlivka itself; northeast of Novopavlivka near Muravka and Novomykolaivka; and south of Novopavlivka near Filiya on February 25 and 26.[lxxxiv]

A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed on February 26 that recent footage indicates that Russian forces conducted artillery strikes against Novomykolaivka and that there are no reports of Russian forces retaking the settlement.[lxxxv] Russian milbloggers previously claimed the seizure of the settlement as of June 16, June 19, and October 21, 2025.[lxxxvi] The settlement is likely a contested grey zone.

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies are intercepting Ukrainian drones in areas of the Russian near rear in Novopavlivka direction.[lxxxvii]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Oleksandrivka direction on February 26 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced northeast of Ivanivka (northeast of Oleksandrivka).[lxxxviii]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Oleksandrivka near Zelenyi Hai and Ivanivka; east of Oleksandrivka toward Tykhe; and southeast of Oleksandrivka near Ternove and Kalynivske and toward Vyshneve, Verbove, Vovche, and Orestopil on February 25 and 26. [lxxxix] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked toward Hai (southeast of Oleksandrivka).[xc]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 14th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff's Main Directorate [GRU]) and 37th Motorized Rifle Brigade (36th CAA, Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces in Dnipropetrovsk and Zaporizhia oblasts.[xci]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Hulyaipole direction on February 26 but did not make confirmed advances.

Assessed Russian infiltrations: Geolocated footage published on February 25 shows Ukrainian forces striking a Russian position in eastern Pryluky (northwest of Hulyaipole) in what ISW assesses was a Russian infiltration mission that did not change the control of terrain or the forward edge of battle area (FEBA) at this time.[xcii]

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces seized Prydorozhnie, Varvarivka, and Pryluky (all northwest of Hulyaipole) and advanced south of Zaliznychne (west of Hulyaipole) and west of Pryluky, Kosivtseve (both northwest of Hulyaipole), Varvarivka, and Dobropillya (both north of Hulyaipole).[xciii]

Russian forces attacked near Hulyaipole itself; northwest of Hulyaipole near Pryluky, Svyatopetrivka, Olenokostyantynivka, and Dobropillya and toward Rizdvyanka, Verkhnya Tersa, and Vozdvyzhivka; north of Hulyaipole near Varvarivka; and west of Hulyaipole near Zaliznychne and toward Hirke on February 25 and 26.[xciv] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked toward Bratske (northwest of Hulyaipole).[xcv]

Ukrainian forces continued their mid-range strike campaign against Russian military assets in the Hulyaipole direction on the night of February 25 to 26. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian equipment depot near occupied Novozlatopil (east of Hulyaipole and roughly 32 kilometers from the frontline) and a drone control point near occupied Poltavka (northeast of Hulyaipole and roughly 21 kilometers from the frontline).[xcvi]

Russian forces recently advanced in western Zaporizhia Oblast.

Assessed Russian Advances: Geolocated footage published on February 26 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced northeast of Prymorske (northwest of Orikhiv).[xcvii]

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced north of Zahirne (east of Orikhiv).[xcviii]

Russian forces attacked northwest of Orikhiv near Mahdalynivka, Lukyanivske and Zapasne; northeast of Orikhiv toward Hulyaipilske; east of Orikhiv near Charivne; southwest of Orikhiv near Bilohirya; and west of Orikhiv near Stepnohirsk, Stepove and Maly Shcherbaky on February 25 and 26.[xcix]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 11th Airborne (VDV) Brigade are reportedly operating near Konovalova (southwest of Orikhiv).[c] Drone operators of the 38th Motorized Rifle Brigade (35th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) near Hulyaipilske (northeast of Orikhiv).[ci] Drone operators of the 7th VDV Division are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces in the Orikhiv direction.[cii]

Russian forces continued limited ground attacks in the Kherson direction on February 26 but did not advance.[ciii]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 98th VDV Division, including its 215th Separate Reconnaissance Battalion, are reportedly striking Ukrainian energy infrastructure in the Kherson direction and Ukrainian forces near Antonivka (east of Kherson City).[civ]

Ukrainian forces continue their long-range strike campaign against Russian military assets in occupied Crimea. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on February 26 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian P-18 Terek radar station and RSP-6M2 radar system in occupied Dzhankoy (roughly 250 kilometers from the frontline).[cv]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

See topline text.

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

Russia sent migrants to Poland through tunnels from Belarus through 2025 in an effort to destabilize Europe. Polish officials told The Telegraph on February 25 that Russia has been sending migrants through an underground tunnel from Belarus into Europe.[cvi] Polish officials reported that they uncovered four tunnels in2025, one of which was 60 meters in length and which 180 migrants used to enter Poland. Polish officials noted that the Belarusian government recruited skilled experts from the Middle East to design the tunnels. These operations are intended to destabilize Europe and undermine NATO cohesion in preparation for a possible NATO-Russia war in the future.[cvii] ISW continues to assess that Russia has de facto annexed Belarus and that Belarus is a cobelligerent in Russia’s war against Ukraine.[cviii]

Russian President Vladimir Putin and Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko continued to implement Russian control over Belarus during a meeting of the Supreme State Council of the Union State on February 26. The Russian and Belarusian governments announced that Putin and Lukashenko held a meeting of the Supreme State Council of the Union State in Moscow on February 26.[cix] Putin and Lukashenko claimed that Russia and Belarus will cooperate on a number of initiatives under the Union State framework, including in the areas of defense, foreign policy, trade, energy, technology, transportation, economic policy, education, and culture. ISW continues to assess that Russia is formalizing the Union State as a Russian-dominated federated government that grants Moscow dominant power over most, if not all, aspects of Belarusian governance.[cx]

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

[i] https://t.me/kpszsu/56598 ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-3-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-7-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-17-2026/

[ii] https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/18125 ; https://x.com/ZelenskyyUa/status/2026930335779266674

[iii] https://www dot dtek-oem.com.ua/ua/news/vorog-atakuvav-energetichniy-ob-yekt-dtek-odeski-elektromerezhi-na-odeshchini

[iv] https://t.me/energyofukraine/6339 ; https://suspilne dot media/1250188-castina-spozivaciv-u-sesti-oblastah-zalisilasa-bez-svitla-minenergo-pro-naslidki-nicnoi-ataki-rf/

[v] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-3-2026/ ;

[vi] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-13-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-31-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-force-generation-technological-adaptations-update-october-9-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-29-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-15-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-2-2025/

[vii] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-17-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-9-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-25-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-29-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-6-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-20-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-3-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-7-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-13-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-23-2025/

[viii] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-7-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-3-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-24-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-10-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-2-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-24-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-3-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-26-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-8-2025/; https://isw.pub/UkrWar070425; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-3-2025/

[ix] https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/18122; https://www.axios.com/2026/02/25/trump-zelensky-call-end-war-ukraine

[x] https://t.me/umerov_rustem/379

[xi] https://t.me/umerov_rustem/379  

[xii] https://www.the-independent.com/news/world/europe/starlink-russia-ukraine-andrii-biletski-elon-musk-b2926280.html

[xiii] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-1-2026/

[xiv] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-14-2026/

[xv] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-5-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-14-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-10-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-8-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-6-2026/

[xvi] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-23-2026/

[xvii] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-8-2026/

[xviii] https://www.vedomosti dot ru/technology/articles/2026/02/26/1179089-kitaitsi-podnyali-tseni-na-optovolokno-dlya-rossiiskih-zakazchikov; https://www.themoscowtimes dot com/2026/02/26/russia-forced-to-rely-on-chinese-optical-fiber-imports-after-ukrainian-strikes-halt-domestic-plant-a92054; https://meduza dot io/news/2026/02/26/rossiya-v-2025-godu-v-10-raz-uvelichila-import-optovolokna-iz-kitaya-ego-v-chisle-prochego-ispolzuyut-dlya-dronov; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-7-2025/

[xix] https://t.me/notes_veterans/27119

[xx] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-31-2025/

[xxi] https://understandingwar.org/research/china-taiwan/china-taiwan-weekly-update-october-20-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/adversary-entente/adversary-entente-task-force-update-july-30-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-force-generation-and-technological-adaptations-update-june-11-2025/

[xxii] https://t.me/prokuratura_kharkiv/27283

[xxiii] https://t.me/anwarfirstgroup/1166; https://x.com/boringosint/status/2026794908221100237; https://x.com/rollowastaken/status/2026977366912696636

[xxiv] https://t.me/serhii_flash/6996

[xxv] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russias-fpv-drone-campaign-in-ukraine-institutionalizes-intentional-civilian-harm-as-a-tool-of-war/

[xxvi] https://t.me/notes_veterans/27119; https://t.me/red_war_machine/251

[xxvii] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-8-2026/; https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/1550; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment_7-11/

[xxviii] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russias-military-restructuring-and-expansion-hindered-by-the-ukraine-war/

[xxix] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-15-2026/

[xxx] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-15-2026/

[xxxi] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-24-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-18-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-16-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-15-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-24-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-20-2026/

[xxxii] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-2-2026/

[xxxiii] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-6-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-7-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-24-2025/

[xxxiv] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-6-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-7-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-24-2025/

[xxxv] https://www.scmp dot com/news/china/politics/article/3344760/why-china-reminding-its-male-citizens-russia-about-moscows-military-service-law

[xxxvi] http://www.kremlin dot ru/acts/bank/52569; https://www.rbc dot ru/politics/05/11/2025/690b8e359a7947483435f9f8

[xxxvii] https://www.rferl.org/a/putin-decree-russian-citizensip-residence-permit/33621628.html

[xxxviii] https://www.scmp dot com/news/china/politics/article/3344760/why-china-reminding-its-male-citizens-russia-about-moscows-military-service-law

[xxxix] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment_20-4/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-force-generation-and-technological-adaptations-update-august-13-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-force-generation-and-technological-adaptations-update-may-21-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-7-2024/; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-20-2024 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-27-2024 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-19-2024 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-30-2024

[xl] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-18-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/warning-the-kremlin-is-preparing-to-mobilize-reservists-on-a-rolling-basis-to-fight-in-ukraine-for-the-first-time/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-9-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-24-2026/

[xli] https://t.me/kiber_boroshno/12600; https://t.me/DniproOfficial/7214; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-25-2026/

[xlii] https://t.me/kiber_boroshno/12600; https://t.me/DniproOfficial/7214

[xliii] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-21-2026/; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/35440

[xliv] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-21-2026/; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/35440

[xlv] https://x.com/auditor_ya/status/2026959571252625859 ; https://t.me/HUNTSMEN71/1096

[xlvi] https://t.me/wargonzo/32525

[xlvii] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/35441 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/35415 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/35413 ; https://t.me/uvkkursk/250 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/32525 ; https://t.me/severnnyi/6902 ; https://t.me/NgP_raZVedka/24524

[xlviii] https://t.me/NgP_raZVedka/24521  

[xlix] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/35440

[l] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/35441 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/35415 ; https://t.me/Joint_Forces_Task_Force/20139 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/35413 ; https://t.me/severnnyi/6902 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/88778 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/40220

[li] https://t.me/prokuratura_kharkiv/27283; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/02/26/u-harkovi-vpershe-zafiksovano-zastosuvannya-fpv-drona-na-optovolokni/

[lii] https://t.me/serhii_flash/6993

[liii] https://t.me/notes_veterans/27130

[liv] https://t.me/rybar/77810

[lv] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/35441 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/40220  

[lvi] https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/33912; https://t.me/batallionnnn/751

[lvii] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/35441; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/35415 ; https://t.me/Joint_Forces_Task_Force/20139; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/35413

[lviii] https://t.me/wargonzo/32525; https://t.me/gvZapad/17838; https://t.me/shot_shot/92677

[lix] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/35441; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/35415 ; https://t.me/Joint_Forces_Task_Force/20139; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/35413; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/40240; https://t.me/wargonzo/32525 ; https://t.me/gvZapad/17838

[lx] https://t.me/gvZapad/17841

[lxi] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/35441; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/35415 ; https://t.me/Joint_Forces_Task_Force/20139; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/35413; https://t.me/wargonzo/32525; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/40232; https://t.me/gvZapad/17838

[lxii] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/02/26/zdebilshogo-cze-svizhi-bijczi-yaki-neshhodavno-pidpysaly-kontrakty-na-slovyanskomu-napryamku-rosiyany-shturmuyut-novachkamy/

[lxiii] https://understandingwar.org/newsroom/rbc-ukraine-russia-unlikely-to-seize-all-of-donetsk-any-sooner-than-2027-2028-isw-analysts-interview/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-14-2025/

[lxiv] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/02/26/namagayemosya-znyshhuvaty-startovi-pozycziyi-pilotiv-protyvnyka-na-lymanskomu-napryamku-polyuyut-na-vorozhyh-dronariv/

[lxv] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/02/26/vony-plachut-shho-yim-ne-vystachaye-yizhi-vody-na-slovyanskomu-napryamku-rosiyan-postachayut-za-dopomogoyu-fpv-droniv/

[lxvi] https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/2026692869604430140; https://t.me/DKulko/1511; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/2027020412530446671; https://t.me/zayndi_zingiev/292   

[lxvii] https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/2026719051595059700; https://t.met.me/voron1OO/257; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/2026993097666601044; https://t.met.me/Khyzhak_brigade/2405

[lxviii] https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/2026692869604430140; https://t.met.me/DKulko/1511

[lxix] https://t.met.me/creamy_caprice/11360; https://t.met.me/voron1OO/257; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/2025969950481842616; https://t.met.me/z4lpr/1502; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/2027020412530446671; https://t.met.me/zayndi_zingiev/292 ; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/2027008707343548903; https://www.instagram.com/gentlemen.100ombr/reel/DVMOr7JjUnW/; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/2026993097666601044; https://t.met.me/Khyzhak_brigade/2405; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/2026719051595059700; https://www.facebook.com/pashtetof/posts/pfbid08rh9Ppyy2pWKycBujjmxb2nX8BYtAxw2J8RM9BLe7pKVjutGQeb5UegTxxhyPmWPl; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/2023264777057739009; https://t.met.me/Legion_W_Bat1/1056; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/2027020412530446671

[lxx] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/199422

[lxxi] https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/2026975923501695316; https://t.met.me/Osintpen/2590; https://t.met.me/verumreactor/33417; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/2026692869604430140; https://t.met.me/DKulko/1511

[lxxii] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/35441; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/35415 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/35413; https://t.me/wargonzo/32525  

[lxxiii] https://t.me/nm_dnr/15076 

[lxxiv] https://t.me/Osintpen/2590; https://t.me/verumreactor/33417; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/2026692869604430140; https://t.me/DKulko/1511; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/2026975923501695316; https://t.me/verumreactor/33417

[lxxv] https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/2027020412530446671; https://t.me/zayndi_zingiev/292

[lxxvi] https://t.me/mod_russia/61534

[lxxvii] https://t.me/wargonzo/32525

[lxxviii] https://t.me/dva_majors/88782  

[lxxix] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/11364 ; https://t.me/skala425/794

[lxxx] https://t.me/wargonzo/32525 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/35441 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/35415 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/35413

[lxxxi] https://t.me/motopatriot78/48955  

[lxxxii] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/35440

[lxxxiii] https://t.me/rybar/77838

[lxxxiv] https://t.me/rybar/77838; https://t.me/wargonzo/32525; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/35441 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/35415 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/35413

[lxxxv] https://t.me/rybar/77838

[lxxxvi] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-16-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-19-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-21-2025/

[lxxxvii] https://t.me/icpbtrubicon/1101 ; https://x.com/MikiValbuena/status/2026658471802810759; https://x.com/MikiValbuena/status/2026658478522032423; https://x.com/MikiValbuena/status/2026658485002207276; https://x.com/MikiValbuena/status/2026658492866801704; https://x.com/MikiValbuena/status/2026658499585827050; https://x.com/MikiValbuena/status/2026658506565153061; https://x.com/MikiValbuena/status/2026658513099817455; https://x.com/MikiValbuena/status/2026658519450059063; https://x.com/MikiValbuena/status/2026658525007487236;https://x.com/MikiValbuena/status/2026658525007487236; https://x.com/MikiValbuena/status/2026658531382788281; https://x.com/MikiValbuena/status/2026658538068578393; https://x.com/MikiValbuena/status/2026658542959120526; https://x.com/MikiValbuena/status/2026658549758099837; https://x.com/MikiValbuena/status/2026658556020167118

[lxxxviii] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/199422

[lxxxix] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/35441; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/35415; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/35413; https://t.me/wargonzo/32525; https://t.me/rybar/77807

[xc] https://t.me/voin_dv/18793

[xci] https://t.me/voin_dv/18795; https://t.me/voin_dv/18794

[xcii] https://x.com/auditor_ya/status/2026678955407761452 ; https://x.com/PuenteUribarri/status/2026669548305265137; https://t.me/assaultregiment33/2572; https://x.com/auditor_ya/status/2026678955407761452?s=20

[xciii] https://t.me/rybar/77807; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/199422

[xciv] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/35441;

 https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/35415; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/35413; https://t.me/rybar/77807;  https://t.me/dva_majors/88778; https://t.me/wargonzo/32525; https://t.me/voin_dv/18793; https://t.me/voin_dv/18787

[xcv] https://t.me/voin_dv/18787

[xcvi] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/35440

[xcvii] https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/2026937557431292389; https://t.me/rubak_vyriy/142

[xcviii] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/199422

[xcix] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/35415; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/35415; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/35441;

https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/35413 ;

https://t.me/wargonzo/32525 ;

https://t.me/dva_majors/88778 ;

https://t.me/dva_majors/88778;

[c] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/40206  

[ci] https://t.me/voin_dv/18797

[cii] https://t.me/mod_russia/61548; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/40202; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/40218; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/40231;

[ciii] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/35415 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/35413 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/88778

[civ] https://t.me/mod_russia/61534 ; https://t.me/osvedomitell_alex/32943

[cv] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/35440

[cvi] https://www.telegraph.co.uk/world-news/2026/02/25/russia-sends-migrants-into-europe-through-secret-tunnels/

[cvii] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-2-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-31-2026 ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-29-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-9-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-15-2025/

[cviii] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-9-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-1-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-17-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-14-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-6-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-2-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-29-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-7-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-9-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-14-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-27-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-24-2025

[cix] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/79225; http://en dot kremlin.ru/events/president/news/79225; https://president dot gov.by/ru/events/ucastie-v-zasedanii-vyssego-gosudarstvennogo-soveta-souznogo-gosudarstva

[cx] http://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russias-quiet-conquest-belarus/