Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, February 23, 2026

Data cutoff: 12:00pm ET on February 23

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

For more information on ISW's map methodology, please view our statement here.

Kremlin officials used the February 23 Defender of the Fatherland Day holiday to set conditions to mitigate any domestic backlash that may result from limited rolling reserve involuntary callups in the future. Defender of the Fatherland Day is a holiday on the day of the creation of the Red Army in 1918 that honors the contemporary Russian military. Russian President Vladimir Putin claimed at an awards ceremony in honor of Defenders of the Fatherland Day that Russian soldiers have on their shoulders an "enormous responsibility" for the Russian people and Russia's "common cause.[1] Putin also claimed that a "sense of patriotism and responsibility for the fate of the Motherland" unifies all Russian soldiers despite their different nationalities and faiths.[2]

Putin's persistent invocation of "responsibility" in his February 23 speech appears to be a narrative condition-setting effort aimed at demanding that Russian society make additional sacrifices for his war effort, including by providing more troops through future involuntary reserve callups. ISW continues to assess that Putin is preparing to conduct limited, rolling involuntary reserve callups in the future to fulfill Russia's force generation needs.[3] Putin's focus on responsibility in his speeches – not only the responsibility of Russian soldiers but also that of all Russians – is likely an attempt to instill a sense of civic duty in the Russian people to lessen possible blowback to potential involuntary mobilization measures. Putin is likely aware of the domestic discontent such involuntary reserve callups could generate and is trying to preemptively garner more support from the population by normalizing the concept of sacrifice and responsibility before he initiates such call-ups.

Russian Security Council Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev appeared to use his February 23 public appearance to support this wider condition-setting effort. Medvedev met with Russian military personnel on February 23 and notably wore a military uniform, despite the fact that he is not a member of the military and is no longer the commander-in-chief.[4] Medvedev claimed that Russia "needs" victory but that the "price of victory matters" and urged Russian soldiers to "take care of themselves...[and] their loved ones." Kremlin officials often publicly state that Russia is prepared to keep fighting in order to achieve its original war aims in Ukraine, and Medvedev's explicit statement about the "price" of such a victory is a notable inflection in that it represents an acceptance of social cost.[5] Medvedev is implying that Russian authorities will "take care" of any involuntarily mobilized personnel and will not simply send them to die - likely in an effort to subdue any societal concern resulting from future involuntary reserve callups. Russian forces, however, have long been reliant on highly attritional tactics on the battlefield, securing advances with disproportionately high losses.[6] The Russian military has furthermore become heavily optimized for such slow, infantry-led positional warfare, suggesting that the Russian military command does not foresee any major shift in tactics that would significantly reduce the casualty rate.[7] Medvedev's February 23 appearance seeks to socialize the concept of loss and sacrifice amongst the entire Russian population.

Putin is setting conditions to offset the significant financial issues that any future limited involuntary reserve callup would cause. Putin held a meeting with the widows of Russian servicemembers who died in Ukraine, in which he claimed that the "Motherland" for which their husbands died will always be with the widows.[8] Putin expressed his support for the women and their children as they "get back on their feet" and stated that he would continue to demand that all levels of government pay "constant attention" to supporting veterans' families. The wide-ranging social benefits that the Russian government has been offering soldiers and their families in order to boost voluntary recruitment are significantly straining the Russian budget.[9] Future limited, rolling involuntary reserve callups would significantly increase the financial burden on the Russian government, and Putin may be preparing to curtail these benefits and compensations as he starts callups in order to grant the Russian economy some breathing room. Putin will likely also need to more evenly balance the compensations and benefits that contract soldiers and involuntary mobilized personnel receive to avoid discontent about any inequities within the Russian force. Putin is likely aware that such changes could spark domestic backlash, having witnessed online criticisms toward his previous policies that reduced the Kremlin's payouts to Russian soldiers.[10] Putin's February 23 meeting with the widows is an effort to persuade Russian society that the Russian government is not going to completely abandon soldiers, even if the Kremlin calls up more troops and reduces their benefits and payouts. Putin's outreach to widows specifically is noteworthy, as disgruntled groups of veterans' wives and mothers historically were able to lead large Soviet and Russian social movements, including by protesting the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the Russian wars in Chechnya.[11] The Kremlin has also recently intensified its internet censorship campaign, likely in order to prevent domestic backlash to future policy decisions that are likely to be unpopular at home, such as the start of limited, rolling reserve callups and the reduction of benefits and payouts to soldiers.[12]

Ukrainian forces continue to liberate territory in southern Ukraine. Geolocated footage published on February 21 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced east of Verbove (southeast of Oleksandrivka).[13] Geolocated footage published on February 22 shows a Ukrainian servicemember operating in northwestern Ternuvate (northwest of Hulyaipole), indicating that Ukrainian forces recently liberated the settlement, contrary to Russian sources' claims that Russian forces maintain control over the settlement.[14] ISW has not observed visual evidence to suggest that Russian forces maintain positions in Ternuvate since February 6, 2026. Ukrainian Southern Defense Forces Spokesperson Colonel Vladyslav Voloshyn reported on February 23 that Russian claims that Russian forces control Ternuvate are untrue.[15] Voloshyn stated that a Russian group infiltrated the settlement two weeks ago (roughly around February 9) but that Ukrainian forces "destroyed" the group. Voloshyn noted that some limited Russian soldiers may remain in Ternuvate but that Russian forces do not control the settlement--likely in reference to the doctrinal definition of control, which is a tactical mission task that requires the commander to maintain physical influence over a specified area to prevent its use by an enemy or to create conditions necessary for successful friendly operations.

ISW assesses that Ukrainian forces recently liberated Andriivka, Ostapivske, Pishchane, Nechaivka (all northwest of Ternuvate), Radisne, Nove Zaporizhzhia (both west of Ternuvate) due to the fact that ISW has not observed visual evidence indicating a Russian presence in any of these settlements in over two weeks (since at least February 9). ISW has not observed significant evidence indicating a Russian presence in Pishchane, Nechaivka, Radisne, and Nove Zaporizhzhia since February 8. Voloshyn stated that Ternuvate is located 10 to 12 kilometers from the front, supporting ISW's assessment that Ukrainian forces also recently liberated the area east and northeast of Ternuvate.[16] ISW continues to assess that Ukrainian forces are leveraging Russian forces' communications challenges following the February 1 SpaceX block of Russian Starlink terminals in order to advance in this area.[17] Voloshyn noted on February 17 that changing weather conditions and successful Ukrainian strikes against Russian logistics are also contributing to Ukrainian successes.[18]

Ukrainian officials have offered differing assessments of control of terrain in southern Ukraine, in large part reflecting the tactical intricacies of the current frontline situation. Ukrainian Commander in Chief Colonel General Oleksandr Syrskyi and Voloshyn stated on February 23 that Ukrainian forces have liberated over 400 square kilometers and eight settlements in the Oleksandrivka direction since the end of January 2025.[19] Voloshyn added that Ukrainian forces are counterattacking along the Zaporizhia-Dnipropetrovsk Oblast administrative border and in the Hulyaipole direction.[20] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on February 20 that Ukrainian forces liberated 300 square kilometers in unspecified areas in southern Ukraine in an unspecified time frame.[21] The Ukrainian Airborne Assault Forces stated on February 22 that Ukrainian forces liberated over 300 square kilometers and have cleared eight settlements in the Oleksandrivka direction since Ukrainian forces began more significant tactical counterattacks in the area (since roughly February 9).[22] It is unclear at this time why Ukrainian officials are giving different figures, but some variation may be due to differences in the geographic and temporal bounds.

ISW has observed evidence to assess that Ukrainian forces have liberated 200 square kilometers in some areas of the Novopavlivka, Oleksandrivka, and Hulyaipole directions between February 1 and 23, but lost 35 square kilometers in other areas of those three directions during the same time frame. ISW's mapping methodology may underestimate Ukrainian advances. ISW's mapping methodology depicts the furthest assessed extent of Russian advances until open-source evidence emerges that allows ISW to confidently assess that Russian forces no longer hold those positions. Available footage and reports that meet ISW's threshold for changing its maps are often limited, and ISW's maps can continue to depict areas where an earlier Russian presence has significantly decreased or even disappeared as still within the "Assessed Russian advances" until a preponderance of reporting and footage indicates otherwise. The frontline in Ukraine, especially near the Dnipropetrovsk-Zaporizhia Oblast administrative border, has become porous with a lack of contiguous lines over time, resulting in Ukrainian and Russian positions intermingling in a way that adds additional complexity to assessing the true control of terrain (COT). ISW will continue to monitor reports and footage about Ukrainian counterattacks and COT in southern Ukraine and will refine its maps from assessments based on these pieces of evidence.

Russia is strengthening its ability to collect intelligence and disrupt enemy satellite communications, which may bolster its strategic capabilities in the event of a future potential confrontation with NATO. The Financial Times (FT) reported on February 4, citing European security officials and other unspecified sources, that the Russian Luch-1 and Luch-2 space vehicles intercepted communications of at least a dozen key satellites carrying government and military communications over Europe at an unspecified time.[23] FT reported that Russian space vehicles have shadowed European satellites for weeks at a time more intensively over the last three years and that Luch-2 in particular has approached European satellites 17 times since its launch in 2023. A senior European intelligence official assessed that the Luch vehicles are likely positioning themselves within the narrow cone of data beams transmitting from Earth-based stations to the satellites, which were launched years ago without advanced technology, and are unable to encrypt their sensitive information. FT reported that the European intelligence official stated that the Luch vehicles are unlikely to be able to jam or destroy the European satellites, but likely provided Russia with data on how to disrupt the satellites from the ground or in orbit. FT reported that Russia may be able to beam false commands to the satellites in order to manipulate their thrusters to knock other satellites out of alignment. Russia is likely strengthening its ability to gather data from space satellites and to disrupt Western communications as part of its "Phase Zero" campaign to prepare for a possible future war with NATO.[24]

Key Takeaways:

• Kremlin officials used the February 23 Defender of the Fatherland Day holiday to set conditions to mitigate any domestic backlash that may result from limited rolling reserve involuntary callups in the future.
• Putin is setting conditions to offset the significant financial issues that any future limited involuntary reserve callup would cause.
• Ukrainian forces continue to liberate territory in southern Ukraine.
• Ukrainian officials have offered differing assessments of control of terrain in southern Ukraine, in large part reflecting the tactical intricacies of the current frontline situation.
• Russia is strengthening its ability to collect intelligence and disrupt enemy satellite communications, which may bolster its strategic capabilities in the event of a future potential confrontation with NATO.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Kupyansk and Oleksandrivka. Russian forces recently advanced in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.  

• Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
• Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis
• Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
• Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
• Significant Activity in Belarus

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Ukrainian forces struck oil and energy infrastructure in the Republic of Tatarstan and Belgorod Oblast on the night of February 22 to 23. Sources in Ukraine’s Security Service (SBU) told Ukrainian broadcaster Suspilne on February 23 that the SBU struck the Kaleykino Oil Pumping Station near Almetyevsk, Republic of Tatarstan, causing six explosions and a large fire at the station.[25] Suspilne reported that the Kaleykino station is a key hub for supplying raw petroleum from Western Siberia and Volyn Oblast to the Druzhba oil pipeline. Geolocated footage published on February 23 shows a substantial fire at the Kaleykino station after the strike.[26] The Almetyevsk City Administration acknowledged that the strike caused a fire in an industrial zone.[27] Belgorod Oblast Governor Vyacheslav Gladkov claimed that Ukrainian forces struck energy infrastructure in Belgorod Oblast on February 22 to 23, causing blackouts.[28] A Ukrainian open-source Telegram channel published satellite imagery on February 23 and assessed that the February 18-19 Ukrainian strike against the Velikolukskaya oil depot in Pskov Oblast damaged almost all of the facility's oil tanks and completely destroyed about half of the tanks.[29]

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in Sumy Oblast along the international border)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Sumy Oblast on February 23 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced south of Yablunivka (northeast of Sumy City).[30]

Russian forces attacked in Kursk and Sumy oblasts including northwest of Sumy City near Ryzhivka and southeast of Sumy City near Pokrovka on February 22 and 23.[31]

Ukrainian Joint Forces Task Force Spokesperson Colonel Viktor Trehubov reported on February 23 that Ukrainian and Russian forces are fighting on the outskirts of Pokrovka (southeast of Sumy City) but have not yet entered the settlement.[32]

A Russian milblogger reportedly affiliated with the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces claimed on February 23 that Ukrainian forces maintain fire control over the entry to Ryzhivka, preventing Russian forces from establishing positions in the settlement following assaults.[33] The milblogger criticized the military commands of the Russian 22nd Motorized Rifle Regiment, 41st Motorized Rifle Regiment (both of the 72nd Motorized Rifle Division, 44th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]), and 1427th Motorized Rifle Regiment (11th AC, LMD) for ordering these assaults despite taking heavy losses. The milblogger claimed that the commanders order assaults in fireteams of four to six soldiers, making the Russian groups prime targets for Ukrainian drone strikes because these are larger than other Russian assault groups.

The milblogger also complained that the 1st Anti-Aircraft Missile Regiment (106th Airborne [VDV] Division) failed to defend its area of responsibility, allowing a Ukrainian drone to strike five Russian servicemembers near Oleshnya (northeast of Sumy City) uncontested.[34]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 106th VDV Division are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Khrapivshchyna (northeast of Sumy City).[35] Drone operators of the Anvar Spetsnaz Detachment (possibly referring to the BARS-25 Anvar volunteer detachment) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Klyusy (either southwest of Sumy City about 67 kilometers from the frontline or along the Chernihiv-Bryansk Oblast international border), and near Myropillya, Velyka Rybytsya, and Marine (all northeast of Sumy City).[36]

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border to create a defensible buffer zone with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Russian sources claimed that Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on February 23, but Russian forces did not make confirmed advances.

A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced near Starytsya and Izbytske (northeast of Kharkiv City).[37]

Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces attacked northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk, Symynivka, Starystya, and Vovchanski Khutory on February 23.[38]

The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the South Slobozhansk direction (northern Kharkiv Oblast) reported on February 23 that Russian forces are attempting and failing to advance between Ukrainian positions in small groups.[39] The brigade spokesperson noted that Russian forces launch Molniya fixed-wing first-person view (FPV) drones and Lancet loitering munitions every day and are equipping Zala long-range reconnaissance drones with special equipment to evade Ukrainian drone interceptors.

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Velykyi Burluk direction on February 23 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced up to 300 kilometers in a forest area near Khatnie (northeast of Velykyi Burluk).[40]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Velykyi Burluk towards Khatnie and southeast of Velykyi Burluk near Dvorichanske on February 22 and 23.[41]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Oskil River (Russian objective: Cross the Oskil River in Kharkiv Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Kupyansk direction.

Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on February 23 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced west of Holubivka (north of Kupyansk).[42]

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced between Petropavlivka and Kucherivka (both east of Kupyansk).[43]

Russian forces attacked within Kupyansk itself; east of Kupyansk near Petropavlivka and Kucherivka; and southeast of Kupyansk near Hlushkivka and Pishchane on February 22 and 23.[44]

Ukrainian Joint Forces Task Force Spokesperson Colonel Viktor Trehubov reported on February 23 that Russian forces control less than three percent of Kupyansk and are trying to survive in the settlement.[45] Trehubov noted that Ukrainian forces detected 20 Russian radio users in Kupyansk within the past day.

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 1st Guards Tank Army (GTA, Moscow Military District [MMD]) are operating in Kupyansk-Vuzlovyi (southeast of Kupyansk).[46]

Russian forces continued offensive operations east of Borova toward Shyikivka and south of Borova near Oleksandrivka and toward Novoserhiivka on February 22 and 23 but did not advance.[47]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Slovyansk direction on February 23 but did not advance.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced within Lyman; toward Staryi Karavan (south of Lyman); near Maslyakivka (east of Lyman); near Kalenyky, Riznykivka, and Kryva Luka (east of Slovyansk); and near Nykyforivka (southeast of Slovyansk).[48]

Assessed Russian infiltrations: Geolocated footage published on February 22 and 23 shows Ukrainian forces striking a Russian-occupied building in southeastern Lypivka (southeast of Slovyansk) and eastern Lyman, and during what ISW assesses were Russian infiltration missions that did not change the control of terrain or the forward edge of the battle area (FEBA) at this time.[49]

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced along the Kryva Luka-Riznykivka line (east of Slovyansk), expanded the contested "gray zone" in Riznykivka, and pushed Ukrainian forces from heights north of Riznykivka.[50]

Russian forces attacked within and toward Lyman itself; north of Lyman near Stavky and Drobysheve; east of Lyman near Maslyakivka; south of Lyman toward Staryi Karavan; northeast of Slovyansk near Zakitne; east of Slovyansk near Ozerne, Platonivka, Kalenyky, Kryva Luka, and Riznykivka and toward Rai-Oleksandrivka; and southeast of Slovyansk near Nykyforivka and Vasyukivka and toward Fedorivka Druha on February 22 and 23.[51] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Nykyforivka and Stary Karavan.[52]

A Russian milblogger reportedly affiliated with the Russian Western Grouping of Forces claimed on February 23 that the Russian military command set and failed to meet a deadline for elements of the Russian 69th Motorized Rifle Division (6th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) to seize Lyman by the start of 2026 and that the division suffered the highest losses in the 25th CAA’s (Central Military District [CMD]) area of responsibility (AoR).[53]

Geolocated footage published on February 23 shows Russian forces striking a bridge in Bohorodychne (north of Slovyansk) with a FAB-500 guided glide bomb.[54]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area.

[Kostyantynivka City map]

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on February 20 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in southern Virolyubivka (north of Kostyantynivka).[55]

Assessed Russian infiltrations: Geolocated footage published on February 23 shows Russian forces operating on the southwestern outskirts of Kostyantynivka and west of Ivanopillya (southeast of Kostyantynivka) in what ISW assesses were infiltration missions that did not change the control of terrain or the forward edge of battle area (FEBA).[56]

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced northeast of Berestok (south of Kostyantynivka).[57]

Russian forces attacked near and within Kostyantynivka itself; northeast of Kostyantynivka near Holubivka, Pryvillya, and Minkivka; southeast of Kostyantynivka near Ivanopillya and Shcherbynivka; south of Kostyantynivka near Pleshchiivka, Illinivka, and Berestok; southwest of Kostyantynivka near Stepanivka; west of Kostyantynivka near Pavlivka; and southwest of Druzhkivka near Novopavlivka and Sofiivka on February 22 and 23.[58] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Yablunivka.[59]

Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces used FAB-500 guided glide bombs and Kh-38ML air-to-surface missiles to strike bridges near Kostyantynivka.[60]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 1194th Motorized Rifle Regiment (4th Motorized Rifle Brigade, 3rd CAA, formerly 2nd Luhansk People's Republic Army Corps [LNR AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) are striking Ukrainian forces in western Kostyantynivka.[61] First-person view (FPV) drone operators of the 13th Rusichi Assault Detachment of the 1194th Motorized Rifle Regiment are striking Ukrainian forces in southwestern Kostyantynivka.[62] Artillery elements of the 4th Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd CAA) are striking Ukrainian forces south of Kostyantynivka.[63] FPV drone operators of the 68th Separate Reconnaissance Battalion of the 20th Motorized Rifle Division (8th CAA, SMD) are reportedly operating near Druzhkivka.[64]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Dobropillya near Kucheriv Yar on February 23 but did not advance.[65]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 33rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (20th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA) and drone operators of the 177th Separate Naval Infantry Regiment (Caspian Flotilla) are reportedly operating in the Dobropillya direction.[66]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction on February 23 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked near Pokrovsk itself; northwest of Pokrovsk toward Hryshyne and Shevchenko; north of Pokrovsk near Rodynske and toward Bilytske; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Udachne and toward Novopidhorodne on February 22 and 23.[67]

A battalion commander of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Pokrovsk direction reported on February 23 that Russian forces are attempting to bypass Ukrainian positions by attacking on the flanks of the Pokrovsk direction from Hryshyne and Rodynske.[68] The Ukrainian commander reported that Russian forces, including drone operators of the Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies, are attempting to interdict Ukrainian logistics in the Pokrovsk direction.

Order of Battle: First-person view (FPV) operators of the Russian 56th Separate Spetsnaz Battalion (51st CAA, formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic [DNR] AC, SMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Rodynske.[69]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Novopavlivka direction on February 23 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced east of Novopavlivka.[70]

Russian forces attacked southwest of Novopavlivka near Filiya on February 22 and 23.[71]

Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Oleksandrivka direction.

See topline for reports of recent Ukrainian advances in the Oleksandrivka direction.  

Russian forces attacked southeast of Oleksandrivka near Ternove, Stepove, and Kalynivske and toward Vyshneve on February 22 and 23.[72] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Novooleksandrivka and Hai (both southeast of Oleksandrivka).[73]

Ukrainian forces continue their mid-range strikes against Russian military assets in occupied Donetsk Oblast. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on February 23 that Ukrainian forces struck an ammunition depot of the Russian Southern Grouping of Forces near occupied Nyzhnya Krynka (roughly 50 kilometers from the frontline) and a materiel and equipment warehouse near occupied Velyka Novosilka (roughly 22 kilometers from the frontline).[74] Geolocated footage published on February 22 shows Ukrainian forces striking two Russian Tor anti-aircraft missile systems northwest of occupied Mariupol (roughly 113 kilometers from the frontline) and Donetsk City (roughly 45 kilometers from the frontline).[75]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Hulyaipole direction on February 23 but did not advance.

See topline text for refinements of areas under Russian claims in the Hulyaipole direction.

Russian forces attacked near Hulyaipole itself; north of Hulyaipole near Nove Zaporizhzhia; northwest of Hulyaipole toward Zelene, Olenokostyantynivka, Verkhnya Tersa, Rizdvyanka, and Vozdvyzhivka; and west of Hulyaipole toward Zaliznychne and Hirke on February 21 and 22.[76]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 14th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff's Main Directorate [GRU]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Lyubytske (northwestof Hulyaipole) and Verkhnya Tersa.[77]

Russian forces continued offensive operationsin western Zaporizhia Oblast on February 23 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northeast of Orikhiv toward Hulyaipilske; west of Orikhiv near Prymorske and Stepove; and northwest of Orikhiv near Stepnohirsk and toward Mahdalynivka on February 22 and 23.[78]

The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Orikhiv direction stated that Russian forces are increasing their air, glide bomb, and multiple launch rocket system (MLRS) strikes in the Orikhiv direction.[79] The spokesperson reported that Russian forces conducted a rotation at an unspecified date and that there are now elements of an unspecified number of motorized rifle units, two airborne (VDV) regiments, and a special forces brigade operating in the Orikhiv direction. The spokesperson noted that Russian forces are using elite paratroopers as regular infantry and assessed that Russian forces are suffering a manpower shortage in this direction.

A Russian milblogger claimed that muddy roads in the Zaporizhia direction are inhibiting the movement of vehicles.[80]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 104th VDV Regiment (76th VDV Division) are reportedly operating toward Mahdalynivka.[81] Elements of the Russian 7th VDV Division reportedly continue to operate in the Zaporizhia direction.[82]

Neither Ukrainian nor Russian sources reported offensive operations in the Kherson direction on February 23.

The Ukrainian General Staff reported on February 23 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian drone control point near occupied Pokrovka, Mykolaiv Oblast (on the Kinburn Peninsula on the east [left] bank of the Dnipro River, the only part of Mykolaiv Oblast under Russian occupation).[83]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 98th VDV Division are reportedly operating in the Kherson direction.[84]

Ukrainian forces continue to strike Russian military targets in occupied Crimea. The Ukrainian General Staff and Ukrainian Special Operations Forces (SSO) reported on February 23 that Ukrainian forces struck a concentration of the Russian 15th Separate Coastal Missile Brigade that was equipped with a Bastion coastal missile system in occupied Crimea.[85]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Russian forces conducted a series of missile and drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of February 22 to 23. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched one Iskander-M ballistic missile from Rostov Oblast and 126 Shahed-type, Gerbera-type, Italmas-type, and other drones, of which roughly 80 were Shahed-type drones, from the direction of Bryansk, Kursk, and Oryol cities; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; and occupied Hvardiiske and Cape Chauda, Crimea.[86] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 105 drones; that one ballistic missile and 20 drones struck 11 locations; and that downed debris fell on one location. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces struck civilian, transport, industrial, and energy infrastructure in Odesa and Zaporizhia oblasts.[87]

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky confirmed on February 23 ISW’s recent assessment that Russian forces have been using Belarusian telecommunications infrastructure in drone operations against Ukraine and incursions into NATO airspace.[88]

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.