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February 22, 2026
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, February 22, 2026
Data Cutoff: 12:15 PM ET
Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.
Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.
Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.
For more information on ISW's map methodology, please view our statement here.
Russian forces conducted another large, combined strike package overnight on February 21 to 22 and appear to be shifting their target set from primarily energy infrastructure to include Ukrainian water and railway infrastructure. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 347 drones and missiles against Ukraine overnight.[1] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 297 Shahed-type, Gerbera-type, Italmas-type, and other strike drone types – of which roughly 200 were Shaheds – from the directions of Bryansk, Kursk, and Oryol cities; Shatalovo, Smolensk Oblast; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; and occupied Crimea. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces also launched 50 missiles, including four Zirkon hypersonic cruise missiles from occupied Crimea; 22 Iskander-M/S-400 ballistic missiles from Bryansk and Belgorod oblasts and occupied Donetsk Oblast; 18 Kh-101 cruise missiles from Volgograd Oblast; and two Iskander-K and four Kh-59/69 cruise missiles from Kursk Oblast. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 274 drones and 33 missiles, including all the Iskander-K and Kh-59/69 cruise missiles and all but one of the Kh-101 cruise missiles. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that 14 missiles and 23 strike drones struck 14 locations and that falling debris hit five locations. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces primarily targeted Kyiv, Odesa, Kirovohrad, and Poltava oblasts.
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky reported that Russian forces targeted Ukrainian logistics, including railway infrastructure, and water supply infrastructure in cities, rather than focusing on energy infrastructure.[2] Ukrainian Deputy Prime Minister and Development Minister Oleksiy Kuleba reported that Russian forces struck railway infrastructure in Donetsk, Zaporizhia, Mykolaiv, and Odesa oblasts, damaging two locomotives.[3] Ukrainian officials reported that Russian strikes also damaged civilian, commercial, medical, residential, and energy infrastructure in Kyiv City and Kyiv, Odesa, Sumy, Mykolaiv, Dnipropetrovsk, and Zaporizhia oblasts, and injured at least 19 civilians and killed one in Mykolaiv and Kyiv oblasts.[4] Mykolaiv Oblast Head Vitaliy Kim reported that Russian strikes overnight caused power outages for at least 16,000 customers in Mykolaiv City.[5] The shifting Russian target set comes after Russian strikes intended to break Ukraine's energy grid in the dead of winter, though Russian forces will likely continue efforts to further degrade Ukraine's energy infrastructure using long-range strikes.[6]
Ukrainian officials accused Russian intelligence services of coordinating an improvised explosive device (IED) attack on a shopping center in Lviv City on February 22 that killed one and injured at least 25. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky reported on February 22 that Russia coordinated the attack in Lviv City and recruited the perpetrators via Telegram.[7] The Lviv Oblast National Police reported on February 22 that Russian special services recruited a woman from Rivne Oblast to make and plant IEDs at predetermined locations.[8] The Lviv Oblast National Police reported that the law enforcement arrived at a retail store to investigate a break-in just after midnight and that the first explosive detonated after law enforcement arrived on scene. The Lviv Oblast National Police reported that a second device detonated after additional law enforcement arrived at the scene of the explosions, killing one law enforcement officer and severely wounding at least six other law enforcement personnel. It is currently unclear how many others of the 25 total wounded are members of Ukrainian law enforcement.
Russia is likely escalating a sabotage campaign intended to degrade Ukrainians' trust in their security and destabilize Ukrainian society. Lviv City Mayor Andriy Sadovyi stated on February 22 that Russia wants to destabilize the situation in Ukraine and noted that Russia deliberately chose to conduct the attack in Lviv City because many tourists and military personnel were in the city at the time of the attack.[9] Ukrainian and Moldovan authorities recently prevented a Russian plot to assassinate several prominent political and defense figures, and Ukraine's Security Service (SBU) warned at the time that Russia intends to use these high-profile assassinations to spread panic and destabilize the socio-political situation in Ukraine.[10] Russian agents assassinated former Ukrainian Verkhovna Rada Chairperson Andriy Parubiy in August 2025.[11] Zelensky warned after the Lviv City attack that Ukrainian intelligence indicates that Russia will likely continue such attacks.[12] Russia will likely continue such attacks and assassination attempts to further its goal of destabilizing Ukraine, and may also seize on reports of attacks or arrests connected with foiled plots to promote narratives aimed at spreading panic and distrust within Ukrainian society.
Russia is reportedly selling man-portable air defense systems (MANPADS) to Iran, likely to repair its reputation among Iran and Russia's other allies. The Financial Times (FT) reported on February 22 citing leaked internal documents and several people familiar with the matter that Russia and Iran concluded a 500 million euro (about $589 million) deal for Iran's purchase of 500 Verba MANPADS, 2,500 9M336 surface-to-air missiles (SAM), and 500 Mowgli-2 night vision sights to be delivered from Russia in three tranches from 2027 to 2029.[13] One person familiar with the deal told FT that it is possible that Russia could deliver a small number of the deliveries early. FT noted that Iran requested Verbas from Russia in July 2025, just weeks after the June 2025 Israel-Iran war obliterated Iran's air defense capabilities. FT noted that there have been several cargo flights from Russia to Iran in December 2025 and January 2026, and Iranian Ambassador to Russia Kazem Jalali confirmed that recent flights from Russia contained military cargo. Russia has relied heavily on its allies, especially members of the Adversary Entente, for military and economic support since launching its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 but has not been able to reciprocate this support.[14] Russia has failed to support its allies in their own conflicts in recent years due to the needs of its war effort in Ukraine, and these allies have suffered, with some even distancing themselves from Russia as a result.[15] The Kremlin likely seeks to repair relations with Iran in the near-term by delivering weapons and equipment on such a timeline that the Kremlin believes will not impact its war effort. Russia reportedly delivered attack helicopters and Spartak armored vehicles to Iran in mid-January 2026, including at least one Mi-28 helicopter that was part of a November 2023 deal.[16] The Kremlin may also assess that it can delay any weapons deliveries beyond their contracted dates, as it has with other allies since its full-scale invasion.[17]
Key Takeaways:
- Russian forces conducted another large, combined strike package overnight on February 21 to 22 and appear to be shifting their target set from primarily energy infrastructure to include Ukrainian water and railway infrastructure.
- Ukrainian officials accused Russian intelligence services of coordinating an improvised explosive device (IED) attack on a shopping center in Lviv City on February 22 that killed one and injured at least 25.
- Russia is likely escalating a sabotage campaign intended to degrade Ukrainians' trust in their security and destabilize Ukrainian society.
- Russia is reportedly selling man-portable air defense systems (MANPADS) to Iran, likely to repair its reputation among Iran and Russia's other allies.
- Russian forces recently advanced near Slovyansk.
We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.
- Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
- Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis
- Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
- Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
- Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
- Significant Activity in Belarus
Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
Battle damage assessments (BDA) confirm damage from recent Ukrainian Flamingo cruise missile and other strikes against Russian defense industrial and oil infrastructure. A Ukrainian open-source intelligence project published satellite imagery on February 22 showing damage to a workshop at the Votkinsk Machine Building Plant in Votkinsk, Republic of Udmurtia, following official Ukrainian reports of an FP-5 Flamingo cruise missile strike against the plant on February 20 to 21.[18] A Ukrainian open-source Telegram channel published satellite imagery on February 22 and assessed that Ukrainian strikes against the Neftogorsk Gas Processing Plant in Samara Oblast on February 20 to 21 damaged two vertical stabilization columns, which help refine petroleum products to standards for transport.[19] The Ukrainian channel assessed that the February 21 to 22 strikes also damaged technical columns and pipelines that discharge excess gases to flare installations. A source reportedly affiliated with Russian intelligence agencies claimed that Ukrainian drone strikes on February 19 to 20 destroyed an Mi-8 helicopter of the 319th Separate Helicopter Regiment (11th Air Force and Air Defense Army, Russian Aerospace Forces [VKS] and Eastern Military District [EMD]) and a Ka-52 attack helicopter of the 16th Army Aviation Brigade (4th Air Force and Air Defense Army, VKS and Southern Military District [SMD]) at the Pugachevka Airfield in Oryol Oblast.[20] Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL) published low-resolution satellite imagery showing a large scorch mark at the fuel tanks of the Velikiye Luki oil depot in Pskov Oblast following a Ukrainian drone strike on February 18 to 19.[21] RFE/RL noted that the imagery is inconsistent with Pskov Oblast Governor Mikhail Vedernikov's claim that the strike only damaged one of the oil depot's fuel tanks.[22] A Russian milblogger claimed that the Ukrainian Flamingo strike against an arsenal of the Russian Main Missile and Artillery Directorate (GRAU) near Kotluban, Volgograd Oblast, on February 11 to 12 damaged a storage bunker.[23]
Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in Sumy Oblast along the international border)
Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Sumy Oblast on February 22 but did not advance.
Russian forces attacked in Kursk and Sumy oblasts, including north of Sumy City near Kindrativka and Oleksiivka, northeast of Sumy City near Myropillya, and southeast of Glushkovo near Kucherov, on February 21 and 22.[24]
Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 1443rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (reportedly under the operational control of the Northern Grouping of Forces and formed during 2022 partial reserve call up) and of the 30th Motorized Rifle Regiment (72nd Motorized Rifle Division, 44th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces in Sumy Oblast.[25]
Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border to create a defensible buffer zone with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)
Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on February 22, but ISW has not collected any evidence to assess that Russian forces made any advances.
Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces attacked northeast of Kharkiv City in Vovchanski Khutory and near Symynivka and Starytsya on February 21 and 22.[26]
Order of Battle: First-person view (FPV) drone operators of the Russian 126th Motorized Rifle Regiment (71st Guards Motorized Rifle Division, 14th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) are striking Ukrainian positions in Okhrimivka (northeast of Kharkiv City).[27]
Russian forces continued offensive operations southeast of Velykyi Burluk near Dvorichanske on February 21 and 22 but did not advance.[28]
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Oskil River (Russian objective: Cross the Oskil River in Kharkiv Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on February 22 but did not advance.
Russian forces attacked east of Kupyansk near Kucherivka and southeast of Kupyansk near Pishchane and Hlushkivka on February 21 and 22.[29]
A Russian milblogger reportedly affiliated with the Russian Western Grouping of Forces claimed on February 22 that the Russian military command in the Kupyansk direction is attempting to force Russian servicemembers to infiltrate Ukrainian positions via the Soyuz gas pipeline.[30] The milblogger criticized the Russian military command for being indifferent to Russian casualties suffered due to portions of the decrepit pipeline collapsing. A Ukrainian brigade operating in the neighboring Borova direction reported that Russian forces attempted to use the pipeline for an infiltration mission in January 2026.[31]
The Ukrainian 16th Army Corps (AC) published footage on February 22 showing Ukrainian drone operators striking a Russian TOS-1A thermobaric artillery system near occupied Bohdanivske (roughly five kilometers behind the frontline and northeast of Kupyansk).[32]
Russian forces continued offensive operations south of Borova near Oleksandrivka and southeast of Borova near Hrekivka and toward Novoserhiivka on December 21 and 22.[33]
Ukrainian forces continued their mid-range strike campaign against Russian oil infrastructure in occupied Luhansk Oblast overnight on February 21 to 22. Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) Commander Robert ”Magyar” Brovdi published geolocated footage on February 22 showing Ukrainian drone operators striking a Russian oil depot in southern occupied Luhansk City (roughly 97 kilometers from the frontline) overnight.[34] Geolocated footage published on February 22 shows a fire at the oil depot.[35] Luhansk People's Republic (LNR) Head Leonid Pasechnik claimed on February 22 that two Ukrainian drones struck an oil depot in southern occupied Luhansk City in the early morning hours of February 22, setting fire to a fuel tank.[36]
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)
Russian forces recently advanced in the Slovyansk direction.
Assessed Russian advances: Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported on February 21 that Russian forces recently seized Zakitne (northeast of Slovyansk), advanced south of Kryva Luka, and began fighting for Kalenyky (both east of Slovyansk).[37] Given Mashovets’ statements, ISW assesses that Russian forces likely advanced to northern Kalenyky.
Assessed Russian infiltrations: Geolocated footage published on February 22 shows Ukrainian forces striking a Russian-occupied building in central Riznykivka (east of Slovyansk) during what ISW assesses was a Russian infiltration mission that did not change the control of terrain or the forward edge of the battle area (FEBA) at this time.[38]
Russian forces attacked north of Lyman near Stavky and Drobysheve; east of Lyman near Maslyakivka; southeast of Lyman near Yampil; north of Slovyansk near Svyatohirsk; northeast of Slovyansk near Zakitne and Dronivka; east of Slovyansk near Riznykivka; and southeast of Slovyansk near Nykyforivka and toward Fedorivka Druha on February 21 and 22.[39]
Mashovets reported on February 21 that elements of the Russian 20th Combined Arms Army (CAA, Moscow Military District [MMD]) are trying to break through to Yarova, Pryshyb, and Novoselivka (all northwest of Lyman) and Drobysheve to cut off Lyman from the northwest, while advancing toward Svyatohirsk and reaching Sosnove (northwest of Lyman) and Oleksandrivka (south of Borova) to create conditions for a possible envelopment of Slovyansk from the north.[40] Mashovets reported that elements of the 3rd CAA (formerly 2nd Luhansk People's Republic Army Corps [LNR AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) exploited the 25th CAA (Central Military District [CMD])’s advance along the northern bank of the Siverskyi Donets River to advance along the southern bank of the river with elements of its 6th and 127th motorized rifle brigades.[41] Mashovets stated that Russian forces are advancing in a narrowing sector between the Siverskyi Donets and the E40 (M-03) Slovyansk-Bakhmut highway, which allows the Russian military command to concentrate its forces. Mashovets assessed, however, that Russian forces will require significantly more troops and resources for a hypothetical seizure of Slovyansk and Kramatorsk than the seizure of Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad.
Ukrainian Joint Forces Task Force Spokesperson Colonel Viktor Trehubov reported on February 22 that Russian forces are trying to bypass Lyman via Drobysheve and Stavky to eventually seize Raihorodok (northeast of Slovyansk) and threaten Slovyansk, but have yet to make significant gains in that direction.[42] The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Slovyansk direction reported on February 22 that Russian forces have been intensifying attempts to infiltrate Zakitne but were unsuccessful in infiltrating Platonivka (east of Slovyansk).[43] The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Lyman direction reported on February 20 that individual Russian assault groups managed to infiltrate into the outskirts of Lyman.[44]
A Russian milblogger reportedly affiliated with the Russian Western Grouping of Forces claimed on February 22 that rising temperatures caused the Zherebets River to overflow, disrupting Russian logistics near Yampil, Zarichne (east of Lyman), and Lyman.[45]
Order of Battle: Mashovets stated that elements of the Russian 85th and 88th motorized rifle brigades (both of the 3rd CAA) are operating near Nykyforivka and Pryvillya (northeast of Kostyantynivka).[46] Mashovets stated that elements of the 2nd Guards Motorized Rifle Division (1st Guards Tank Army [GTA], MMD) and the 144th Motorized Rifle Division (20th CAA, MMD) are operating near Derylove (northwest of Lyman), Stavky, Drobysheve, and Kolodyazi (northeast of Lyman).[47]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area on February 22 but did not advance.
Russian forces attacked near and within Kostyantynivka itself; northeast of Kostyantynivka near Minkivka and Holubivka; southeast of Kostyantynivka near Ivanopillya and Shcherbynivka; south of Kostyantynivka near Pleshchiivka, Illinivka, and Berestok; southwest of Kostyantynivka near Stepanivka; south of Druzhkivka near Rusyn Yar; and southwest of Druzhkivka near Novopavlivka and Sofiivka and toward Torske on February 21 and 22.[48]
A Russian milblogger claimed on February 22 that reports of Russian advances near Torske and in the neighboring Dobropillya tactical area are premature and exaggerated, and implied that the Russian military command demanded these reports of advances.[49]
Order of Battle: FPV drone operators of the Russian 68th Separate Reconnaissance Battalion of the 20th Motorized Rifle Division (8th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian vehicles near Mykolaipillya (south of Druzhkivka).[50] Elements of the BARS-35 Detachment (Russian Combat Army Reserve, known as the Skif Battalion and under the operational control of the Terek Cossack Brigade (Russian Volunteer Corps) are reportedly operating in the Kramatorsk direction.[51]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Dobropillya tactical area on February 22 but did not make confirmed advances.
Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces seized Novyi Donbas (east of Dobropillya).[52]
Russian forces attacked northeast of Dobropillya toward Kucheriv Yar and east of Dobropillya near Shakhove on February 21 and 22.[53]
Order of Battle: Artillery elements, drone operators, and other elements of the Russian 150th Motorized Rifle Division (8th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) and the 33rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (20th Motorized Rifle Division) are reportedly operating in the Dobropillya direction.[54]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction on February 21 and 22 but did not make confirmed advances.
Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced north of Molodetske (southwest of Pokrovsk) and east of and in southern Bilytske (north of Pokrovsk).[55]
Russian forces attacked near Pokrovsk itself; northwest of Pokrovsk near Hryshyne and toward Serhiivka; north of Pokrovsk near Rodynske and toward Bilytske; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Udachne and Molodetske on February 21 and 22.[56]
The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Pokrovsk direction reported on February 22 that Russian drone operators are surveilling Ukrainian vehicles and remotely mining Ukrainian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) up to 15 kilometers behind the frontline at night.[57] The spokesperson noted that Russian forces are prioritizing conducting KAB guided glide bomb strikes against Ukrainian drone operator positions. The spokesperson added that Russian forces are installing their own antennas and cable communication systems to compensate for the blocking of Russian-operated Starlink terminals. The spokesperson noted that Russian forces previously fielded Starlink-equipped drones against Ukrainian logistics as far as Pavlohrad (about 50 kilometers behind the frontline) but noted that such strikes have decreased since the blocking of Starlink terminals.
Order of Battle: Drone elements of the Russian 76th Airborne (VDV) Division are reportedly operating in the Pokrovsk direction.[58]
Russian forces continued offensive operations near Novopavlivka itself, northeast of Novopavlivka near Muravka, and south of Novopavlivka near Filiya on February 21 and 22 but did not advance.[59]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Oleksandrivka direction on February 22 but did not advance.
Russian forces attacked toward Oleksandrivka itself and southeast of Oleksandrivka near Zaporizke, Stepove, Kalynivske, and Ternove on February 21 and 22.[60] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked toward Kolomiitsi (east of Oleksandrivka) and Sosnivka (southeast of Oleksandrivka).[61]
Ukrainian forces continued their mid-range strike campaign against Russian military assets in occupied Donetsk Oblast on the night of February 21 to 22. Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) Commander Robert “Magyar” Brovdi reported on February 22 that Ukrainian forces struck two Russian Tor anti-aircraft missile systems in occupied Donetsk Oblast, one near occupied Donetsk City (roughly 45 kilometers from the frontline), and the other in occupied Topolyne (roughly 95 kilometers from the frontline).[62]
Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)
Ukrainian forces maintained positions or recently advanced in the Hulyaipole direction.
Refinement of area under Russian claims: Geolocated footage published on February 22 shows Russian forces striking Ukrainian positions west of Myrne (southwest of Hulyaipole) -- an area where Russian sources previously claimed that Russian forces maintained a presence.[63]
Russian forces attacked near Hulyaipole itself; north of Hulyaipole near Nove Zaporizhzhia; northwest of Hulyaipole toward Dobropillya, Varvarivka, Zelene, Svyatopetrivka, Verkhnya Tersa, Rizdvyanka, and Vozdvyzhivka; west of Hulyaipole toward Staroukrainka, Zaliznychne, and Hirke; and southwest of Hulyaipole near Myrne and Zahirne on February 21 and 22.[64] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked toward Pryluky, Boikove (both northwest of Hulyaipole), and Rizdvyanka.[65]
Order of Battle: Aircraft of the Russian 11th Air Force and Air Defense Army (Russian Aerospace Forces [VKS] and Eastern Military District [EMD]) are striking Ukrainian forces west of Myrne and reportedly near Verkhnya Tersa.[66]
Ukrainian forces maintained positions or recently advanced in western Zaporizhia Oblast.
Refinement of area under Russian claims: Geolocated footage published on February 22 shows Russian forces striking Ukrainian positions in eastern Mahdalynivka (northwest of Orikhiv) – an area where Russian sources previously claimed that Russian forces maintained a presence.[67]
Russian forces attacked east of Orikhiv toward Hulyaipilske and west of Orikhiv near Prymorske, Stepnohirsk, and Stepove on February 21 and 22.[68] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Mahdalynivka.[69]
Order of Battle: FPV drone operators and other elements of the Russian 104th Airborne (VDV) Division, including its 1180th Artillery Regiment, are striking Ukrainian positions in eastern Mahdalynivka.[70] Drone operators of the 1198th Motorized Rifle Regiment and 189th Motorized Rifle Regiment (both of the 35th Combined Arms Army [CAA], EMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian vehicles near Hulyaipilske.[71] Elements of the 7th Airborne (VDV) Division reportedly continue to operate in the Zaporizhia direction.[72]
Geolocated footage confirmed that Ukrainian forces struck Russian military and logistics targets in occupied Zaporizhia Oblast between February 18 and 20. Geolocated footage published on February 19 shows Ukrainian Special Operations Forces (SSO) drone operators striking Russian ammunition depots, armored vehicles, and fuel and lubricant storage facilities in occupied Polohy (roughly 15 kilometers from the front line).[73] Geolocated footage published on February 20 shows Ukrainian forces striking the M-18 Zaporizhzhia City-Melitopol highway bridge over the Karachokrak River in occupied Vasylivka (roughly 20 kilometers from the front line), a key Russian GLOC.[74]
Neither Ukrainian nor Russian sources reported ground activity in the Kherson direction on February 22.
Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 98th VDV Division are reportedly striking Ukrainian vehicles in Kherson City.[75]
Geolocated footage confirmed that Ukrainian forces recently conducted a medium-range strike against Russian military targets in occupied Crimea. Geolocated footage published on February 21 confirmed that Ukrainian forces struck two Project 22460 Okhotnik border patrol vessels near occupied Inkerman, Crimea (roughly 237 kilometers from the frontline) and two Be-12 amphibious aircraft at the Yevpatoria aircraft repair plant in occupied Yevpatoria, Crimea (165 kilometers from the frontline) on the night of February 20 to 21.[76]
Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)
See topline text.
Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)
Nothing significant to report.
Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.
[1] https://t.me/kpszsu/56278
[2] https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/18052
[3] https://t.me/OleksiiKuleba/8207
[4] https://t.me/OleksiiKuleba/8207; https://t.me/Mykola_Kalashnyk/9046; https://t.me/Mykola_Kalashnyk/9044; https://t.me/kyivoda/43545; https://t.me/vitaliy_klitschko/6254; https://t.me/mykolaivskaODA/18721; https://suspilne dot media/poltava/1246658-u-poltavskomu-rajoni-vpali-ulamki-rosijsogo-bpla-e-poskodzenna/; https://t.me/odeskaODA/14281; https://x.com/andrii_sybiha/status/2025319195479572686
[5] https://t.me/mykolaivskaODA/18715
[6] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-7-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-24-2026/;
https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-18-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-20-2026/
[7] https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/18055
[8] https://suspilne dot media/lviv/1246732-pravoohoronci-zatrimali-jmovirnu-vikonavicu-vibuhiv-u-lvovi/; https://lv.npu.gov dot ua/news/natspolitsiia-zatrymala-zhinku-iaka-vlashtuvala-terakt-u-lvovi-vnaslidok-choho-zahynula-politseiska-ta-postrazhdaly-shche-25-liudei
[9] https://t.me/novynylive/187879
[10] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-20-2026/; https://ssu.gov dot ua/novyny/sbu-natspolitsiia-ta-pravookhorontsi-moldovy-zneshkodyly-ahenturnoboiovu-hrupu-rf-yaka-hotuvala-rezonansni-vbyvstva-v-ukraini-video
[11] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-30-2025/; https://t.me/SBUkr/15969
[12] https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/18055
[13] https://www.ft.com/content/d034cc1a-f5fb-494e-a3c1-466e8e80ed82
[14] https://understandingwar.org/research/adversary-entente/adversary-entente-task-force-update-september-10-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/russia-and-iran-double-down-on-their-strategic-partnership/; https://understandingwar.org/research/adversary-entente/adversary-entente-cooperation-at-russias-shahed-factory-threatens-global-security/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/north-korea-joins-russias-war-against-ukraine/; https://understandingwar.org/research/adversary-entente/the-strengthening-china-russia-nexus/
[15] https://understandingwar.org/research/adversary-entente/adversary-entente-task-force-update-june-26-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/The20Russia-Iran20Coalition20Deepens20013025.pdf; https://understandingwar.org/research/adversary-entente/adversary-entente-task-force-update-june-18-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-8-2024/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-3-2024/; https://understandingwar.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/08/AETF20Update2C20August20132C20202520PDF.pdf; https://understandingwar.org/research/adversary-entente/russias-non-response-to-us-actions-in-venezuela-reveal-a-kremlin-balancing-act/
[16] https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-february-4-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/middle-east/iran-update-january-13-2026/
[17] https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2025/02/11/russia-struggles-to-keep-india-dependent-on-its-arms-supplies-a87940; https://www.reuters.com/world/india/india-pivots-away-russian-arms-will-retain-strong-ties-2024-01-28/; https://www.defensenews.com/global/europe/2026/02/02/russia-claims-15-billion-in-2025-arms-exports-with-focus-on-africa/;
[18] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-21-2026/; https://t.me/kiber_boroshno/12582; https://militarnyi dot com/uk/news/raketnyj-udar-znyshhyv-tseh-zavodu-yskander/
[19] https://t.me/exilenova_plus/16636; https://militarnyi dot com/uk/news/drony-znysh-elementy-neftegorskogo-zavodu/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-21-2026/;
[20] https://t.me/dosye_shpiona/724; https://militarnyi dot com/uk/news/syly-oborony-znyshhyly-my-8-ta-ka-52-u-orlovskij-oblasti-rf/
[21] https://x.com/kromark/status/2025498367661400281; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-19-2026/
[22] https://x.com/kromark/status/2025498367661400281; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-19-2026/
[23] https://t.me/milinfolive/166569
[24] https://t.me/wargonzo/32439; https://t.me/severnnyi/6852; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/35299; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/35280; https://t.me/uvkkursk/245
[25] https://t.me/dva_majors/88615; https://t.me/mod_russia/61393
[26] https://t.me/wargonzo/32439; https://t.me/severnnyi/6852
[27] https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/2025505664190312887; https://t.me/warriorofnorth/15587
[28] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/35299; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/35280; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/35299
[29] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/35299; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/35280; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/35278; https://t.me/wargonzo/32439
[30] https://t.me/gvZapad/17818
[31] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-5-2026/
[32] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/02/22/solnczepok-zgoriv-u-rajoni-bogdanivskogo-dronari-urazyly-zhyrnu-czil/; https://t.me/corpsarmy16/2151
[33] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/35299; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/35280; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/35278
[34] https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/33809; https://t.me/robert_magyar/2003; https://x.com/neonhandrail/status/2025424358127403397; https://x.com/99Dominik_/status/2025492702784020874; https://x.com/klinger66/status/2025517674235613272
[35] https://x.com/neonhandrail/status/2025424358127403397
[36] https://t.me/tass_agency/362328; https://t.me/glava_lnr_info/4712
[37]https://www.facebook.com/pashtetof/posts/pfbid0wMR7FN6RuULDAnrMWGvzFf54XNWT8GEFLvhjaRpoih3tf3WeZ3qNeDd4tuVTVN9pl?rdid=5We6gRX9mWO0V7Mf
[38] https://x.com/Bielitzling/status/2025570146350240003; https://t.me/edelweiss10tg/2333; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/11337
[39]https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/35299; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/35280; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/35278; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/109633; https://suspilne dot media/donbas/1246790-postijni-infiltracii-j-ataki-na-infrastrukturu-rf-sukae-slabki-misca-v-oboroni-zsu-na-limanskomu-napramku/; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Uu50wPIJ4ps; https://t.me/wargonzo/32439
[40]https://www.facebook.com/pashtetof/posts/pfbid0wMR7FN6RuULDAnrMWGvzFf54XNWT8GEFLvhjaRpoih3tf3WeZ3qNeDd4tuVTVN9pl?rdid=5We6gRX9mWO0V7Mf
[41] https://www.facebook.com/pashtetof/posts/pfbid0wMR7FN6RuULDAnrMWGvzFf54XNWT8GEFLvhjaRpoih3tf3WeZ3qNeDd4tuVTVN9pl?rdid=5We6gRX9mWO0V7Mf
[42] https://suspilne dot media/donbas/1246790-postijni-infiltracii-j-ataki-na-infrastrukturu-rf-sukae-slabki-misca-v-oboroni-zsu-na-limanskomu-napramku/; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Uu50wPIJ4ps
[43] https://suspilne dot media/donbas/1246514-rosijski-vijska-namagautsa-vidpraviti-bilse-grup-do-zakitnogo-na-slovanskomu-napramku-81-oaembr/; https://youtu.be/v_hgVy3tUZM
[44] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/02/22/u-pogani-dni-tilky-5-okupantiv-za-den-u-horoshi-40-na-lymanskomu-napryamku-rosiyan-vynyshhuyut-bez-zmin/; https://youtu.be/I1FTvZvzMKw
[45] https://t.me/gvZapad/17817
[46]https://www.facebook.com/pashtetof/posts/pfbid0wMR7FN6RuULDAnrMWGvzFf54XNWT8GEFLvhjaRpoih3tf3WeZ3qNeDd4tuVTVN9pl?rdid=5We6gRX9mWO0V7Mf
[47]https://www.facebook.com/pashtetof/posts/pfbid0wMR7FN6RuULDAnrMWGvzFf54XNWT8GEFLvhjaRpoih3tf3WeZ3qNeDd4tuVTVN9pl?rdid=5We6gRX9mWO0V7Mf
[48] https://t.me/dva_majors/88591; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/35299 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/32439; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/35280 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/35278
[49] https://t.me/dva_majors/88591
[50] https://t.me/nm_dnr/15053
[51] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/198854; https://t.me/majorfront/16453
[52] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/198946
[53] https://t.me/dva_majors/88591; https://t.me/wargonzo/32439; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/35280 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/35278
[54] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/109661; https://t.me/dva_majors/88598
[55] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/198899; https://t.me/motopatriot78/48880 ; https://t.me/Ukr_G_M/75283; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/198850
[56] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/35299; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/35280 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/35278 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/32439; https://t.me/motopatriot78/48880
[57] https://suspilne dot media/donbas/1246700-15-kilometrova-kilzona-rosijski-droni-tisnut-na-logistiku-zsu-na-pokrovskomu-napramku-59-osbr/; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ow_xucz46SI
[58] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/40057
[59] https://t.me/wargonzo/32439; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/35299; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/35280; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/35278
[60] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/35299; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/35280; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/35278; https://t.me/wargonzo/32439;
[61] https://t.me/voin_dv/18723
[62] https://t.me/robert_magyar/2003
[63] https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/2025537247563628852; https://t.me/voin_dv/18727
[64] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/35299; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/35280; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/35278; https://t.me/wargonzo/32439; https://t.me/voin_dv/18723
[65] https://t.me/voin_dv/18723; https://t.me/voin_dv/18728
[66] https://t.me/voin_dv/18727; https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/2025537247563628852
[67] https://x.com/ne_kotletka/status/2025566858498179454; https://t.me/RtrDonetsk/34111
[68] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/35299; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/35280; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/35278; https://t.me/wargonzo/32439; https://t.me/voin_dv/18723
[69] https://t.me/wargonzo/32439
[70] https://x.com/ne_kotletka/status/2025566858498179454; https://t.me/RtrDonetsk/34111
[71] https://t.me/voin_dv/18731
[72] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/40059; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/40054
[73] https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/33800; https://t.me/ukr_sof/2558; https://x.com/front_ukrainian/status/2025247661914222752 ; https://x.com/neonhandrail/status/2025288362199056815; https://x.com/neonhandrail/status/2025574338276331966
[74] https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/33797; https://militarnyi [dot] com/uk/news/pryvyd-kyyeva-znyshhyv-perepravu-okupantiv/; https://x.com/moklasen/status/2025272409540919510; https://x.com/dimdim518484/status/2024882875590484141
[75] https://t.me/osvedomitell_alex/32859
[76] https://x.com/blinzka/status/2025284941928440013; https://x.com/bayraktar_1love/status/2025223809297433077










