Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, February 21, 2026

Assessment as of: 7:30PM ET

Data cutoff: 12:30 PM ET on February 21

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

For more information on ISW's map methodology, please view our statement here.

Ukrainian forces continue to hold defensive lines and push back Russian advances in southern Ukraine. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky told AFP in an interview published on February 20 that Ukrainian forces have liberated 300 square kilometers of territory in an unspecified area of southern Ukraine.[i] Zelensky did not specify the timeframe or the exact locations of these recent Ukrainian advances, but AFP characterized Zelensky as suggesting that Ukrainian forces are "taking advantage" of the situation, following the recent SpaceX block on Russian forces’ usage of Starlink terminals, which supported such Ukrainian advances.

Available open source evidence indicates that Ukrainian forces have liberated multiple settlements around Dnipropetrovsk-Zaporizhia Oblast administrative border in recent weeks.[ii] ISW has observed evidence to assess that Ukrainian forces have liberated at least 168.9 square kilometers of territory in southern Ukraine since January 1, 2026. A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger published a map on February 20 acknowledging that Ukrainian forces advanced east of Novopavlivka.[iii] ISW has not observed visual evidence in 2026 to assess that Russian forces maintain positions in northern Novopavlivka, and geolocated footage published on February 20 shows Ukrainian forces operating in eastern Novopavlivka.[iv] Geolocated footage published on February 20 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced in central Ternove (southeast of Oleksandrivka).[v] A Ukrainian military source reported on February 18 that Ukrainian forces advanced to northwestern Verbove, indicating that Ukrainian forces likely liberated Orestopil, Vovche, Novooleksandrivka, and Hai (all southeast of Oleksandrivka) on recent prior dates.[vi] ISW will continue to refine its control of terrain assessment as more information becomes available.

The Kremlin is intensifying its efforts to restrict Internet usage and set informational conditions to block Telegram in Russia. Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a law on February 20, requiring Russian cell operators to disconnect communications at the request of the Federal Security Service (FSB) in cases “established by regulatory legal acts of the President of the Russian Federation.”[vii] Russian opposition outlet Meduza noted on February 20 that the law allows the FSB to block communications in all of Russia or specific federal subjects without explanation.[viii] Meduza reported that the initial version of the bill specified that the FSB would only be granted these powers in cases of “emerging security threats,” but that legislators removed this language that could restrain the scope of Russian censorship by the bill’s second reading. Russian authorities have previously disconnected large swaths of Russia from the internet to suppress dissent under the pretext of national security.[ix] The Kremlin has been intensifying its efforts in recent weeks to restrict access to Telegram, WhatsApp, and other Western social media platforms, news sites, and internet services as part of broader efforts to regain control over the Russian information space and dismantle the open internet in Russia.[x] The Kremlin has been manufacturing justifications to ban Telegram in order to coerce Russian citizens to abandon other messaging apps for the state-controlled messenger app Max.[xi] The Kremlin may use its expanded powers to create an information blackout in the event of a possible mobilization or to further tighten state control over the Russian information space.

Russian authorities are likely setting information conditions to block Telegram in Russia by accusing the platform of being compromised by Ukrainian intelligence or endangering Russian operational security.  The FSB additionally claimed to Kremlin newswire TASS on February 21 that it possesses information showing that Ukrainian forces and intelligence are capable of rapidly obtaining data posted in Telegram and using this information “for military purposes,” and that Russian forces’ usage of Telegram has threatened the lives of Russian servicemembers within the past three months.[xii] The FSB’s statement comes against the backdrop of Russian authorities’ recent throttling of Telegram despite Russian forces’ widespread usage of the platform.[xiii] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and prominent Kremlin television propagandist Vladimir Solovyov published footage on February 21 of Russian servicemembers claiming that Russian forces use their own encrypted “military messenger” rather than Telegram for communications.[xiv] A Russian servicemember also claimed that Russian forces do not use Telegram as its dangerous and threatens the lives of Russian forces. A Russian milblogger claimed, however, that Russian forces only possess a military messenger “locally” and expressed skepticism of Russian authorities' claims about the military messenger’s supposed capabilities — consistent with other recent milblogger claims that Telegram outages are having negative effects on Russian command and control (C2).[xv] The milblogger noted that the FSB’s statement indicates that Russian authorities have already made a decision, presumably to block Telegram, and are leveraging Russian state media to shape public opinion against the messenger.[xvi] Another Russian milblogger claimed that the blocking of Telegram is an attempt by the Russian ruling class to suppress Telegram as it is a communications platform that the Russian authorities cannot control.[xvii] The milblogger also noted that a division is emerging in Russia between internet users who use the Russian-controlled internet and internet users who use VPNs and platforms that Russian authorities do not fully control for now. Russian milbloggers’ skeptical reaction to Russian officials’ statements denouncing Telegram demonstrates the extent to which Russian authorities have lost credibility regarding the blocking of Telegram among the milblogger community.

Ukrainian forces continued their long-range strike campaign against Russian defense industrial and energy assets on the night of February 20 to 21, including with Ukrainian-produced FP-5 Flamingo cruise missiles. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces conducted a FP-5 Flamingo missile strike against the Russian state-owned Votkinsk Machine Building Plant in Votkinsk, Udmurtia Republic (roughly 1230 kilometers from the international border).[xviii] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that the Votkinsk Plant produces Yars-series intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM), submarine-launched Bulava ballistic missiles (SLBM), 9M723-1 type Iskander-M ballistic missiles, and 9-S-7760 Kinzhal aeroballistic missiles. Russian opposition outlet Astra and a Ukrainian open-source intelligence project reported that the plant also produces Topol-M missile systems and Oreshnik intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBM).[xix] Geolocated footage published on February 20 shows smoke rising from the Votkinsk Plant.[xx] Udmurtia Republic Governor Aleksandr Brechalov acknowledged that Ukrainian drones struck and damaged an unspecified facility in Udmurtia.[xxi] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces also struck the Neftegorsk gas processing plant in Samara Oblast (roughly 850 kilometers from the international border), causing fires.[xxii] Ukrainian military outlet Militarnyi reported that the Neftegorsk gas processing plant processes associated petroleum gas and has an annual processing capacity of 0.7-0.75 billion cubic meters.[xxiii] Heat anomalies detected by the NASA FIRMS/VIIRS sensors indicate that there were fires at the Neftegorsk gas processing plant on February 21.[xxiv] Samara Oblast Governor Vyacheslav Fedorishchev acknowledged that Ukrainian drones struck two unspecified industrial sites in Samara Oblast.[xxv] Geolocated footage published on February 21 shows fires and smoke plumes at the Elektrovypriamitel-ZSP plant in Saransk, Mordovia Republic, after a reported explosion.[xxvi] It is unclear if the reported explosion was the result of a Ukrainian strike.

Ukrainian forces continued their mid-to-long-range strike campaign against Russian military assets in occupied Ukraine on the night of February 20 to 21. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces struck two Project 22460 Okhotnik border patrol vessels near occupied Inkerman, Crimea (roughly 237 kilometers from the frontline) and two Be-12 amphibious aircraft at the Yevpatoria aircraft repair plant in occupied Yevpatoria, Crimea (165 kilometers from the frontline).[xxvii] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces also struck a Russian Tornado multiple launch rocket system (MLRS) system near occupied Astrakhanka, Zaporizhia Oblast (roughly 61 kilometers from the frontline); a Russian materiel and technical depot in occupied Polohy, Zaporizhia Oblast (roughly ten kilometers from the frontline); a fuel and lubricants warehouse in occupied Donetsk City (roughly 45 kilometers from the frontline); and a Russian production and maintenance workshop near occupied Nova Karakuba, Donetsk Oblast (roughly 65 kilometers from the frontline).[xxviii] The Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) posted geolocated footage on February 21 showing Ukrainian forces striking a Russian 76th Airborne (VDV) Division drone operators’ concentration point in occupied Selydove, Donetsk Oblast (roughly 17 kilometers from the frontline).[xxix] ISW has observed a notable increase in Ukrainian mid-range strikes against Russian military assets in occupied Ukraine since December 2025, as Ukrainian forces undertake their own battlefield air interdiction (BAI) campaign to parallel Russia’s BAI campaign that enabled Russian advances in Fall 2025.[xxx]

Russia has been using Belarusian infrastructure to support Russian drone operations against Ukraine and incursions into NATO airspace. Pro-Ukrainian hacker groups announced on February 20 that the hackers conducted a six-month cyber operation using dozens of hacked Russian military personnel accounts to gain access to Russian drone monitoring systems.[xxxi] The hacker groups reported that Russian forces used civilian infrastructure in Belarus, including cellular towers, to lay out routes and provide stable signals for Russian drone strikes against targets in northern and western Ukraine, including energy and railway infrastructure. The hacker groups reported that Russian strikes overnight on September 9 to 10, 2025, during which Russian drones crossed into NATO airspace in Poland through Belarus, were actually a test of Belarusian civilian and cellular infrastructure for Russian drone strikes.[xxxii] The hacker groups noted that Russian forces used incursions into NATO airspace to plan strikes against logistics routes in both Ukraine and Poland to cut flows of Western military assistance to Ukraine. These operations are likely part of Russia's "Phase Zero" campaign, which it has been intensifying destabilize Europe and undermine NATO cohesion in preparation for a possible NATO-Russia war in the future.[xxxiii] ISW continues to assess that Russia has de facto annexed Belarus and that Belarus is a cobelligerent in Russia's war against Ukraine.[xxxiv]

Key Takeaways:

• Ukrainian forces continue to hold defensive lines and push back Russian advances in southern Ukraine.
• The Kremlin is intensifying its efforts to restrict Internet usage and set informational conditions to block Telegram in Russia.
• Ukrainian forces continued their long-range strike campaign against Russian defense industrial and energy assets on the night of February 20 to 21, including with Ukrainian-produced FP-5 Flamingo cruise missiles.
• Ukrainian forces continued their mid-to-long-range strike campaign against Russian military assets in occupied Ukraine on the night of February 20 to 21.
• Russia has been using Belarusian infrastructure to support Russian drone operations against Ukraine and incursions into NATO airspace.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Kupyansk, Novopavlivka, and Oleksandrivka.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.    

• Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
• Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis
• Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
• Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
• Significant Activity in Belarus

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

See topline text for reports of Ukrainian strikes within Russia.

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in Sumy Oblast along the international border)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Sumy Oblast on February 20 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked in Kursk and Sumy oblasts, including northeast of Sumy City near Yablunivka and Plekhovo, Kursk Oblast, and toward Myropillya and Nova Sich, on February 20 and 21.[xxxv]

A Russian milblogger reportedly affiliated with the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces claimed on February 21 that the Russian military command is redeploying elements of the Russian 80th Separate Arctic Motorized Rifle Brigade (14th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) from the Kherson direction to Kursk Oblast and that commanders are extorting money from servicemembers in exchange for service in rear-area roles.[xxxvi]

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border to create a defensible buffer zone with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on February 21 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked north of Kharkiv City toward Kozacha Lopan and northeast of Kharkiv City near Starytsia, Vovchansk, Vovchanski Khutory, Kruhle, Symynivka, Lyman, and Hrafske on February 20 and 21.[xxxvii]

Order of Battle: First-person view (FPV) drone operators of the Russian 1431st Motorized Rifle Regiment (11th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Velyki Prokhody (north of Kharkiv City).[xxxviii] Drone operators of the 71st Guards Motorized Rifle Division (14th AC, LMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Zakharivka (northeast of Kharkiv City).[xxxix] Elements of the Chechen Zapad-Akhmat Battalion, the Chechen Kurchaloyevsky Raion Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) Department, and the 128th Motorized Rifle Brigade (44th AC, LMD) are reportedly operating near Vovchanski Khutory.[xl]

A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces continued offensive operations northeast of Velykyi Burluk near Khatnie on February 20 and 21, but ISW has not collected any evidence to assess that Russian forces made any advances.[xli]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Oskil River (Russian objective: Cross the Oskil River in Kharkiv Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Kupyansk direction.

Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on February 20 and 21 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced in eastern Kurylivka (southeast of Kupyansk) and marginally advanced in central Kupyansk itself.[xlii]

Russian forces attacked near Kupyansk itself; east of Kupyansk near Petropavlivka; and southeast of Kupyansk near Kurylivka, Pishchane, and Novoosynove on February 20 and 21.[xliii]

A Russian milblogger reportedly affiliated with the Russian Western Grouping of Forces claimed on February 21 that Russian forces have made minimal advances in the Kupyansk direction and cannot consolidate positions due to constant Ukrainian fire on Russian forward positions.[xliv] The milblogger claimed that Russian forces are attempting to infiltrate near Radkivka and Kindrashivka (both north of Kupyansk) but are not having success.

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 288th Artillery Brigade (1st Guards Tank Army [GTA], Moscow Military District [MMD]) are striking Ukrainian forces in and around Kurylivka.[xlv] First-person view (FPV) drone operators of the 122nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (68th Motorized Rifle Division, 6th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) are striking Ukrainian forces in Kupyansk.[xlvi]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Borova direction on February 21 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on February 21 that Russian forces seized Karpivka (southeast of Borova).[xlvii]

Russian forces attacked southeast of Borova near Hrekivka on February 21.[xlviii] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Korovii Yar (south of Borova).[xlix]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Slovyansk direction on February 21 but did not advance.

Assessed Russian infiltrations: Geolocated footage published on February 20 shows Ukrainian forces striking Russian forces northwest of Svyato-Pokrovske (east of Slovyansk) during what ISW assesses was a Russian infiltration mission that did not change the control of terrain or the forward edge of the battle area (FEBA) at this time.[l]

Russian forces attacked within and near Lyman itself; northwest of Lyman near Sosnove, Yarova, and Novoselivka; north of Lyman near Stavky, Ridkodub, and Drobysheve; east of Lyman near Zarichne and Maslyakivka; southeast of Lyman near Yampil; and south of Lyman toward Brusivka and Staryi Karavan; north of Slovyansk near Svyatohirsk; northeast of Slovyansk near Dronivka and Zakitne; east of Slovyansk near Platonivka, Riznykivka, and Kryva Luka and toward Rai-Oleksandrivka; and southeast of Slovyansk near Nykyforivka and toward Fedorivka Druha on February 20 and 21.[li] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Drobysheve and Novoselivka.[lii]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian Smuglyanka Detachment and the Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies are reportedly coordinating unguided aerial bomb strikes near Mykolaivka (east of Slovyansk).[liii]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area on February 21 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces seized Pryvillya and advanced northwest of Minkivka, into Holubivka, and near Orikhovo-Vasylivka (all northeast of Kostyantynivka).[liv]

Russian forces attacked near Kostyantynivka itself; northeast of Kostyantynivka near Pryvillya, Minkivka, and Holubivka; southeast of Kostyantynivka near Shcherbynivka and Ivanopillya; south of Kostyantynivka near Pleshchiivka, Illinivka, and Berestok; southwest of Kostyantynivka near Stepanivka; south of Druzhkivka near Rusyn Yar; and southwest of Druzhkivka near Novopavlivka and Sofiivka on February 20 and 21.[lv]

A Ukrainian battalion commander operating in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area reported on February 21 that Russian forces are attempting to use SIM cards recovered from intercepted Ukrainian drones to access the internet after the recent block on Russian forces’ access to Starlink.[lvi] The commander reported that Russian forces have begun to operate hexacopter heavy bomber drones in the area, which Ukrainian drone operators are focusing on intercepting.

Order of Battle: First-person view (FPV) drone operators of the Russian 68th Separate Reconnaissance Battalion of the 20th Motorized Rifle Division (8th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Mykolaipillya (south of Druzhkivka).[lvii]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Dobropillya tactical area on February 21 but did not make confirmed advances.

Assessed Russian infiltrations: Geolocated footage published on February 20 shows three Russian servicemembers operating in northwestern Toretske (east of Dobropillya) after what ISW assesses was a Russian infiltration mission that did not change the forward edge of the battle area (FEBA) at this time.[lviii]

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced south of Kucheriv Yar (northeast of Dobropillya) and west of Sofiivka (southwest of Druzhkivka).[lix]

Russian forces attacked east of Dobropillya near Toretske and Shakhove and toward Kucheriv Yar on February 20 and 21.[lx] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Kucheriv Yar and Novyi Donbas, Toretske, and Vilne (all east of Dobropillya).[lxi]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 33rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (20th Motorized Rifle Division) are operating in the Dobropillya direction, including in and around Toretske.[lxii] Grad multiple launch rocket system (MLRS) artillery elements of the 40th Separate Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet) are reportedly operating in the Dobropillya direction.[lxiii]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction on February 21 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced in central Hryshyne (northwest of Pokrovsk).[lxiv]

Russian forces attacked near Pokrovsk itself; northwest of Pokrovsk toward Novooleksandrivka; north of Pokrovsk near Rodynske and Bilytske; northeast of Pokrovsk near Chervonyi (Krasnyi) Lyman; east of Pokrovsk near Myrnohrad; southwest of Pokrovsk near Kotlyne, Udachne, and Molodetske; and west of Pokrovsk toward Serhiivka on February 20 and 21.[lxv] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Kotlyne.[lxvi]

A Ukrainian brigade operating in the Pokrovsk direction reported that Russian forces are attempting to push Ukrainian forces from positions in northern Myrnohrad and on its outskirts.[lxvii] The brigade reported that Russian forces continue to use small-group infiltration tactics on light vehicles, including motorcycles and buggies, to advance in depth into Ukrainian defenses. The brigade reported that Russian forces are attempting to install antennas and signal amplifiers in central Myrnohrad to bolster drone operations. ISW previously assessed that Russian forces seized Myrnohrad on a prior date.[lxviii] 

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian Smuglyanka Detachment and Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies are reportedly coordinating glide bomb strikes against Ukrainian forces near Myrne (northwest of Pokrovsk).[lxix] First-person view (FPV) drone operators of the 56th Separate Spetsnaz Battalion (51st CAA, formerly 1st Donetsk People’s Republic [DNR] AC, SMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Shevchenko (northwest of Pokrovsk).[lxx]

Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Novopavlivka direction.

See topline text for assessed Ukrainian advances in the Novopavlivka direction.

Russian forces attacked toward Novopavlivka itself and northeast of Novopavlivka near Novomykolaivka and Muravka on February 20 and 21.[lxxi]

Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Oleksandrivka direction.

See topline text for assessed Ukrainian advances in the Oleksandrivka direction.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced east of Ivanivka (northeast of Oleksandrivka).[lxxii]

Russian forces attacked southeast of Oleksandrivka near Zaporizke and Stepove on February 20 and 21.[lxxiii] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Hai and Novooleksandrivka (both southeast of Oleksandrivka).[lxxiv]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Hulyaipole direction on February 21 but did not make confirmed advances.

Assessed Russian infiltrations: Geolocated footage published on February 21 shows Russian servicemembers operating in eastern Pryluky (northwest of Hulyaipole) and in the eastern outskirts of Dobropillya (north of Hulyaipole) what ISW assesses were Russian infiltration missions that did not change the control of terrain or the forward edge of the battle area (FEBA) at this time.[lxxv]

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced toward the Rizdvyanka-Vozdvyzhivka-Verkhnya Tersa line (northwest of Hulyaipole).[lxxvi]

Russian forces attacked near Hulyaipole itself; northwest of Hulyaipole near Ternuvate and toward Dobropillya, Varvarivka, Zelene, Svyatopetrivka, Verkhnya Tersa, Rizdvyanka, Vozdvyzhivka, and Olenokostyantynivka; and west of Hulyaipole toward Staroukrainka, Zaliznychne, and Hirke on February 20 and 21.[lxxvii] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Vozdvyzhivka.[lxxviii]

A Russian milblogger rejected recent reports of Ukrainian advances in Zaporizhia Oblast.[lxxix]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 37th Motorized Rifle Brigade (36th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Eastern Military District [EMD]) and 14th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff's Main Directorate [GRU]) reportedly continue to operate in the Hulyaipole direction.[lxxx]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on February 21 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked east of Orikhiv near Zahirne and toward Hulyaipilske; west of Orikhiv near Prymorske, Stepnohirsk, Mali Shcherbaky, and Stepove; and northwest of Orikhiv toward Mahdalynivka on February 20 and 21.[lxxxi]

Order of Battle: Molniya fixed-wing first-person view (FPV) drone operators of the 71st Motorized Rifle Regiment (42nd Motorized Rifle Division, 58th CAA, Southern Military District [SMD]) are striking Ukrainian forces in eastern Orikhiv.[lxxxii] Drone operators of the 1251st and 70th motorized rifle regiments (both of the 42nd Motorized Rifle Division) are striking Ukrainian positions north of Mala Tokmachka (southeast of Orikhiv).[lxxxiii] Elements of the 7th Airborne (VDV) Division reportedly continue to operate in the Zaporizhia direction.[lxxxiv]

Russian forces continued limited ground assaults northeast of Kherson City toward the Antonivskyi Bridge on February 20 and 21.[lxxxv]

Order of Battle: Molniya-2 fixed-wing first-person view (FPV) drone operators of the Russian 80th Arctic Motorized Rifle Brigade (14th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) and artillery elements and drone operators of the 217th VDV Regiment (98th VDV Division) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces in the Kherson direction.[lxxxvi]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Russian forces conducted a combined drone and ballistic missile strike against Ukraine overnight on February 20 to 21. The Ukrainian Air Force reported on February 21 that Russian forces launched one Iskander-M ballistic missile from Voronezh Oblast and 120 Shahed-type, Gerbera-type, Italmas-type, and other strike drones, of which about 80 were Shaheds, from the directions of Bryansk, Kursk, and Oryol cities; Shatalovo, Smolensk Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; and occupied Hvardiiske, Crimea.[lxxxvii] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 108 Russian drones in northern, southern, and eastern Ukraine. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that the Russian Iskander-M missile and 13 drones struck 11 locations, and drone fragments fell on eight locations. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces struck an energy facility, residential areas, and a warehouse in Odesa City and residential infrastructure in Zaporizhzhia and Kharkiv cities.[lxxxviii]

Ukrainian Center for Countering Disinformation Head Lieutenant Andriy Kovalenko, who frequently reports on Russian and Ukrainian strike campaigns, warned on February 20 that Russian forces may be preparing for intensified strikes against Ukrainian infrastructure.[lxxxix]

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

See topline text.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media, as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.