Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, February 2, 2026

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

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Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

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Russian Security Council Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev used a three-way interview with Western and Russian newswires and an ultranationalist milblogger to reaffirm that Russia’s demands for Ukraine "remain unchanged" and to reject security guarantees for Ukraine. Medvedev gave an interview on February 1 to Reuters, Kremlin newswire TASS, and pro-war Russian milblogger and head of the WarGonzo social media military project Semyon Pegov.[1] Medvedev stated that Russian demands for ending the war in Ukraine "remain unchanged" and that Russian President Vladimir Putin voiced these conditions during his June 2024 speech to the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA). Medvedev also stated that Putin relayed these conditions to the United States at the August 2025 US-Russia Alaska Summit. Putin demanded in his June 2024 speech that Ukraine and NATO capitulate to Russia’s original war demands and cede the illegally annexed Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts — including unoccupied areas of these regions.[2] Russia's original war demands include Ukraine’s neutrality (the Kremlin's ability to dictate Ukraine’s international alignment), demilitarization (reductions in the Ukrainian military such that Ukraine cannot defend itself), and denazification (the replacement of the current Ukrainian government with a pro-Russian puppet government). Medvedev also stated that Russia considers the “dismantling” of the Ukrainian government to be an “extremely important task” and that the current Ukrainian government “must disappear.” Medvedev questioned the legitimacy of the current Ukrainian government and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky. Kremlin officials have repeatedly exploited the lack of clarity about the outcome of the 2025 Alaska Summit, including by claiming that the United States and Russia agreed to principles based on Putin’s June 2024 MFA speech during the summit.[3]

Medvedev explicitly rejected proposals from the British and French-led Coalition of the Willing to station foreign troops on Ukrainian territory as part of postwar security guarantees for Ukraine.[4] Medvedev recalled that Putin, Medvedev, and Lavrov have all publicly stated that Russia does not accept such proposals and would consider troops from NATO countries as “legitimate targets.” Medvedev also demanded that Russia receive security guarantees. The Kremlin originally demanded "security guarantees" in its December 2021 ultimatums to the United States and NATO, which amounted to the destruction of the current NATO alliance by calling for halting the deployment of forces or weapons systems to member states that joined NATO after 1997.[5] Medvedev likely deliberately participated in the three-way interview with Reuters, TASS, and Pegov in an effort to disseminate Russia's demands across Russian domestic and ultranationalist audiences, English-speaking outlets, and international media.

Medvedev continued to use nuclear carrots and sticks, likely in an attempt to distract attention from and secure concessions during US-led peace negotiations on Ukraine. Medvedev stated in the interview that Russia's proposal to extend the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START), which expires on February 5, remains on the table for the United States to agree to.[6] Putin previously offered to adhere to the terms of New START for another year upon its expiration, but only if the United States does the same.[7] Medvedev claimed in the interview that the risk of a global conflict is high and that the "Doomsday Clock" is moving forward. Medvedev referenced Russia’s updated nuclear doctrine, stating that “no one should have any doubts” about Russia’s willingness to use nuclear weapons if the fate of Russia is at stake. Medvedev’s mix of thinly veiled nuclear threats and comments offering to engage the United States on nuclear arms treaties aims to use issues unrelated to Russia’s war in Ukraine to push the United States into giving in to Russia’s demands on Ukraine — as ISW has long assessed.[8]

Medvedev implicitly threatened and accused Finland of dismantling Russian-Finnish relations. Medvedev claimed that Finland “wiped” out the positive Russian-Finnish relations that emerged after the Soviet Union collapsed. Medvedev issued a subtle threat, claiming that Finland has forgotten how the Soviet Union “crushed” Finland when it was a Nazi ally and that Finland should not joke about its relations with Russia as the 20th-century conflicts were not in Finland’s “favor.” Medvedev referenced Finland’s historical ties to the Soviet Union and Russia, claiming that Finland should “thank” Vladimir Lenin — likely referring to Lenin’s 1917 recognition of Finland’s independence. Putin and other Russian officials have previously threatened Finland, including by using language that mirrors Russia’s justifications for its invasion of Ukraine to Finland.[9] Russian officials’ narratives about Finland have long invoked historic Finnish-Russian ties and Finland’s history as a Nazi ally during the Second World War.[10] These threats come as Russia is expanding its military infrastructure along its border with Finland, likely as part of wider military expansion efforts that seek to prepare Russia for potential future conflict with NATO.[11] ISW continues to assess that Russia remains unlikely to conduct a full-scale invasion of Finland at this time and that Medvedev's statements are likely part of the Kremlin's long-term cognitive warfare campaign to create justifications for a possible conflict with NATO in the future.

Medvedev subtly threatened Russians who do not support Russia's war efforts in Ukraine and possibly against NATO. Medvedev responded to a question from TASS by claiming that Western states, particularly those in Europe, are Russia’s enemies who want to defeat and destroy Russia.[12] Medvedev directly compared the ongoing war against Ukraine to the Second World War, claiming that Russia, like the Soviet Union, is defending the state and the Russian people. Medvedev further claimed that those in Russia who are indifferent to Russian soldiers on the front, who are unwilling to help their own state, and who “lack basic patriotism” are Russia’s “internal enemies.” The Kremlin has often used the mythos of the Second World War to glorify the Russian military and unify the Russian people around the ongoing war effort in Ukraine.[13] Medvedev's statements about external enemies and the Second World War aim to justify to the Russian population the sacrifices the Kremlin has been demanding of them and the need to maintain a war footing for the protracted war in Ukraine or even a possible conflict with NATO in the future. Medvedev’s statements about internal enemies likely aim to threaten those Russians who either oppose the war or the Kremlin itself, and to evoke memories of the Soviet-era “enemies of the people” to set a behavioral standard the Kremlin expects all Russians to adhere to. ISW continues to assess that the Kremlin is transforming Russia into a Soviet-style police state, likely in preparation for expected anti-war sentiment in the Russian population, and continued Kremlin discussion about alleged internal enemies aim to justify these increased repressions.[14][15]

Russian forces continue efforts to seize Lyman and subsequently launch an offensive on Slovyansk, but likely do not have the offensive capability to do so in the short-term, in part due to Ukrainian counterattacks in the Kupyansk direction. Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported on February 2 that the main objective of the Russian Western Grouping of Forces in the Lyman direction is to reach the Slovyansk-Kramatorsk agglomeration from the northeast, and that the Russian military command hopes to begin this offensive in May or June 2026.[16] Mashovets reported that Russian forces - namely elements of the 20th Combined Arms Army (CAA, Moscow Military District [MMD]), 25th CAA (Central Military District [CMD]), and the 2nd Motorized Rifle Division (1st Guards Tank Army [GTA], MMD) -- must first seize Lyman and push Ukrainian forces from the north (left) bank of the Siverskyi Donets River in the area. Mashovets assessed that the Russian military command aims to do so by mid-to-late Spring 2026. Mashovets stated that the current Russian offensive operations, including attacks with elements of the 25th CAA from the northwest and with elements of the 20th CAA from the east and northeast, aim to establish favorable positions for a future effort to envelop Lyman.

Russian forces remain unlikely to meet their Spring 2026 deadlines for the Slovyansk direction without receiving additional reinforcements or deprioritizing the Kupyansk offensive. Russian forces first reached Lyman in November 2025 following intensified offensive operations in the area, but have been unable to build on these successes and make tactically significant advances near or within Lyman itself in the following months.[17] The 20th CAA has been operating in the Lyman direction since at least September 2022, and the 25th CAA has been in the area since October 2023.[18] ISW observed reports of elements of the 2nd Motorized Rifle Division operating in the Lyman direction since at least April 2025.[19] These forces are likely degraded and unlikely to achieve the Russian military command's reported timeline without significant reinforcement. Mashovets stated that the Russian Western Grouping of Forces is unlikely to be able to use its reserves in the Lyman area, as Russian forces are currently using all available reserves in the Kupyansk direction. Mashovets assessed that the Russian military command may have to redeploy elements of the 2nd Motorized Rifle Division to the Kupyansk direction in the future — presumably to defend against the ongoing Ukrainian counterattacks that have successfully liberated most of Kupyansk and the surrounding areas. Mashovets noted that the reserves of the Western Grouping of Forces have deployed to the Kupyansk direction to defend against these counterattacks, leaving them unavailable to bolster offensive operations in the Lyman direction.[20]

ISW continues to assess that Russian forces are at least several months away from being able to begin a ground offensive against Ukraine’s Fortress Belt from the north or east. Russian forces would need to complete the seizure of Lyman and advance 14 kilometers from Lyman to Slovyansk (including crossing the Siverskyi Donets River) or would need to traverse 30 kilometers from Siversk (east of Slovyansk) to Slovyansk.[21] Elements of the Russian 3rd CAA (formerly 2nd Luhansk People's Republic Army Corps [LNR AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) operating in the Siversk direction may launch a direct offensive against Slovyansk from the east should they make the requisite advances before the 20th and 25th CAAs can seize Lyman and reach the Siverskyi Donets River. Russian forces in the Lyman direction have been attempting to use Russia’s new offensive campaign design, which consists of an initial monthslong effort to degrade Ukrainian defenses and logistics to forward positions ahead of ground operations.[22] Russian forces were able to employ this new campaign design to make relatively quicker advances in the Pokrovsk and Hulyaipole directions, but the slow rate of Russian advances near and within Lyman suggests that Russian forces have so far not been able to completely degrade Ukrainian defenses in the area.[23] Russian forces would likely have to dedicate significant resources, including infantry and drone operators, to the Lyman direction in order to achieve their desired rate of advance, but this would come at the expense of other areas in the theater, such as offensive operations to complete the seizure of Pokrovsk or defensive operations in the Kupyansk direction.[24] The Kremlin has been attempting for months to convince the West that Russia’s seizure of the Fortress Belt will be easy and swift, but ISW continues to assess that these efforts — either from the south from the Kostyantynivka direction or from the north from the Lyman direction — could take years.[25][26]

The Ukrainian government is working with SpaceX to prohibit all non-registered Starlink satellite terminals from operating in Ukraine as part of joint efforts to counter Russia’s use of Starlink to operate drones in Ukraine. Ukrainian Defense Minister Mykhailo Fedorov reported on February 2 that the Ukrainian government adopted a resolution to only allow officially registered and verified Starlink terminals to operate in Ukraine and to disconnect all other terminals.[27] Fedorov stated that Russian drones equipped with Starlink terminals fly at low altitudes, are resistant to Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW), and are controllable in real time at long distances. Fedorov noted that the Ukrainian military will register their Starlink terminals and that measures allowing only authorized Starlink terminals to operate in Ukraine will deprive Russian forces of technological advantages and safeguard Ukraine’s energy infrastructure. Fedorov did not provide an estimated timeframe on how long individual Ukrainians will have to register and verify their private Starlink terminals. The Ukrainian government has been working recently with SpaceX CEO Elon Musk to counter Russia’s use of Starlink.[28]

Belarus continues to increase the frequency of its balloon incursions into Polish airspace. The Polish Armed Forces Operational Command reported that Polish radar systems recorded the incursion of “balloon-like objects” into Polish airspace on the night of February 1 to 2.[29] The Polish Armed Forces Operational Command noted that there were fewer balloon violations than on previous nights. Belarus has launched balloon-like objects into Polish airspace four times in five days (since January 27).[30] ISW continues to assess that Russia has de facto annexed Belarus and that Russia is likely using airspace incursions into NATO states like Lithuania and Poland from Belarus as part of its “Phase Zero” effort — the informational and psychological condition-setting phase — to prepare for a possible NATO-Russia war in the future.[31]

Key Takeaways:

• Russian Security Council Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev used a three-way interview with Western and Russian newswires and an ultranationalist milblogger to reaffirm that Russia’s demands for Ukraine "remain unchanged" and to reject security guarantees for Ukraine.
• Medvedev continued to use nuclear carrots and sticks, likely in an attempt to distract attention from and secure concessions during US-led peace negotiations on Ukraine.
• Medvedev implicitly threatened and accused Finland of dismantling Russian-Finnish relations.
• Medvedev subtly threatened Russians who do not support Russia's war efforts in Ukraine and possibly against NATO.
• Russian forces continue efforts to seize Lyman and subsequently launch an offensive on Slovyansk, but likely do not have the offensive capability to do so in the short-term, in part due to Ukrainian counterattacks in the Kupyansk direction.
• ISW continues to assess that Russian forces are at least several months away from being able to begin a ground offensive against Ukraine’s Fortress Belt from the north or east.
• The Ukrainian government is working with SpaceX to prohibit all non-registered Starlink satellite terminals from operating in Ukraine as part of joint efforts to counter Russia’s use of Starlink to operate drones in Ukraine.
• Belarus continues to increase the frequency of its balloon incursions into Polish airspace.
• Russian forces recently advanced in northern Kharkiv Oblast, the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area, and near Kupyansk, Pokrovsk, and Hulyaipole.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

• Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
• Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis
• Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
• Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
• Significant Activity in Belarus

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Nothing significant to report.

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in Sumy Oblast along the international border)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Sumy Oblast on February 2 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced in Pokrovka and northeast of Lukashivka (both southeast of Sumy City near the international border).[32] ISW continues to assess that Russian cross-border attacks in previously dormant frontline areas in northern Ukraine are part of a cognitive warfare campaign that aims to convince the West that the frontlines in Ukraine are collapsing.[33]

Russian forces attacked in Sumy and Kursk oblasts, including north of Sumy City near Andriivka, Oleksiivka, and Yablunivka; and northeast of Sumy City near Yunakivka on February 2.[34]

A Russian milblogger reportedly affiliated with the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces claimed on February 1 that over 200 personnel of the Russian 22nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (72nd Motorized Rifle Division, 44th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) have died in the past three weeks (since roughly January 12) during Russian attempts to seize Ryzhivka (northeast of Sumy City near the international border).[35] The milblogger claimed that elements of the 22nd Motorized Rifle Regiment complained that the Russian military command ordered soldiers to leave wounded on the battlefield.[36]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces in Sumy and Kharkiv oblasts.[37]

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border to create a defensible buffer zone with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Russian forces recently marginally advanced in northern Kharkiv Oblast.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on February 1 indicates that Russian forces recently marginally advanced in southern Vovchansk (northeast of Kharkiv City).[38]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk, Prylipka, Starytsya, Hrafske, Vovchanski Khutory, Symynivka, Vilcha, and Lyman on February 1 and 2.[39]

A Russian milblogger reportedly affiliated with the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces claimed on February 2 that the Russian military command replaced the commander of the Russian 128th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (44th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]), Aleksandr Mikhaylov, after 98 days in command of the brigade.[40] The milblogger speculated that, despite Mikhaylov’s poor performance as brigade commander, the Russian military command may promote Mikhaylov to corps command. The milblogger claimed that the Russian military command had previously appointed Mikhaylov to command the 128th Motorized Rifle Brigade in October 2025 despite the 1427th Motorized Rifle Regiment’s (11th AC, LMD) suffering heavy casualties under Mikhaylov’s command near Tetkino (southwest of Glushkovo in Kursk Oblast). The milblogger claimed that both the 1427th Motorized Rifle Regiment and 128th Motorized Rifle Brigade have lost combat effectiveness under Mikhaylov’s command and require restoration.

Order of Battle: The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) credited elements of the Russian 9th Motorized Rifle Regiment (18th Motorized Rifle Division, 11th AC) with the claimed seizure of Zelene (northeast of Kharkiv City).[41] Drone operators of the Chechen Akhmat Spetsnaz Vakha Battalion and the Russian 11th Tank Brigade (25th CAA, Central Military District [CMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Hraniv, Tsupivka, and Kozacha Lopan (all north of Kharkiv City).[42]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Velykyi Burluk direction on February 2 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced east of Kolodyazne (southeast of Velykyi Burluk).[43]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Velykyi Burluk near Khatnie and southeast of Velykyi Burluk near Dvorichanske on February 1 and 2.[44]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Oskil River (Russian objective: Cross the Oskil River in Kharkiv Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces recently advanced in the Kupyansk direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on February 2 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced northeast of Pishchane (southeast of Kupyansk).[45]

Assessed Russian infiltrations: Geolocated footage published on February 1 shows Ukrainian forces striking Russian positions in central Kupyansk after what ISW assesses was a Russian infiltration mission that did not change control of terrain or the forward edge of battle area (FEBA) at this time.[46] ISW cannot verify the likely route that Russian forces took in central Kupyansk.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces seized Pishchane and advanced southwest of Stepova Novoselivka.[47]

Russian forces attacked near and within Kupyansk itself; north of Kupyansk near Kutkivka; east of Kupyansk near Petropavlivka and toward Podoly and Kucherivka; and southeast of Kupyansk near Pishchane and toward Kurylivka on February 1 and 2.[48]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Borova direction on February 2 but did not advance.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced east of Korovii Yar (south of Borova).[49]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Borova near Zahryzove; east of Borova toward Novoserhiivka; and south of Borova near Korovii Yar, Vovchyi Yar, Serednie, and Oleksandrivka on February 1 and 2.[50]

Order of Battle: Knyaz Vandal Novgorodsky (KVN) fiber optic drone operators of the Russian 148th Separate Reconnaissance Battalion (144th Motorized Rifle Division, 20th Combined Army [CAA], Moscow Military District [MMD]) are striking Ukrainian positions in central Pisky-Radkivski (south of Borova).[51]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Slovyansk direction on February 2 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces seized Nykyforivka (southeast of Slovyansk).[52] Another milblogger claimed that Russian forces only advanced in southern Nykyforivka, however.[53] The milblogger claimed that Russian forces also advanced west of Bondarne (southeast of Slovyansk) and along the Lyman-Zarichne (northeast of Lyman) road.[54]

Russian forces attacked northwest of Lyman near Svyatohirsk, Yarova, and Novoselivka; north of Lyman near Drobysheve; northeast of Lyman near Zarichne and toward Stavky; northeast of Slovyansk near Dronivka; east of Slovyansk near Platonivka, Svyato-Pokrovske, and Riznykivka; and southeast of Slovyansk near Bondarne and toward Dibrova and Rai-Oleksandrivka on February 1 and 2.[55]

A pilot of a Ukrainian drone crew operating in the Slovyansk direction reported on February 2 that Russian forces continue attempts to advance in order to interdict the M-03 Slovyansk-Izyum highway.[56] The Ukrainian drone operator reported that Russian forces continue infiltration tactics in teams of two to three personnel, attacking both on foot and using light motorized vehicles, including motorcycles, all-terrain vehicles (ATVs), and even inflatable boats in water features. The Ukrainian drone operator noted that Russian forces are regularly attempting to cross the Siverskyi Donets River. The Ukrainian drone operator noted that Russian forces have not completely interdicted Ukrainian logistics in the Slovyansk direction.

Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported that elements of the Russian 252nd and 752nd motorized rifle regiments and 237th Tank Regiment (all of the 3rd Motorized Rifle Division, 20th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Moscow Military District [MMD]) are conducting an active defense along the Karpivka-Hrekivka line (southeast of Borova and northwest of Lyman) to cover the left flank of the Russian forces fighting in the Lyman direction.[57]

Order of Battle: Mashovets reported that elements of the Russian 144th Motorized Rifle Division (20th CAA) are fighting for Drobysheve and that elements of the 362nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (3rd Motorized Rifle Division) are fighting in the Kolodyazi-Stavky (north of Lyman) area.[58] Mashovets reported that elements of the 37th and 1234th motorized rifle regiments (both of the 67th Motorized Rifle Division, 25th CAA, Central Military District [CMD]) are fighting west of Zarichne and on the southeastern outskirts of Lyman and that elements of the 164th Motorized Rifle Brigade and 11th Tank Brigade (both 25th CAA) are fighting near Ozerne (southeast of Lyman) and Dibrova.[59] Elements of the 7th Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd CAA, formerly 2nd Luhansk People's Republic Army Corps [LNR AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) reportedly continue to operate in the Siversk-Zakitne area.[60] First-person view (FPV) drone operators of the 16th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff's Main Directorate [GRU]) are reportedly operating in the Lyman direction.[61]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area.

Assessed Russian advance: Geolocated footage published on February 2 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced southwest of Novomarkove (northeast of Kostyantynivka).[62]

Assessed Russian infiltrations: Geolocated footage published on February 1 shows Ukrainian forces striking Russian servicemembers on a rural road east of Kostyantynivka after what ISW assesses was a Russian infiltration mission that did not change control of terrain or the forward edge of the battle area (FEBA) at this time.[63]

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced south of Kostyantynivka.[64]

Russian forces attacked near and within Kostyantynivka itself; north of Kostyantynivka near Virolyubivka and Maiske; northeast of Kostyantynivka near Pryvillya, Holubivka, Minkivka, Markove, and Novomarkove; south of Kostyantynivka near Pleshchiivka, Shcherbynivka, Kleban-Byk, and Ivanopillya; southwest of Kostyantynivka near Illinivka and Yablunivka and toward Stepanivka; south of Druzhkivka near Rusyn Yar; and southwest of Druzhkivka near Pavlivka, Novopavlivka, and Sofiivka on February 1 and 2.[65]

Ukrainian 11th Army Corps (AC) Spokesperson Lieutenant Colonel Dmytro Zaporozhets reported on February 1 that Russian forces have increased the intensity of artillery, drones, and tactical aviation strikes in the Slovyansk and Kramatorsk direction in the last week, likely in preparation to conduct armored assaults in the near future.[66]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Roy Svarog Detachment of the Russian 27th Artillery Regiment (6th Motorized Rifle Division, 3rd AC, under operational control of the Southern Grouping of Forces) are striking Ukrainian forces in eastern Kostyantynivka.[67] Drone operators and artillery elements of the 10th Tank Regiment (20th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA, SMD) are striking Ukrainian forces in and around Berestok (south of Kostyantynivka).[68] Drone operators of the Smuglyanka Detachment and the Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies are reportedly coordinating glide bomb strikes against Ukrainian forces near Oleksiyevo-Druzhkivka (southeast of Druzhkivka).[69] Drone operators of the 72nd Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd AC, under operational control of the Southern Grouping of Forces) are reportedly operating in the Kostyantynivka direction.[70]

Russian forces continued offensive operations east of Dobropillya near Vilne, Novyi Donbas, and Toretske on February 1 and 2 but did not advance.[71]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Pokrovsk direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on February 1 and 2 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced east of Hryshyne (northwest of Pokrovsk) and northwest of Rodynske (north of Pokrovsk).[72]

Russian forces attacked near Pokrovsk itself; north of Pokrovsk near Rodynske and toward Bilytske; northeast of Pokrovsk near Zatyshok and Dorozhnie; east of Pokrovsk near Myrnohrad; southwest of Pokrovsk near Kotlyne, Udachne, Molodetske, and Novopidhorodne; west of Pokrovsk toward Novooleksandrivka and Serhiivka; and northwest of Pokrovsk toward Shevchenko on February 1 and 2.[73]

A spokesperson of the Ukrainian 7th Rapid Reaction Corps of the Air Assault Forces stated on February 1 that Ukrainian forces control northern Myrnohrad and that Russian forces are concentrating personnel in the southern part of the settlement to attack northward.[74] The spokesperson stated that Ukrainian forces control Hryshyne and that Ukrainian forces maintain a presence within and north of Pokrovsk and north of Myrnohrad. The spokesperson stated that both Ukrainian and Russian forces maintain positions north of the Donetska railway and that both sides' positions are interspersed within Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad. The spokesperson noted that the Russian infantry is struggling to withstand the cold temperatures as they attack into unequipped positions in open fields. A spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Pokrovsk direction reported on February 2 that Russian forces are trying to infiltrate into Myrnohrad, including occasionally with vehicles, and are attempting to sever Ukrainian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) in the settlement.[75]

Russian forces continued offensive operations near Novopavlivka itself and south of Novopavlivka near Dachne and Filiya on February 1 and 2, but did not advance.[76]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Oleksandrivka direction on February 2 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked southeast of Oleksandrivka near Verbove and Vyshneve on February 1 and 2.[77]

Order of Battle: Molniya fixed-wing drone operators of the Russian Rubikon Center for Advanced Technologies are striking Ukrainian forces in Orly (northwest of Oleksandrivka).[78] Bombers of the 11th Air Force and Air Defense Army (Russian Aerospace Forces [VKS] and Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces in the Vremivka (Oleksandrivka) direction.[79]

Ukrainian forces continued their mid-range strike campaign against Russian military assets in occupied Donetsk on the night of February 1 to 2. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian regimental and a divisional level command post and an ammunition depot near occupied Kurakhivka (roughly 35 kilometers from the frontline).[80]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)

Russian forces recently advanced and infiltrated in the Hulyaipole direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on February 1 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced into southern Olenokostyantynivka (northwest of Hulyaipole).[81]

Assessed Russian infiltrations: Geolocated footage published on February 2 shows two Russian servicemembers raising flags in Prydorozhnie (northwest of Hulyaipole) during what ISW assesses was a Russian infiltration mission that did not change the control of terrain or the forward edge of the battle area (FEBA) at this time.[82]

Unconfirmed claims: The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that elements of the Russian 36th Motorized Rifle Brigade (29th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Eastern Military District [EMD]) seized Prydorozhnie.[83] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced west of Pryluky (north of Hulyaipole).[84]

Russian forces attacked near Hulyaipole itself; northwest of Hulyaipole near Svyatopetrivka and Zelene; north of Hulyaipole near Dobropillya, Pryluky, Ostapivske, and Varvarivka; south of Hulyaipole near Dorozhnyanka; and west of Hulyaipole near Zaliznychne and toward Staroukrainka on February 1 and 2.[85] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Pryluky, Olenokostyantynivka, Svyatopetrivka.[86]

Ukrainian forces continued their strike campaign against Russian military assets near the frontline on the night of February 1 to 2. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces struck Russian drone control points near Uspenivka (northeast of Hulyaipole) and Hulyaipole.[87]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on February 2 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northwest of Orikhiv near Richne, Novoyakovlivka, Lukyanivske, and toward Prymorske on February 2.[88]

A Russian milblogger claimed that Mala Tokmachka (southeast of Orikhiv) remains a contested gray zone and that Ukrainian forces continue to operate in the settlement.[89]

Order of Battle: Tank crews and other elements of the Russian 7th Airborne (VDV) Division are reportedly operating in the Zaporizhia direction.[90] Drone operators of the 4th Military Base (58th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating in the Orikhiv direction.[91]

Neither Ukrainian nor Russian sources reported ground activity in the Kherson direction on February 1 or 2.

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 98th VDV Division, including its 331st VDV Regiment, are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces in the Kherson direction, including near Kherson City.[92]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Russian forces conducted a series of drone and missile strikes against Ukraine overnight on February 1 to February 2. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched one Iskander-M ballistic missile from occupied Crimea and 171 Shahed-type, Gerbera-type, and other drones — of which about 100 were Shaheds — from the directions of Oryol and Kursk cities; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; and occupied Donetsk City.[93] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 157 strike drones and that the Iskander missile and 12 drones struck 8 locations. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces struck residential, civilian, and industrial infrastructure in Chernihiv, Cherkasy, Dnipropetrovsk, Kharkiv, Kyiv, Sumy, and Zaporizhia oblasts.[94]

Ukraine's Ministry of Community and Territorial Development reported on February 2 that Russian forces struck a diesel train at a station in Zaporizhia Oblast.[95] ISW continues to assess that Russian forces are striking Ukrainian railway infrastructure, seeking to target Ukrainian rear logistics hubs, which are part of the Russian forces' ongoing battlefield air interdiction (BAI) campaign intended to facilitate Russian battlefield gains.[96]

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

Nothing significant to report.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.