Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, February 17, 2026

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

For more information on ISW's map methodology, please view our statement here.

Russian forces conducted another large, combined strike package against Ukrainian energy infrastructure overnight on February 16 to 17 — the eve of trilateral US-Ukrainian-Russian negotiations in Geneva. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 425 drones and missiles against Ukraine overnight.[1] The Ukrainian Air Forces reported that Russian forces launched 396 Shahed-type, Gerbera-type, Italmas-type, and other strike drone types — of which roughly 250 were Shaheds — from the directions of Kursk, Oryol, and Bryansk cities; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; Shatalovo, Smolensk Oblast; and occupied Hvardiiske, Crimea. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces also launched 29 missiles, including four Iskander-M ballistic missiles from Rostov Oblast and occupied Crimea; 20 Kh-101 cruise missiles from the Caspian Sea; four Iskander-K cruise missiles from Kursk Oblast; and one Kh-59/69 cruise missile from the airspace over occupied Donetsk Oblast. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 367 drones and 25 missiles, including all of the Iskander-K, Kh-101, and Kh-59/69 cruise missiles. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that the four ballistic missiles and 18 strike drones struck 13 locations and that falling debris fell at eight locations. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces struck energy and transport infrastructure in Sumy, Chernihiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, and Odesa oblasts.[2] Russian strikes caused power outages for at least 28,000 consumers in Kharkiv Oblast and tens of thousands of people in Odesa City.[3]

Russian forces have been launching large strike packages in recent months in the days before and after bilateral and trilateral negotiations but are likely refraining from fully maximizing Russia's strike capabilities in order to avoid upsetting US President Donald Trump. Russian forces have consistently launched large strike packages of roughly 400 to 700 drones and missiles in the days right before and after major negotiations in recent months, such as the August 2025 US-Russia Alaska summit, the November 2025 US-Ukraine talks in Geneva, the November 2025 US-Russian talks in Moscow, US-Ukrainian-European and US-Russian talks in December 2025, and two rounds of US-Ukrainian-Russian talks in Abu Dhabi in late January and early February 2026.[4] The largest Russian strike package of the war thus far consisted of 823 drones and missiles in early September 2025, and all the strike packages Russian forces have launched around these bilateral and trilateral talks are far below this record.[5] Ukrainian officials warned in Summer 2025 that Russia intended to increase its strike packages to include over 1,000 drones per day by Fall 2025, and Russia may be deliberately curtailing the size of these strike packages to maintain the facade that the Kremlin is interested in meaningful negotiations and to avoid Trump's ire.[6]

The ongoing talks in Geneva will reportedly discuss another possible short-term moratorium on energy strikes.[7] Russia used similar moratoriums in March-April 2025 and in January-February 2026 to claim it was interested in peace while stockpiling drones and missiles for subsequent devastating strikes after the moratorium lifted.[8] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky warned on the evening of February 16, citing Ukrainian intelligence, that Russian forces were preparing another large, combined missile and drone strike against Ukrainian energy infrastructure.[9] The Kremlin may seek to portray its compliance with another moratorium on energy strikes as a major Russian concession while preparing to launch another devastating strike against Ukraine in the near future.[10]

Russian strike packages against Ukraine are dangerous regardless of their size. Russian strike packages — even those below 500 drones and missiles — have inflicted devastating damage on Ukraine's energy and civilian infrastructure.[11] Russian forces have been altering their strike tactics, warheads, and the composition of their strike packages in order to maximize damage and disproportionately impact civilians, especially as Russia has intensified its efforts in recent months to collapse the Ukrainian energy grid.[12] The Ukrainian Ministry of Defense (MoD) reported that Russian forces launched 96 ballistic missiles in January 2026 — the largest number of ballistic missiles that Russian forces have launched during a single month of the war thus far.[13] Ukraine has adapted its air defense to down many but not all the Russian drones and missiles in a strike package, and Russian forces have concentrated their fire on targets for devastating effects. Ukrainian Air Force Spokesperson Colonel Yuriy Ihnat reported that Ukrainian forces downed all the cruise missiles that Russia launched on February 16 to 17, mostly with Ukrainian F-16 and Mirage fighter jets.[14] Ihnat noted that Ukrainian forces did not down any of the ballistic missiles overnight. Ukraine requires advanced Western-provided air defense systems to down ballistic missiles, forcing Ukraine to husband Western-provided systems and missiles, which remain in very short supply.[15]

Kremlin officials and Kremlin-affiliated media sources reaffirmed Russia's unwillingness to compromise as trilateral talks started in Geneva on February 17. US, Ukrainian, and Russian delegations began trilateral talks in Geneva on February 17 and will continue on February 18.[16] A source told Kremlin newswire TASS that the talks will cover at least five tracks —  territorial, military, political, economic, and security issues.[17] ISW will continue to monitor reports about the trilateral talks in the coming days.

Russian State Duma deputies and Federation Council senators, whose target audience is the Russian population and who often act as bullhorns for the Kremlin’s true diplomatic and military aims, continue to advance the Kremlin's boilerplate rhetorical lines about Russia's original war demands that go beyond territory in eastern Ukraine. Duma Defense Committee Chairperson Andrei Kartapolov claimed that Ukraine will only be able to "win" when it joins the Russian Federation — reiterating Russia's long-term goal of destroying an independent Ukraine.[18] Duma Defense Committee Deputy Chairperson Yuri Shvytkin claimed that Russia's military achievements and technological superiority create a "favorable backdrop" for a future diplomatic settlement — furthering the Kremlin's false narrative that Ukraine and the West should give in to Russia's demands now at the negotiating table out of fear of future Russian actions on the battlefield.[19] Deputies and senators continued to claim that Russia should only negotiate with the United States, and that Russia and the United States together should act in the "spirit of Anchorage" — a reference to the Kremlin's insistence that the United States and Russia came to an alleged agreement during the August 2025 Alaska Summit to end the war based on Russian President Vladimir Putin's public demands for Ukrainian and NATO capitulation.[20]

Russian ultranationalist television network Tsargrad published an op-ed by a Russian journalist that claimed that Russia is trying to use ongoing negotiations to "create the impression" that Russia seriously desires to resolve the most complex issues in the war.[21] The journalist claimed that Russia will only be able to achieve peace on its terms when the Ukrainian frontlines collapse, which the article claimed is "still a long way off." The journalist claimed that the Russian delegation must not give Ukraine and the West any reason to blame Russia for the lack of progress in the negotiations. Kremlin-affiliated Russian oligarch and Orthodox nationalist Konstantin Malofeev founded Tsargrad, which serves an informational role of conditioning the Russian nationalist community to support the Kremlin’s war effort.[22] Malofeev often appeals to Russian nationalists to convince them that Russia has no other choice but to fight against Ukraine and NATO. The op-ed in Tsargrad likely aims to condition Russian ultranationalists — a key constituency of Putin — to believe that Russia has no intention of abandoning its original war aims or of compromising to end Russia's war. ISW continues to assess that the Kremlin has not prepared Russian society for the idea of possible Russian concessions and compromises to end the war.[23]

Russian Presidential Aide and former Security Council Secretary Nikolai Patrushev used escalatory language to try to push the West to stop the seizures of Russian shadow fleet tankers. Patrushev responded in an interview with Russian state newspaper Argumenty i Fakty (AiF) published on February 17 to recent Western seizures of Russian shadow fleet oil tankers.[24] Patrushev claimed that Russia must give a “firm rebuff” to alleged British, French, and Baltic attempts to block Russia's access to the Atlantic Basin. Patrushev stated that Russia must have a permanent naval presence in the “main maritime directions” around the world in order to deter ”Western pirates.” Patrushev accused European countries of pursuing military escalation and NATO of planning to blockade Kaliningrad Oblast. Patrushev warned that the Russian Navy would forcibly break any future blockade if the parties cannot resolve the situation peacefully. Patrushev claimed that the Russian Navy, which he described as the “most powerful and flexible geopolitical instrument" of the Russian armed forces, can counter alleged Western attempts to paralyze Russia’s foreign trade. Patrushev called for BRICS to take on a "full-fledged strategic maritime dimension." Patrushev implicitly accused the United States and Europe of trying to impose a blockade on Russia — an exaggerated response to the seizures of a few Russian tankers, including those as far from Russia as the Indian Ocean and Caribbean Sea.[25] Patrushev is trying to claim that Russia would view any Western interference with Russia's illegal shadow fleet as a blockade on Russia that would justify an aggressive Russian response. These efforts aim to intimidate the Trump administration and push the United States and Europe to stop their tank seizures. The Russian Navy cannot credibly back up such escalatory threats, however.

Patrushev baselessly criticized Finland for preparing to attack Russia. Patrushev particularly highlighted Finland in his wider criticisms of NATO's alleged preparation for offensive action against Russia.[26] Patrushev complained that Finland, which is Russia's direct northwestern neighbor and shares a land and maritime border, is acquiring corvettes with weapons that can easily reach northwestern Russia. Patrushev's complaints are meaningless, as Finnish vessels docked within Finnish waters would inherently be able to strike northwestern Russia given their geographic proximity. Patrushev's February 17 complaints about Finland are only the latest in a string of Kremlin threats against Finland that aim to set conditions to justify any possible future Russian aggression against NATO.[27]

Key Takeaways:

• Russian forces conducted another large, combined strike package against Ukrainian energy infrastructure overnight on February 16 to 17 — the eve of trilateral US-Ukrainian-Russian negotiations in Geneva.
• Russian forces have been launching large strike packages in recent months in the days before and after bilateral and trilateral negotiations but are likely refraining from fully maximizing Russia's strike capabilities in order to avoid upsetting US President Donald Trump.
• Russian strike packages against Ukraine are dangerous regardless of their size.
• Kremlin officials and Kremlin-affiliated media sources reaffirmed Russia's unwillingness to compromise as trilateral talks started in Geneva on February 17.
• Russian Presidential Aide and former Security Council Secretary Nikolai Patrushev used escalatory language to try to push the West to stop the seizures of Russian shadow fleet tankers.
• Patrushev baselessly criticized Finland for preparing to attack Russia.
• Russian forces recently advanced near Borova, in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area, and near Pokrovsk.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.  

• Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
• Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis
• Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
• Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
• Significant Activity in Belarus

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Ukrainian forces continued their long-range strike campaign against Russian energy infrastructure on the night of February 16 to 17. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces struck the Ilsky Oil Refinery in Ilsky, Krasnodar Krai.[28] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that the refinery is one of Russia’s largest oil industry enterprises in southern Russia with a total capacity of 6.6 million tons per year and is involved in supplying Russian forces. Geolocated footage published on February 17 shows fires at the refinery.[29]

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in Sumy Oblast along the international border)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Sumy Oblast on February 17 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced northwest and south of Popivka and south of Hrabovske (both southeast of Sumy City).[30]

Russian forces attacked in Kursk and Sumy oblasts, including north of Sumy City near Oleksiivka and Kindrativka and toward Mala Korchakivka and northeast of Sumy City near Yunakivka, on February 16 and 17.[31] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Pokrovka (southeast of Sumy City).[32]

A Russian milblogger stated on February 17 that the claimed Russian seizure of Pokrovka is not indicative of a larger Russian effort toward Krasnopillya (southeast of Sumy City and west of Pokrovka) in the near future.[33]

Order of Battle: Artillery elements of the Russian Chechen Akhmat Spetsnaz are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Hrunivka (northeast of Sumy City).[34] Drone operators of the Anvar Spetsnaz Detachment (possibly referring to the BARS-25 Anvar volunteer detachment) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces in Tymofiivka (northwest of Sumy City) and Marine (northeast of Sumy City).[35] Drone operators of the 128th Motorized Rifle Brigade (44th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) are reportedly intercepting Ukrainian drones in Sumy Oblast.[36] Molniya-2 drone operators and other elements of the 34th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (49th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) and of the 106th Airborne (VDV) Division are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces in Sumy Oblast.[37]

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border to create a defensible buffer zone with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on February 17 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk, Vovchanski Khutory, Vilcha, and Hrafske and toward Okhrimivka on February 16 and 17.[38]

A Russian milblogger reportedly affiliated with the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces claimed on February 17 that the Russian 6th Combined Arms Army (CAA) (Leningrad Military District [LMD]) command banned Russian servicemembers from using their personal vehicles after the 3rd Combined Arms Army (formerly 2nd Luhansk People's Republic Army Corps [LNR AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) (operating in the Siversk direction) banned personal vehicles about a week ago (between roughly February 3 and February 10).[39] The milblogger claimed that the ban has put Russian servicemembers in a difficult position as Russian forces do not provide units with enough official vehicles, and drone crews often use personal vehicles, but the Russian military command has set up checkpoints to confiscate these vehicles.

Russian forces continued offensive operations northeast of Velykyi Burluk towards Shevyakivka and Chuhunivka on February 16 and 17 but did not advance.[40]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Oskil River (Russian objective: Cross the Oskil River in Kharkiv Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Ukrainian forces recently maintained positions or advanced in the Kupyansk direction.

Refinement of areas under Russian claims: Geolocated footage published on February 16 shows Russian forces striking Ukrainian positions in northern Kupyansk — an area where Russian sources previously claimed that Russian forces maintained positions.[41]

Russian forces attacked near Kupyansk itself, east of Kupyansk near Petropavlivka, and southeast of Kupyansk near Kurylivka and toward Novoosynove on February 16 and 17.[42]

The Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) published footage on February 16 showing Ukrainian forces striking a North Korean M-1978 “Koksan” self-propelled artillery system in the Kupyansk direction.[43]

Russian forces recently marginally advanced in the Borova direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on February 14 indicates that Russian forces marginally advanced south of Novoyehorivka (southeast of Borova).[44]

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced into southeastern Oleksandrivka (south of Borova).[45]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Borova near Nova Kruhlyakivka and Bohuslavka and south of Borova near Oleksandrivka on February 16 and 17.[46] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Krymki (southwest of Borova).[47]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Slovyansk direction on February 17 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced northeast of Staryi Karavan (south of Lyman), northwest and southeast of Ozerne, west of Dibrova (both southeast of Lyman), and north of Riznykivka (east of Slovyansk).[48]

Russian forces attacked near and within Lyman itself; northwest of Lyman near Drobysheve, Sosnove, Svyatohirsk, and Yarova; northeast of Lyman near Zarichne and toward Stavky; southeast of Lyman near Yampil and Ozerne; south of Lyman near Dibrova and toward Staryi Karavan and Brusivka; northeast of Slovyansk near Dronivka; east of Slovyansk near Zakitne, Platonivka, Kryva Luka, Riznykivka and toward Rai-Oleksandrivka; and southeast of Slovyansk near Nykyforivka, Bondarne, and Vasyukvivka on February 16 and 17.[49]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 16th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff's Main Directorate [GRU]) are striking Ukrainian vehicles in Mykolaivka (east of Slovyansk).[50]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on February 12 indicates that Russian forces advanced on the southeastern outskirts of Kostyantynivka and on the northern outskirts of Pleshchiivka (southeast of Kostyantynivka).[51]

Assessed Russian infiltration: Geolocated footage published on February 16 shows Ukrainian forces striking a Russian position in southwestern Chasiv Yar (northeast of Kostyantynivka) after what ISW assesses was a Russian infiltration mission that did not change control of terrain of the forward edge of the battle area (FEBA) at this time.[52]

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced in southwestern Kostyantynivka.[53]

Russian forces attacked near and within Kostyantynivka itself; northeast of Kostyantynivka near Orikhovo-Vasylivka and Minkivka; south of Kostyantynivka near Kleban-Byk, Pleshchiivka, and Shcherbynivka; southwest of Kostyantynivka near Oleksandro-Kalynove, Illinivka, Berestok, and Stepanivka; south of Druzhkivka near Rusyn Yar; and southwest of Druzhkivka near Sofiivka, Novopavlivka, and Toretske on February 16 and 17.[54]

The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Kostyantynivka direction reported on February 17 that Russian forces continue limited attempts to infiltrate and attempt to accumulate forces in basements, but that Russian forces are infiltrating less frequently and are instead focusing on using drones to attack Ukrainian logistics, prevent Ukrainian maneuver, and exhaust Ukrainian forces.[55]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Dobropillya tactical area on February 17 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked east of Dobropillya near Novyi Donbas and Vilne and southeast of Dobropillya near Zapovidne on February 16 and 17.[56]

Order of Battle: First-person view (FPV) drone operators of the Russian 80th Sparta Separate Reconnaissance Battalion (51st Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic Army Corps [DNR AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Krasnopodillya (south of Dobropillya).[57] Elements of the 33rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (20th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA, SMD) are reportedly operating in the Dobropillya direction.[58]

Russian forces recently infiltrated in the Pokrovsk direction.

Assessed Russian infiltrations: Geolocated footage published on February 17 shows Ukrainian forces striking a Russian position northwest of Rodynske (north of Pokrovsk) after what ISW assesses was a Russian infiltration mission that did not change the control of terrain or FEBA at this time.[59]

Russian forces attacked near Pokrovsk itself; northwest of Pokrovsk near Hryshyne and toward Shevchenko and Novooleksandrivka; north of Pokrovsk near Rodynske and Bilytske; northeast of Pokrovsk near Chervonyi (Krasnyi) Lyman; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Kotlyne, Udachne, and Novopidhorodne on February 16 and 17.[60]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 57th Motorized Rifle Regiment (20th Guards Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA, SMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Rodynske.[61] Artillery elements of the 385th Artillery Brigade (2nd CAA, Central Military District [CMD]) are reportedly shelling Ukrainian positions in the Pokrovsk direction.[62]

Russian forces continued offensive operations toward Novopavlivka itself and south of Novopavlivka toward Filiya on February 16 and 17 but did not advance.[63]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Oleksandrivka direction on February 17 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northeast of Oleksandrivka near Ivanivka and southeast of Oleksandrivka near Ternove and toward Oleksiivka and Verbove on February 16 and 17.[64] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Bratske (southwest of Oleksandrivka), Hai (southeast of Oleksandrivka), and from Velykomykhailivka (east of Oleksandrivka) toward the Stepove-Berezove-Ternove line (south of Velykomykhailivka).[65]

Southern Defense Forces Spokesperson Colonel Vladyslav Voloshyn reported on February 17 that Ukrainian forces have conducted a series of clearing operations near Verbove and along the Dnipropetrovsk-Zaporizhia oblasts’ borders and have retaken some territory that Russian forces had infiltrated into, but that these clearing operations did not amount to a counteroffensive, contrary to Russian claims.[66]

A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger acknowledged that Ukrainian forces entered Orestopil (southeast of Oleksandrivka) during recent counterattacks but claimed that neither Russian nor Ukrainian forces control the settlement.[67]

Order of Battle: FPV drone operators of the Russian 69th Covering Brigade (35th CAA, Eastern Military District [EMD]) are striking Ukrainian forces north and northwest of Ternove.[68]

Ukrainian forces continued their mid-range strike campaign against Russian military assets in rear areas of occupied Donetsk Oblast. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces struck logistics depots in occupied Donetsk City (roughly 45 kilometers from the frontline) and Lidyne (roughly 102 kilometers from the frontline) overnight on February 16 to 17.[69] Geolocated footage published on February 17 shows Ukrainian Special Operations Forces (SSO) FP-2 drones striking Russian force concentrations in occupied Velyka Novosilka (roughly 33 kilometers from the frontline), reportedly between February 9 and 14.[70]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Hulyaipole direction on February 17 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces seized Tsvitkove (northwest of Hulyaipole) and Zaliznychne (west of Hulyaipole) and advanced south of Kosivtseve (northwest of Hulyaipole), east of Krynychne, and into central Staroukrainka (both west of Hulyaipole).[71]

Russian forces attacked near Hulyaipole itself; northwest of Hulyaipole near Varvarivka, Dobropillya, Pryluky, Svyatopetrivka, Zelene, Ternuvate, Krynychne, Kosivtseve, Verkhnya Tersa, and Tsvitkove; northeast of Hulyaipole near Pryvillya, Zlahoda, and Solodke; southwest of Hulyaipole near Myrne; and west of Hulyaipole near Zaliznychne and Staroukrainka on February 16 and 17.[72] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Olenokostyantynivka, Vozdvyzhivka, Rizdvyanka (all northwest of Hulyaipole), Andriivka (north of Hulyaipole), Pryluky, Ternuvate, Hulyaipole, Zaliznychne, and Staroukrainka.[73]

A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces are clearing the Ukrainian forces who infiltrated between Dobropillya and Solodke.[74] Another milblogger claimed that Russian forces are reconnoitering Vyshneve, Yehorivka, Pryvillya, and Zlahoda (all northeast of Hulyaipole along the Yanchur River) for Ukrainian sabotage and reconnaissance groups.[75]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 11th Air Force and Air Defense Army (EMD and VKS) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Hirke (west of Hulyaipole).[76]

Ukrainian forces continue their short-, mid-, and long-range strikes against Russian military assets in occupied Ukraine. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces struck Russian drone control points near Hulyaipole and Zatyshshya (just northeast of Hulyaipole in the Russian near rear) on February 16.[77] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian manpower concentration near Lyubimivka (east of Hulyaipole and roughly 30 kilometers from the frontline) and Rozivka (southeast of Hulyaipole and roughly 65 kilometers from the frontline) and a communications node of the Russian 127th Motorized Rifle Division (5th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Eastern Military District [EMD]) near Zelenopil (southeast of Hulyaipole and roughly 45 kilometers from the front).[78] The UkrainianSpecial Operations Forces (SSO) reported that Ukrainian forces also struck a Russian Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies remote piloting point in occupied Vysoke (roughly 36 kilometers from the frontline) and an ammunition depot northwest of occupied Terpinnya (roughly 63 kilometers from the frontline).[79] The (SSO) posted geolocated footage showing recent FP-2 drone strikes against a military equipment warehouse north of Lyubimivka and against a logistics and technical support command post in Yalta, Donetsk Oblast (southeast of Hulyaipole along the Sea of Azov coast, roughly 110 kilometers from the frontline).[80]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on February 17 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked east of Orikhiv near Myrne; southeast of Orikhiv near Mala Tokmachka and Bilohirya; south of Orikhiv near Novodanylivka; west of Orikhiv near Stepnohirsk, Novoandriivka, and Prymorske; and northwest of Orikhiv near Lukyanivske and Novoboikivske on February 16 and 17.[81] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Richne (northwest of Orikhiv) and Stepnohirsk and Prymorske (both west of Orikhiv).[82]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 11th Separate Airborne (VDV) Brigade are reportedly operating in Zapasne (northwest of Orikhiv).[83] Lancet loitering munition operators of the 4th Military Base (58th CAA, Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces west of Preobrazhenka (north of Orikhiv).[84] Artillery elements of the Russian 7th VDV Division reportedly continue to operate in the Zaporizhia direction, including near Prymorske.[85]

Russian forces continued limited offensive operations in the Kherson direction on February 17 but did not advance.[86]

Ukrainian forces continue their long-range strike campaign against Russian military infrastructure in occupied Crimea. The Ukrainian Special Operations Forces (SSO) reported that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian Iskander operational-tactical missile complex storage site near occupied Pasichne (roughly 220 kilometers from the frontline), reportedly between February 9 and 14.[87] The Ukrainian General Staff reported on February 17 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian Ka-27 naval helicopter near occupied Kamyshly (roughly 233 kilometers from the frontline).[88]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

See topline text for reports on Russian strikes against Ukraine.

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

Nothing significant to report.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.