Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, February 11, 2026

Data cutoff: 11:45am on February 11

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Kremlin officials recently have been repeating the same messages about Russia's commitment to its original war aims in Ukraine to various media sources that reach international and domestic audiences. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov has given interviews to three different media sources in the past three days, repeating the same Kremlin lines in each.[1] Lavrov gave an interview on February 9 to TV BRICS, a Russian newswire service covering BRICS states and candidate states; an interview on February 10 to Russian state channel NTV, which also broadcasts in the United States, Canada, and Belarus; and an interview on February 11 to "Empathy Manuchi," a popular Russian podcast channel from Russian propagandist Vyacheslav Manucharov on RuTube (Russia's analogue of YouTube).[2] "Empathy Manuchi" RuTube channel caters to a younger Russian audience and promotes Russian state propaganda, including interviews with Russian MFA Spokesperson Maria Zakharova and Russian propagandist and RT Editor-in-Chief Margarita Simonyan.[3] Lavrov's three interviews were likely intended to reach audiences in the West and Russia's allied and partner states, as well as younger audiences within Russia. Russian Security Council Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev similarly held a three-way interview on February 1 with Reuters, Kremlin newswire TASS, and pro-war Russian milblogger and head of the WarGonzo social media military project Semyon Pegov that was likely intended to simultaneously influence Russian and Western audiences.[4] These interviews likely aim to shape the public perception in various countries about ongoing negotiations and to garner domestic and international support for Russia's position.

Kremlin messaging in these various interviews is consistent, with Kremlin officials repeating Russia's unwavering commitment to its demands. Lavrov and Medvedev both referenced the agreements to end the war that the United States and Russia allegedly made at the August 2025 Alaska Summit.[5] Lavrov and Medvedev directly pointed to Russian President Vladimir Putin's June 2024 speech to the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), wherein Putin demanded that Ukraine and NATO capitulate to Russia’s original war demands and cede the illegally annexed Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts — including unoccupied areas of these regions. Lavrov and Medvedev also repeated the Kremlin's rejection of Western security guarantees for post-war Ukraine — reinforcing how the Kremlin does not view the territorial issue as the only significant issue left unresolved in negotiations.

Lavrov explicitly reiterated Russia's 2021 and 2022 demands of NATO and Ukraine in his February 11 interview with a Russian propagandist channel. Lavrov used his February 11 interview with "Empathy Manuchi" to reiterate Russia's 2021 demands that NATO halt its expansion and not deploy forces to any states that joined after 1997, asserting that "security is non-negotiable" for Russia.[6] Lavrov stated that Ukraine "is obligated" to repeal its laws about the use of the Russian language and the Ukrainian Orthodox Church Moscow Patriarchate (UOC MP) and that Russia "will not change these positions." Lavrov's reiteration of Russia's commitment to its original war aims to a propaganda channel demonstrates how the Kremlin is not socializing Russians, particularly the pro-war segments of Russian society, to the possibility of Russian compromises in order to end the war.

The United States, Ukraine, and Russia may hold another round of trilateral talks on February 17 to 18. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky told Bloomberg on February 11 that Ukraine accepted the US offer to host another round of talks in the United States on February 17 to 18.[7] Zelensky stated that it is unclear, however, if Russia would agree to participate in the talks. Zelensky also told journalists on February 11 that Russian officials have not confirmed their participation in a trilateral meeting in Miami and will likely demand that the parties meet again in Abu Dhabi.[8] Zelensky stated that the next round of meetings may discuss Ukraine's postwar economy and the US-Ukrainian prosperity plan.[9] Zelensky called on Ukraine, the United States, and Russia to use future trilateral talks to further discuss the US proposal to establish a "free economic zone" as a buffer zone in Donbas. The Kremlin, however, explicitly rejected in December 2025 the proposal to establish a demilitarized zone in Donetsk Oblast.[10] Zelensky also stated that Ukraine has not received an answer from Russia about a US proposal to renew the moratorium on energy infrastructure strikes.[11]

The Kremlin appears to be subordinating two major security institutions under Russian Chief of the General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov, a Putin loyalist. Russian President Vladimir Putin signed on February 11 a decree designating the Russian General Staff as the primary command body for Rosgvardia troops.[12] The decree states that the General Staff will organize the command and control (C2) of Rosgvardia troops and their application in peacetime and wartime; will participate in the development of plans for developing Rosgvardia troops; and will maintain Rosgvardia's combat and mobilization readiness. The decree also stipulates that the General Staff is responsible for the training, combat support, intelligence organization, and development of C2 systems for Rosgvardia troops. A Russian insider source claimed on February 3 that the Russian Security Council may be planning to abolish the Ministry of Emergency Situations (MChS) and merge some of its employees with Rosgvardia.[13] The insider source claimed that the Security Council may move the MChS's rescue corps, consisting of roughly 50,000 employees, to Rosgvardia and supplement the corps' employees with sappers and other unspecified specialists.

Putin likely aims for these changes to protect his regime, particularly as the Rosgvardia failed to engage Wagner forces during the Wagner mutiny in June 2023.[14] Putin created Rosgvardia in 2016 by subordinating some security forces from the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) under his direct control.[15] Putin likely deliberately vaguely defined Rosgvardia's responsibilities to grant him direct authority to control protests and to coup-proof his regime. Putin may have perceived Rosgvardia as an emerging threat to his regime, particularly after Rosgvardia's insufficient response to the 2023 mutiny and after Rosgvardia's leadership attempted to exploit the mutiny and Russia's military failures in Ukraine to expand its authority.[16] The subordination of Rosgvardia to the General Staff is also likely a continuation of Putin's efforts to centralize irregular forces fighting in Ukraine under the command of the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD), similar to how the Russian MoD's Africa Corps replaced the Wagner Group following the Wagner mutiny.[17] The subordination of Rosgvardia and parts of the MChS to the General Staff would significantly increase Gerasimov's control over Russia's security personnel, highlighting that Putin is rewarding Gerasimov for his loyalty and that Gerasimov retains a central place in Putin's inner circle. Rosgvardia's subordination to the General Staff will likely also streamline military personnel recruitment into the Russian MoD, as the Russian MoD and Rosgvardia previously competed for recruits and conscripts.

Russian milbloggers issued new complaints about the Kremlin's handling of the recent throttling of Telegram, continuing domestic backlash against further Kremlin censorship efforts. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov stated on February 11 that he cannot imagine that Russian forces are using Telegram or other messenger platforms for frontline communications.[18] Russian State Duma Defense Committee Chairperson Andrei Kartapolov similarly claimed that Russian forces ”minimally” use Telegram during combat operations.[19] Russian sources accused Peskov and Kartapolov of lying or not understanding how Russian forces use the platform, with one milblogger questioning if Kartapolov receives "distorted" reports about the situation on the ground.[20] Russian milbloggers first complained about Russian federal censor Roskomnadzor’s throttling of Telegram on February 9 and 10, claiming that it would have serious implications on Russian command and control (C2).[21] The Kremlin appears to have deemed it necessary to respond to the milbloggers' February 9-10 complaints, which only triggered further criticism. The milbloggers' widespread criticisms highlight how the Kremlin is trying to balance its longer-term censorship objectives, including a possible full block on Telegram in the future, with the need to avoid domestic backlash.

US Ambassador to NATO Matt Whitaker highlighted the success of the Prioritized Ukrainian Requirements List (PURL) initiative, which funds NATO purchases of US-manufactured weapons for Ukraine. Whitaker stated on February 11 that 21 NATO member states, Australia, and New Zealand have contributed $4.5 billion to PURL since the program's launch in Summer 2025.[22] Whitaker stated that Norway, the Netherlands, and Germany have especially provided significant contributions to PURL. Whitaker noted that unspecified states would announce new commitments to PURL at a NATO ministerial meeting on February 12.

Key Takeaways:

• Kremlin officials recently have been repeating the same messages about Russia's commitment to its original war aims in Ukraine to various media sources that reach international and domestic audiences.
• Lavrov explicitly reiterated Russia's 2021 and 2022 demands of NATO and Ukraine in his February 11 interview with a Russian propagandist channel.
• The United States, Ukraine, and Russia may hold another round of trilateral talks on February 17 to 18.
• The Kremlin appears to be subordinating two major security institutions under Russian Chief of the General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov, a Putin loyalist.
• Russian milbloggers issued new complaints about the Kremlin's handling of the recent throttling of Telegram, continuing domestic backlash against further Kremlin censorship efforts.
• US Ambassador to NATO Matt Whitaker highlighted the success of the Prioritized Ukrainian Requirements List (PURL) initiative, which funds NATO purchases of US-manufactured weapons for Ukraine.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Hulyaipole. Russian forces recently advanced in northern Sumy Oblast, and near Velykyi Burluk, Borova, and Slovyansk.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

• Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
• Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis
• Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
• Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
• Significant Activity in Belarus

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Ukrainian forces continue their long-range strike campaign against energy infrastructure in Russia. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces struck the Volgograd Oil Refinery in Volgograd City on the night of February 10 to 11.[23] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that the strike caused fires on the facility’s territory but that Ukrainian forces are still clarifying the damage. Geolocated footage published on February 10 shows explosions near the refinery.[24] Volgograd Oblast Governor Andrei Bocharov acknowledged on February 11 that Ukrainian drone strikes caused fires at an unspecified factory in southern Volgograd City.[25]

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in Sumy Oblast along the international border)

Russian forces recently advanced in northern Sumy Oblast.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on February 11 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced north of Nova Sich (north of Sumy City).[26]

Russian forces attacked in Kursk and Sumy oblasts, including north of Sumy City toward Korchakivka and southeast of Sumy City near Popivka, on February 10 and 11.[27] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Oleksiivka (north of Sumy City) and Myropillya (northeast of Sumy City).[28]

Geolocated footage published on February 11 shows likely Ukrainian strikes against Russian trucks and a vehicle transporting electronic warfare (EW) systems in Golovchino, Belgorod Oblast.[29]

Order of Battle: Molniya-2 drone operators of the Russian Chechen Akhmat Spetsnaz's Kashtan Battalion Tactical Group are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces in the Sumy direction.[30]

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border to create a defensible buffer zone with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on February 11 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk, Hrafske, Vovchanski Khutory, Prylipka, Symynivka, Starytsya, and Nesterne on February 10 and 11.[31]

Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Velykyi Burluk direction.

Assessed Ukrainian advances: The commander of a Ukrainian company operating in the Velykyi Burluk direction reported on February 11 that Ukrainian forces cleared Chuhunivka (northeast of Velykyi Burluk).[32] The Russian MoD claimed on February 7 that Russian forces seized Chuhunivka, and geolocated footage published on February 8 shows Ukrainian forces clearing western Chuhunivka, indicating that Russian forces had advanced into the settlement on a prior date.[33]

Russian sources claimed that Russian forces attacked northeast of Velykyi Burluk near Khatnie and Chuhunivka and southeast of Velykyi Burluk toward Kolodyazne on February 10 and 11.[34]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Oskil River (Russian objective: Cross the Oskil River in Kharkiv Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

A Russian source claimed that Russian forces continued offensive operations east of Kupyansk near Petropavlivka and Kucherivka and southeast of Kupyansk near Podoly and Kurylivka on February 11, but ISW assesses that Russian forces did not advance.[35] The Ukrainian General Staff did not report any ground activity in the Kupyansk direction on February 10 or 11.

Russian forces recently advanced in the Borova direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on February 10 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in central Bohuslavka (northeast of Borova). [36]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Borova near Borivska Andriivka and southeast of Borova near Novoyehorivka on February 10 and 11.[37] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Oleksandrivka and Korovii Yar (both south of Borova).[38]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)

Russian forces recently advanced in the Slovyansk direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on February 11 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in southern Nykyforivka (southeast of Slovyansk).[39]

Russian forces attacked near and within Lyman itself; northwest of Lyman near Yarova; north of Lyman near Drobysheve and Stavky; northeast of Lyman near Zakitne and Dronivka; east of Lyman near Maslyakivka and Zarichne; south of Lyman near Dibrova; southeast of Lyman near Ozerne; east of Slovyansk toward Riznykivka and Kryva Luka; and southeast of Slovyansk near Nykyforivka and toward Rai-Oleksandrivka on February 10 and 11.[40] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Yarova and Drobysheve.[41]

The Ukrainian Operation Task Force East reported on February 10 that Ukrainian forces control Bondarne and Nykyforivka (both southeast of Slovyansk).[42]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 488th Motorized Rifle Regiment (144th Motorized Rifle Division, 20th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Moscow Military District [MMD]) are reportedly operating near Terny (northeast of Lyman).[43]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area on February 11 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked near and within Kostyantynivka itself, southeast of Kostyantynivka near Pleshchiivka and Shcherbynivka, south of Kostyantynivka near Illinivka and Berestok, southwest of Kostyantynivka near Yablunivka and Stepanivka, south of Druzhkivka near Rusyn Yar, and southwest of Druzhkivka near Novopavlivka and Sofiivka and toward Pavlivka on February 10 and 11.[44]

The commander of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Kostyantynivka direction reported on February 10 that Russian forces are using first-person view (FPV) drones to maintain fire control over Ukrainian ground lines of communication (GLOCs); are conducting well-prepared attacks during bad weather; and are skillfully camouflaged.[45] A drone operator of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Kostyantynivka direction reported on February 11 that Russian forces continue small group infiltrations, but that these Russian infiltrators act recklessly as they believe that they are invisible when wearing camouflage cloaks, allowing Ukrainian drone operators to identify and strike them.[46]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 255th Motorized Rifle Regiment (20th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA, Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian equipment in Mykolaipillya (south of Druzhkivka).[47]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Dobropillya tactical area on February 11 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked east of Dobropillya near Toretske, Nove Shakhove, and Novyi Donbas on February 10 and 11.[48]

Order of battle: Drone operators of the Russian 150th Motorized Rifle Division (8th CAA, SMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces in the Dobropillya direction.[49]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction on February 11 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked near Pokrovsk itself; northwest of Pokrovsk near Hryshyne; north of Pokrovsk near Rodynske; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Kotlyne, Udachne, and Molodetske on February 10 and 11.[50]

The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Pokrovsk direction reported on February 11 that Russian forces continue to commit soldiers facing disciplinary action into preliminary assaults in the Pokrovsk direction.[51] The spokesperson reported that Russian forces routinely abandon wounded personnel on the battlefield and treat soldiers as expendable once they can no longer fight. The spokesperson reported that Russian forces conducted a large-scale assault in the brigade’s area of responsibility (AoR) on February 7-8, but that Ukrainian forces repelled the attack and destroyed 15 pieces of equipment and inflicted 127 Russian casualties, including 80 killed in action (KIA).

Order of Battle: FPV drone operators of the Russian 56th Separate Spetsnaz Battalion (51st CAA, formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic Army Corps [DNR AC], SMD) are reportedly destroying Ukrainian equipment in Shevchenko (south of Pokrovsk).[52] Artillery elements of the 90th Tank Division (41st CAA, Central Military District [CMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces in the Pokrovsk direction.[53]

Russian forces continued offensive operations toward Novopavlivka itself, northeast of Novopavlivka near Novomykolaivka, and south of Novopavlivka near Filiya on February 10 and 11 but did not advance.[54]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Oleksandrivka near Ivanivka and Zelenyi Hai on February 10 and 11 but did not advance.[55]

Ukrainian forces continued their mid-range strike campaign against Russian military assets in occupied Ukraine on the night of February 10 to 11. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian Osa anti-aircraft missile system near occupied Tretyaky, Donetsk Oblast (roughly 88 kilometers from the frontline).[56]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)

Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Hulyaipole direction.

Assessed Ukrainian advances: Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported on February 11 that Ukrainian forces cleared Ternuvate, Tsvitkove, and Staroukrainka (all northwest of Hulyaipole), and Zaliznychne (west of Hulyaipole).[57] Geolocated footage published on February 11 indicates that Ukrainian forces also advanced in Kosivtseve (northwest of Hulyaipole).[58]

Assessed Russian infiltrations: Mashovets reported on February 11 that Ukrainian forces cleared Tsvitkove, Staroukrainka, and Zaliznychne of Russian infiltrators, indicating that Russian forces previously infiltrated east of the settlements.[59] ISW assesses that this did not change the control of terrain or the forward edge of the battle area (FEBA) at this time.

Russian forces attacked near Hulyaipole itself; northwest of Hulyaipole near Tsvitkove and Pryluky; north of Hulyaipole near Dobropillya and Varvarivka; northeast of Hulyaipole near Zlahoda and Rybne; south of Hulyaipole near Dorozhnyanka; and west of Hulyaipole near Zaliznychne on February 10 and 11.[60] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Staroukrainka, Hulyaipole, Dobropillya, Pryluky, Ternuvate, and Hirke (west of Hulyaipole).[61]

Mashovets reported on February 11 that recent Ukrainian advances in the Hulyaipole direction were part of limited clearing operations rather than a large counteroffensive effort — contrary to recent Russian claims that Ukrainian forces were conducting a counteroffensive near the Dnipropetrovsk-Zaporizhia Oblast administrative border, in line with ISW’s ongoing assessment.[62]

Order of Battle: Mashovets stated that elements of the Russian 127th Motorized Rifle Division (5th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Eastern Military District [EMD]), including its 114th, 143rd, and 394th motorized rifle regiments, and its 218th Tank Regiment; the 57th and 60th separate motorized rifle brigades (both of the 5th CAA); the 5th Tank Brigade and 37th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (both of the 36th CAA, EMD); the 38th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade and 69th Separate Cover Brigade (both of the 35th CAA, EMD); and of the 76th Airborne (VDV) Division are operating from the Zaporizhia-Donetsk highway to the Hulyaipole area.[63] Drone operators and reconnaissance elements of the 14th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff's Main Directorate [GRU]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces in Zaporizhia Oblast.[64]

Ukrainian forces continued their frontline and mid-range strike campaign against Russian military assets in occupied Zaporizhia Oblast on the night of February 10 to 11. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces struck a concentration of the Russian Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies drone operators in Hulyaipole, a Russian military logistics depot near occupied Balochky (roughly 20 kilometers from the front line), and a concentration of Russian military equipment in occupied Lyubymivka (roughly 30 kilometers from the front line).[65]

Russian forces recently advanced in western Zaporizhia Oblast.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on February 10 indicates that Russian forces recently marginally advanced northeast of Stepnohirsk (west of Orikhiv).[66]

Refinement of areas under Russian advances: Mashovets reported that Russian forces retreated from their positions near Lukyanivske (northwest of Orikhiv) and northeast of Stepnohirsk, indicating that Russian forces no longer hold Lukyanivske.[67] ISW’s assessed Russian infiltration layer is compatible with both Russian and Ukrainian forces maintaining positions within any given infiltration areas.

Refinement of areas under Russian claims: Geolocated footage published on February 10 indicates that Ukrainian forces maintain a presence southwest of Lukyanivske, an area where Russian sources previously claimed that Russian forces maintained a presence.[68]

Russian forces attacked southeast of Orikhiv near Luhivske and northwest of Orikhiv near Prymorske, Novoyakovlivka, Novoboykivske, and toward Mahdalynivka and Richne on February 10 and 11.[69]

Order of Battle: Mashovets stated that elements of the Russian 19th Motorized Rifle Division (58th CAA, Southern Military District [SMD]), including its 392nd, 503rd, and 429th motorized rifle regiments; the 42nd Motorized Rifle Division, (58th CAA), including its 291st and 70th motorized rifle regiments; the 7th VDV Division, including its 108th and 247th VDV regiments; the 4th Military Base (58th CAA); the 100th Separate Reconnaissance Brigade (58th CAA); and the 45th Spetsnaz Brigade of the Russian VDV forces are operating along the Dnipro River from Kamyanske (west of Orikhiv) toward Zaporizhzhia City.[70] Elements of the 104th VDV Division are reportedly operating in the Orikhiv direction.[71]

Russian forces continued limited ground attacks in the Kherson direction on February 11 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked in unspecified areas of Kherson Oblast on February 11.[72]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 98th VDV Division reportedly continue to strike Ukrainian forces in Kherson Oblast.[73]

Ukrainian forces continued their mid and long-range strike campaign against Russian military assets in occupied Kherson Oblast and Crimea on the night of February 10 to 11. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on February 11 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian Tor anti-aircraft missile system in occupied Voskresenske, Kherson Oblast (roughly 100 kilometers from the frontline).[74] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces also struck a Russian fuel and lubricants warehouse in occupied Lobanove, Crimea (roughly 130 kilometers from the frontline).

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Russian forces conducted a series of drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of February 10 and 11. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 129 Shahed-type, Gerbera-type, Italmas-type, and other drones — of which roughly 80 were Shaheds — from the directions of Kursk, Oryol, and Bryansk cities; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; and occupied Donetsk City.[75] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 112 drones and that 15 drones struck eight locations. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces struck energy, residential, railway, and civilian infrastructure in Sumy, Chernihiv, Kharkiv, and Zaporizhia oblasts.[76]

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

Belarusian International Military Cooperation Department Head Major General Valery Revenko met with Russian Deputy Minister of Defense Vasily Osmakov on February 10 to discuss the current state of bilateral military and military-technical cooperation and outlined agenda items for the upcoming Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) Council of Defense Ministers meeting scheduled for April 2 in Moscow.[77]

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media, as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.