Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, February 10, 2026

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Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov continued to explicitly blame the United States on February 10 for the lack of progress in ending Russia’s war against Ukraine and reinvoked the Spring 2022 Istanbul talks to justify Russia’s rejection of Ukraine receiving meaningful security guarantees. Lavrov used a February 10 interview with Russian state outlet NTV to accuse the United States of acting in bad faith during peace negotiations by imposing new sanctions on Russia and placing secondary tariffs on importers of Russian oil, reiterating his February 9 criticism that the United States is to blame for the lack of progress to end the war.[1] Lavrov claimed that US policies toward Russia under US President Donald Trump are “moving in the wrong direction.” Russian State Duma International Affairs Committee First Deputy Head Alexei Chepa echoed Lavrov’s criticism of US policies toward Russia, noting that US “actions rather than words” demonstrate that the United States remains an “adversary” to Russia.[2] Lavrov also explicitly referred to Russia’s position codified in the 2022 Istanbul Protocols, to which the Kremlin periodically refers to as the appropriate basis for a peace agreement, to justify Russia’s continued rejection of meaningful security guarantees for Ukraine.[3] Lavrov specifically called for the composition and decision-making framework of the guarantees proposed in the 2022 Istanbul Protocol draft document. The 2022 Istanbul Protocol draft document stipulated that Russia – the aggressor in the war in Ukraine – would be treated as a neutral ”guarantor state” of Ukraine; that Russia and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) would have veto power over a mechanism to respond to future aggression in Ukraine; and that Ukraine commit to neutrality, severe restrictions on military size and composition, and never accepting military assistance from its allies.[4] The Kremlin has been attempting to push the United States to abandon the recent US-led negotiations with Ukraine and Europe in favor of a US-Russian settlement based almost entirely on Russia’s demands, which have not changed over the course of the war.[5]

The Kremlin throttled Telegram on February 9 and 10 – a significant intensification of Russia's three-year campaign to reassert control over the Russian information space. Website and online services monitoring platforms registered a significant rise in complaints about access and usage of Telegram in Russia on the morning of February 9, declining on the evening, and rising again on the morning of February 10.[6] Russian outlet RBK claimed on February 10 that a source in the Russian IT industry and two sources in unspecified "relevant" Russian agencies stated that Russian federal censor Roskomnadzor decided to start throttling Telegram on February 10.[7] Roskomnadzor confirmed to Russian business outlet Kommersant that it is restricting Telegram's operations in order to force it to comply with Russian laws.[8] Roskomnadzor claimed that Telegram needs to protect Russian citizens from fraud and create conditions to combat extremism and terrorism. Russian authorities began to restrict calls on Telegram in August 2025, but the February 9-10 throttling marks a more significant Kremlin effort to block access to the platform. Russian opposition outlet Verstka reported that sources close to the Russian Presidential Administration stated that the recent throttling of Telegram is a "test" and that Russian authorities may completely block Telegram ahead of the September 2026 State Duma elections, as the Kremlin fears a negative domestic reaction to the United Russia Party winning 70 percent of the vote.[9] A Verstka source stated that the Kremlin may completely block Telegram due to worries about society's mood about the upcoming Duma elections and attitudes toward the war in Ukraine, but a source claimed to Verstka that the Kremlin has not yet decided to fully block Telegram.

Russian milbloggers complained about the Telegram restrictions on February 10 and expressed concern about possible implications on Russian command and control (C2).[10] A Russian milblogger claimed that Telegram slowdowns will have a "profound" negative impact on Russian military communications.[11] Another Russian milblogger claimed that Russian authorities began to slow down Telegram "some time ago" and that the decision is "clumsy" as Telegram serves as a "lifeline" for Russian military communications.[12] The milblogger claimed that the throttling of Telegram will negatively impact interoperability among air defense units and maneuver groups that need to be able to cooperate in the face of Ukrainian drone strikes. Telegram slowdowns could exacerbate C2 issues Russian forces are reportedly facing after SpaceX shut down Russian Starlink terminals operating in Ukraine as of February 1.[13] Russian strikes and assaults have not stopped entirely since the shutdown of Starlink and throttling of Telegram, however, and Russian forces likely maintain alternative C2 networks, such as mesh networks, that they can use in the meantime.

The Kremlin has been engaged in a widespread censorship campaign to regain control over the Russian information space since late 2022, when the Kremlin began to censor, arrest, and coopt Russian milbloggers who criticized the Kremlin and its methods of waging war in Ukraine.[14] Russian authorities justified their initial efforts to deliberately restrict Telegram by blaming the platform for enabling scammers to commit fraud against Russian citizens.[15] The Kremlin introduced the state-controlled messenger app Max in March 2025 and has been attempting to entice and coerce Russian citizens to abandon other messaging platforms for Max.[16] The Max platform has remained largely unpopular among Russians, however.[17] The Kremlin is likely more significantly restricting Telegram now in order to incentivize Russians to switch to Max, as previous Russian efforts to do so have been largely ineffective. Telegram founder Pavel Durov assessed on February 10 that Russia is restricting access to Telegram to force Russian citizens to switch to Max.[18] ISW will outline the Kremlin's intensified efforts to regain control over the Russian information space and dismantle the open internet in Russia in a forthcoming special edition.

Russia's ability to acquire foreign machine tools despite Western sanctions is reportedly allowing Russia to increase its production of tank and artillery barrels- a key constraining factor on Russia’s defense industrial base (DIB). Ukrainian open source intelligence outlet Frontelligence Insight reported on February 9, citing internal Russian procurement documents that Russia is modernizing the Uralmash Plant No. 9, which manufactures barrels for the Koalitsiya and Msta self-propelled howitzers and for various Russian tanks, including the T-14 Armata, T-90, and modernized T-62 and T-72.[19] Frontelligence Insight reported that Russia has been modernizing the Uralmash Plant No. 9 since 2016 and that the plant has acquired at least 22 of machine tools manufactured by companies in Taiwan, the United Kingdom, Germany, and Italy for its production efforts. Frontelligence Insight noted that Russia determined it cannot compensate for its dependency on foreign machine tools for its defense industrial base (DIB) and that the planning documents indicate that Russia feels confident about its ability to acquire these machine tools despite Western sanctions.

Russia's struggles to acquire foreign-produced machine tools have historically limited its DIB production, including tank and artillery barrels. Russia was reportedly able to produce about 50 artillery barrels per year as of October 2024 – a major bottleneck to Russia's ability to produce new and maintain existing artillery systems.[20] Russia has not been able to produce tanks and artillery systems to match its losses of these systems in Ukraine, but successful sanctions evasion schemes may allow Russia to scale up its rate of production and refurbishment of artillery systems in particular.[21] Russia's production of the precision machine tools it needs for its DIB has atrophied in the past 30 years, and Russia has been increasingly relying on the PRC to obtain these machine tools.[22] Russia will likely continue to intensify its sanctions evasion efforts to acquire foreign-made machine tools for both its near- and long-term armament efforts, highlighting the critical importance of Western sanctions in countering these efforts and inhibiting Russia's war machine.

Unconfirmed media reports suggest that Japan may fund non-lethal military aid to Ukraine through the Prioritized Ukrainian Requirements List (PURL) initiative. Japanese outlet NHK reported on February 10, citing anonymous NATO officials, that Japan plans to join the PURL initiative, which funds NATO purchases of US-manufactured weapons for Ukraine, and plans to announce this publicly in the coming days.[23] The anonymous NATO officials reportedly stated that Japan would only fund non-lethal defense equipment, including radar systems and body armor. Japanese Chief Cabinet Secretary Minoru Kihara denied media reports about Japan joining PURL, noting that Japan will still continue to provide economic and humanitarian support to Ukraine.[24] It is unclear how Japan would be able to join the PURL initiative. Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution stipulates that Japan renounce war and the "threat or use of force as a means of settling international disputes," which has historically precluded the Japanese government from providing military support to any country.[25]

NATO jets intercepted another Russian fighter jet close to NATO airspace in the Baltic Sea in late January 2026. The Spanish Ministry of Defense (MoD) reported on January 28 that Spanish EF-18M Hornet jets intercepted a Russian Su-30SM2 fighter jet flying over the Baltic Sea close to NATO airspace as a part of the NATO Baltic Air Policing mission.[26] ISW continues to assess that Russia is intensifying its ”Phase Zero” campaign to destabilize Europe and undermine NATO cohesion in preparation for a possible NATO-Russia war in the future.[27]

Key Takeaways:

• Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov continued to explicitly blame the United States on February 10 for the lack of progress in ending Russia’s war against Ukraine and reinvoked the Spring 2022 Istanbul talks to justify Russia’s rejection of Ukraine receiving meaningful security guarantees.
• The Kremlin throttled Telegram on February 9 and 10 – a significant intensification of Russia's three-year campaign to reassert control over the Russian information space.
• Russia's ability to acquire foreign machine tools despite Western sanctions is reportedly allowing Russia to increase its production of tank and artillery barrels- a key constraining factor on Russia’s defense industrial base (DIB).
• Unconfirmed media reports suggest that Japan may fund non-lethal military aid to Ukraine through the Prioritized Ukrainian Requirements List (PURL) initiative.
• NATO jets intercepted another Russian fighter jet close to NATO airspace in the Baltic Sea in late January 2026.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Dobropillya tactical area. Russian forces recently advanced in northern Sumy Oblast, in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area, near Hulyaipole, and in western Zaporizhia Oblast.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.  

• Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
• Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis
• Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
• Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
• Significant Activity in Belarus

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Ukrainian forces may have continued their long-range strike campaign against military assets in Russia. A Russian Telegram channel, which claims to have insider information, claimed that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian 96L6 radar station in Trykovka, Bryansk Oblast (roughly 111 kilometers from the international border), on February 7, and that two Russian mobile fire groups failed to intercept the Ukrainian drone.[28]

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in Sumy Oblast along the international border)

Russian forces recently marginally advanced in northern Sumy Oblast.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on February 9 indicates that Russian forces recently marginally advanced south of central Kostyantynivka (north of Sumy City).[29]

Russian forces attacked in Kursk and Sumy oblasts, including north of Sumy near Kindrativka; northeast of Sumy City near Yunakivka; and southeast of Sumy City near Pokrovka on February 9 and 10.[30]

The Ukrainian General Staff reported on February 10 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian drone control point near Tetkino (southwest of Glushkovo, Kursk Oblast) on February 9.[31] The Ukrainian 8th Air Assault Corps reported on February 9 that 22 Russian servicemembers recently tried to advance through a gas pipeline near Yablunivka (northeast of Sumy City), but Ukrainian forces eliminated all but one of the Russian servicemembers.[32]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 83rd Separate Airborne (VDV) Brigade are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Myropillya and Varachyne (both northeast of Sumy City).[33] Molniya-2 fixed-wing first-person view (FPV) drone operators of the Chechen Akhmat Spetsnaz Kashtan Detachment are reportedly operating in the Sumy direction.[34]

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border to create a defensible buffer zone with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on February 10 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk, Prylipka, Zelene, Symynivka, Hrafske, Zybyne, Nesterne, and Vovchanski Khutory on February 9 and 10.[35]

A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed on February 9 that limited Russian forces are conducting localized attacks without strategic objectives in northern Kharkiv Oblast.[36]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 7th Separate Motorized Rifle Regiment (11th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces in Kharkiv Oblast.[37]

Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported ground activity in the Velykyi Burluk direction on February 10.

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Oskil River (Russian objective: Cross the Oskil River in Kharkiv Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on February 10 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked near Kupyansk itself; north of Kupyansk near Dovhenke; east of Kupyansk near Petropavlivka; and southeast of Kupyansk near Kupyansk-Vuzlovyi, Pishchane, Kurylivka, and Podoly on February 9 and 10.[38]

Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Borova direction on February 10, but ISW has not collected any evidence to assess that Russian forces made any advances.

Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces attacked south of Borova near Korovii Yar and Oleksandrivka on February 10.[39]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 283rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (144th Motorized Rifle Division, 20th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Moscow Military District [MMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Novomykhailivka (southeast of Borova).[40]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Slovyansk direction on February 10 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked near and within Lyman itself; northwest of Lyman near Novoselivka and toward Sosnove; north of Lyman near Drobysheve and Stavky; northeast of Lyman near Zakitne, Dronivka, and Platonivka; east of Lyman near Maslyakivka; and southeast of Slovyansk near Ozerne and toward Rai-Oleksandrivka on February 9 and 10.[41]

Ukrainian Donetsk Oblast Military Administration Head Vadym Filashkin reported on February 10 that Russian forces conducted six FAB-250 glide bomb strikes against Slovyansk, killing two civilians and injuring 16.[42]

A Ukrainian brigade operating in the Slovyansk direction reported on February 10 that Russian forces managed to cross unspecified parts of the frozen Siverskyi Donets River and continue to infiltrate along the river from the Serebryanske forest area.[43] The spokesperson stated that Russian forces are using an increased number of sleeper and other types of drones and remote mining to interdict Ukrainian ground lines of communication (GLOCs).

Order of Battle: Kub-2 reconnaissance and other drone operators of the Russian 2nd Artillery Brigade and the 88th Motorized Rifle Brigade (both of the 3rd CAA, formerly 2nd Luhansk People's Republic Army Corps [LNR AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) are striking Ukrainian forces in eastern Mykolaivka (east of Slovyansk).[44]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on February 5 and 9 indicates that Russian forces advanced in central Pleshchiivka and northwest of Ivanopillya (both southeast of Kostyantynivka).[45]

Russian forces attacked near and within Kostyantynivka itself; north of Kostyantynivka near Markove; northeast of Kostyantynivka near Minkivka; east of Kostyantynivka near Stupochky; southeast of Kostyantynivka near Kleban-Byk; south of Kostyantynivka near Illinivka and Berestok; southwest of Kostyantynivka near Yablunivka and Stepanivka; south of Druzhkivka near Rusyn Yar; and southwest of Druzhkivka near Novopavlivka and Sofiivka and toward Pavlivka on February 9 and 10.[46]

Order of Battle: Drone operators and reconnaissance elements of the Russian Rubikon Center for Unmanned Technologies and of the 242nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (20th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA, SMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Rusyn Yar.[47]

Ukrainian forces continued their mid-range strike campaign against Russian military assets in occupied Donetsk Oblast on the night of February 9 to 10. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on February 10 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian fuel and lubricants depot near occupied Fedorivka (approximately 30 kilometers from the frontline).[48]

Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Dobropillya tactical area.

Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on February 9 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced in northern Novyi Donbas (east of Dobropillya).[49]

Russian forces attacked east of Dobropillya near Novyi Donbas on February 10.[50]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction on February 10 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked near Pokrovsk itself; northwest of Pokrovsk near Hryshyne; north of Pokrovsk near Rodynske and Bilytske; east of Pokrovsk near Myrnohrad; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Kotlyne, Udachne, Molodetske, and Novopidhorodne on February 9 and 10.[51]

The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Pokrovsk direction reported on February 10 that roughly 150,000 Russian personnel are currently operating in the direction.[52] The spokesperson added that Russian forces have deployed unspecified specialized drone units to support operations in the area.

Russian forces continued offensive operations near Novopavlivka itself, northeast of Novopavlivka near Novomykolaivka, and south of Novopavlivka near Filiya and Dachne on February 9 and 10 but did not advance.[53]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Oleksandrivka direction but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northeast of Oleksandrivka near Ivanivka on February 9 and 10.[54] A Russian milblogger claimed Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Velykomykhailivka, Pokrovske (north of Oleksandrivka), Vorone and Sichneve (both southeast of Oleksandrivka).[55]

Ukrainian forces continued their mid-range strike campaign against Russian military targets in occupied Donetsk Oblast overnight on February 9 to 10. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on February 10 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian repair unit near occupied Yalta (roughly 105 kilometers from the frontline).[56]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)

Russian forces recently advanced in the Hulyaipole direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on February 10 indicates that Russian forces recently seized Zaliznychne (west of Hulyaipole).[57] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) credited elements of the Russian 114th Motorized Rifle Regiment (127th Motorized Rifle Division, 5th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Eastern Military District [EMD]) with seizing the settlement.[58]

Russian forces attacked near and within Hulyaipole itself; northeast of Hulyaipole near Uspenivka and Zlahoda; northwest of Hulyaipole near Svyatopetrivka; north of Hulyaipole near Zelene, Pryvillya, and Dobropillya; and west of Hulyaipole near Zaliznychne on February 9 and 10.[59] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Dobropillya (north of Hulyaipole), Pryluky, Ternuvate (both northwest of Hulyaipole), Dorozhnyanka (south of Hulyaipole) and Zaliznychne.[60]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 38th Motorized Rifle Brigade (35th CAA, EMD) are reportedly continuing to operate in Zaporizhia Oblast.[61]

Russian forces recently advanced in western Zaporizhia Oblast.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on February 10 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in the southwestern outskirts of Novoandriivka (southwest of Orikhiv).[62]

Russian forces attacked east of Orikhiv near Zahirne, west of Orikhiv near Mali Shcherbaky and Stepnohirsk, and northwest of Orikhiv near Prymorske, Lukyanivske, and Richne and toward Mahdalynivka on February 9 and 10.[63]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 71st Motorized Rifle Regiment (42nd Motorized Rifle Division, 58th CAA, Southern Military District [SMD]) are striking Ukrainian forces in Orikhiv.[64] Elements of the 7th Airborne (VDV) Division reportedly continue to operate in the Zaporizhia direction.[65]

Ukrainian forces continued their mid-range strike campaign against Russian military assets in occupied Zaporizhia Oblast on the night of February 9 to 10. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian manpower concentration near occupied Khliborobne (roughly 24 kilometers from the frontline), a Russian Rubikon Center for Unmanned Technologies drone control point near occupied Vysoke (roughly 35 kilometers from the frontline), and a Russian drone production facility and pilot training center in near occupied Komysh-Zorya (roughly 45 kilometers from the frontline).[66]

Russian forces continued limited ground attacks in the Kherson direction on February 9 and 10 but did not advance.[67]

Order of Battle: Molniya-2 drone operators of the Russian 98th VDV Division reportedly continue to strike Ukrainian forces in Kherson Oblast.[68]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Russian forces conducted a series of drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of February 9 and 10. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 125 Shahed-type, Gerbera-type, Italmas-type, and other drones – of which roughly 80 were Shaheds – from the directions of Kursk, Oryol, and Bryansk cities; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; Shatalovo, Smolensk Oblast; and Millerovo, Rostov Oblast.[69] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 110 drones, that 13 drones struck six locations, and that drone debris fell on two locations. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces struck energy, residential, railway, and civilian infrastructure in Sumy, Chernihiv, Kharkiv and Odesa oblasts.[70]

Russian forces continue to target railway infrastructure in Ukraine. Ukrainian Deputy Prime Minister and Development Minister Oleksiy Kuleba reported that Russian forces struck the Tereshchenska train station in Voronizh, Sumy Oblast (roughly 43 kilometers from the international border), damaging the track and injuring one civilian, and that Russian forces struck a diesel train at the Snovsk train station (roughly 27 kilometers from the international border) in Chernihiv Oblast.[71] Geolocated footage published on February 10 shows Russian forces conducting a Geran-2 drone strike against a train car on the Pivdenna-Zakhidna railway line near the Tereshchenska station in southeastern Voronizh.[72] ISW continues to assess that Russian forces are striking Ukrainian railway infrastructure and seeking to target Ukrainian rear logistics hubs as part of the Russian forces’ ongoing battlefield air interdiction (BAI) campaign intended to facilitate Russian battlefield gains.[73]

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

Nothing significant to report.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.