Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, December 9, 2025

Assessment as of December 9:00 pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

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Note: The data cut-off for this product was 12 pm ET on December 9. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the December 10 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

The Kremlin is significantly intensifying its cognitive warfare effort to present the Russian military and economy as able to inevitably win a war of attrition against Ukraine. High-ranking Kremlin officials, including Russian President Vladimir Putin, have been aggressively promoting exaggerated battlefield advances and the alleged strength and resilience of the Russian economy.[i] This multipronged cognitive warfare effort aims to push Ukraine and the West into conceding to Russia's demands now during negotiations out of fear of intensified, protracted Russian military operations in the future. Though the situation in specific sectors of the frontline is serious, especially in the Pokrovsk and Hulyaipole directions, most of Putin's assertions of Russian victories do not correspond to the battlefield reality, nor do they indicate that the frontlines in Ukraine will collapse imminently.[ii] Putin's claims about the strength of the Russian economy also ignore how the Kremlin's recent economic policies indicate that the Russian economy is facing mounting costs in the face of Western sanctions, monetary constraints, and the compounding costs of the war.[iii]

The Kremlin's cognitive warfare effort aims to achieve several of Putin's original war aims through a negotiated settlement, as Russian forces are currently unable to achieve them on the battlefield. Putin and other high-ranking Kremlin officials have repeatedly and publicly reiterated their commitment to Russia's original war aims, including granting Russia a veto over future NATO expansion, the removal of the Ukrainian government, the installation of a pro-Russian puppet government, and limits on Ukraine's ability to defend itself.[iv] Putin reiterated on December 9 his call for Ukraine to cede all of Luhansk and Donetsk oblasts – including areas that Russian forces currently do not occupy. Putin claimed that Luhansk and Donetsk oblasts are Russia's "historical territory" and were "always part of Russia."[v] Putin repeated his narrative that Ukraine is an artificial state that Soviet authorities whimsically created. The Russian Federation has notably recognized Ukraine's independence, sovereignty, and borders several times in the past three decades, including with its recognition of Ukrainian independence in 1991, the 1994 Budapest Memorandum, and the 1997 Russian-Ukrainian Friendship Treaty.

ISW continues to assess that the Russian campaign to militarily seize the rest of Donetsk Oblast, including Ukraine's heavily fortified Fortress Belt, would likely take at least two-to-three years, pose a significant challenge, and result in difficult and costly battles that the Russian Federation may not be able to sustain.[vi] Russia's cognitive warfare effort aims to push Ukraine and the West to cede this heavily defended territory to Russia without a fight, allowing Russia to avoid spending significant amounts of time and resources to try to seize it on the battlefield. Ceding Donetsk Oblast to Russia would also notably set conditions for Russia to renew its aggression against Ukraine from more advantageous positions at a time of its choosing, particularly as Putin and other Kremlin officials continue to indicate that their longer-term strategic goal of controlling all of Ukraine – not only its southern and eastern regions – remains unchanged.[vii]

Russian forces have gained 0.77 percent of Ukrainian territory since the start of 2025 while suffering disproportionately high personnel costs. ISW has observed evidence to assess that Russian forces have seized roughly 4,669 square kilometers since January 1, 2025. Data from the Ukrainian General Staff indicates that Russian forces have suffered a total of 391,270 casualties in that time – or about 83 casualties per square kilometer. The Russian rate of advance has not exceeded a footpace, even in areas where Russian forces have been making relatively quicker gains recently, such as in the Hulyaipole and Pokrovsk directions. Russian advances are unlikely to move faster than a footpace in the near- to medium- term. The drone-dominated battlefield denies Russian forces the ability to conduct maneuver warfare at the scale necessary for rapid, operational-level advances that restore maneuver to the battlefield.[viii] Ukraine’s drone-based defenses have some vulnerabilities (e.g. weather factors) that Russian forces have managed to exploit to make tactically significant advances, but Ukraine’s drone defenses overall have denied Russian forces the ability to use armored vehicles and conduct mechanized maneuver and have forced Russian forces into grinding attritional infantry missions.[ix] This equilibrium is unlikely to change rapidly, barring any sudden changes in the fundamental technologies and operational concepts underpinning the current war in Ukraine.

Russia's resources are not endless as Putin is trying to assert, and Putin currently appears to be facing difficult decision points regarding the strategic sustainment of Russian force generation. ISW assessed in February 2025 that Russia would likely face a number of materiel, manpower, and economic issues in the next 12 to 18 months as the mounting costs of the war compounded over time.[x] Russia's main force generation recruitment system that uses high financial incentives to attract personnel appears to be hitting diminishing returns and negatively affecting the Russian economy.[xi] ISW previously assessed that Russia's slowing recruitment efforts likely could not indefinitely replace Russia's casualty rates without a compulsory reserve mobilization.[xii]

Putin is very likely preparing to attempt to offset Russia’s near-exhaustion of voluntary recruitment in 2026 by mobilizing elements of Russia's strategic reserve to sustain combat operations in Ukraine. The Kremlin remains unlikely to undertake a single large-scale mobilization at this time, however, and is most likely to persistently recruit reservists on a rolling basis. Putin signed a decree on December 8 authorizing the compulsory call-up of an unspecified number of Russian inactive reservists who will undergo compulsory "military assemblies" in the Russian Armed Forces, National Guard (Rosgvardia), Federal Security Service (FSB), Ministry of Emergency Situations military rescue units, and other state security agencies.[xiii] Putin tasked the Russian government with calling up the inactive reservists and organizing the assemblies in 2026, but the publicly released version of the decree classified two of the four provisions.[xiv] Military assemblies in Russia refer to the gathering of staff at a training ground or a unit's headquarters, usually within the context of preparing units for military exercises or service.[xv] Russia's resolution titled, "On Military Assembly and Certain Issues of Ensuring the Fulfillment of Military Duty," states that the Russian president may order military assemblies for training purposes or to check combat and mobilization readiness; that the assemblies may last no longer than two months; and that the total duration of a mobilized person's participation in a military assembly may not exceed 12 months.[xvi]

The December 8 decree will likely allow the Kremlin to covertly mobilize members of its strategic inactive reserve. Russia has two types of reserves. Russia retains a higher readiness “human mobilization reserve” - an active reserve of Russian citizens who sign a contract with the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) on a voluntary basis to serve in the reserve while remaining civilians except when called up. Russia also maintains an inactive reserve (also known as the human mobilization resource or “zapas” in Russian), which includes Russian men as old as 65-70 years old in some circumstances who are not actively affiliated with the Russian Armed Forces.[xvii] ISW warned in October 2025 that the Kremlin was preparing to conduct rolling partial mobilization without a formal declaration of war or formal announcement that it was conducting partial compulsory call-up.[xviii] Putin first signed a law on November 4 that allowed the Kremlin to call up active reservists to "defend critical infrastructure facilities" in Russia and occupied Ukraine, and Russian officials and state media avidly rejected concerns that the Kremlin would commit active reservists to combat operations in Ukraine.[xix] The December 8 decree notably does not impose any restrictions on the use of inactive reservists in combat operations, however, allowing the Kremlin to call up and determine the uses of inactive reservists during or after the military assemblies.[xx]

The Kremlin notably has been setting up a system that could support some limited compulsory reservist call-ups without interrupting Russia's semi-annual conscription cycles. The December 8 decree follows the Kremlin's recent intensified efforts to mitigate Russia’s administrative capacity bottlenecks that would complicate Russia’s ability to quickly mobilize reserves during the semi-annual conscription cycles. Putin signed another law on November 4, allowing Russian military conscription administrative processes to occur year-round, as opposed to only during the spring and fall cycles as had happened before.[xxi] The Kremlin has also been simplifying conscription regulations, likely to decrease the number of administrative and medical staff needed to support the semi-annual conscription cycles.[xxii] The Kremlin notably postponed the Fall 2022 conscription cycle after declaring partial mobilization in late September 2022 because it lacked the necessary administrative and medical staff to simultaneously facilitate two compulsory call-ups, and the September 2022 partial mobilization resulted in mass societal backlash against the regime.[xxiii]

The December 8 decree marks a notable departure from the Kremlin's social contract with the Russian people via its volunteer recruitment campaign, through which the Kremlin aimed to avoid deeply unpopular compulsory reserve call-ups. The ever-increasing cost of the system that used high financial incentives to recruit volunteers and the growing need for manpower to sustain Russia's highly attritional assaults have likely forced the Kremlin to reconsider its social contract regarding compulsory military service in Ukraine. Compulsory call-ups of reservists may enable the Kremlin to generate forces more cheaply and demobilize servicemembers mobilized in 2022, but will likely pose greater political risks to the Kremlin.[xxiv] The Kremlin's ongoing efforts to downplay or misrepresent the true intent of these personnel system changes suggest that the Kremlin remains unlikely to conduct a general mobilization of inactive reservists or repeat its 2022 partial mobilization at this time due to the heavy political costs associated with such compulsory reserve call-ups.[xxv] ISW continues to assess that the West and Ukraine can leverage the manner in which Russia’s economic, demographic, and force generation challenges compound over time to force Putin to grapple with challenging decision points at home sooner than he would like. The US can use such an approach to build leverage against Russia to compel Putin to come to the negotiating table with and offer concessions to end the war in Ukraine.[xxvi] The Kremlin notably has offered no concessions on the war in Ukraine so far and has not publicly signaled agreement with any of the United States' recently proposed ceasefires or peace plans.

A Kremlin official suggested that Russia may try to renege on any future peace agreement it signs with Ukraine due to the Ukrainian government's alleged "illegitimacy" - as ISW has long warned. Russian State Duma International Affairs Committee Chairperson Leonid Slutsky claimed on December 9 that Ukraine must hold elections in order to "legitimize" the government.[xxvii] Slutsky stated that Russia must be "absolutely certain" that no one can challenge the authority of the Ukrainian signatories on a future peace agreement. The Kremlin, including Russian President Vladimir Putin, have long used deliberate misinterpretations of Ukrainian law and the Ukrainian constitution to allege that Zelensky is illegitimate.[xxviii] Slutsky's statement is in line with ISW's ongoing assessment that the Kremlin may use its false claims about Zelensky’s illegitimacy to renege on any future peace agreement it signs with Ukraine at a time of Russia’s choosing.[xxix]

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky commented on the latest 20-point US-proposed peace plan. Zelensky stated on December 8 that the latest US-proposed peace plan contains 20 points.[xxx] Zelensky stated that territorial issues remain unresolved and that Ukrainian forces are fighting in order to not give up Ukrainian territory. Zelensky noted that Russia is putting military, informational, and diplomatic pressure on Ukraine to cede all of Donetsk Oblast. Zelensky noted that there is currently a proposal to "exchange" the Russian-occupied Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) and part of the territories that Russian forces occupy for the parts of Donetsk Oblast that Russian forces currently do not occupy. Zelensky continued to reiterate the importance of security guarantees for post-war Ukraine.

Ukraine continued discussions with its European allies on December 8 about the ongoing peace negotiations. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky met on December 8 with French President Emmanuel Macron, British Prime Minister Keir Starmer, and German Chancellor Friederich Merz in London to discuss diplomatic engagement with the United States and further defense support for Ukraine.[xxxi] Starmer noted the importance of reaching a settlement that guarantees a just and lasting peace for Ukraine. The Ukrainian readout of the meeting noted that the leaders reiterated that a peace plan must provide for Ukraine’s territorial integrity and sovereignty, security guarantees from Ukraine's partners, and a full ceasefire. Zelensky and Starmer also held a joint telephone conversation with representatives of Finland, Italy, Poland, Norway, the Netherlands, Denmark, Sweden, Turkey, NATO, and the European Commission on December 8, wherein the parties emphasized that the Coalition of the Willing must play a significant role in future security guarantees for Ukraine.[xxxii] Zelensky noted that Ukraine is engaging in continuous communication with its partners to ensure that the ongoing negotiations consider Europe's position.

Key Takeaways:

• The Kremlin is significantly intensifying its cognitive warfare effort to present the Russian military and economy as able to inevitably win a war of attrition against Ukraine.
• The Kremlin's cognitive warfare effort aims to achieve several of Putin's original war aims through a negotiated settlement, as Russian forces are currently unable to achieve them on the battlefield.
• Russian forces have gained 0.77 percent of Ukrainian territory since the start of 2025 while suffering disproportionately high personnel costs.
• Russia's resources are not endless as Putin is trying to assert, and Putin currently appears to be facing difficult decision points regarding the strategic sustainment of Russian force generation.
• Putin is very likely preparing to attempt to offset Russia’s near-exhaustion of voluntary recruitment in 2026 by mobilizing elements of Russia's strategic reserve to sustain combat operations in Ukraine. The Kremlin remains unlikely to undertake a single large-scale mobilization at this time, however, and is most likely to persistently recruit reservists on a rolling basis.
• A Kremlin official suggested that Russia may try to renege on any future peace agreement it signs with Ukraine due to the Ukrainian government's alleged "illegitimacy" - as ISW has long warned.
• Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky commented on the latest 20-point US-proposed peace plan.
• Ukraine continued discussions with its European allies on December 8 about the ongoing peace negotiations.
• Russian forces recently advanced near Lyman and Pokrovsk and in western Zaporizhia Oblast. Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Oleksandrivka.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

• Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
• Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis
• Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
• Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
• Significant Activity in Belarus

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Ukrainian forces may have continued their long-range strike campaign against Russia’s defense-industrial base (DIB) on the night of December 8 to 9. Footage posted on December 9 shows a large plume of smoke, reportedly from a Ukrainian drone strike in Cheboksary, Chuvashia Republic.[xxxiii] Russian opposition outlet Astra reported that a drone struck targeted a Joint Stock Company (JSC) VNIIR-Progress enterprise in Cheboksary, which produces military equipment like satellite receivers and antennas.[xxxiv] Governor of Chuvashia Republic Oleg Nikolaev confirmed that Ukrainian drones struck Cheboksary on December 9 and declared a state of emergency in the republic.[xxxv]

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in northern Ukraine along the international border)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Sumy Oblast on December 9 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked in unspecified areas of Sumy Oblast on December 8 and 9.[xxxvi] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Andriivka, Kindrativka (both north of Sumy City), Sadky, and Myropillya (both northeast of Sumy City).[xxxvii]

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on December 9 but did not make confirmed advances.

Russian forces attacked northeast of Kharkiv City near Pryplipka, Vovchansk, Synelnykove, Vilcha, and Lyman on December 8 and 9.[xxxviii] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Vovchansk.[xxxix]

Ukrainian Joint Forces Task Force Spokesperson Colonel Viktor Trehubov reported on December 8 that Russian forces’ December 7 strike against the Pechenhiy Dam (east of Kharkiv City) intended to inflict temporary complications on Ukrainian logistics but noted that Russian forces are not preparing for a large-scale breakthrough in the area.[xl] Trehubov reported that the strikes did not affect Ukrainian logistics and that Russian forces continue to rely on small infantry groups conducting slow, attritional assaults.

A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces conducted four FAB-500 UMPK guided glide bomb strikes against Ukrainian forces in Vilcha.[xli]

Order of Battle: The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) credited elements of the Russian Veter Assault Detachment of the 128th Motorized Rifle Brigade (44th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) with the claimed seizure of Vovchansk.[xlii]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Velykyi Burluk direction on December 9 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northeast of Velykyi Burluk near Milove, Khatnie, and Dovhenke and east of Velykyi Burluk near Odradne on December 8 and 9.[xliii]

Geolocated footage published on December 9 shows Russian forces striking the Siverskyi Donets Reservoir dam (southwest of Velykyi Burluk) with guided rockets fired from multiple launch rocket system (MLRS).[xliv] ISW assesses that these strikes are likely part of the Russian forces’ efforts to prepare the battlefield by degrading Ukrainian logistics to facilitate future ground attacks in the Velykyi Burluk direction.[xlv]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on December 9 but did not advance.

Refinement of areas under Russian claims: Geolocated footage published on December 8 shows Ukrainian forces operating along the H-26 Kupyansk-Kharkiv City highway west of Stepova Novoselivka (southeast of Kupyansk) - an area where Russian sources previously claimed Russian forces maintained a presence.[xlvi]

Russian forces attacked east of Kupyansk near Petropavlivka, southeast of Kupyansk near Pishchane, and south of Kupyansk near Kupyansk-Vuzlovyi on December 8 and 9.[xlvii] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near northern and western Kupyansk.[xlviii]

Order of Battle: First-person view (FPV) drone operators of the Russian 272nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (47th Tank Division, 1st Guards Tank Army [GTA], Moscow Military District [MMD]) are striking Ukrainian positions west of Stepova Novoselivka and southeast of Kurylivka (both southeast of Kupyansk).[xlix] Elements of the 352nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (11th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) are reportedly operating in the Kupyansk direction.[l]

Russian forces attacked north of Borova near Bohuslavka and Novoplatonivka and southeast of Borova near Novovodyane and Hrekivka on December 8 and 9.[li]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Slovyansk-Lyman direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on December 9 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced south of Zarichne (east of Lyman) and west of Serednie (northwest of Lyman).[lii]

Russian forces attacked near Lyman itself; northwest of Lyman near Yarova, Shandryholove and toward Drobysheve; north of Lyman near Novyi Myr and toward Stavky; northeast of Lyman near Kolodyazi and Myrne; and east of Lyman near Zarichne on December 8 and 9.[liii]

A servicemember of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Lyman direction reported on December 9 that Russian forces are taking heavy losses while trying to move equipment and personnel across the Chornyi Zherebets River.[liv] The official stated that Russian forces have to cover eight to 20 kilometers on foot to attack and are using fewer unmanned ground vehicles (UGVs) to conduct logistics, using donkeys instead of UGVs.

Ukrainian forces reportedly continued their mid-range strike campaign against Russian military infrastructure in occupied Luhansk Oblast on the night of December 8 to 9. Geolocated footage published on December 9 indicates that Ukrainian Special Operations Forces (SSO) struck the Krasnodonska 220-kilowatt substation in occupied Prokhladne, Luhansk Oblast (about 140km from the frontline).[lv]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Siversk direction on December 9 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced in eastern and central Siversk and south of the settlement; crossed the Bakhmutka River; and are operating in western Siversk.[lvi] One milblogger claimed that Russian forces are operating west of Siversk.[lvii] A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger stated that observed limited Russian infiltrations within Siversk do not indicate that Russian forces control eastern Siversk, however, and that the small infiltration teams often become cut off from Russian logistics to resupply.[lviii] Another Russian milblogger similarly noted that it is too early to talk about complete Russian control across the Bakhmutka River and stated that Russian activity in the area expanded the contested "gray zone."[lix] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces also advanced across the Siverskyi Donets River from near Yampil (northwest of Siversk).[lx]

Russian forces attacked within and near Siversk; northwest of Siversk near Zakitne, Yampil, and Dronivka; northeast of Siversk near Serebryanka; and southwest of Siversk near Svyato-Pokrovske and Fedorivka on December 8 and 9.[lxi] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Zakitne.[lxii]

Russian milbloggers claimed on December 8 that Russian forces conducted a guided glide bomb strike against Kramatorsk, causing a power outage in the city.[lxiii]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 123rd Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 2nd Luhansk People's Republic Army Corps [LNR AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating in Siversk.[lxiv] Elements of the 7th Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd CAA) are reportedly operating near Siversk.[lxv] Elements of the 169th Motorized Rifle Brigade (25th CAA, Central Military District [CMD]) reportedly continue to operate in Yampil.[lxvi] First-person view (FPV) drone operators of the 1st Volki Volunteer Reconnaissance-Assault Brigade (Russian Volunteer Corps) are striking Ukrainian artillery positions west of Rai-Oleksandrivka (southwest of Siversk).[lxvii]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area on December 9 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked near Kostyantynivka itself; north of Kostyantynivka near Podilske; northeast of Kostyantynivka near Chasiv Yar and Orikhovo-Vasylivka and toward Minkivka; east of Kostyantynivka near Pleshchiivka, Shcherbynivka, Ivanopillya, and Kleban-Byk; south of Kostyantynivka near Yablunivka; south of Druzhkivka near Rusyn Yar; and southwest of Druzhkivka near Sofiivka on December 8 and 9.[lxviii] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Mayske (north of Kostyantynivka).[lxix]

Order of Battle: FPV drone operators of the Russian 1307th Motorized Rifle Regiment (6th Motorized Rifle Division, 3rd AC, under operational control of the Southern Grouping of Forces) are striking Ukrainian positions in Kostyantynivka.[lxx] Elements of the 255th Motorized Rifle Regiment (20th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA, SMD) are reportedly struggling to use vehicles in the Kostyantynivka direction due to mud.[lxxi] FPV drone operators of the 68th Separate Reconnaissance Battalion of the 20th Motorized Rifle Division (8th CAA) are reportedly striking Ukrainian equipment near Sofiivka.[lxxii] Drone operators of the Russian Sever-V Brigade (Russian Volunteer Corps) are reportedly conducting reconnaissance north of Chasiv Yar.[lxxiii]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Dobropillya tactical area on December 9 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked east of Dobropillya near Shakhove and southeast of Dobropillya near Zapovidne and Ivanivka on December 8 and 9.[lxxiv]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 174th Separate Reconnaissance Battalion (150th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA, SMD) and of the 33rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (20th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA) are reportedly operating in the Dobropillya direction.[lxxv]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Pokrovsk direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on December 9 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in northwestern Pokrovsk and in eastern Rodynske (north of Pokrovsk).[lxxvi]

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced in central Myrnohrad and northwest and southwest of Myrnohrad.[lxxvii]

Refinement of areas under Russian infiltrations: Geolocated footage published on December 9 indicates that Ukrainian forces maintain a strongpoint in northwestern Pokrovsk – an area near where ISW assessed Russia forces previously conducted infiltration missions.[lxxviii] ISW will adjust its assessment as it collects and verifies additional evidence.

Russian forces attacked near and within Pokrovsk; northwest of Pokrovsk near Hryshyne; north of Pokrovsk near Rodynske and Sukhetske; northeast of Pokrovsk near Chervonyi (Krasnyi) Lyman, Fedorivka; east of Pokrovsk near Myrnohrad; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Udachne, Novopidhorodne, Molodetske, and Kotlyne on December 8 and 9.[lxxix] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked in Rodynske.[lxxx]

The Ukrainian 7th Rapid Reaction Corps of the Air Assault Forces reported on December 8 that the situation in and around Myrnohrad remains difficult and that Russian forces are attacking intensively in southeastern Myrnohrad and conducted 21 glide bomb strikes against the town within the last week (between roughly December 2 and December 8).[lxxxi]

Russian Chief of the General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov claimed on December 9 that Russian forces have seized over 30 percent of the buildings in Myrnohrad.[lxxxii] Gerasimov stated that the primary goal of the Russian 2nd CAA (CMD) is to seize Myrnohrad after Pokrovsk.

Order of Battle: FPV drone operators of the Russian 132nd Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA, formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic [DNR] AC, SMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces in Myrnohrad.[lxxxiii] Artillery elements of the 27th Motorized Rifle Division (2nd CAA, CMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces in the Pokrovsk direction.[lxxxiv]

Russian forces continued offensive operations near Novopavlivka itself, south of Novopavlivka near Dachne, and southwest of Novopavlivka near Yalta on December 8 and 9 but did not advance.[lxxxv]

Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Oleksandrivka direction.

Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on December 9 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced north of Stepove (southeast of Oleksandrivka).[lxxxvi]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Oleksandrivka near Zelenyi Hai and southeast of Oleksandrivka near Vorone, Sichneve, Vyshneve, Verbove, and Krasnohirske on December 8 and 9.[lxxxvii]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 37th Motorized Rifle Brigade (36th CAA, Eastern Military District [EMD]) and of the 14th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff's Main Directorate [GRU]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast.[lxxxviii]

Ukrainian forces continued their mid-range strike campaign against Russian military infrastructure in occupied Donetsk Oblast on the night of December 8 to 9. Ukrainian Special Operations Forces (SSO) published footage on December 9 and reported that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian drone depot affiliated with the Russian 9th Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA, SMD) near occupied Donetsk City (roughly 53 kilometers from the frontline).[lxxxix]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Hulyaipole direction on December 9 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and Russian milbloggers claimed that elements of the Russian 36th Motorized Rifle Brigade (29th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Eastern Military District [EMD]) seized Ostapivske (north of Hulyaipole at the junction of the Haichur and Yanchul rivers).[xc] ISW previously assessed that Russia’s ability to cross the Haichur River will likely be the determining factor in its ability to make operationally significant advances further westward towards Hulyiapole.[xci] Russian advances near Danylivka (just east of Ostapivske) could threaten to isolate the Ukrainian grouping in Hulyaipole from Ukrainian forces in the Pokrovske-Oleksandrivka area (northeast of Ostapivske) and Russian advances across the Haichur River in the Danylivka-Dobropillya area (south of Ostapivske) could threaten an eventual encirclement of Hulyaipole from the northwest.

Russian forces attacked near and within Hulyaipole; north of Hulyaipole near Danylivka, Yehorivka, and Rybne and toward Pryluky and Varvarivka; northeast of Hulyaipole near Solodke and Pryvilne; and east of Hulyaipole near Zatyshshya on December 8 and 9.[xcii] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Dobropillya.[xciii]

Russian sources claimed that Russian drone operators are isolating the combat zone by striking Ukrainian vehicles that try to enter the Ukrainian garrison in Hulyaipole and that Russian forces are conducting airstrikes from Su-34 fighter-bomber aircraft against Hulyaipole.[xciv] A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger criticized other Russian sources for falsely claiming Russian advances within Hulyaipole on December 9.[xcv]

Russian forces recently advanced in western Zaporizhzhia Oblast.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on December 9 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in the southern outskirts of Stepnohirsk (west of Orikhiv).[xcvi]

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced in central Mala Tokmachka (southeast of Orikhiv).[xcvii]

Russian forces attacked southeast of Orikhiv near Mala Tokmachka and Bilohirya and west of Orikhiv near Stepove, Stepnohirsk, and Prymorske on December 8 and 9.[xcviii]

The commander of an assault unit in Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) operating in the Zaporizhia direction reported on December 9 that Russian forces have intensified their efforts to advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City.[xcix] The commander reported that the terrain in the area prevents Russian forces from using heavy equipment, such that Russian forces are utilizing small group infiltration tactics.

A Russian milblogger refuted on December 9 the Russian Ministry of Defense’s (MoD) December 8 claim that Russian forces seized Novodanylivka, acknowledging that Ukrainian forces maintain a limited presence in Novodanylivka.[c]

Geolocated footage published on December 9 shows a Ukrainian Air Force MiG-29 conducting an Armement Air-Sol Modulaire (AASM) Hammer strike against a Russian manpower concentration in Stepnohirsk.[ci]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 108th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (7th VDV Division) are reportedly operating in the Zaporizhia direction.[cii]

Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported ground activity in the Kherson direction on December 9.

The commander of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Kherson direction reported on December 8 that Russian forces are taking advantage of foggy weather conditions to attempt to send units to the islands in the Dnipro River delta daily.[ciii] The commander noted that Russian forces are trying to cross multiple small rivers opposite Oleshky (south of Kherson City) using inflatable boats, while Russian forces trying to cross the Dnipro River delta near Hola Prystan (southwest of Kherson City) are using faster motorboats.

Order of Battle: Drone operators and artillery elements of the Russian 299th and 331st VDV regiments (both of the 98th VDV Division) are reportedly operating in the Kherson direction.[civ]

Ukrainian forces may have targeted occupied Crimea on the night of December 8 to 9. A Crimea-focused Telegram channel reported that unspecified actors caused explosions near Bakachyk-Kyiat in occupied Crimea, between Simferopol Airport and Simferopol-Vantazhnyi train station.[cv] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces downed 22 Ukrainian drones over occupied Crimea.[cvi]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Russian forces conducted a series of drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of December 8 to 9. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 110 Shahed-type, Gerbera-type, and other drones – of which roughly 70 were Shahed-type drones – from the directions of Bryansk, Oryol, and Kursk cities; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; occupied Donetsk city; and occupied Hvardiiske, Crimea.[cvii] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 84 drones and that 24 drones struck nine locations. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces struck energy, residential, and civilian infrastructure in Sumy, Kharkiv, and Dnipropetrovsk oblasts.[cviii]

Ukraine’s largest private energy company, DTEK, reported on December 8 that it suspended activities at the last DTEK-operated “Bilozerska” coal mine in Donetsk Oblast due to the deteriorating security situation and lack of stable power supply.[cix]

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

Nothing significant to report.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.