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Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, December 5, 2025
Assessment as of December 5, 2026 as of: 6:20pm ET
Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.
Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.
Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.
For more information on ISW's map methodology, please view our statement here.
Note: The data cut-off for this product was 11:15am ET on December 5. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the December 6 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.
US and Ukrainian officials continued peace talks to end the war in Ukraine in Miami, Florida on December 4 and 5. Ukrainian National Security and Defense Council Secretary Rustem Umerov and Chief of the Ukrainian General Staff Major General Andriy Hnatov met with US Special Envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff and former Senior Advisor to the US President Jared Kushner in Miami, Florida on December 4 and 5 to continue discussing a possible peace settlement.[1] A source with knowledge of the negotiations told Axios that Witkoff and Kushner briefed the Ukrainian delegation on the December 2 Witkoff-Russian President Vladimir Putin meeting.[2] Umerov previously led the Ukrainian delegation in talks with US negotiators in Hallandale Beach, Florida on November 30.[3] Russian Presidential Aide Yuriy Ushakov stated on December 5 that Russia is waiting on a response to the December 2 talks.[4] ISW will continue to monitor for more information about the ongoing peace negotiations process.
Available open-source information indicates that Russian forces have not encircled Ukrainian forces in Myrnohrad as of December 5 as Russian forces continue efforts to complete the encirclement of the Pokrovsk-Myrnohrad pocket. Geolocated footage published on December 4 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced north and southeast of Myrnohrad (east of Pokrovsk.[5] Additional geolocated footage published on December 4 indicates that Russian forces also infiltrated into positions in northwestern Pokrovsk.[6] These geolocations are not yet dispositive that Russian forces have achieved a complete land encirclement of Ukrainian forces in the Pokrovsk-Myrnohrad pocket, however. Commander of the Ukrainian 7th Rapid Reaction Corps of the Air Assault Forces, Commander Brigadier General Yevhen Lasiychuk, reported on December 5 that Russian forces have not encircled the Pokrovsk-Myrnohrad pocket and that Ukrainian forces hold northern Pokrovsk and maintain positions in central Pokrovsk.[7] Lasiychuk noted that Russian forces are avoiding urban warfare and are instead attempting to bypass Pokrovsk from its flanks. ISW continues to assess that Russian forces will very likely complete the seizure of Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad after a 21-month campaign, though the timing and operational implications of these seizures remain unclear at this time.[8] Although ISW has not observed visual evidence or official Ukrainian reports to assess that Russian forces have encircled Ukrainian forces in Myrnohrad, the situation is likely extremely difficult, and Russian forces very likely can disrupt narrow Ukrainian exfiltration routes and ground lines of communication (GLOCs) with artillery and drones.
Russian forces are attempting to completely deny Ukrainian tactical- and operational-level logistics to the Pokrovsk direction using drones to achieve effects of battlefield air interdiction (BAI). A Ukrainian artillery battalion commander operating in the Pokrovsk direction reported on December 5 that Russian forces are using drones in an attempt to interdict Ukrainian GLOCS within a 50-kilometer range of Pokrovsk but that Ukrainian forces are attempting to mitigate.[9] Lasiychuk noted that Ukrainian forces are able to supply and conduct rotations into the Pokrovsk-Myrnohrad pocket and are working to widen the GLOC north of the pocket.[10] Russia’s evolving campaign design relies on achieving partial effects battlefield air interdiction (BAI) against Ukrainian logistics at an operational depth (about 25 to 100 kilometers) over several months to degrade Ukrainian defensive abilities such that Russian forces can advance more easily against a degraded Ukrainian forces.[11] Russian forces have dedicated elite drone units, such as the Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies, to striking Ukrainian logistics and drone operators at operational depths.[12] A successful Russian BAI campaign within a 50-kilometer range of Pokrovsk would also impact Ukrainian logistics into the Kramatorsk, Kostyantynivka, and Novopavlivka directions and would likely enable more rapid Russian advances, especially if Russian forces managed to replicate campaign successes in other areas of the frontline.
Ukrainian forces continue to strike Russian oil and defense industrial base (DIB) infrastructure. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on December 5 that Ukrainian forces struck an unspecified facility and caused a fire at the Temyruk seaport in Krasnodar Krai, which houses liquified natural gas (LNG) infrastructure, ships, and other cargo.[13] The Ukrainian General Staff noted that the battle damage assessment (BDA) is ongoing. A Krasnodar Krai government source reported on December 5 that a Ukrainian drone strike damaged port infrastructure in Temyruk and caused a fire covering an area of 1,350 square kilometers.[14] The Ukraine General Staff also reported that Ukrainian strikes damaged an installation and caused a fire at the Syzran Oil Refinery in Samara Oblast, which has an annual processing capacity of seven to 8.9 million tons of oil.[15] Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) Commander Major Robert “Magyar” Brovdi reported that Ukrainian forces also struck the Balashovskaya electrical substation in Volgograd Oblast.[16]
The Ukrainian General Staff confirmed on December 4 that Ukrainian forces struck the Nevinnomyssk Azot Chemical Plant in Nevinnomyssk, Stavropol Krai on the night of December 3 to 4.[17] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that the Nevinnomyssk Azot Chemical Plant is a critical part of the Russian DIB with a production capacity of over one million tons of ammonia and up to 1.4 million tons of ammonium nitrate per year — making the plant a key supplier of basic components for explosives and ammunition products for the Russian military. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on December 5 that a recent Ukrainian strike against Saratov Oil Refinery, Saratov Oblast, likely referring to a strike overnight on November 27 to 28, damaged the refinery’s ELOU-AVT-6 primary oil purification unit.[18] The Ukrainian General Staff noted that Ukrainian strikes forced the Saratov Oil Refinery to suspend crude oil processing as of December 2025 and that the refinery is operating at under 50 percent of its capacity.
Five unidentified drones flew over a major French nuclear submarine base on the evening of December 4 amid increasing reports of drones flying over European military infrastructure. French Defense Minister Catherine Vautrin confirmed on December 5 that the French military used unspecified means to intercept the drones over the Île Longue base in Finistère, which houses France’s four nuclear ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs).[19] French military sources told Agence France-Presse that French marines opened fire on the drones, but other French media sources suggested that French authorities attempted to jam the drones.[20] French officials have not officially attributed the drones to a specific actor as of this writing. Several sources noted that an unspecified number of drones also flew over the Crozon peninsula — where the Île Longue base is located — on the evening of November 17 to 18 but the drones did not enter restricted military airspace.[21] The December 4 drone sightings are part of a newly observed pattern of aerial incursions into NATO airspace, possibly with the purpose of reconnoitering known European military bases and defense infrastructure.[22] ISW continues to assess that Russia is increasingly engaging in covert and overt attacks against Europe and that ongoing Russian and suspected Russian airspace violations are likely part of Russia’s “Phase Zero” effort — Russia's broader informational and psychological condition-setting effort that aims to prepare for a possible NATO-Russia war in the future.[23]
Russian forces committed a war crime in the Siversk direction. Geolocated footage published on December 2 shows a soldier of the Russian 88th Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 2nd Luhansk People’s Republic Army Corps [LNR AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) executing a Ukrainian prisoner-of-war (POW) with his hands raised in surrender in Svyato-Pokrovske (southwest of Siversk).[24] A Russian Telegram channel claiming to be the official channel of the Russian 3rd CAA notably published the footage of the execution and characterized Russian forces’ murder of a Ukrainian POW as “humane treatment.”[25] ISW has observed an increase in Russian war crimes in directions where Russian forces are beginning to intensify offensive operations and infiltrating into towns, and Russian forces recently began infiltration operations in Siversk.[26] ISW continues to assess that the Russian military command is endorsing and sometimes ordering war crimes on the battlefield and that Russia is torturing and abusing Ukrainian civilian prisoners as part of the wider military modus operandi.[27]
Key Takeaways:
- US and Ukrainian officials continued peace talks to end the war in Ukraine in Miami, Florida on December 4 and 5.
- Available open-source information indicates that Russian forces have not encircled Ukrainian forces in Myrnohrad as of December 5 as Russian forces continue efforts to complete the encirclement of the Pokrovsk-Myrnohrad pocket.
- Russian forces are attempting to completely deny Ukrainian tactical- and operational-level logistics to the Pokrovsk direction using drones to achieve effects of battlefield air interdiction (BAI).
- Ukrainian forces continue to strike Russian oil and defense industrial base (DIB) infrastructure.
- Five unidentified drones flew over a major French nuclear submarine base on the evening of December 4 amid increasing reports of drones flying over European military infrastructure.
- Russian forces committed a war crime in the Siversk direction.
- Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Novopavlivka. Russian forces recently advanced near Borova and Pokrovsk.
We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.
- Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
- Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis
- Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
- Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
- Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
- Significant Activity in Belarus
Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
See topline text.
Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in northern Ukraine along the international border)
Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Sumy Oblast on December 5 but did not advance.
Russian forces attacked in Kursk and Sumy oblasts, including northeast of Sumy City near Varachyne, on December 4 and 5.[28] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Oleksiivka (north of Sumy City) and south of Yunakivka (northeast of Sumy City).[29]
The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in Sumy Oblast reported on December 5 that Russian forces are exploiting foggy weather conditions that degrade Ukrainian drone reconnaissance to assault Ukrainian positions in Sumy Oblast.[30] ISW has previously observed Russian forces leveraging poor weather conditions that hinder Ukrainian drone operations in northern Sumy Oblast.[31]
Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 119th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (106th VDV Division) are reportedly operating in Yunakivka.[32] Drone operators and other elements of the 137th VDV Regiment (106th VDV Division) and assault elements of the 1st Motorized Rifle Regiment (Territorial Control) (Russian Aerospace Forces [VKS] and reportedly under the operational control of the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces) are reportedly operating in the Sumy direction.[33]
Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)
Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on December 5 but did not advance.
Assessed Russian infiltrations: Geolocated footage published on December 5 shows Ukrainian forces striking a Russian-occupied building in western Lyman (northeast of Kharkiv City) in what ISW assesses was a Russian infiltration mission that did not change control of terrain or forward edge of battle (FEBA).[34]
Russian forces attacked northeast of Kharkiv City near Vilcha, Vovchansk, Prylipka, Lyman, and Synelnykove and toward Izbytske on December 4 and 5.[35] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked in Vilcha.[36]
Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 128th Motorized Rifle Brigade (44th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) and 1009th Motorized Rifle Regiment (69th Motorized Rifle Division, 6th Combined Arms Army [CAA], LMD) reportedly continue to operate in and near Vovchansk.[37]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Velykyi Burluk direction on December 5 but did not make confirmed advances.
Russian forces attacked northeast of Velykyi Burluk near Milove and Khatnie and east of Velykyi Burluk near Odradne on December 4 and 5.[38]
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on December 5 but did not advance.
Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on December 2 indicates that Ukrainian forces advanced in central Kupyansk.[39]
Russian forces attacked near Kupyansk itself and southeast of Kupyansk near Pishchane, Stepova Novoselivka, and Hlushkivka on December 4 and 5.[40] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked in the western outskirts of Kupyansk.[41]
Order of Battle: Multiple launch rocket system (MLRS) elements of the Russian 1st Guards Tank Army (GTA, Moscow Military District [MMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions in the Kupyansk direction.[42]
Russian forces recently advanced in the Borova direction.
Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on December 4 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in southern Bohuslavka (north of Borova).[43]
Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced east and south of Bohuslavka.[44]
Russian forces attacked north of Borova toward Novoplatonivka and southeast of Borova near Hrekivka, Novoyehorivka, and Novovodyane on December 4 and 5.[45]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Slovyansk-Lyman direction on December 5 but did not advance.
Unconfirmed claims: The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Slovyansk-Lyman direction reported on December 5 that Ukrainian forces maintain control of Novoselivka (northwest of Lyman) and Stavky (north of Lyman).[46] The spokesperson noted that Russian forces are raising flags during infiltration missions to exaggerate claims of advance on the battlefield — in line with ISW’s continuing assessment that the Russian military command is using ostentatious flag raisings across the frontline to support its exaggerated claims of Russian advances as part of a cognitive warfare effort to portray Russian battlefield victory as inevitable.[47]
Russian forces attacked northwest of Lyman near Drobysheve, Derylove, and Shandryholove and toward Oleksandrivka; northeast of Lyman near Kolodyazi; and east of Lyman near Zarichne on December 4 and 5.[48]
Ukrainian 3rd Army Corps (AC) Spokesperson Oleksandr Borodin reported on December 4 that Russian forces are intensifying assault operations in the Slovyansk-Lyman direction and deploying mercenaries, including from unspecified African countries.[49] Borodin reported that Russian forces are not employing fiber-optic drones as frequently and that Russian drone operations have expanded the kill zone (an area immediately near the frontline where a mass of tactical strike and reconnaissance drones pose an elevated risk to any equipment or personnel that enters the area), complicating Ukrainian logistics. An officer of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Slovyansk-Lyman direction reported that Russian forces are advancing in groups of five to seven, using the cover of fog.[50] The officer stated that Russian forces deployed two elite drone units to the Slovyansk-Lyman direction, further complicating Ukrainian logistics in the area.
Order of Battle: Electronic warfare (EW) elements of the Russian 144th Motorized Rifle Division (20th Combined Arms Army [CAA], MMD) are reportedly intercepting Ukrainian drones in the Lyman direction.[51] Artillery elements of the 73rd Artillery Brigade (25th CAA, Central Military District [CMD]) are reportedly operating in the Lyman direction.[52]
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Siversk direction on December 5 but did not advance.
Assessed Russian advances: A Ukrainian military source published maps on November 14 and November 26 showing that Russian forces seized Serebryanka (northeast of Siversk) and advanced north, east, and southeast of Siversk, east of Dronivka (northwest of Siversk), northwest of Vyimka (southeast of Siversk), and east of Zvanivka (south of Siversk).[53] ISW has adjusted its control of terrain assessment on its maps accordingly after observing this evidence for the first time on December 5. ISW does not assess that these Russian gains occurred over the past 24 hours, despite only collecting evidence to assess the change now.
Assessed Russian infiltrations: The Ukrainian military source published a map on November 26 showing that Russian forces are operating in eastern Siversk and available footage suggests a continued Ukrainian presence in eastern Siversk, indicating that Russian and Ukrainian positions are intermixed in eastern Siversk.[54]
Russian forces attacked near and within Siversk itself; northwest of Siversk near Dronivka and Yampil and toward Ozerne and Zakitne; northeast of Siversk near Serebryanka; south of Siversk near Fedorivka; and southwest of Siversk near Vasyukivka on December 4 and 5.[55] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked along the Siverskyi Donets River near Dibrova and Bruskivka (both northwest of Siversk).[56]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area on December 5 but did not make confirmed advances.
Unconfirmed claims: The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on December 5 that Russian forces seized Klynove and Bezimyane (both north of Kostyantynivka and roughly 6.5 kilometers from the frontline).[57] The Russian MoD first claimed that Russian forces seized Klynove on December 1.[58] ISW assesses that the Russian MoD made these claims as part of a wider Russian effort to falsely portray Russian advances on the battlefield and has observed Russian forces using similar tactics, such as raising flags during infiltration missions that do not change the control of terrain or the forward edge of battle (FEBA), to posture false advances for informational effects.[59]
Refinement of areas under Russian claims: Geolocated footage published on December 4 indicates that Ukrainian forces maintain position in southern and southeastern Kostyantynivka – areas where Russian sources previously claimed that Russian forces maintained a presence.[60]
Russian forces attacked near and within Kostyantynivka itself; north of Kostyantynivka near Virolyubivka; northeast of Kostyantynivka near Chasiv Yar and Novomarkove; east of Kostyantynivka near Oleksandro-Shultyne; southeast of Kostyantynivka near Ivanopillya, Pleshchiivka, Kleban-Byk, and Shcherbynivka; south of Kostyantynivka near Yablunivka and toward Berestok; south of Druzhkivka near Rusyn Yar and toward Mykolaipillya; southwest of Druzhkivka near Sofiivka and Volodymyrivka; and west of Druzhkivka toward Torske on December 4 and 5.[61]
Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 1442nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (6th Motorized Rifle Division, 3rd Army Corps [AC], under operational control of the Southern Grouping of Forces) and 72nd Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd AC) are striking Ukrainian positions in southern and southeastern Kostyantynivka.[62] Drone operators of the 103rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (150th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian vehicles in the Kostyantynivka direction.[63]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Dobropillya tactical area on December 5 but did not advance.
Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on December 2 indicates that Russian forces advanced south of Zapovidne (southeast of Dobropillya).[64]
Russian forces attacked east of Dobropillya near Shakhove and Nove Shakhove and toward Vilne and southeast of Dobropillya near Dorozhnie and Mayak on December 4 and 5.[65]
Russian forces recently advanced in the Pokrovsk direction.
See topline text for assessed Russian advances and infiltrations in the Pokrovsk direction.
Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced north of Pokrovsk and in central Novopidhorodne (southwest of Pokrovsk).[66]
Russian forces attacked near and within Pokrovsk itself; northwest of Pokrovsk near Hryshyne; north of Pokrovsk near Rodynske; northeast of Pokrovsk near Chervonyi (Krasnyi) Lyman, Svitle, and Novoekonomichne; east of Pokrovsk near and within Myrnohrad; southeast of Pokrovsk near Novopavlivka; south of Pokrovsk near Shevchenko; southwest of Pokrovsk near Kotlyne, Udachne, and Molodetske; and west of Pokrovsk toward Serhiivka on December 4 and 5.[67]
Order of Battle: FPV drone operators of the Russian 80th Sparta Separate Reconnaissance Battalion (51st CAA, formerly 1st Donetsk People’s Republic [DNR] AC, SMD) are reportedly interdicting Ukrainian logistics into Myrnohrad.[68]
Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Novopavlivka direction.
Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on December 4 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced along the T-0420 Novopavlivka-Slovyanka highway in central Novopavlivka.[69]
Refinement of areas under Russian claims: A Ukrainian brigade operating in the Novopavlivka direction reported on December 4 that Ukrainian forces cleared Novopavlivka of Russian forces, indicating that Russin forces at least no longer maintain a presence on the west (right) bank of the Solena River in Novopavlivka, areas where Russian sources previously claimed that Russian forces maintained a presence.[70] ISW has not observed open-source evidence to confirm that Ukrainian forces completely liberated Novopavlivka on the east (left) bank of the Solena River, though it is possible. ISW will continue to update its assessment as it collects and verifies more information.
Russian forces attacked northeast of Novopavlivka near Novoserhiivka and south of Novopavlivka near Dachne on December 4 and 5.[71]
The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Novopavlivka direction reported on December 4 that the Russian military command does not inform servicemembers whom it sends on assault missions about any Ukrainian presence in the area, but simply orders servicemembers to reach a designated objective.[72] The spokesperson reported that the Russian Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies drone operators attempt to expand the "kill zone" (an area immediately near the frontline where a mass of tactical strike and reconnaissance drones pose an elevated risk to any equipment or personnel that enters the area) by interdicting Ukrainian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) before Russian forces conduct ground assaults. The spokesperson noted that the first wave of Russian ground assaults consists of poorly trained servicemembers who draw Ukrainian fire so that Russian drones can strike Ukrainian positions. The spokesperson added that Russian forces include relatively well-trained troops that the Russian military command avoids employing in attritional assaults.
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Oleksandrivka direction on December 5 but did not advance.
Russian forces attacked northeast of Oleksandrivka near Zelenyi Hai and Yalta; east of Oleksandrivka near Oleksandrohrad; southeast of Oleksandrivka near Sosnivka, Stepove, Verbove, Vyshneve, Pavlivka, Pryvilne, Rybne, and Krasnohirske; and southwest of Oleksandrivka toward Andriivka on December 4 and 5.[73]
The Ukrainian General Staff reported on December 4 that an unspecified Ukrainian strike against a Russian training ground near occupied Dokuchaievsk, Donetsk Oblast killed or wounded 60 Russian servicemembers.[74]
Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Hulyaipole direction on December 5 but did not advance.
Assessed Russian infiltrations: Geolocated footage published on December 4 and 5 shows Ukrainian forces striking Russian positions east of Varvarivka (north of Hulyaipole) during what ISW assesses was a Russian infiltration mission that did not change control of terrain or the forward edge of the battle area (FEBA) at this time.[75]
Russian forces attacked near Hulyaipole itself; north of Hulyaipole near Dobropillya and toward Varvarivka and Pryluky; northeast of Hulyaipole near Solodke; and east of Hulyaipole near Zatyshshya on December 4 and 5.[76]
Russian milbloggers published footage on December 5 reportedly showing Russian forces conducting FAB-500 UMPK guided glide bomb strikes against apartment buildings in Hulyaipole.[77]
Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 114th Motorized Rifle Regiment (5th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly operating in the north and east of Hulyaipole.[78] Drone operators, artillery, and other elements of the 38th Motorized Rifle Brigade (35th CAA, EMD) reportedly continue to operate toward eastern Hulyaipole and strike Ukrainian vehicles and positions near and in Hulyaipole.[79] Drone operators of the 57th Motorized Rifle Brigade (5th CAA) are intercepting Ukrainian drones over eastern Hulyaipole and reportedly continue to strike Ukrainian positions in Hulyaipole.[80] Elements of the 11th Air Force and Air Defense Army (EMD and Russian Aerospace Forces [VKS]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces in Hulyaipole.[81]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on December 5 but did not make confirmed advances.
Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed on December 4 that Russian forces control about 75 percent of Prymorske and eastern, central, and southern Stepnohirsk (both west of Orikhiv).[82] ISW has observed evidence to assess that Russian forces have advanced in about 3.64 percent of Prymorske as of December 5.
Refinement of area under Russian claims: Geolocated footage published on December 4 indicates that Ukrainian forces maintain positions in eastern Mala Tokmachka (southeast of Orikhiv), an area where Russian sources previously claimed that Russian forces maintained a presence.[83]
Russian forces continued attacking west of Orikhiv near Prymorske, Stepove, and Stepnohirsk on December 4 and 5.[84] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Prymorske.[85]
Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 291st Motorized Rifle Regiment (58th CAA, Southern Military District [SMD]) are striking Ukrainian forces in central Mala Tokmachka.[86] Elements of the 7th Airborne (VDV) Division reportedly continue to operate in Stepnohirsk.[87] Drone operators of the 108th VDV Regiment (7th VDV Division) and the Nemets group of the 3rd Assault Company of the 291st Motorized Rifle Regiment reportedly continue to operate in the Zaporizhia direction.[88]
Russian forces continued limited ground attacks east of Kherson City toward the Antonivskyi roadway bridge on December 4 and 5 but did not advance.[89]
A Russian milblogger claimed on December 5 that Russian forces have heavily shelled Prydniprovske and Sadove (both east of Kherson City) for the past several days and conducted a large rocket strike against the settlements on December 5.[90] The milblogger also called for Russian drone and artillery crews to target medical facilities and the Kherson Thermal Power Plant (TPP) in Kherson City, which supplies heat to warm the city in the winter.[91]
Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 98th VDV Division, including its 215th Separate Reconnaissance Battalion, reportedly continue to operate in the Kherson direction.[92]
Ukrainian forces continue to strike Russian military assets in occupied Crimea. Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported on December 5 that GUR drone operators struck a Russian Su-24 tactical bomber, radio antenna, a 39N6 Kasta-2E2 radar station, an Orion reconnaissance drone, two Podlyot radar stations, a freight train, and a Ural truck in occupied Crimea in the past two weeks (since about November 21).[93] GUR posted geolocated footage on December 5 showing a Ukrainian strike on a Russian Su-24 at the occupied Novofedorivka Airbase and a railway depot in occupied northern Feodosia.[94]
Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)
Russian forces conducted a series of drone strikes against Ukraine overnight on December 4 to 5. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 137 Shahed-type, Gerbera-type, and other strike drones, of which about 90 were Shaheds, from the directions of Kursk and Oryol cities; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast, Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai, and occupied Cape Chauda, Crimea.[95] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 80 Russian drones and that 57 drones struck 13 locations in Ukraine. The Ukrainian State Emergency Service reported that Russian drones struck an unspecified facility in Kharkiv City.[96] Ukrainian state electricity transmission operator Ukrenergo reported that Ukraine is implementing energy restrictions and rolling blackouts on December 5 and 6 due to Russian strikes.[97]
The Ukrainian National Police reported that a Russian drone struck a truck in Izyum, Kharkiv Oblast on December 5, killing two civilians.[98] Russian milbloggers claimed on December 4 that Russian Geran-2 drones struck Kharkiv City and Chuhuiv, Kharkiv Oblast, and Slovyansk, Donetsk Oblast.[99]
Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)
Nothing significant to report.
Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.
[1] https://www.axios.com/2025/12/05/ukraine-peace-talks-witkoff-kushner-putin; https://suspilne dot media/1181402-u-maami-zaversilasa-zustric-ukrainskoi-ta-amerikanskoi-delegacij-dzerela/; https://suspilne dot media/1182024-umerov-i-gnatov-provedut-zustric-iz-predstavnikami-trampa-v-maami-5-grudna-dzerela/
[2] https://www.axios.com/2025/12/05/ukraine-peace-talks-witkoff-kushner-putin
[3] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-30-2025/
[4] https://tass dot ru/politika/25823451; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-2-2025/
[5] https://x.com/14brigade/status/1996612553884237853; https://x.com/Bielitzling/status/1996650402251682273; https://t.me/argus38/731 ; https://x.com/Richer214469/status/1996638783035658495; https://x.com/Richer214469/status/1996639247491911879
[6] https://x.com/Bielitzling/status/1996655937638297754; https://x.com/craftoriz/status/1996636447114514778; https://t.me/contraomnes4/19
[7] https://suspilne dot media/donbas/1181480-sili-oboroni-namagautsa-rozsiriti-logisticnij-koridor-do-pokrovska-ta-mirnograda-komandir-7-korpusu-dsv/
[8] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-26-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-23-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-22-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-19-2025/
[9] https://youtu.be/Uu50wPIJ4ps; https://suspilne dot media/donbas/1177140-uskladnena-logistika-do-pokrovska-ta-ci-buv-proriv-u-limani-vse-pro-boi-na-doneccini-i-lugansini-5-grudna-2025/?anchor=live_1764881966
[10] https://suspilne dot media/donbas/1181480-sili-oboroni-namagautsa-rozsiriti-logisticnij-koridor-do-pokrovska-ta-mirnograda-komandir-7-korpusu-dsv/
[11] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-drone-innovations-are-likely-achieving-effects-of-battlefield-air-interdiction-in-ukraine/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-partial-battlefield-air-interdiction-enabled-recent-russian-advances-in-pokrovsk/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-12-2025/
[12] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-4-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-17-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-9-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-drone-innovations-are-likely-achieving-effects-of-battlefield-air-interdiction-in-ukraine/
[13] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/32227
[14] https://t.me/opershtab23/14616; https://t.me/opershtab23/14618
[15] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/32227
[16] https://t.me/robert_magyar/1677
[17] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/32204 ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-4-2025/
[18] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/32227 ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-28-2025/
[19] https://www.euronews dot com/2025/12/05/french-soldiers-open-fire-on-drones-over-nuclear-submarine-base; https://www.tf1info dot fr/justice-faits-divers/finistere-5-drones-detectes-au-dessus-de-la-base-sous-marine-de-l-ile-longue-2410994.html
[20] https://www.euronews dot com/2025/12/05/french-soldiers-open-fire-on-drones-over-nuclear-submarine-base; https://www.euractiv.com/news/drone-intrusion-reported-at-key-french-nuclear-deterrence-base/; https://www.tf1info dot fr/justice-faits-divers/finistere-5-drones-detectes-au-dessus-de-la-base-sous-marine-de-l-ile-longue-2410994.html; https://www.franceinfo dot fr/economie/emploi/metiers/armee-et-securite/la-base-sous-marine-de-l-ile-longue-dans-le-finistere-qui-abrite-les-sous-marins-nucleaires-francais-a-ete-survolee-par-des-drones_7659868.html; https://www.defensenews.com/global/europe/2025/12/05/drones-fly-over-french-strategic-nuclear-submarine-base-media-report/; https://www.liberation dot fr/societe/police-justice/une-enquete-ouverte-apres-le-survol-par-des-drones-de-la-base-de-sous-marins-nucleaires-de-lile-longue-20251205_SEOPNNL2MFDANLRD5HJJ3ZQZZ4/?redirected=1; https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/france-investigates-reports-drones-over-nuclear-sub-base-2025-12-05/
[21] https://www.drone-actu dot fr/drone/crozon-un-drone-survole-une-zone-interdite-pres-des-sites-militaires#google_vignette ; https://www.france24 dot com/en/live-news/20251205-france-takes-anti-drone-measures-after-flight-over-nuclear-sub-base; https://www.lemonde dot fr/en/france/article/2025/12/05/france-takes-anti-drone-measures-after-flight-over-nuclear-sub-base_6748188_7.html; https://www.franceinfo dot fr/economie/emploi/metiers/armee-et-securite/la-base-sous-marine-de-l-ile-longue-dans-le-finistere-qui-abrite-les-sous-marins-nucleaires-francais-a-ete-survolee-par-des-drones_7659868.html ; https://www.euronews dot com/2025/12/05/french-soldiers-open-fire-on-drones-over-nuclear-submarine-base
[22] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-24-2025/ https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-26-2025/; https://www.ndr dot de/nachrichten/schleswig-holstein/drohnensichtungen-jetzt-auch-in-sh-landespolizei-verstaerkt-abwehr,drohnen-170.htm; https://www.bild dot de/politik/inland/drohnen-alarm-in-kiel-brisanter-als-gedacht-thyssenkrupp-und-uni-klinik-betroffen-68dcc14412c5eba0ff76163a; https://www.politico dot eu/article/sabine-sutterlin-waack-drone-buzz-critical-infrastructure-germany/; https://www.bbc dot com/news/articles/c3rvzdq93yro
[23] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-22-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-12-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-10-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-9-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-5-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-27-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-24-2025/
[24] *warning: graphic* https://t.me/shock3OA/3692; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/10675
[25] *warning: graphic* https://t.me/shock3OA/3692
[26] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-18-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-22-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-18-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-21-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-7-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-29-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-16-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-28-2025/
[27] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-1-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-4-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-23-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-8-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-7-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-29-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-28-2025/
[28] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/32228; https://t.me/wargonzo/30899; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/37000
[29]https://t.me/severnnyi/5935; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/37000; https://t.me/dva_majors/84459; https://t.me/wargonzo/30899;
[30] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WY8sDvZdWEA ; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/12/05/pihota-yaka-rozbrelas-tezh-bula-znyshhena-na-sumshhyni-rosijski-grupy-postijno-namagayutsya-peretynaty-kordon/
[31] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-24-2025/;
[32] https://t.me/severnnyi/5942
[33] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/37006; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/105057; https://t.me/severnnyi/5943; https://t.me/severnnyi/5930
[34] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/10699; https://www.instagram.com/reel/DR351ChE1q6/
[35]https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/32228; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/32206; https://t.me/Joint_Forces_Task_Force/19784; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/32205; https://t.me/dva_majors/84459
[36] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/37011; https://t.me/severnnyi/5935
[37] https://t.me/mod_russia/59130; https://t.me/SolovievLive/347492
[38] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/32228; https://t.me/dva_majors/84459; https://t.me/severnnyi/5935
[39] https://x.com/Bielitzling/status/1996662203051913400; https://t.me/rug_ua/197
[40] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/32228; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/32206 ; https://t.me/Joint_Forces_Task_Force/19784; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/37000
[41] https://t.me/wargonzo/30899
[42] https://t.me/mod_russia/59121
[43] https://t.me/craftoriz/409; https://x.com/Bielitzling/status/1996635787367272843; https://x.com/Bielitzling/status/1996635792123568147
[44] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/105059
[45] https://t.me/Sladkov_plus/14757; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/32206 ; https://t.me/Joint_Forces_Task_Force/19784; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/32205; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/32228
[46] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/12/05/zalyshayetsya-datskym-korolivstvom-bilya-lymana-vorozhi-pihotynczi-prodovzhuyut-taktyku-flagovtykiv/
[47] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-1-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-21-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-27-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-16-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-25-2025/
[48] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/32228; https://suspilne dot media/donbas/1181362-rosijski-vijska-v-rajoni-limana-nastupaut-udarnim-kulakom-recnik-tretogo-armijskogo-korpusu/; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/32206 ; https://t.me/Joint_Forces_Task_Force/19784; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/32205
[49] https://youtu.be/WY8sDvZdWEA; https://suspilne dot media/donbas/1181362-rosijski-vijska-v-rajoni-limana-nastupaut-udarnim-kulakom-recnik-tretogo-armijskogo-korpusu/
[50] https://youtu.be/WY8sDvZdWEA; https://suspilne dot media/donbas/1181362-rosijski-vijska-v-rajoni-limana-nastupaut-udarnim-kulakom-recnik-tretogo-armijskogo-korpusu/
[51] https://t.me/kotjambo/3619
[52] https://t.me/milinfolive/161712
[53] https://t.me/muchnoy_jugend/12867; https://t.me/muchnoy_jugend/12929
[54] https://t.me/muchnoy_jugend/12929; https://t.me/shock3OA/3608; https://x.com/medwqf/status/1994989144377053578; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/10675; https://t.me/shock3OA/3692
[55] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/32228; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/32205; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/32206; https://t.me/dva_majors/84459; https://t.me/wargonzo/30899; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/37000; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/37025; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/32228
[56] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/37032
[57] https://t.me/mod_russia/59133; https://t.me/mod_russia/59135 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/59135
[58] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-2-2025/
[59] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-2-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-3-2025/
[60] https://t.me/verumreactor/29921; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1996963447033024549; https://t.me/verumreactor/29928; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1996966319309148313
[61] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/32228 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/32206 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/32205 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/69247 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/37000 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/30899
[62] https://t.me/verumreactor/29921 ; https://t.me/verumreactor/29928; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1996966319309148313 ; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1996963447033024549
[63] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/105072
[64] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/10698 ; https://t.me/rubizh3018/3898 ; https://x.com/franfran2424/status/1996914257628483908; https://x.com/franfran2424/status/1996914370857914557
[65] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/32228 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/32206 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/32205
[66] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/37000 ; https://t.me/rybar/75723
[67] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/32228 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/32206 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/32205 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/30899
[68] https://t.me/nm_dnr/14686
[69] https://t.me/kvbarmy/1571; https://x.com/moklasen/status/1996655495139283145
[70] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WY8sDvZdWEA; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/12/04/spochatku-jdut-marginalizovani-yunity-poblyzu-pokrovska-rosiyany-namagayutsya-shturmuvaty-i-zbilshuvaty-kilzonu/
[71] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/32228; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/32206; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/32205
[72] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WY8sDvZdWEA; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/12/04/spochatku-jdut-marginalizovani-yunity-poblyzu-pokrovska-rosiyany-namagayutsya-shturmuvaty-i-zbilshuvaty-kilzonu/
[73] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/32228; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/32206; https://t.me/SJTF_Odes/13439; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/32205; https://t.me/wargonzo/30899
[74] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/32204
[75] https://www.facebook.com/reel/4158276751106510; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/10707; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/10697; https://www.facebook.com/share/v/17dg2DEf3N/?mibextid=wwXIfr
[76] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/32228; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/32206; https://t.me/SJTF_Odes/13439; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/32205; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/105090; https://t.me/wargonzo/30899
[77] https://t.me/The_Wrong_Side/27067; https://t.me/milinfolive/161755; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/189512
[78] https://t.me/voin_dv/17949
[79] https://t.me/voin_dv/17949; https://t.me/voin_dv/17948; https://t.me/voin_dv/17945
[80] https://t.me/voin_dv/17947; https://x.com/ukrliberation/status/1996975655922077930; https://t.me/Mavic_57/70
[81] https://t.me/voin_dv/17946
[82] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/105054
[83] https://t.me/UVO58/711; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/10704
[84] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/32228; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/32206 ; https://t.me/SJTF_Odes/13439 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/32205; https://t.me/dva_majors/84459; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/37019 https://t.me/wargonzo/30899
[85] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/105054
[86] https://t.me/UVO58/711; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/10704
[87] https://t.me/dva_majors/84471; https://t.me/rogozin_do/7847
[88] https://t.me/wargonzo/30916; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/37002; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/37010 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/37023
[89] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/32228; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/32206 ; https://t.me/SJTF_Odes/13439 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/32205
[90] https://t.me/osvedomitell_alex/31094
[91] https://t.me/osvedomitell_alex/31065; https://t.me/osvedomitell_alex/31093; https://t.me/osvedomitell_alex/31066
[92] https://t.me/rodnaya98vdd/2746; https://t.me/osvedomitell_alex/31061; https://t.me/rodnaya98vdd/2759; https://t.me/osvedomitell_alex/31095; https://t.me/osvedomitell_alex/31064; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/37006
[93] https://t.me/DIUkraine/7424
[94] https://x.com/blinzka/status/1996895129605714086; https://x.com/NOELreports/status/1996870155180085477; https://x.com/99Dominik_/status/1996849785320726787; http://t.me/DIUkraine/7424
[95] https://t.me/kpszsu/49018
[96] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/12/05/u-harkovi-ryatuvalnyky-likviduvaly-pozhezhu-sprychynenu-udaramy-bpla/; https://t.me/dsns_telegram/54297
[97] https://t.me/Ukrenergo/4378; https://suspilne dot media/1181248-5-grudna-v-ukraini-diatimut-grafiki-vidklucenna-svitla/; https://t.me/Ukrenergo/4381 ; https://suspilne dot media/1182114-v-usih-regionah-6-grudna-diatimut-grafiki-vidklucen-svitla-ukrenergo/
[98] https://t.me/astrapress/98930 ; https://suspilne dot media/kharkiv/1181936-dvoe-colovikiv-zaginuli-v-izumi-pid-cas-perevantazenna-drov-po-avtivci-vdariv-bezpilotnik-rf/
[99] https://t.me/milinfolive/161684; https://t.me/milinfolive/161678



















