Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, December 4, 2025

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Note: The data cut-off for this product was 12:15pm ET on December 4. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the December 5 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Russian President Vladimir Putin reiterated his commitment to his original war aims from 2021 and 2022 and unwillingness to compromise during an interview with Indian media – likely as part of the Kremlin’s efforts to shape the international information space during the ongoing negotiations process. Putin gave an interview to India Today English-language news magazine ahead of his December 4 state visit to India.[i] Putin stated that Russia will end its war in Ukraine when it achieves the goals that Putin set forth at the start of the full-scale invasion. Putin stated that Ukraine must understand that the "best way" to solve the war is for Ukraine to agree to a peace settlement like the one Russia tried to impose on Ukraine in 2022 – referencing the 2022 Istanbul agreement that amounted to Ukraine's full capitulation.[ii] Putin responded to a question about what constitutes a victory for Russia, stating that Russia wants to "protect" ethnic Russians, the Russian language, and the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) in Ukraine – justifications the Kremlin has often used for its demand for the removal of the current Ukrainian government and its replacement with a pro-Russian government.[iii] Putin also demanded that NATO not expand further, essentially calling for a revocation of NATO's Open Door Policy and return to NATO's 1997 borders. ISW continues to assess that Putin, in part, launched his full-scale invasion in order to destroy NATO and seize control of all of Ukraine, and Putin's original war demands notably include not only demands of Ukraine but of NATO and the West as well.[iv]

Putin is attempting to falsely frame his war aims as solely geographically limited to Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts. Putin falsely claimed that Russia "had no choice" but to recognize the Donetsk and Luhansk People's Republics (DNR and LNR), that he offered Ukraine to withdraw its forces from all of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts to avoid hostilities in 2022, and that Ukraine subsequently refused. Putin claimed that Russia will now either seize all of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts through military means or Ukrainian forces will withdraw from the areas of the two oblasts that Ukraine still controls. Putin's focus during the December 4 interview on Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts ignores the way that his full-scale invasion initially sought to capture far more territory than just those two regions, including Kyiv City, and to fully control Ukraine through a Kremlin-installed government. Russia had to rescope its strategy after its failure to take Kyiv City to focus instead on more limited operations in eastern Ukraine.

Putin attempted to obfuscate his rejection of the latest US peace proposal in the December 4 interview. Putin discussed the December 2 meeting with US Special Envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff and former Senior Advisor to the US President Jared Kushner, claiming that the peace proposals from the US delegation were "in one way or another" based on the agreements from Putin's previous meeting with US President Donald Trump in Alaska. Putin stated that there were points in the US-proposal to which Russia could not agree, but that he would not offer more specifics so as to not "disrupt" Trump's peace process. ISW continues to assess that the Kremlin is purposely refraining from publicly discussing the December 2 meeting in order to obfuscate Russia's rejection of the US-Ukrainian peace proposal that did not concede to all of Russia’s absolutist war demands.[v]

Other Kremlin officials continued to publicly display their commitment to Putin's original war aims. Russian State Duma International Affairs Committee Chairperson Leonid Slutsky stated that Russia will not change its "basic" demands, including the prohibition of NATO membership for Ukraine and Ukraine's demilitarization (Ukraine’s disarmament such that Ukraine cannot defend itself in the future) and denazification (a term the Kremlin uses to call for the removal of the current Ukrainian government).[vi] Slutsky claimed that Russia can "entirely" achieve this "baseline" on the battlefield. State Duma Defense Committee Member Andrei Kolesnik claimed that Ukraine could lose its statehood, not just territory, such that it is "better" for Ukraine to reach a negotiated settlement before "things will get worse."[vii] ISW continues to assess that the Kremlin has been engaged in widespread cognitive warfare efforts in the lead up to and during the ongoing negotiations process that aims to paint a Russian victory on the battlefield as imminent and inevitable, such that Ukraine and the West should give in to Russia's demands now.[viii] Russian military victory is not imminent or inevitable, however, and the West maintains significant agency in how Russia’s war against Ukraine ends.[ix]

The Kremlin is setting conditions to frame any future agreement to not attack and seize Odesa and Mykolaiv cities as an alleged Russian "concession" in peace negotiations, even though Russia is currently incapable of seizing these cities. Russian State Duma Defense Committee Deputy Chairperson Alexei Zhuravlev claimed on December 3 that Russian commanders have not been publicly reporting on activity in the Kherson direction recently because Russian forces are "deliberately" not intensifying offensive operations there.[x] Zhuravlev claimed that Russian forces "definitely could" intensify in the area and then could launch an offensive on Odesa and Mykolaiv cities such that Ukraine would have "no other major cities left on the Black Sea coast." Zhuravlev threatened that Russian forces could use occupied Crimea as a launch point for such offensive operations "both on land and at sea." Zhuravlev further claimed that Ukrainian authorities are discriminating against Russian-speakers in Odesa, Kherson, and Mykolaiv cities and that residents in Odesa and Mykolaiv oblasts would vote to "join" Russia should there be referenda in those regions – calling back to the sham referenda that Russia held in Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts in 2022 to justify its illegal annexation of the four regions.[xi] High-ranking Kremlin officials, including Putin himself, have recently reignited the longstanding Russian narratives about Russia's claim to Odesa and Mykolaiv oblasts.[xii] These Kremlin statements in the past days are likely part of a cognitive warfare effort aimed at influencing the ongoing peace negotiations. Russian forces are notably not in a position to make such large-scale advances to take Odesa or Mykolaiv cities either by land or sea. Russian forces would need to deprioritize other sectors to deploy a significant force grouping to successfully cross the Dnipro River and make significant advances westward and northward over land - an exceedingly difficult undertaking.[xiii] Ukrainian forces have also significantly damaged and denied further usage of the Black Sea Fleet's (BSF) landing ships that Russian forces would need for an amphibious invasion, while also pushing the BSF out of the northwestern Black Sea.[xiv] The Kremlin may be setting conditions to "relinquish" its demands for these territories in the future in order to create the impression that the Kremlin is making "concessions" during negotiations.

The Kremlin may also be incorporating threats of kinetic action into this cognitive warfare effort surrounding Odesa and Mykolaiv oblasts. Putin responded to an alleged Ukrainian attack against a Russian-flagged tanker off the coast of Turkey on December 2, threatening to strike Ukrainian ports, ships traveling to Ukrainian ports, and vessels of states helping Ukraine.[xv] Putin also threatened to cut Ukraine off from the Black Sea – possibly threatening to seize territory in Odesa and Mykolaiv oblasts. The Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) and Ukrainian Navy Spokesperson Captain Third Rank Dmytro Pletenchuk assessed, however, that Russia may have staged the attack.[xvi] The Kremlin may also try to present a Russian agreement to refrain from striking Ukrainian ports and vessels on the Black Sea as an alleged "compromise" in negotiations. ISW continues to assess that Putin remains committed to his goal of taking control of all of Ukraine, however. Any putative Kremlin "concession" agreeing to abandon efforts to seize Odesa and Mykolaiv cities would be a short-term negotiating tactic, not a shift in the Kremlin's long-standing strategic goals.

ISW has not observed evidence to suggest that Russian forces have encircled Myrnohrad (east of Pokrovsk) as some Ukrainian sources continue to indicate that Ukrainian forces maintain limited ground lines of communication (GLOCs) into Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad. Ukrainian media outlet Hromadske reported on December 3 that Ukrainian servicemembers stated that Russian forces encircled Ukrainian forces in Myrnohrad as of November 29, and one of the sources stated that Ukrainian forces in the area have not rotated since November 12.[xvii] A source told Hromadske that Ukrainian attempts to relieve the encirclement have been partially successful. The source also indicated that Ukrainian forces could hold Myrnohrad if Ukrainian forces retook Chervonyi (Krasnyi) Lyman (north of Myrnohrad) and Rodynske (just northwest of Chervonyi Lyman). Ukraine's 7th Rapid Reaction Corps of the Air Assault Forces Spokesperson Colonel Volodymyr Polevyi refuted claims that Russian forces had surrounded Ukrainian forces in Myrnohrad, reporting that Ukrainian forces continue to conduct rotations and limited logistics within the town.[xviii] ISW has not observed visual evidence or official Ukrainian reports to assess that Russian forces have encircled Ukrainian forces in Myrnohrad, though the situation is likely extremely difficult, and Russian forces very likely can disrupt narrow Ukrainian exfiltration routes and GLOCs with artillery and drones.

Ukrainian forces are still operating within Pokrovsk as Russian forces continue infiltration missions in the area. Ukrainian military officials, including the Ukrainian General Staff and Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief General Oleksandr Syrskyi, reported on December 4 that Ukrainian forces maintain a presence within Pokrovsk and even hold unspecified areas of the town.[xix] Geolocated footage published on December 1 and 3 shows two Russian servicemembers unconfidently operating north of Pokrovsk and two operating in central Rivne (between Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad).[xx] The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Pokrovsk direction reported on December 4 that Russian forces are infiltrating in fireteams of two to three personnel into northern Pokrovsk during poor weather conditions.[xxi] The spokesperson stated that the Russian military command has concentrated roughly 150,000 personnel in the Pokrovsk-Myrnohrad area, about 11,000 to 12,000 of which are conducting assaults. The spokesperson stated that Russian drones are complicating Ukrainian logistics but that Ukrainian forces have been able to conduct several rotations and bring in supplies in the past few days.

Russia appears to have launched a new cognitive warfare campaign aimed at spreading narratives about Russian preparations for an offensive on Chernihiv City against the backdrop of the ongoing peace negotiations. Ukrainian Center for Combatting Disinformation Head Lieutenant Andriy Kovalenko warned on December 4 that Russian sources are spreading narratives about Russian forces purportedly preparing for offensive operations against Chernihiv City.[xxii] Kovalenko observed that these narratives emerged against the backdrop of the US-led peace effort and noted that the claims aim to put additional pressure on Ukrainian society and imitate a Russian ability to simultaneously advance on multiple fronts. Kovalenko stated that Russia does not have the manpower or materiel required for an assault on Chernihiv City and that Ukrainian forces have been repelling Russian provocations in Chernihiv Oblast. Kovalenko recalled that Russia launched similar cognitive warfare campaigns against Kharkiv and Sumy cities in the past but that Ukrainian forces prevented Russian forces from advancing to these cities. ISW observed on December 3 and 4 a limited number of milbloggers vaguely implying that Russian forces are preparing for offensive operations against Chernihiv City.[xxiii] The Kremlin may start widely amplifying this narrative as part of its consolidated cognitive warfare campaign aimed at convincing Ukraine and the West to capitulate to Russia's demands that it cannot secure militarily.[xxiv]

Key Takeaways:

• Russian President Vladimir Putin reiterated his commitment to his original war aims from 2021 and 2022 and unwillingness to compromise during an interview with Indian media – likely as part of the Kremlin’s efforts to shape the international information space during the ongoing negotiations process.
• Other Kremlin officials continued to publicly display their commitment to Putin's original war aims.
• The Kremlin is setting conditions to frame any future agreement to not attack and seize Odesa and Mykolaiv cities as an alleged Russian "concession" in peace negotiations, even though Russia is currently incapable of seizing these cities.
• ISW has not observed evidence to suggest that Russian forces have encircled Myrnohrad (east of Pokrovsk) as some Ukrainian sources continue to indicate that Ukrainian forces maintain limited ground lines of communication (GLOCs) into Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad.
• Russia appears to have launched a new cognitive warfare campaign aimed at spreading narratives about Russian preparations for an offensive on Chernihiv City against the backdrop of the ongoing peace negotiations.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Oleksandrivka and Hulyaipole. Russian forces recently advanced near Velykyi Burluk, Kupyansk, Lyman, Siversk, Novopavlivka in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.    

• Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
• Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis
• Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
• Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
• Significant Activity in Belarus

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Ukrainian forces likely continued their long-range strike campaign against Russian energy and defense industrial infrastructure on the night of December 3 to 4.  Geolocated footage published on December 4 that shows fires near the Nevinnomyssk Azot Chemical Plant in Nevinnomyssk, Stavropol Krai.[xxv]  Local news agency 1777 reported that local residents observed at least eight drones flying near the plant and Stavropol Krai Governor Vladimir Vladimirov claimed that Russian forces downed an unspecified number of drones over Nevinnomyssk.[xxvi] Unspecified sources confirmed to Russian opposition outlet Astra on December 4 that Ukrainian forces also conducted a drone strike against the Lukoil Bobrovskaya oil depot in Khrenovoye, Voronezh Oblast on the night of December 2 to 3, damaging two fuel tanks.[xxvii]  Voronezh Oblast Governor Alexander Gusev claimed on December 3 that downed drone debris caused minor damage to several fuel tanks in Voronezh Oblast.[xxviii] Footage published on November 29 and geolocated on December 3 shows a Ukrainian Air Force MiG-29 conducting an Armement Air-Sol Modulaire (AASM) Hammer strike against a Russian troop concentration point southwest of Kirillovka (northwest of Sumy City).[xxix]

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in northern Ukraine along the international border)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Sumy Oblast on December 4 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked in Sumy and Kursk Oblasts, including southwest of Glushkovo near Tetkino, north of Sumy City near Oleksiivka, and northeast of Sumy City near Yablunivka, on December 3 and 4.[xxx] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Oleksiivka and Varachyne (north of Sumy City).[xxxi]

A Russian milblogger reportedly affiliated with the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces claimed on December 3 that elements of the 9th and 10th companies of the 3rd Battalion of the Russian 1st Motorized Rifle Regiment (Russian Aerospace Forces [VKS] and reportedly under the operational control of the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces) conducted rotations and unsuccessfully attacked near Tetkino and Bezsalivka (northwest of Sumy City on the international border).[xxxii] The milblogger reported that a Russian servicemember told the milblogger on December 4 that Russian forces suffered heavy casualties in attacks east of Bezsalivka due to ineffective command.[xxxiii] The alleged servicemember claimed that the Russian military command falsely told Russian servicemembers that they would be holding positions rather than conducting assault operations.

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 83rd Airborne (VDV) Brigade are reportedly intercepting Ukrainian drones near Varachyne.[xxxiv]

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on December 4 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger reportedly affiliated with the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces claimed that Russian forces advanced to northern Izbytske (northeast of Kharkiv City).[xxxv] Another milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced in northern Vilcha (northeast of Kharkiv City).[xxxvi]

Refinement of area under Russian claims: Geolocated footage published on December 4 indicates that Ukrainian forces maintained positions or recently advanced in western Vovchanski Khutory (northeast of Kharkiv City) – an area where Russian sources previously claimed that Russian forces maintained a presence.[xxxvii]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk, Vilcha, Lyman, Prylipka, Synelnykove, and Starytsia and toward Izbytske on December 3 and 4.[xxxviii] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Vilcha.[xxxix]

The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Vovchansk direction reported on December 4 that Russian forces are conducting artillery and air, TOS-1A thermobaric artillery, and Iskander ballistic missile strikes against Ukrainian positions to support Russian ground efforts to seize Vovchansk.[xl] The spokesperson added that Russian forces are employing both fiber-optic and conventional drones. The spokesperson noted that Russian forces continue to employ small group infiltration tactics and that the first wave of Russian assaults includes former prisoners. The spokesperson reported that Russian forces are regularly conducting flag raising missions in the area to support exaggerated claims of Russian advances on the backdrop of negotiations on ending the war - a statement consistent with ISW‘s running assessment that the Russian military command is using ostentatious flag raisings across the frontline to support its exaggerated claims of Russian advances as part of a cognitive warfare effort to portray Russian battlefield victory as inevitable.[xli] 

Footage published on December 3 shows Ukrainian forces striking a Russian drone control point and communications hub in Vovchansk with a GBU-62 Joint Direct Attack Munition-Extended Range (JDAM-ER) guided bomb.[xlii]

The Russian milblogger reportedly affiliated with the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces claimed on December 4 that forested terrain near Izbytske is slowing elements of the Russian 7th Motorized Rifle Regiment's (11th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) attacks in the area.[xliii]

Order of Battle: Artillery elements of the Russian 245th Motorized Rifle Regiment (47th Tank Division, 1st Guards Tank Army [GTA], Moscow Military District [MMD]) reportedly continue to operate in the Kharkiv direction.[xliv]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Velykyi Burluk direction.

Assessed Russian advances: The Ukrainian General Staff published a map on December 3 showing that Russian forces advanced north of Odradne and east of Hryhorivka (both east of Velykyi Burluk) and north of Kamyanka and east of Dvorichanske (both southeast of Velykyi Burluk).[xlv]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Velykyi Burluk near Ambarne, Milove, and Khatnie and southeast of Velykyi Burluk near Dvorichanske and toward Kolodyazne on December 3 and 4.[xlvi]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces recently advanced in the Kupyansk direction.

Assessed Russian advances: The Ukrainian General Staff published maps on December 3 showing that Russian forces seized Dvorichna (north of Kupyansk).[xlvii]

Russian forces attacked north of Kupyansk near Kutkivka, east of Kupyansk near Petropavlivka, southeast of Kupyansk near Pishchane, and south of Kupyansk near Kupyansk-Vuzlovyi on December 3 and 4.[xlviii]

A Russian milblogger refuted other Russian sources’ claims on December 4 that Russian forces entered Kupyansk-Vuzlovyi.[xlix]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 15th Motorized Rifle Regiment (2nd Motorized Rifle Division, 1st Guards Tank Army [GTA], Moscow Military District [MMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Kupyansk.[l] Drone operators of the Russian 3rd Separate Drofa Drone Battalion (6th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions in the Kupyansk direction.[li]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Borova direction on December 4 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced in Bohuslavka (north of Borova).[lii]

Russian forces attacked east of Borova near Nadiya and southeast of Borova near Novoyehorivka and Hrekivka on December 3 and 4.[liii]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Slovyansk-Lyman direction.

Assessed Russian advances: The Ukrainian General Staff published a map on December 3 showing that Russian forces advanced west of Serednie and northwest of Shandryholove (both northwest of Lyman) and south of Karpivka and Ridkodub (both north of Lyman).[liv]

Assessed Russian infiltrations: Geolocated footage published on December 4 shows Ukrainian forces assaulting Russian positions in southern Yarova (northwest of Lyman) during what ISW assesses was an infiltration mission that did not change control of terrain or the forward edge of the battle area (FEBA) at this time.[lv]

Russian forces attacked northwest of Lyman near Drobysheve, Oleksandrivka, Derylove, and Yarova; north of Lyman near Stavky; northeast of Lyman near Myrne; and east of Lyman near Zarichne and Torske on December 3 and 4.[lvi]

Order of Battle: Drone operators and other elements of the Russian 144th Motorized Rifle Division (20th CAA, MMD) are reportedly operating in the Lyman direction.[lvii] First-person view (FPV) drone operators of the 16th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff's Main Directorate [GRU]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian equipment in the Lyman direction.[lviii]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)

Russian forces recently advanced in the Siversk direction.

Assessed Russian advances: The Ukrainian General Staff published a map on December 3 showing that Russian forces advanced west of Soledar and Krasnopolivka (both south of Siversk).[lix]

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced in northern Ozerne (northwest of Siversk).[lx]

Russian forces attacked within and near Siversk; northwest of Siversk near Dronivka and Yampil; northeast of Siversk near Serebryanka; and south of Siversk near Svyato-Pokrovske on December 3 and 4.[lxi]

A Russian source claimed on December 4 that Russian forces have begun conducting artillery strikes in preparation to seize Ozerne and Zakitne (northwest of Siversk).[lxii] ISW assesses that these strikes are likely part of the Russian forces’ efforts to prepare the battlefield by degrading Ukrainian logistics to facilitate future ground attacks in the Siversk direction.[lxiii] A Russian milblogger claimed on December 4 that Russian forces gained fire control of the T-0513 Siversk-Lyman highway in Svyato-Pokrovske.[lxiv]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area.

Assessed Russian advances: The Ukrainian General Staff posted maps on December 3 showing that Russian forces advanced south of Orikhovo-Vasylivka, Mayske, and Novomarkove, and northwest of Chasiv Yar (all northeast of Kostyantynivka).[lxv] Geolocated footage published on December 4 indicates that Russian forces recently marginally advanced in southeastern Kostyantynivka.[lxvi]

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced southeast of Kostyantynivka and north of Kleban-Byk (southeast of Kostyantynivka).[lxvii]

Russian forces attacked near and within Kostyantynivka itself; north of Kostyantynivka and toward Virolyubivka; northeast of Kostyantynivka near Chasiv Yar, Markove, and Novomarkove; east of Kostyantynivka near Oleksandro-Shultyne; southeast of Kostyantynivka near Ivanopillya, Pleshchiivka, Kleban-Byk, and Shcherbynivka; south of Kostyantynivka near Yablunivka and Oleksandro-Kalynove and toward Berestok; southwest of Kostyantynivka toward Stepanivka; south of Druzhkivka near Rusyn Yar; southwest of Druzhkivka near Sofiivka; and west of Druzhkivka toward Novopavlivka and Torske on December 3 and 4.[lxviii]

Order of Battle: Loitering munitions operators of the Russian 33rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (20th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Pryiut (southwest of Druzhkivka).[lxix] First-person view (FPV) drone operators of the 58th Separate Spetsnaz Battalion (unofficially designated the Okhotnik [Hunter] Spetsnaz Detachment) (51st CAA, formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic Army Corps [DNR AC], SMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian equipment in the Kostyantynivka direction.[lxx]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Dobropillya tactical area on December 4 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced northwest of Shakhove (east of Dobropillya).[lxxi]

Russian forces attacked east of Dobropillya near Vilne, Shakhove, and Nove Shakhove and southeast of Dobropillya near Vilne on December 3 and 4.[lxxii]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction on December 4 but did not make confirmed advances.

See topline text for reports of Russian infiltrations in the Pokrovsk direction.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces seized Rodynske (north of Pokrovsk) and advanced into southern Hryshyne (northwest of Pokrovsk).[lxxiii]

Russian forces attacked near and within Pokrovsk itself; northwest of Pokrovsk near Hryshyne; north of Pokrovsk near Rodynske and toward Bilytske; northeast of Pokrovsk near Chervonyi (Krasnyi) Lyman, Svitle, and Novoekonomichne; east of Pokrovsk near Myrnohrad; southeast of Pokrovsk near Novopavlivka; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Kotlyne, Udachne, and Molodetske on December 3 and 4.[lxxiv] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Mezhova (southwest of Pokrovsk) and Serhiivka (west of Pokrovsk).[lxxv]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 506th Motorized Rifle Regiment (27th Motorized Rifle Division, 2nd CAA, Central Military District [CMD]), 1437th and 1435th motorized rifle regiments, and the 30th Motorized Rifle Brigade (all 2nd CAA) are reportedly operating in Pokrovsk.[lxxvi] Drone operators of the 35th Motorized Rifle Brigade (41st CAA, CMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces in the outskirts of Pokrovsk.[lxxvii] Drone operators of the 27th Motorized Rifle Division and the 80th Sparta Separate Reconnaissance Battalion (51st CAA, SMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near and within Myrnohrad.[lxxviii] Elements of the 132nd Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA) are reportedly operating in Rodynske.[lxxix]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Novopavlivka direction.

Assessed Russian advances: ISW assesses that Ukrainian forces no longer maintain positions along the southern and eastern banks of the Solona River north of and in central Novopavlivka, given several observed geolocations of Russian forces operating in Novopavlivka. ISW assesses that Russian forces advanced in the area at a prior date.

Russian forces attacked south of Novopavlivka near Yalta, Filiya, and Dachne and southwest of Novopavlivka near Zelenyi Hai on December 3 and 4.[lxxx]

Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Oleksandrivka direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported on December 3 that Ukrainian forces liberated Ivanivka (northeast of Oleksandrivka) and geolocated footage published on December 3 shows Ukrainian forces striking Russian positions north of Ivanivka during what ISW assesses was a Ukrainian clearing operation.[lxxxi]  A Ukrainian source, reportedly with access to Ukrainian military intelligence sources, similarly reported on November 30 that Ukrainian forces cleared Ivanivka.[lxxxii] ISW assesses that Russian forces occupied most, if not all, of Ivanivka at one point, but that Ukrainian forces retook the settlement and that Russian forces no longer maintain a presence in the settlement. ISW also assesses that this change likely did not occur in the past 24 hours.

Russian forces attacked east of Oleksandrivka near Oleksandrohrad and southeast of Oleksandrivka near Sosnivka, Verbove, Stepove, Krasnohirske, Vyshneve, Rybne, and Pryvilne on December 3 and 4.[lxxxiii]

A servicemember of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Oleksandrivka direction reported on December 4 that Russian forces rarely use unmanned ground vehicles (UGVs) in the brigade’s area of responsibility (AoR), in contrast to Ukrainian forces that rely on UGVs to evacuate wounded personnel from frontal positions.[lxxxiv]

Order of Battle: Reconnaissance and assault elements of the Russian 37th Motorized Rifle Brigade and 5th Tank Brigade (both of the 36th CAA, Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly operating in the south Dnipropetrovsk direction.[lxxxv] Drone operators of the 14th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff's Main Directorate [GRU]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian vehicles in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast.[lxxxvi]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)

Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Hulyaipole direction.

Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on December 4 shows Ukrainian servicemembers raising Ukrainian flags in central Dobropillya (north of Hulyaipole), indicating that Ukrainian forces recently liberated the settlement.[lxxxvii] The Ukrainian General Staff refuted on December 4 recent Russian claims that Russian forces seized Dobropillya.[lxxxviii] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that a Russian sabotage and reconnaissance group penetrated the outskirts of the settlement but that Ukrainian forces later destroyed the group.

Refinement of areas under Russian claims: Geolocated footage published on December 4 showing Ukrainian forces operating in central Dobropillya indicates that Russian forces do not currently hold positions on the east bank of the Haichur River west of Dobropillya, an area where Russian sources previously claimed that Russian forces maintained a presence.[lxxxix]

Russian forces attacked near Hulyaipole itself; north of Hulyaipole near Dobropillya and Pryluky and toward Varvarivka; and east of Hulyaipole near Zatyshshya on December 3 and 4.[xc]

The Ukrainian 17th Army Corps (AC) refuted on December 4 Russian claims that Russian forces seized Solodke (northeast of Hulyaipole) and Zatyshshya (east of Hulyaipole).[xci] The 17th Army Corps reported that fighting is ongoing in both settlements and that Ukrainian forces maintain logistics into the area.

Order of Battle: Assault elements of the Russian 114th Motorized Rifle Regiment (127th Motorized Rifle Division, 5th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly operating in northeastern Hulyaipole.[xcii] Drone operators of the 57th Motorized Rifle Brigade (5th CAA) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces in Hulyaipole.[xciii] Assault elements of the 38th Motorized Rifle Brigade (35th CAA, EMD) are reportedly operating west of Vysoke and Zelenyi Hai (both east of Hulyaipole).[xciv] Elements of the 143rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (127th Motorized Rifle Division) reportedly continue to operate in the Zaporizhia (likely Hulyaipole) direction.[xcv] Elements of the 11th Air Force and Air Defense Army (EMD and Russian Aerospace Forces [VKS]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces in Hulyaipole and Zaliznychne (west of Hulyaipole).[xcvi]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on December 4 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked west of Orikhiv near Prymorske and Stepnohirsk on December 3 and 4.[xcvii]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 7th Airborne (VDV) Division, including drone operators of its 108th VDV Regiment, reportedly continue to operate in the Zaporizhia direction.[xcviii]

Russian forces continued limited ground attacks in the Kherson direction on December 4 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked east of Kherson City near the Antonivskyi Bridge on December 3 and 4.[xcix]

A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces conducted a drone strike using a domestically produced drone with a 40-kilometer coil in Kherson Oblast, likely referring to a fiber optic drone.[c]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 98th VDV Division, including of its 215th Separate Reconnaissance Battalion, reportedly continue to operate in the Kherson direction.[ci]

Ukrainian forces continued their mid-range strike campaign against Russian military targets in occupied Crimea. Ukraine’s Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported, and geolocated footage confirmed, that Ukrainian drones struck a Russian Mig-29 fighter aircraft at Kacha Air Base north of occupied Sevastopol and an Irtysh aircraft radar system near occupied Simferopol on December 4.[cii]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Russian forces conducted a series of missile and drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of December 3 to 4. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched two Iskander-M ballistic missiles from Rostov Oblast and occupied Crimea and 138 Shahed-type, Gerbera-type, and other drones – of which roughly 85 were Shahed-type drones -- from the directions of Oryol, Bryansk, and Kursk cities; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; and occupied Cape Chauda, Crimea.[ciii] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 114 drones and that 24 drones and the two Iskander-M ballistic missiles struck 14 locations. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces struck energy, residential, and civilian infrastructure in Dnipropetrovsk, Kharkiv, Mykolaiv, and Odesa oblasts.[civ]

The Ukrainian Ministry of Energy reported on December 4 that Russian strikes against energy infrastructure left more than 60,000 consumers in Donetsk Oblast, 51,000 consumers in Odesa Oblast, and 1,600 consumers in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast without power.[cv]

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

Nothing significant to report.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.