Assessment as of December 31: 7:30pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

For more information on ISW's map methodology, please view our statement here.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 11:30am ET on December 31. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the January 2 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment. ISW will not publish a Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment tomorrow, January 1, 2026.

Russian forces increased their average rate of advance in 2025 due to a new operational template supported by technological adaptations and a shift in assault tactics. ISW observed evidence to assess that Russian forces seized 4,831 square kilometers in Ukraine and regained roughly 473 square kilometers that Ukrainian forces had taken in Kursk Oblast in 2025. Russian gains in Ukraine amounted to 0.8 percent of Ukraine's territory. Russian forces had seized 3,604 square kilometers in Ukraine in 2024. Data from the Ukrainian General Staff shows that Russian forces suffered 416,570 casualties throughout 2025, for an average of 78 casualties per square kilometer seized in Ukraine and Kursk Oblast. The average daily Russian rate of advance in 2025 was 13.24 square kilometers per day — higher than the daily average of 9.87 square kilometers per day in 2024. The Russian rate of advance has not been consistent throughout 2025, however. The Russian rate of advance was highest in November at 20.99 square kilometers per day, but this high came after one of the slowest months in 2025 — 8.8 square kilometers per day in October - and subsequently slowed to 15 square kilometers per day in December.

Russian forces began employing a new operational template that relies on a prolonged battlefield air interdiction (BAI) campaign, tactical interdiction efforts, infiltration missions, and mass small group assaults that enabled the Russian advances in the Pokrovsk, Oleksandrivka, and Hulyaipole directions that occurred in Fall 2025.[1] Russian forces began achieving some BAI effects by using UAVs to interdict Ukrainian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) in early Spring 2025.[2] The Russian military began to proliferate its elite drone operators of the Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies — the elements that have been largely responsible for successes in Russia’s operational BAI efforts — across the frontline in April and May 2025.[3]

Russian technological adaptations have also supported Russia’s BAI campaign. Russian forces have scaled the production of fiber optic UAVs that are more resistant to Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) interference and have increased the range of their fiber optic UAVs from roughly seven kilometers in early Spring 2025 to around 20 kilometers in Summer 2025.[4] Russian forces also introduced “mothership” drones that can carry and extend the range of first-person view (FPVs) drones and significantly increase the reach of Russian drone strikes in the near rear.[5] Recent Russian technological adaptations have further extended the range of Russian fiber-optic drones to between 50 and 60 kilometers.[6] Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief Colonel General Oleksandr Syrskyi noted on December 30 that Russia’s concentration of fiber optic drones with ranges of more than 20 kilometers in the Siversk direction enabled Russia’s seizure of Siversk.[7] Russian forces’ use of fiber optic drones has also improved their ability to interdict Ukrainian GLOCs in forested areas, such as the Serebryanske forest area, where radio-controlled drones struggle to operate.[8]

Russian forces changed their tactical-level assault methods as well, moving away from highly attritional infantry-led assaults in June 2025 to infiltration tactics (and flag raisings) to make (and falsely claim) gains across the front.[9] This shift in tactics has enabled a more rapid rate of Russian advance in 2025, but Russian forces continue to suffer high casualty rates for gains that remain small.[10]

The Russian military command largely prioritized efforts to seize the remainder of Donetsk Oblast and establish a buffer zone in northern Sumy and Kharkiv oblasts in 2025 but failed to accomplish these goals. Ukrainian Presidential Office Deputy Head Colonel Pavlo Palisa stated on June 5 that Russia intended to seize and occupy the full extent of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts by September 1, 2025, and to create a buffer zone along the northern Ukrainian-Russian border by the end of 2025 — both of which tasks Russian forces failed to complete.[11] Russian forces prioritized efforts to seize Pokrovsk, advance in western Donetsk Oblast, and push into southeastern Dnipropetrovsk Oblast in 2025. Russian forces advanced into Pokrovsk in September 2025 and have seized 67.63 percent of the town as of December 2025.[12] Russian forces seized Velyka Novosilka in late January 2025, intensified efforts toward Oleksandrivka and Hulyaipole, and began making notable advances towards the towns in November 2025.[13] Russian forces began operating within Hulyaipole in early December 2025.[14]  Russian sabotage and reconnaissance groups infiltrated toward Dobropillya in August 2025, but the Russian military command was unable to reinforce the penetration and turn tactical-level advances into an operational-level breakthrough, and Ukrainian forces subsequently retook roughly 70 square kilometers of the penetration.[15] Russian forces also continued attempts to envelop Ukraine’s Fortress Belt from the northeast and southwest. Intensified Russian offensive operations northeast of Slovyansk resulted in Russian advances into Lyman (roughly 15 kilometers from Slovyansk) and the likely seizure of Siversk (roughly 30 kilometers from Slovyansk) in December 2025.[16] Russian forces continued efforts to envelop the Fortress Belt from the southwest and completed the seizure of Toretsk by August 1, 2025, having taken 14 months to advance about 6.4 miles from the southeastern outskirts of Toretsk to the northwestern outskirts of Toretsk, and began efforts to seize Kostyantynivka in October 2025.[17]

Russian forces completed efforts to push Ukrainian forces out of Kursk Oblast in March 2025 and launched a largely unsuccessful offensive operation in northern Sumy Oblast aimed at creating a “buffer zone.”[18] Russian forces also continued efforts to establish a buffer zone along the international border in northern Kharkiv Oblast and opened an offensive toward Velykyi Burluk in July 2025, but this sector of the frontline remained largely dormant until December 2025.[19] The Russian military command intensified efforts to seize Kupyansk in Summer 2025 but failed to complete the seizure of the town, despite the Kremlin’s claims, and Ukrainian forces retook most of Kupyansk in December 2025.[20]

The orientation of Ukrainian defenses and fortified areas hindered Russian advances in select areas in 2025. Russian forces made their most rapid advances in 2025 in the Velyka Novosilka and Hulyaipole directions near the Donetsk-Dnipropetrovsk-Zaporizhia Oblast administrative border, an area characterized by small settlements and open fields. Russian forces initially intensified offensive operations toward Hulyaipole from the south and southeast in May 2025 but failed to make tactically significant advances by mid-July 2025 due to Ukraine's extensive defensive line oriented against attacks from the south.[21] Recent Russian advances toward Hulyaipole have come from the northeast and east, bypassing these south-facing defenses. Ukraine's south-facing defensive lines continue to constrain Russian forces elsewhere in Zaporizhia Oblast, however. Ukrainian defenses in the Orikhiv direction, also oriented to defend against attacks from the south, have largely constrained Russian advances toward Orikhiv and Zaporizhzhia City. The Russian military command indicated on December 29 that it intends to join the Russian efforts in the Orikhiv and Hulyaipole directions in order to advance on Zaporizhzhia City, likely intending to bypass Ukrainian defenses south of Orikhiv by moving westward from the Hulyaipole direction.[22] Russian forces have also spent 18 months fighting to seize the Pokrovsk-Myrnohrad area — a heavily fortified Ukrainian area. The success of Ukraine's defensive lines in constraining Russian advances underscores the importance of Ukraine's heavily fortified Fortress Belt in defending against Russian advances in Donetsk Oblast.

The relatively faster Russian advances in 2025 were still constrained to footpace and often took advantage of poor weather conditions that hinder Ukrainian drone operations — conditions that will not last indefinitely. Russian forces have been leveraging rain, fog, and snow, which all constrain Ukrainian reconnaissance and strike drone operations, to conduct attacks according to their new offensive template. Russian forces fought more effectively in 2025 than in 2024, but have still not restored maneuver to the battlefield and are advancing slowly. Russian casualties remain disproportionately high relative to the territory gained, and it is unclear whether Russia will be able to sustain this tempo of operations in the medium- to long-term.

Ukrainian forces appear to be undertaking their own BAI campaign that will likely parallel that of Russia. Ukrainian forces have noticeably increased their mid-range strikes against Russian energy military assets throughout December 2025 and appear to have significantly escalated such strikes on December 30 to 31.[23] Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) Commander Major Robert “Magyar” Brovdi reported on December 31 that USF elements struck several Russian energy and military objects at or near operational depths (25 to 100 kilometers) in occupied Donetsk, Luhansk, and Zaporizhia oblasts and Crimea.[24] Brovdi stated that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian oil depot in occupied Rovenky, Luhansk Oblast (roughly 124 kilometers from the frontline), and geolocated footage shows the strike and fire at the depot.[25] Brovdi reported that Ukrainian forces also struck positions of the Russian Rubikon-D Spetsnaz unit (Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies), 74th Motorized Rifle Brigade (41st Combined Arms Army [CAA], Central Military District [CMD]), and 589th Motorized Rifle Regiment (27th Motorized Rifle Division, 2nd CAA, CMD) near Selydove, Donetsk Oblast (roughly 20 kilometers from the frontline); substations in occupied Melitopol and Molochansk, Zaporizhia Oblast (50 kilometers and 35 kilometers from the frontline, respectively); and the base of the Russian 92nd River Boat Brigade and an ST-68 radar station near Olenivka, Crimea.[26] The Ukrainian General Staff noted that the Olenivka strike occurred overnight on December 30 to 31 and reported that Ukrainian forces also struck Russian ammunition depots near Blizhnye and Siatel, Donetsk Oblast (roughly 74 kilometers and 90 kilometers behind the frontline, respectively).[27] Russian sources and occupation officials indicated that Ukrainian forces likely conducted the Rovenky oil depot and Melitopol and Molochansk substation strikes on the night of December 30 to 31.[28] Ukrainian forces likely seek to use these mid-range strikes to counter recent Russian advances. This Ukrainian BAI campaign is still in its early stages, so the immediate effects on Russian offensive operations are still unclear.

Russian forces launched over 54,000 long-range drones and over 1,900 missiles against Ukraine in 2025. The sizes of Russia's overnight strike packages have grown significantly throughout 2025. Prior to 2025, Russian forces launched their largest strike package against Ukraine on the night of November 16 to 17, 2024, with 210 drones and missiles.[29] Russian forces in 2025 have launched 52 strike packages containing 210 or more projectiles.[30] Russian forces launched their largest-ever strike package on September 6 to 7, 2025, containing 810 drones and 13 missiles.[31] Russian forces have launched a total of 18 strike packages that each contain over 500 projectiles in 2025.[32] The Russian defense industrial base's (DIB) ramped-up production in 2025 has allowed Russia to produce and launch missiles and drones at such high numbers and frequencies.[33] Russian strikes during Fall and Winter 2025 have largely targeted Ukraine's energy grid with devastating effects.[34] Russian forces have also significantly increased their strikes against Ukrainian railway infrastructure to impede Ukrainian logistics.[35] Russian forces have used a series of technological adaptations to their missiles and drones to achieve these effects in 2025, including integrated cameras and radio control capabilities on Russian Shahed-type drones that have allowed Russian forces to strike moving targets such as locomotives.[36] Russia has also leaned on its partners and allies to increase production, importing critical components from the People's Republic of China (PRC) and relying on North Korea for KN-23 missiles and labor to work at Russia's Shahed-producing factory in the Republic of Tatarstan.[37]

The Kremlin is presenting alleged evidence to support its claim that Ukrainian drone strikes targeted Russian President Vladimir Putin's residence in Novgorod Oblast on the night of December 28 to 29, but the alleged evidence continues to be unpersuasive. Major General Alexander Romanenko, chief of the Anti-Aircraft Missile Troops of the Russian Aerospace Forces (VKS), gave a briefing on December 31 about the alleged Ukrainian drone strike against Putin's residence.[38] Romanenko repeated many of the claims from the Russian Ministry of Defense's (MoD) December 29 report, including the claim that Russian forces downed 91 total Ukrainian drones targeting Putin's residence over Novgorod, Bryansk, and Smolensk oblasts.[39] The Russian MoD first issued a report about downed Ukrainian drones on the morning of December 29 and subsequently updated that report later in the day, likely to correct some of the discrepancies that did not conform to Kremlin claims about the alleged Ukrainian strike.[40] The Russian MoD is likely leveraging Romanenko as a high-ranking commander to try to bring credibility to the Kremlin's claims.

The Russian MoD posted a map on December 31 of the alleged flight paths of the Ukrainian drones.[41] The map appears to show dozens of drones flying over or near Smolensk City, east of the Russian-Belarusian border. ISW had not observed reports of Russian forces downing drones over Smolensk Oblast on the night of December 28 to 29, and it is unlikely that Russian air defenses would have engaged these drones over a major city with nearby military infrastructure. It is also unclear how the Russian MoD would have been able to confirm that drones flying over Bryansk Oblast were targeting Putin's residence in Novgorod Oblast, as drones could have been targeting many other areas in various directions from Bryansk. ISW did not observe reports or evidence of Russian forces downing drones over Bryansk Oblast on the night of December 28 to 29 in any event. The absence of such evidence is not in itself proof that there were no Ukrainian drone overflights in these areas, but it is part of a pattern of silence that is unusual when Ukraine conducts strikes deep into Russia.

The Russian MoD posted footage on December 31 showing a Russian servicemember next to a drone that Russian forces allegedly downed while it was flying toward Novgorod Oblast on the night of December 28 to 29.[42] The servicemember in the footage claimed that the drone was targeting a "protected facility" in Valdai Raion, Novgorod Oblast.[43] The servicemember highlighted the technical characteristics of the drone and claimed that the drone's high-explosive warhead is designed to destroy "personnel or civilian targets." The footage offers no distinguishing features to confirm the location or timing of filming. The Russian MoD's footage of the alleged drone wreckage comes after Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov told journalists on December 30 that he does not think there "should be any evidence" of the strike, but that questions about any downed drone debris as possible evidence are a matter for the Russian military.[44] ISW continues to note that strikes such as the one Russia is claiming Ukrainian forces conducted on December 28-29 typically generate the rapid publication of various sorts of evidence of the strike, such as footage, statements from Russian authorities about Russian air defense activity, and reports from local sources and media about the strike and damages.[45] The circumstances of the alleged December 28-29 strike continue do not conform to the pattern of observed evidence that typically follows Ukrainian deep strikes. Kremlin statements and presentations of alleged evidence do not account for these discrepancies. ISW is aware of reports that US intelligence officials have confirmed that Putin's residence was not the target of Ukrainian strikes, but has no ability to confirm those reports.[46]

Russian President Vladimir Putin officially named 2026 the Year of the Unity of the Peoples of Russia in his annual New Year's Eve address. Putin described Russians as “together one large family” and appealed to “traditions, faith and memory” as unifying characteristics.[47] Putin emphasized that the Russian people are united ”in [their] selfless and devoted love” for Russia and in their support of Russia's war effort. ISW continues to note that Putin’s narratives about Russia as a multiethnic and multireligious state whose people come together under a united love for the Russian Federation are at odds with the xenophobic views of the Russian ultranationalist community — one of Putin’s core constituencies with ardent supporters of the war effort that advocates for a Russia centered on the ethnic Russian identity and the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC).[48] Putin notably continues to lean into a concept of civic nationalism more consistent with the Soviet ideal than with the Christian nationalism of Russian ultranationalists and emphasized on December 19 that the Year of the Unity of the Peoples of Russia in 2026 carries special significance in wartime.[49]

Key Takeaways:

• Russian forces increased their average rate of advance in 2025 due to a new operational template supported by technological adaptations and a shift in assault tactics.
• The Russian military command largely prioritized efforts to seize the remainder of Donetsk Oblast and establish a buffer zone in northern Sumy and Kharkiv oblasts in 2025 but failed to accomplish these goals.
• The orientation of Ukrainian defenses and fortified areas helped to hinder Russian advances in select areas in 2025.
• Ukrainian forces appear to be undertaking their own BAI campaign that will likely parallel that of Russia.
• Russian forces launched over 54,000 long-range drones and over 1,900 missiles against Ukraine in 2025.
• The Kremlin is presenting alleged evidence to support its claim that Ukrainian drone strikes targeted Russian President Vladimir Putin's residence in Novgorod Oblast on the night of December 28 to 29, but the alleged evidence continues to be unpersuasive.
• Russian President Vladimir Putin officially named 2026 the Year of the Unity of the Peoples of Russia in his annual New Year's Eve address.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced in western Zaporizhzhia Oblast. Russian forces recently advanced near Pokrovsk.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.    

• Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
• Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis
• Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
• Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
• Significant Activity in Belarus

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Ukrainian forces continued their long-range strike campaign against Russian oil infrastructure overnight on December 30 to 31. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on December 31 that Ukrainian drones struck the Tuapse Oil Refinery near Tuapse and the Tamannefttegaz Oil Terminal near Volna, Krasnodar Krai, damaging the Tuapse refinery's main processing unit and causing fires at both facilities.[50] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that the Tuapse Oil Refinery has an annual production capacity of 12 million tons of petroleum products and that both facilities support the production and transport of petroleum products to the Russian military and export abroad. Geolocated footage published on December 31 shows a fire at the Tuapse Oil Refinery, and Krasnodar Krai officials confirmed that Ukrainian strikes also damaged berths at the port of Tuapse.[51] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces also struck the Temp oil depot near Rybinsk, Yaroslavl Oblast, causing a large fire.[52] Geolocated footage published on December 31 shows a smoke plume at the Temp oil depot.[53] Sources in Ukraine's Security Service (SBU) told Ukrainian media that Rybinsk is a significant Russian logistics hub and that the Temp oil depot helps distribute petroleum products to northeastern Russia.[54]

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in northern Ukraine along the international border)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Sumy Oblast on December 31 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced southeast of Oleksiivka, south of Varachyne (both north of Sumy City), and marginally southeast of Sadky (northeast of Sumy City).[55]

Russian forces attacked north of Sumy City near Kostyantynivka, Kindrativka, Oleksiivka, and Andriivka and northeast of Sumy City near Yunakivka, Yablunivka, and Varachyne on December 30 and 31.[56] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Kindrativka and periodically counterattack near Yunakivka.[57]

Russian Chief of the General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov inspected a Russian Northern Grouping of Forces command post on December 31 and praised Russian forces for alleged successes in establishing a "security zone" in Sumy and Kharkiv oblasts.[58] The Kremlin and senior Russian military commanders have recently intensified discussions of a buffer zone outside of the four Ukrainian oblasts that Russia has illegally annexed, likely as part of a cognitive warfare effort aimed at portraying Ukrainian lines as facing imminent collapse across the theater.[59] ISW continues to assess that the frontlines do not face imminent collapse, however.

Order of Battle: D-30 howitzer crews of the Russian 106th Airborne (VDV) Division are reportedly operating in the Sumy direction.[60]

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on December 31 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces marginally advanced in western Vovchanski Khutory (northeast of Kharkiv City).[61]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk, Vovchanski Khutory, Starytsia, and Lyman and toward Izbytske on December 30 and 31.[62] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Lyman and Vilcha (northeast of Kharkiv City).[63]

A Russian milblogger reportedly affiliated with the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces claimed that the commander of the Russian 1st Motorized Rifle Regiment (Russian Strategic Missile Forces [RVSN] and reportedly under the operational control of the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces) sends personnel into highly attritional assaults and has not rotated units for 1.5 years despite manpower shortages.[64]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 69th Motorized Rifle Division (6th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) reportedly continue to operate in Kharkiv Oblast.[65]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Velykyi Burluk direction on December 31 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked north of Velykyi Burluk near Dehtyarne, northeast of Velykyi Burluk near Ambarne, and southeast of Velykyi Burluk near Dovhenke and Dvorichanske and toward Obukhivka on December 30 and 31.[66] A Russian milblogger reportedly affiliated with the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Khatnie (northeast of Velykyi Burluk).[67]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued limited offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on December 31 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Some Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces retain control over northern and western Myrove (west of Kupyansk) and areas northeast of the settlement.[68] Another milblogger claimed that it is unclear whether Russian forces managed to consolidate positions in Myrove, however.[69] Russian milbloggers likely made these claims in response to geolocated footage published on December 30 showing Russian servicemembers operating in northwestern Myrove during what ISW assesses was a Russian infiltration mission that did not change control of terrain or the forward edge of the battle area (FEBA).[70]

Russian forces attacked east of Kupyansk near Pishchane on December 30 and 31.[71] Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Kupyansk itself.[72]

A Russian milblogger stated that there is no clear frontline in Kupyansk as Russian and Ukrainian positions are intermingled.[73] The milblogger claimed that inclement weather is hindering Russian logistics to remaining positions in Kupyansk, as Russian logistics currently rely on drone-dropped supplies.

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 352nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (11th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) reportedly continue to operate in the Kupyansk direction.[74]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Borova direction on December 31 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked north of Borova near Bohuslavka and southeast of Borova near Shyikivka and toward Druzhelyubivka and Novoserhiivka on December 30 and 31.[75]

A Russian milblogger reportedly affiliated with the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces expressed reservations about the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD)'s December 29 claim of seizing Bohuslavka.[76]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Slovyansk-Lyman direction on December 31 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northwest of Lyman near Drobysheve, Novoselivka, Korovii Yar, and Oleksandrivka and toward Sosnove; north of Lyman toward Stavky; and east of Lyman near Zarichne and Yampil on December 30 and 31.[77]

A Ukrainian drone group commander operating in the Lyman direction reported on December 31 that Russian forces are attempting to use fog and snow to conceal their efforts to advance toward Ukrainian positions.[78] The Ukrainian drone group commander noted that Russian forces attack both during the day and at night.

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 349th Separate Signal Battalion of the 67th Motorized Rifle Division (25th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Central Military District [CMD]) reportedly continue to operate in the Lyman direction.[79]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Siversk direction on December 31 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced northwest of Ozerne (northwest of Siversk).[80]

Russian forces attacked northwest of Siversk near Ozerne, Dronivka, and Platonivka, northeast of Siversk near Serebryanka, and southwest of Siversk toward Riznykivka on December 30 and 31.[81] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Svyato-Pokrovske (south of Siversk).[82]

Ukrainian forces recently advanced or maintained positions in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area.

Refinement of area under Russian claims: Geolocated footage published on December 30 shows Ukrainian forces operating in eastern Kostyantynivka, an area where Russian sources have previously claimed that Russian forces maintained a presence.[83]

Russian forces attacked near Kostyantynivka itself; north of Kostyantynivka near Markove; northeast of Kostyantynivka near Minkivka; east of Kostyantynivka near Oleksandro-Shultyne; southeast of Kostyantynivka near Ivanopillya, Kleban-Byk, Pleshchiivka, and Shcherbynivka; southwest of Kostyantynivka toward Stepanivka; south of Druzhkivka near Rusyn Yar; and southwest of Druzhkivka toward Torske, Novopavlivka and Sofiivka on December 30 and 31.[84]

The chief of staff of a Ukrainian drone battalion operating in the Kramatorsk (Kostyantynivka) direction reported that Russian forces have begun to use snow suits for camouflage during small group infiltration missions toward Kostyantynivka due to winter conditions.[85] The chief of staff added that Russian forces are using sleeper first-person view (FPV) drones to interdict Ukrainian ground lines of communication (GLOCs).[86]

Order of Battle: D-30 howitzer elements of the Howitzer Artillery Battalion of the Russian 1442nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (6th Motorized Rifle Division, 3rd Army Corps [AC], under operational control of the Southern Grouping of Forces) are striking Ukrainian forces in eastern Kostyantynivka.[87] Reconnaissance drone operators of the 40th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet) are reportedly coordinating strikes against Ukrainian vehicles near Raiske (southwest of Druzhkivka) with Skalpel-M loitering munition operators of the 381st Artillery Regiment (150th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]).[88] FPV drone operators of the 150th Motorized Rifle Division and the 58th Separate Spetsnaz Battalion (unofficially designated the Okhotnik [Hunter] Spetsnaz Detachment) (51st CAA, formerly 1st Donetsk People’s Republic [DNR] AC, SMD) reportedly continue to operate in the Kostyantynivka direction.[89]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Dobropillya tactical area on December 31 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced in eastern Novyi Donbas and near Toretske (both east of Dobropillya).[90]

Russian forces attacked east of Dobropillya near Nove Shakhove on December 30 and 31.[91] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Nove Shakhove.[92]

Order of Battle: Elements of the 174th Separate Reconnaissance Battalion (150th Motorized Rifle Division) reportedly continue to operate in the Dobropillya direction.[93]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Pokrovsk direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on December 30 indicates that Russian forces advanced north of Udachne (southwest of Pokrovsk).[94]

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced to southern Bilytske (north of Pokrovsk) and marginally north of Pokrovsk.[95]

Russian forces attacked near and within Pokrovsk itself; northwest of Pokrovsk near Hryshyne; north of Pokrovsk near Rodynske and Bilytske; northeast of Pokrovsk near Sukhetske and Chervonyi (Krasnyi) Lyman; east of Pokrovsk near and within Myrnohrad and Rivne; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Kotlyne, Udachne, and Molodetske on December 30 and 31.[96] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked west of Pokrovsk.[97]

The Ukrainian 7th Rapid Reaction Corps of the Air Assault Forces reported on December 31 that Ukrainian forces continue to operate in Pokrovsk, Myrnohrad, and Hryshyne.[98] A Ukrainian brigade operating in the Pokrovsk direction refuted Russian claims that Russian forces seized Rodynske and published footage showing Ukrainian forces raising a flag in Rodynske.[99] The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Pokrovsk direction reported that Russian forces in the direction are concentrating their main efforts against Hryshyne.[100]

Order of Battle: Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov credited elements of the Russian 5th Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA), the 1435th Motorized Rifle Regiment (likely comprised of mobilized personnel) (reportedly of the 2nd CAA, Central Military District [CMD]), and the 1487th Motorized Rifle Regiment (under the operational control of the 110th Motorized Rifle Brigade, 51st CAA) with the claimed seizure of Myrnohrad.[101] FPV drone operators of the 80th Separate Sparta Reconnaissance Battalion (51st CAA) are reportedly striking Ukrainian unmanned ground vehicles (UGVs) near Shevchenko (northwest of Pokrovsk).[102] Elements of the 61st Naval Infantry Brigade (Northern Fleet) and multiple launch rocket system (MLRS) elements of the 5th Motorized Rifle Brigade are reportedly operating in the Pokrovsk direction.[103]

Russian forces attacked near Novopavlivka itself and south of Novopavlivka near Filiya and Yalta on December 30 and 31 but did not advance.[104]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Oleksandrivka near Andriivka-Klevtsove; east of Oleksandrivka near Oleksandrohrad; and southeast of Oleksandrivka near Sichneve and Vyshneve on December 30 and 31 but did not advance.[105]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Hulyaipole direction on December 31 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced to the western outskirts of Varvarivka (north of Hulyaipole).[106]

Russian forces attacked near Hulyaipole; northwest of Hulyaipole toward Ternuvate; north of Hulyaipole near Danylivka, Varvarivka, and Dobropillya; northeast of Hulyaipole near Solodke, Rybne, Pryvillya, and Zlahoda; south of Hulyaipole near Dorozhnyanka; and west of Hulyaipole toward Zaliznychne and Staroukrainka on December 30 and 31.[107] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Hulyaipole.[108]

Ukraine's Southern Operational Command on December 31 refuted Russian claims that Russian forces fully control Hulyaipole.[109]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 60th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade, the 1st Unmanned Systems Battalion, the 305th Artillery Brigade (all 5th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Eastern Military District [EMD]), and the 14th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff's Main Directorate [GRU]) are striking Ukrainian forces in eastern Hirke (west of Hulyaipole).[110] Elements of the 11th Air Force and Air Defense Army (Russian Aerospace Forces [VKS] and EMD) are reportedly conducting FAB unguided glide bomb strikes against Ukrainian forces in Rizdvyanka (northwest of Hulyaipole).[111] Elements of the 189th Motorized Rifle Regiment (35th CAA, EMD) are reportedly operating in the Zaporizhia direction.[112]

Ukrainian forces recently advanced in western Zaporizhia Oblast.

Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on December 30 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced within Stepnohirsk (west of Orikhiv).[113]

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on December 30 indicates that Russian forces had advanced within Stepnohirsk at a prior date.[114] ISW assesses that this change did not occur within the last 24 hours.

Refinement of areas under Russian claims: Geolocated footage published on December 30 indicates that Ukrainian forces maintain positions or recently advanced north of Stepnohirsk, an area where Russian sources previously claimed that Russian forces maintained a presence.[115]

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced north and northwest of Lukyanivske (northwest of Orikhiv) and within Prymorske (west of Orikhiv).[116]

Russian forces attacked southeast of Orikhiv near Bilohirya and west of Orikhiv near Prymorske and toward Pavlivka and Novoyakovlivka on December 30 and 31.[117]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 247th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (7th VDV Division) are reportedly operating in Stepnohirsk.[118] Interceptor drone operators of the 4th Military Base (58th CAA, Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian drones near Orikhiv.[119] Drone operators of the 108th VDV Regiment and 162nd Separate Reconnaissance Battalion (both of the 7th VDV Division) are reportedly operating in the Zaporizhia direction.[120] Elements of the Nemets group of the 3rd Assault Company of the 291st Motorized Rifle Regiment (42nd Motorized Rifle Division, 58th CAA, SMD) and the 70th Motorized Rifle Regiment (42nd Motorized Rifle Division) are reportedly operating in the Zaporizhia direction.[121] Drone operators of the BARS-Sarmat Unmanned Systems Special Purpose Center (formerly BARS-Sarmat Detachment, subordinated to VDV Forces) are reportedly operating in Zaporizhia Oblast.[122]

Russian forces conducted limited ground assaults in the Dnipro direction, including east of Kherson City toward the Antonivskyi Bridge, on December 30 and 31 but did not advance.[123]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Russian forces conducted a series of missile and drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of December 30 to 31. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 127 Shahed-type, Gerbera-type, and other drones, of which about 80 were Shahed-type drones, from the directions of Oryol, Bryansk, and Kursk cities; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; and occupied Cape Chauda, Crimea.[124] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 101 drones and that 20 drones struck 11 locations. Kyiv Oblast Military Administration Head Mykola Kalashnyk reported that Russian forces struck residential infrastructure in Bila Tserkva, Kyiv Oblast, injuring two people.[125] Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces struck residential, logistics, and energy infrastructure in Odesa Oblast, injuring six people, including three children, and causing power outages in parts of Odesa City.[126] Ukraine’s largest private energy company, DTEK, reported that Russian forces struck two energy facilities in Odesa Oblast.[127]

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

The opposition Belarusian Railway Workers' Community reported on November 27 that Belarus sent 31 flatcars of military equipment from its 814th Technical Support Center to the Russian 1311th Central Tank Reserve Base near Yekaterinburg between April and August 2025.[128]

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.