Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, December 29, 2025

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The Kremlin accused Ukraine of conducting a long-range drone strike targeting Russian President Vladimir Putin's residence in Novgorod Oblast on December 29. Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov claimed that Ukrainian forces launched 91 long-range drones against Putin's residence overnight on December 28 to 29 in Novgorod Oblast, likely referring to the residence in Valdai, Novgorod Oblast.[i] Lavrov claimed that Russian forces downed the drones and that the strike caused no damage. Lavrov condemned this alleged strike and stated that Russia will "revise" its negotiating position due to the strike. US President Donald Trump and Russian President Vladimir Putin had a phone call on December 29, and Russian Presidential Aide Yuri Ushakov stated that Putin informed Trump about the claimed strike and told him that Russia will "reconsider" its position on peace agreements.[ii] The United States has not published a readout of the December 29 Trump-Putin call as of this writing, though US officials — including Trump — confirmed the call occurred and that Putin made claims to Trump about the alleged strike.[iii]  

The circumstances of this alleged strike do not conform to the pattern of observed evidence when Ukrainian forces conduct strikes into Russia. Confirmed Ukrainian strikes in Russia typically generate evidence observable in open sources. Such evidence includes footage, often geolocated, of air defense operations, explosions, fires, or smoke plumes near targeted objects; statements from local and regional Russian authorities, usually downplaying successful Ukrainian strikes as "debris" from downed drones; and reports from local sources and media of fire or damage to such objects. ISW has not observed any such footage nor local or regional reporting about Ukrainian strikes near Putin's residence to corroborate Lavrov’s claim. Lavrov's claim of downing 89 Ukrainian drones over Novgorod Oblast is also inconsistent with the Russian Ministry of Defense's (MoD's) claim that Russian forces downed 47 Ukrainian drones over the oblast overnight on December 28 to 29, further undermining the claim. Ukrainian forces previously struck numerous military targets in Novgorod Oblast, which produced evidence.[iv] The Kremlin has offered no evidence to support its claim that Ukrainian forces targeted Putin’s residence on December 29.

Russian opposition outlet Sota published an investigation into the alleged strike on December 29, reporting that Valdai residents did not hear air defenses operating overnight, even though Russian air defenses would have had to operate to down up to 91 Ukrainian drones.[v] Sota reported that drones launched from Ukraine's northern border would have to cross into heavily protected Russian airspace, including multiple installations of Strategic Missile Forces facilities, air defense units, military aviation, and other assets that would either be under heavy air defense protection or themselves act as the Russian air defense umbrella. Sota concluded that Ukraine would have been able to strike Putin's residence in Valdai through a "miracle" or deliberate Russian military negligence. Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL)'s Russia service reported in August 2025 that Russia increased the number of air defense systems defending Valdai from two to 12 from 2022 to August 2025.[vi]

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky refuted the alleged strike against Putin's residence in Novgorod Oblast and warned that Russia will use this claim to justify strikes against Kyiv City and Ukrainian government buildings.[vii] Russia has already targeted Ukrainian government buildings in previous long-range strikes, including Ukraine’s Cabinet of Ministers building in Kyiv City in September 2025.[viii] Lavrov stated that Russia has determined the targets and timing for retaliatory strikes against Ukraine but did not provide further specifics.[ix] Russia has already intensified its long-range strike campaign against Ukraine in recent months, however, specifically targeting Ukraine’s energy infrastructure ahead of Winter 2025-2026.[x] Russia has notably intensified strikes against Ukraine around negotiations multiple times since the Trump administration began pursuing peace efforts in Winter 2025, including most recently overnight on December 26 to 27, ahead of Zelensky's talks with Trump in Florida on December 28.[xi] Russian overnight long-range strike packages purposefully target Ukrainian civilian infrastructure and disproportionately impact civilians.[xii]

The Kremlin may intend to use this claimed strike to justify its rejection of any peace proposals that come out of recent bilateral US-Ukrainian and multilateral US-Ukrainian-European talks.[xiii] Ushakov's readout of the December 29 Trump-Putin call criticized the US-Ukrainian framework, likely referring to the 20-point peace proposal, as "still leav[ing] room" for Ukraine to "avoid" unspecified obligations and rejected the notion of a ceasefire.[xiv] Since the Trump administration began peace efforts in January-February 2025, the Kremlin has sought to delay and prolong peace negotiations in order to continue its war undisturbed, prevent the U.S. from imposing measures intended to pressure Russia into meaningful negotiations, and even to extract concessions about bilateral US-Russian relations.[xv]

Russian President Vladimir Putin and high-ranking Russian military commanders held another meeting to aggrandize tactical details and create the false impression that the front lines across Ukraine are on the verge of collapse. Putin met with the leadership of the Russian General Staff and grouping of forces commanders on December 29 — following a string of performative, publicized meetings between Putin and his commanders in recent weeks, including the most recent meeting on December 27.[xvi] Putin, Russian Chief of the General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov, and the groupings of forces commanders made a series of exaggerated claims about Russian successes across the battlefield, all of which rely on exaggerated quantitative data intended to obfuscate the relatively slow rate of Russian advances. Gerasimov claimed that Russian forces seized over 700 square kilometers and 32 settlements in Ukraine in December 2025 and 6,640 square kilometers and 334 settlements in total in 2025. ISW has observed evidence indicating a Russian presence (either through assaults or infiltration missions) in 480 square kilometers, and that Russian forces seized or completely infiltrated 23 settlements in December 2025. ISW has also observed evidence indicating a Russian presence in 4,952 square kilometers and seized or completely infiltrated 245 settlements in all of 2025. Russian Northern Grouping of Forces Commander Colonel General Yevgeny Nikiforov claimed that Russian forces seized 940 square kilometers in Kharkiv and Sumy oblasts in 2025. ISW has observed evidence to assess a Russian presence in 639 square kilometers in Kharkiv and Sumy oblasts during 2025. Nikiforov notably claimed that Russian forces have advanced to within 20 kilometers of Sumy City in 2025 — an implicit acknowledgement that Russian forces have advanced under seven kilometers deep in the area, given that Sumy City is located roughly 27 kilometers from the Sumy Oblast northern international border where Russian forces hold the deepest positions.

Putin and senior Russian military officials continued to heavily aggrandize Russian operations near Kupyansk despite all available evidence indicating that Ukrainian forces have liberated much of the town and surrounding area.[xvii] Russian Western Grouping of Forces Commander Colonel General Sergei Kuzovlev claimed that Russian forces will complete the encirclement of Ukrainian forces in Kupyansk in January to February 2026, which is incredibly slow compared to how long Russian officials have been making claims about nearly completing the seizure of Kupyansk.[xviii] Gerasimov notably claimed that Russian forces encircled Ukrainian forces in Kupyansk as of October 26 and had seized Kupyansk as of November 20.[xix] A Russian milblogger reporting on the Western Grouping of Forces claimed on December 21 that the Russian military command had set the deadline to seize Kurylivka and Pishchane (both southeast of Kupyansk) by January 1, 2026.[xx]

Gerasimov and the other Russian commanders claimed that Russian forces seized Dibrova (northwest of Siversk), Drobysheve (northwest of Lyman), and Lukyanivske (northwest of Orikhiv) as of December 29. ISW has not observed geolocated evidence to assess any Russian presence in Dibrova or Drobysheve as of December 29, or that Russian forces completed the seizure of Lukyanivske. Russian Southern Grouping of Forces Commander Lieutenant General Sergei Medvedev claimed on December 29 that Russian forces have seized 40 to 45 percent of Kostyantynivka — contradicting Gerasimov’s December 27 claim that Russian forces seized over half of the buildings in Kostyantynivka.[xxi] ISW has observed evidence to assess that Russian forces have operated in five percent of Kostyantynivka. Gerasimov claimed that Russian forces control over half of Lyman, Donetsk Oblast though ISW has observed evidence to assess that Russian forces have operated in only six percent of Lyman. Dnepr Grouping of Forces Commander Colonel General Mikhail Teplinsky claimed that Russian forces advanced within 15 kilometers of Zaporizhzhia City, and ISW has observed evidence to assess that Russian forces have advanced within 20 kilometers of Zaporizhzhia City. The Kremlin is intensifying its efforts to portray the front line as imminently collapsing across the theater and claim that Russian forces are capable of imminently threatening Ukraine’s Fortress Belt. Available evidence continues to indicate that the front line is not collapsing, and Russian forces would require at least two to three years to seize all of Ukraine’s Fortress Belt.[xxii]

Pro-war Russian ultranationalist milbloggers are publicly acknowledging that the Russian military command’s claims are exaggerated. A Kremlin-affiliated milblogger questioned Gerasimov’s claim that Ukrainian forces are not conducting counteroffensive operations, likely referring to ongoing Ukrainian counterattacks that have pushed Russian forces back from most of Kupyansk.[xxiii] The milblogger also noted that available evidence does not support Gerasimov and Teplinsky’s claim that Russian forces are operating within Orikhiv, Zaporizhia Oblast, as Russian forces are only on the “southern approaches” of the town. The milblogger added that such high-profile meetings underscore the Kremlin’s intention to continue the war rather than agree to a ceasefire that freezes the front line. Other Russian milbloggers also continue to contradict the Russian MoD’s portrayal of the situation in Kupyansk, and one milblogger criticized the Russian military command as being a "witness to a lie" and acknowledged that Ukrainian forces have encircled Russian forces operating within the town.[xxiv]

Russian forces continue to commit war crimes in the Hulyaipole and Pokrovsk directions. The Ukrainian General Prosecutor’s Office reported on December 29 that Russian forces executed two Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs) in Shakhove, Donetsk Oblast (east of Dobropillya) on December 27 after disarming the POWs and forcing them to partially undress.[xxv] A source reportedly affiliated with Ukrainian military intelligence reported on December 28 that Russian forces also executed three Ukrainian POWs south of Hulyaipole, Zaporizhia Oblast on December 20.[xxvi] Ukraine’s “I Want to Live” initiative reported on December 29 that on December 20 two Russian servicemembers of the 1st Assault Battalion of the Russian 30th Motorized Rifle Brigade (2nd Combined Arms Army [CAA], Central Military District [CMD]) broke into a house in Pokrovsk where civilians were sheltering, shot and killed seven civilians and injured another, and then set the building on fire.[xxvii] Ukraine’s “I Want to Live” initiative reported that another servicemember of the Russian 30th Motorized Rifle Brigade (2nd CAA) tortured and killed a civilian in Pokrovsk and raped his wife in Pokrovsk on December 22.[xxviii] ISW observed an increase in Russian war crimes in the Hulyaipole and Pokrovsk directions since late October and November 2025, as Russian forces have intensified offensive operations in these directions and advanced into the towns.[xxix] ISW continues to assess that the Russian military command is endorsing and sometimes ordering war crimes on the battlefield and that Russia is torturing and abusing Ukrainian civilian prisoners as part of the wider military modus operandi.[xxx]

Several dozen Belarusian smuggling balloons illegally entered Polish airspace, and Polish aircraft intercepted a Russian reconnaissance aircraft near the international border overnight on December 24 to December 25.[xxxi] Polish authorities reported on December 25 that Polish fighter jets intercepted, identified, and subsequently escorted a Russian reconnaissance aircraft flying over the Baltic Sea near Polish airspace overnight on December 24 to 25.[xxxii]  A source in Polish law enforcement told Polish outlet RMF24 that 59 balloons violated Polish airspace and that authorities found four downed balloons in Podlaskie Voivodeship in northeastern Poland and three in Lubelskie Voivodeship in eastern Poland.[xxxiii] The balloons carried illegal cigarettes and Global Positioning System (GPS) tracking equipment. Polish authorities told RMF24 that the balloon violations may have been testing the response of Polish air surveillance systems.[xxxiv] Belarusian balloons frequently violated Lithuanian airspace throughout October and November 2025, often forcing airports to temporarily cease operations.[xxxv] SW continues to assess that Russia is intensifying its covert and overt attacks against Europe and that Russia has entered "Phase Zero" — the informational and psychological condition-setting phase — to prepare for a possible NATO-Russia war in the future.[xxxvi] ISW continues to assess that Russia has de facto annexed and that Belarusian incursions into NATO airspace are very likely part of Russia's broader Phase Zero effort.[xxxvii]

Key Takeaways:

• The Kremlin accused Ukraine of conducting a long-range drone strike targeting Russian President Vladimir Putin's residence in Novgorod Oblast on December 29.
• The circumstances of this alleged strike do not conform to the pattern of observed evidence when Ukrainian forces conduct strikes into Russia.
• Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky refuted the alleged strike against Putin's residence in Novgorod Oblast and warned that Russia will use this claim to justify strikes against Kyiv City and Ukrainian government buildings.
• The Kremlin may intend to use this claimed strike to justify its rejection of any peace proposals that come out of recent bilateral US-Ukrainian and multilateral US-Ukrainian-European talks.
• Russian President Vladimir Putin and high-ranking Russian military commanders held another meeting to aggrandize tactical details and create the false impression that the front lines across Ukraine are on the verge of collapse.
• Pro-war Russian ultranationalist milbloggers are publicly acknowledging that the Russian military command’s claims are exaggerated.
• Russian forces continue to commit war crimes in the Hulyaipole and Pokrovsk directions.
• Several dozen Belarusian smuggling balloons illegally entered Polish airspace, and Polish aircraft intercepted a Russian reconnaissance aircraft near the international border overnight on December 24 to December 25.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Siversk, Oleksandrivka, and Hulyaipole. Russian forces recently advanced in western Zaporizhia Oblast, in the Dobropillya tactical area, and near Pokrovsk.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.      

• Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
• Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis
• Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
• Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
• Significant Activity in Belarus

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Ukrainian forces likely continued their long-range strike campaign against Russian military infrastructure overnight on December 28 to 29. Russian opposition outlet Astra posted geolocated footage on December 29 that shows Russian air defense operations to Maykop, Republic of Adygea and assessed that Ukrainian forces targeted the nearby Khanskaya air base.[xxxviii] Ukrainian defense outlet Militarnyi noted that the Khanskaya air base is a key Russian Aerospace Forces (VKS) rear aviation logistics hub.[xxxix]

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in northern Ukraine along the international border)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Sumy Oblast on December 29 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked in Kursk and Sumy oblasts, including north of Sumy City near Kostyantynivka, Andriivka, Oleksiivka, and Varachyne and toward Kindrativka; northeast of Sumy City near Yablunivka; and southeast of Sumy City near Hrabovske on December 28 and 29.[xl] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Andriivka.[xli]

A Sumy Oblast local media organization reported on December 28 that Russian small infantry groups have recently intensified operations near Komarivka (northwest of Sumy City) since around December 22.[xlii] A Russian milblogger reportedly affiliated with the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces claimed that a group of the Russian 1st Motorized Rifle Regiment (Territorial Control) (Russian Aerospace Forces [VKS] and reportedly under the operational control of the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces) operating in Bezsalivka (northwest of Sumy City) is unable to evacuate wounded servicemembers and criticized the regimental commander for conducting fruitless attritional assaults.[xliii] The milblogger claimed that the Russian General Staff stopped paying contract servicemembers of the Northern Grouping of Forces the compensation for their participation in the "counterterrorism operation" (a term the Kremlin used to define Ukraine's incursions into Kursk Oblast) since September 2025, despite claiming the pause would be temporary.[xliv] The milblogger stated that the Russian General Staff continued to allocate these payments to conscripts and volunteers, however. The milblogger claimed that the Russian military command has not sent replacements to rotate one company of the 1st Motorized Rifle Regiment since Spring 2025. The milblogger also claimed that Chechen Akhmat Spetsnaz forces are indiscriminately training and committing VKS servicemembers to assault operations without accounting for their specialized skills, and that the Russian command accuses servicemembers who question the Russian military command’s exaggerated claims about the battlefield situation of refusing orders to fight.

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 106th Airborne (VDV) Division are reportedly striking Ukrainian vehicles near Mykilske (northeast of Sumy City).[xlv] Drone operators of the Chechen Akhmat Spetsnaz Aida Detachment are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Andriivka.[xlvi]

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Russian forces continued to infiltrate in northern Kharkiv Oblast on December 28 but did not make confirmed advances.

Assessed Russian infiltrations: Geolocated footage published on December 29 shows a Russian servicemember operating and surrendering to Ukrainian forces in southeastern Lyman (northeast of Kharkiv City) during what ISW assesses was a Russian infiltration mission that did not change the control of terrain or the forward edge of battle area (FEBA).[xlvii]

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced northeast of Kozacha Lopan (north of Kharkiv City).[xlviii]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Kharkiv City near Prylipka, Vovchanski Khutory, Starytsia, Vilcha, Vovchansk, Izbytske, and Lyman and toward Hrafske on December 28 and 29.[xlix] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Vilcha.[l]

Russian forces attacked east of Velykyi Burluk near Milove and toward Khatnie and Hryhorivka and southeast of Velykyi Burluk near Dvorichanske on December 28 and 29 but did not advance.[li]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on December 29 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked near Kupyansk itself; northwest of Kupyansk toward Mala Shapkivka; east of Kupyansk toward Petropavlivka; southeast of Kupyansk near Kurylivka and toward Pishchane;   south of Kupyansk near Kupyansk-Vuzlovyi and toward Boldyrivka and Prystin; and southwest of Kupyansk toward Blahodativka on December 28 and 29.[lii] Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked within and near Kupyansk itself and near Podoly (east of Kupyansk) and Nechvolodivka (west of Kupyansk).[liii]

Ukrainian Joint Forces Task Force Spokesperson Colonel Viktor Trehubov reported on December 29 that Russian forces have shifted their focus in the Kupyansk direction to attacking Ukrainian positions on the east (left) bank of the Oskil River, including toward Kupyansk-Vuzlovyi.[liv] Trehubov stated that weather conditions have made Russian troop movements more visible against snow-covered terrain, but that freezing conditions along the Oskil River could allow Russian infantry to cross on foot if ice forms.[lv] Trehubov stated that Ukrainian forces are operating many drones in the Kupyansk direction, which would make Russian infantry attempts to cross the frozen Oskil River vulnerable to Ukrainian drone strikes - if weather conditions permit drone flights. A Russian milblogger claimed that both Russian and Ukrainian forces each control different parts of Kupyansk, while the remainder of the town is a contested “gray zone.”[lvi] Another Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces have encircled and mined three areas within Kupyansk where some small Russian groups retained positions.[lvii]

A Russian milblogger reportedly affiliated with the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces claimed on December 29 that the command of the Russian 79th Motorized Rifle Regiment (18th Motorized Rifle Division, 11th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) operating near Dvorichanske (northeast of Kupyansk) formed platoons consisting entirely of disabled, injured, and ill personnel to the frontline.[lviii] The milblogger claimed that the regiment suffered about 200 casualties in December 2025of which 140 casualties were due to non-combat medical problems.[lix]

Order of Battle: Drone operators and other elements of the Russian 352nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (11th AC) and of the 121st Motorized Rifle Regiment (68th Motorized Rifle Division, 6th CAA, LMD) reportedly continue to operate in the Kupyansk direction.[lx]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in Borova on December 29 but did not make confirmed advances.

See topline text for additional unconfirmed claims of Russian advances in the Borova direction.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced near Hrekivka (southeast of Borova) and west of the settlement.[lxi]

Russian forces attacked southeast of Borova near Hrekivka and towards Druzhelyubivka on December 28 and 29.[lxii]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Slovyansk-Lyman direction on December 29 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced near Lyman itself and near Korovii Yar (northwest of Lyman).[lxiii]

Russian forces attacked near and within Lyman itself; northwest of Lyman near Novoselivka, Oleksandrivka, Korovii Yar, and Drobysheve; north of Lyman near Novomykhailivka and Stavky; northeast of Lyman near Myrne; and east of Lyman near Zarichne on December 28 and 29.[lxiv] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Drobysheve and Stavky.[lxv]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)

Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Siversk direction.

See topline text for additional reports of unconfirmed claims of Russian advances in the Siversk direction.

Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on December 28 shows Russian forces striking a Ukrainian vehicle in eastern Svyato-Pokrovske (south of Siversk), during a recent   Ukrainian mechanized assault into the settlement.[lxvi] A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger acknowledged the Ukrainian mechanized assault into Svyato-Pokrovske.[lxvii]

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced northeast of Riznykivka (southwest of Siversk) and southeast of Zakitne (northwest of Siversk).[lxviii]

Russian forces attacked near Siversk itself; northwest of Siversk near Dronivka, Platonivka, Ozerne, Zakitne, Yampil, and Dibrova; northeast of Siversk near Serebryanka; south of Siversk near Svyato-Pokrovske; and southwest of Siversk near Riznykivka on December 28 and 29.[lxix] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Riznykivka.[lxx]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area on December 29 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked near Kostyantynivka itself; northeast of Kostyantynivka near Minkivka; east of Kostyantynivka near Oleksandro-Shultyne; southeast of Kostyantynivka near Kleban-Byk, Shcherbynivka and Pleshchiivka; south of Kostyantynivka toward Berestok; southwest of Kostyantynivka near Yablunivka and toward Stepanivka; south of Druzhkivka near Rusyn Yar; and southwest of Druzhkivka near Sofiivka on December 28 and 29.[lxxi] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked from Novopavlivka (southwest of Druzhkivka).[lxxii]

Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets assessed on December 29 that Russia intensified attacks near Sofiivka and Volodymyrivka (southwest of Druzhkivka), indicating that Russian forces are attempting to advance to Druzhkivka from the southwest.[lxxiii] Mashovets added that Russian forces have redeployed reserves from the Dnepr Grouping of Forces such as elements of the 70th Motorized Rifle Division (18th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) and the main forces of the Russian 49th CAA, (SMD) to the Southern Grouping of Forces’ area of responsibility (AoR) in the Slovyansk and Kostyantynivka directions.[lxxiv]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 58th Separate Spetsnaz Battalion (unofficially designated the Okhotnik [Hunter] Spetsnaz Detachment) (51st CAA, formerly 1st Donetsk People’s Republic [DNR] AC, SMD) reportedly continue to strike Ukrainian vehicles in the Kostyantynivka direction.[lxxv]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Dobropillya tactical area.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on December 29 indicates that Russian forces recently seized Nove Shakhove (east of Dobropillya).[lxxvi] Additional geolocated footage published on December 26 shows Ukrainian forces repelling a Russian mechanized assault northwest of Boikivka (southeast of Dobropillya), indicating that Russian forces recently advanced in the area.[lxxvii]

Russian forces attacked east of Dobropillya near Nove Shakhove, Shakhove, and Vilne and southeast of Dobropillya near Pankivka and Dorozhnie on December 28 and 29.[lxxviii]

Mashovets reported on December 29 that elements of the Russian 51st CAA have recently intensified attacks from the army’s foothold west of the Kazennyi Torets river near Nove Shakhove and Novotoretske (southeast of Dobropillya).[lxxix]

Ukraine’s 1st Azov National Guard Corps reported on December 29 that Ukrainian forces killed 12,492 Russian servicemembers, wounded 8,346, and captured another 185 in the Dobropillya direction between August 4 and December 29.[lxxx] The corps reported that Ukrainian forces also damaged or destroyed 93 tanks, 259 armored fighting vehicles (AFVs), and 314 artillery pieces during this period.

Order of Battle: First-person view (FPV) drone operators of the Russian 57th Separate Spetsnaz Company (8th CAA, SMD) and the 102nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (150th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA) are reportedly striking Ukrainian drone launch points in Toretske (east of Dobropillya).[lxxxi] Elements of the 174th Separate Reconnaissance Battalion (150th Motorized Rifle Division) reportedly continue to operate in the Dobropillya direction.[lxxxii]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Pokrovsk direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Mashovets reported on December 29 that Russian forces advanced to the Donetska railway in northwestern Rodynske (north of Pokrovsk) and along the O0525 road southeast of Hryshyne (northwest of Pokrovsk).[lxxxiii]

Russian forces attacked near and within Pokrovsk itself; northwest of Pokrovske near Hryshyne; north of Pokrovsk near Rodynske; northeast of Pokrovsk near Chervonyi (Krasnyi) Lyman and Novoekonomichne; east of Pokrovsk near and within Myrnohrad; southwest of Pokrovsk near Kotlyne, Udachne, and Molodetske; and west of Pokrovsk toward Serhiivka on December 28 and 29.[lxxxiv]

Ukraine’s Eastern Operational Command and 1st Azov National Guard Corps refuted on December 29 Russian claims that Russian forces seized Rodynske.[lxxxv] Ukraine’s Eastern Operational Command reported that Russian forces unsuccessfully attempted to consolidate positions along the Donetska railway north of and in western Rodynske. Mashovets reported that Russian forces are employing crossings along the Kazennyi Torets river to send reinforcements to Russian forces directly attacking Myrnohrad and trying to bypass the town from the north through Chervonyi Lyman (north of Myrnohrad).[lxxxvi]

Mashovets reported that Russian forces may have committed between 110,000 and 150,000 personnel to efforts in the Pokrovsk and Dobropillya directions, including elements of eleven motorized rifle brigades, one motorized rifle division, an assault brigade, and an artillery brigade.[lxxxvii]

Order of Battle: Mashovets reported that elements of the Russian 27th Motorized Rifle Division (2nd CAA, CMD) are operating south of Hryshyne.[lxxxviii] Mashovets reported that elements of the 15th and 30th motorized rifle brigades, the 137th Assault Brigade (all of the 2nd CAA), the 35th and 55th motorized rifle brigades (both of the 41st CAA), and likely the 74th Motorized Rifle Brigade (41st CAA), are operating in the Pokrovsk direction.[lxxxix] Elements of the Russian 5th Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA) reportedly continue to operate in Myrnohrad.[xc] Drone operators of the 506th Motorized Rifle Regiment (27th Motorized Rifle Division) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Myrnohrad.[xci]

Russian forces continued offensive operations near Novopavlivka itself, northeast of Novopavlivka near Novoserhiivka, and south of Novopavlivka near Filiya on December 28 and 29 but did not advance.[xcii]

Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Oleksandrivka direction.

Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on December 28 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced in northern Oleksandrohrad (southeast of Oleksandrivka).[xciii] ISW cannot independently verify the likely route of Ukrainian forces to northern Oleksandrohrad.

Russian forces attacked northeast of Oleksandrivka near Andriivka-Klevtsove, Yalta, Tovste, and Ivanivka and southeast of Oleksandrivka near Oleksandrohrad, Verbove, and Vyshneve and toward Sosnivka on December 28 and 29.[xciv]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)

Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Hulyaipole direction.

Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on December 29 shows Russian forces repelling a Ukrainian mechanized assault east of the T-0401 Pokrovske-Hulyaipole highway between Dobropillya (north of Hulyaipole) and Pryluky (south of Dobropillya) toward Solodke (northeast of Hulyaipole), indicating that Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the area.[xcv] ISW cannot independently verify the likely route of Ukrainian forces east of the T-0401 highway.

Russian forces attacked near and within Hulyaipole itself; north of Hulyaipole near Nove Zaporizhzhia and Varvarivka; northeast of Hulyaipole near Solodke, Pryvilne, and Rybne; south of Hulyaipole near Dorozhnyanka; and west of Hulyaipole toward Zaliznychne on December 28 and 29.[xcvi]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 1198th Motorized Rifle Regiment (35th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Eastern Military District [EMD]) are striking Ukrainian positions in Verkhnya Tersa (west of Hulyaipole).[xcvii] Drone operators of the 1466th Motorized Rifle Regiment (127th Motorized Rifle Division, 5th CAA, EMD) are striking Ukrainian positions in Zaliznychne.[xcviii] Drone operators of the 38th Motorized Rifle Brigade (35th CAA, EMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Tsvitkove (west of Hulyaipole).[xcix]

Russian forces recently advanced in the western Zaporizhia direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on December 27 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in western Stepnohirsk (west of Orikhiv) and northeast of the settlement.[c]

See topline text for additional reports on unconfirmed claims of Russian advances in western Zaporizhia Oblast.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced northwest of Lukyanivske (northwest of Orikhiv) and north of Stepnohirsk along the M-18 Zaporizhzhia City-Melitopol highway toward Veselyanka.[ci]

Russian forces attacked southeast of Orikhiv near Mala Tokmachka and Bilohirya; west of Orikhiv near Shcherbaky, Stepove, Plavni, Novoandriivka, and Prymorske on December 28 and 29.[cii]

Order of Battle: Air defense elements of the 104th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (76th VDV Division) are reportedly operating in the Zaporizhia direction, including near Orikhiv.[ciii] Drone operators and other elements of the Nemets group of the 3rd Assault Company of the 291st Motorized Rifle Regiment (42nd Motorized Rifle Division, 58th CAA, Southern Military District [SMD]), and of the 108th VDV Regiment (7th VDV Division) are reportedly operating in the Zaporizhia direction.[civ]

Ukrainian forces recently conducted a sabotage attack against a Russian ammunition depot and manpower concentration point in occupied Melitopol. Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported on December 29 that an explosion at Melitopol's industrial area, which Russian forces used to concentrate ammunition and manpower, wounded four Russian servicemembers and damaged a Ural off-road truck.[cv]

Russian forces continued limited ground attacks in the Kherson direction on December 29 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked east of Kherson City toward the Antonivskyi Bridge on December 28 and 29.[cvi]

Order of Battle: Engineering elements of the Russian 98th VDV Division are operating on the left bank of the Dnipro River.[cvii]

Russia reportedly has no elements of its Black Sea Fleet operating in the Black and Azov seas.   Ukrainian Navy Spokesperson Captain Third Rank Dmytro Pletenchuk reported on December 29 that Russia does not have any ships or submarines in the Black and Azov seas.[cviii] Pletenchuk stated that the Black Sea Fleet only has two cruise missile submarines left, which it uses infrequently due to maintenance issues and fears of damage. Pletenchuk added that Russian forces struggle to repair damaged vessels in Novorossiysk, Krasnodar Krai, because nearby dry docks remain within range of Ukrainian strikes.

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Russian forces conducted a series of long-range drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of December 28 to 29. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 25 Shahed-type, Gerbera-type, and other drones — of which about 15 were Shahed-type drones — from the directions of Oryol City; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; occupied Donetsk City; and occupied Hvardiiske, Crimea.[cix] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 21 drones and that four drones struck two locations. Ukrainian Verkhovna Rada Deputy Serhiy Nahornyak reported that Brovary and Vyshhorod, Kyiv Oblast, may remain without power for up to a week following a Russian strike against an electrical substation near Kyiv on the night of December 26 to 27.[cx] Ukrainian energy operator Ukrenergo reported that it will continue and extend scheduled power outages across most Ukrainian oblasts on December 29 and 30 due to damage from recent Russian missile and drone strikes against energy infrastructure.[cxi]

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

Nothing significant to report.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.