Assessment as of December 27: 8:00 pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

For more information on ISW's map methodology, please view our statement here.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 12pm ET on December 27. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the December 28 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Russian forces are currently unable to build out a strategic reserve and will therefore likely be constrained to grinding, slow advances at their current rate and scale in the coming year. Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Head Lieutenant General Kyrylo Budanov told Ukrainian broadcaster Suspilne on December 27 that Russia had fulfilled its plan to recruit 403,000 people in 2025 on December 3 and will surpass its set goal by the end of the year.[1] Budanov stated that Russia can continue recruitment for a “long time” given its population and financial resources and has plans to increase its mobilization to 409,000 people in 2026. ISW has previously assessed that the Kremlin is setting conditions for involuntary partial reserve call-ups to sustain its military manpower and possibly to try to establish a strategic reserve in the face of its continuing high casualty rate in Ukraine.[2] ISW's assessments have focused on challenges Russian recruiters appear to face in attracting voluntary recruits at costs the Kremlin is willing to pay, an issue that Budanov did not address in this interview. Budanov stated that Russia has not yet developed a strategic reserve to its desired capabilities as it “constantly” activates its operational reserve to support ongoing combat operations in Ukraine.[3] Russian forces currently maintain a rate of incoming personnel sufficient to replace losses but have been unable to build large enough reserves to be able to flood a sector of the front without redeploying personnel from other areas. The requirement to draw reserves from some sectors of the line to focus on operationally significant undertakings often leaves Russia’s flanks undermanned in ways that create vulnerabilities, sometimes allowing Ukrainian forces to counterattack and retake land. Ukrainian forces were recently able to retake land north of Hulyaipole during Russia’s push into central Hulyaipole, and Ukraine liberated a significant portion of the Russian penetration in the Dobropillya direction (northwest of Pokrovsk) during Russia’s offensive on Pokrovsk in early November.[4] The Ukrainian liberation of much of Kupyansk also benefited from the concentration of Russian forces elsewhere on the line and the lack of ready Russian operational reserves in the area. Russian forces are currently unable to open a new front and cannot expand recent limited cross-border attacks in Sumy and Kharkiv oblasts.[5] Constraints on Russia's available military manpower, in contrast with its overall numerical superiority in population, are a severe constraint on Russian operations and will likely remain so in the coming year.

Russian forces are therefore unlikely to dramatically change the pace and scale of Russian advances along the frontlines in 2026 if support for Ukraine continues at current levels. The grinding nature of Russian advances incurs high casualty rates, and Russian forces need incoming personnel to replenish losses in active sectors of the frontlines to maintain a slow but steady rate of advance. Russian President Vladimir Putin has continued to claim that Russian forces are advancing all along the line, which is untrue, and to intimate that Russian forces can increase the scale and speed of their advances at any moment of his choosing.[6] ISW forecasts that Russian forces will continue fighting at their current scale and rate of advance. Russian forces are constrained in the scale and rate of their advances not only by the lack of mobilized military personnel but also because the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) has optimized Russian forces for positional warfare instead of focusing on restoring maneuver warfare.[7] Russian forces cannot currently conduct maneuver warfare at the scale necessary for rapid, operational-level advances. Russian forces are currently unable to address any of the factors complicating its ability to conduct rapid advances or significantly increase its current rate of advance.

Russian forces conducted another large-scale combined missile and drone strike against Ukrainian critical infrastructure overnight on December 26 and 27, primarily targeting Kyiv City and Kyiv Oblast. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 519 Shahed-type, Gerbera-type, and other strike drones, of which about 300 were Shahed-type drones, from the directions of Kursk and Oryol cities; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Shatalovo, Smolensk Oblast; and occupied Hvardiivske, Crimea.[8] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces also launched 10 Iskander-M ballistic/Kh-47M2 Kinzhal aeroballistic missiles from Ryazan and Bryansk oblasts; seven Iskander-K/Kalibr cruise missiles from Rostov Oblast and the Black Sea; 21 Kh-101 cruise missiles from the airspace over Vologda Oblast; and two Kh-22 cruise missiles from the airspace over the Black Sea.[9] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 474 drones, six Iskander-M/Kinzhal missiles, four Iskander-K/Kalibr cruise missiles, and 19 Kh-101 cruise missiles as of 1300 local time. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that 10 Russian missiles and 25 drones struck 30 locations; that debris fell at 16 locations; that one missile did not reach its target; and that Ukrainian forces are clarifying information that 15 drones were "locally lost" (likely referring to Ukrainian electronic warfare [EW] interference). Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and other Ukrainian officials stated that Russian strikes primarily targeted energy and civilian infrastructure in Kyiv City and Kyiv Oblast.[10] Ukrainian Prime Minister Yulia Svyrydenko reported that Russian strikes left nearly 600,000 Kyiv City and Kyiv Oblast residents without power, and Ukrainian state electricity transmission operator Ukrenergo reported that Russian strikes caused power outages in Kyiv and Chernihiv oblasts.[11] Ukraine's state-owned oil and gas company Naftogaz reported that Russian forces targeted Naftogaz's thermal power plant (TPP) and gas production facilities with Shahed drones.[12] Kyiv City officials reported that the strikes damaged residential and civilian infrastructure in seven raions of the city, killed one person, and injured 32.[13] Ukrainian officials also reported that Russian forces targeted industrial and residential infrastructure in Kyiv Oblast, resulting in one person being trapped under rubble of a destroyed building in Vyshhorod and one death in Bila Tserkva.[14] Cherkasy Oblast officials reported that Ukrainian forces shot down six missiles and 21 drones over the region and that Russian forces damaged at least 123 buildings in Uman, of which nine were completely destroyed.[15] The Odesa Oblast Military Administration reported that Russian forces struck industrial and port infrastructure in the region, damaging equipment for grain transport.[16]

A high-ranking Kremlin official explicitly stated that Russia will not deviate from its war demands "one bit."[17]  Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) Spokesperson Maria Zakharova stated on December 26 that Russia will not retreat from its positions, goals, and objectives and emphasized that the Russian leadership has affirmed this position "every day." Zakharova noted that current US-Russian talks reflect the understandings that the Kremlin claims were reached at the Alaska Summit in August 2025. Zakharova also specifically called US-Russian discussions "contacts," stating that "some call it a negotiation process" but "others call it contacts," supporting ISW's previous assessment that the Kremlin sees its "offers" as ultimata and does not see itself participating in an actual negotiations process.[18] Russian State Duma International Affairs Committee Chairperson Leonid Slutsky stated on December 26 that several provisions in the publicly available US-Ukrainian-European 20-point peace plan are "a priori unacceptable" and called on the United States to adhere to the “spirit of Anchorage” in order to achieve real progress to end the war.[19] Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov stated on December 26 to CNN that Ukraine ceding the rest of Donetsk Oblast to Russia “could contribute significantly” to a peace deal  — implying that such a Ukrainian concession would not be sufficient for Russia to end its war and effectively rejecting the key point of the  20-point peace plan on freezing the current frontline.[20] No public agreements emerged from the Alaska Summit and US President Donald Trump stated at the time that the parties had not reached a deal.[21] Russian officials subsequently claimed that the Alaska Summit agreed to principles based on Russian President Vladimir Putin’s June 2024 speech to the Russian MFA, in which Putin demanded the capitulation to Russia’s original war demands of both Ukraine and NATO before the start of negotiations.[22]

The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) is intensifying its efforts to cover up recent Russian failures in Kupyansk amid ongoing widespread criticism from Russian milbloggers. The Russian MoD suddenly resumed its publication of detailed situational reports about the Kupyansk direction on December 27 after facing extensive milblogger criticism about Russian military commanders' and Kremlin officials' exaggerations and lies about Russian advances in Kupyansk.[23] The Russian MoD posted footage and statements on December 27 from company commanders of the Russian 1427th, 1468th, and 1843rd motorized rifle regiments (all three of the 6th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) claiming that elements of the 6th CAA control Kupyansk and that Russian forces are operating in central and northeastern Kupyansk.[24] A Russian military journalist and retired colonel, who frequently contributes to Russian state media reporting on the war, recently observed that Russian state media had decreased its coverage of the Kupyansk direction after Ukrainian successes in the area, even though the Russian MoD had been providing daily, detailed accounts about Kupyansk in late November 2025.[25] The Russian MoD likely leveraged lower ranking commanders in the December 27 reports to try to restore the MoD's credibility within the Russian information space. The Kremlin is also likely trying to leverage Russian State Duma deputies, who are avidly denying Ukrainian advances, to mitigate the backlash over Kupyansk with the general Russian public. State Duma Defense Committee Member Andrei Kolesnik accused Ukraine on December 27 of faking Ukrainian control in Kupyansk, for example.[26] The Russian MoD, Kremlin officials, and Russian state media appear to be engaged in a whole-of-government effort to cover up battlefield failures in Kupyansk and to address widespread milblogger and ultranationalists' criticism of the Kremlin's false reports.

There is ample evidence to indicate that Ukrainian forces have liberated most of Kupyansk, however. Geolocated footage published on December 16, 20, and 26 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced along the P-07 Kupyansk-Shevchenkove highway and the P-79 Kupyansk-Chuhuiv highway in central Kupyansk.[27] ISW has observed ample geolocated footage in recent weeks indicating Ukrainian advances near and within Kupyansk — in line with statements from Ukrainian officials about Ukrainian successes in the area.[28] Russian milbloggers, including some who have traditionally been hesitant to criticize the Russian MoD, have engaged in an unusual discourse acknowledging Ukraine's successes and aggressively blaming the MoD for lying about Russian advances.[29] Select Russian milbloggers have tried to downplay or write off Ukrainian successes in the Kupyansk direction, which other milbloggers stated was "manipulative" and diverting attention away from the main problem at hand — the systemic culture of lying in the Russian military.[30] The Russian MoD is likely now doubling down on its efforts to cover up its failures in Kupyansk in order to not weaken Russia's position in the ongoing peace talks with the United States. The scale of available open-source evidence of Ukrainian advances in the Kupyansk direction, coupled with the uncharacteristically high number of corroborating reports from Russian sources who do not typically discuss Ukrainian battlefield successes, seriously undermine the Kremlin's cognitive warfare effort that aims to paint a Russian military victory as inevitable and Ukrainian defenses on the verge of collapse.
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky will meet with Western partners ahead of his December 28 meeting with US President Donald Trump in Florida. Zelensky told journalists on December 27 that he will stop in Canada on December 27 to meet with Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney.[31] Zelensky stated that European leaders will join his meeting with Carney virtually to discuss the details of the peace plan documents Zelensky will discuss with Trump.

Key Takeaways:

• Russian forces are currently unable to build out a strategic reserve and will therefore likely be constrained to grinding, slow advances at their current rate and scale in the coming year.
• Russian forces conducted another large-scale combined missile and drone strike against Ukrainian critical infrastructure overnight on December 26 and 27, primarily targeting Kyiv City and Kyiv Oblast.
• A high-ranking Kremlin official explicitly stated that Russia will not deviate from its war demands "one bit."
• The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) is intensifying its efforts to cover up recent Russian failures in Kupyansk amid ongoing widespread criticism from Russian milbloggers.
• There is ample evidence to indicate that Ukrainian forces have liberated most of Kupyansk, however.
• Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky will meet with Western partners ahead of his December 28 meeting with US President Donald Trump in Florida.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Kupyansk. Russian forces recently advanced near Hulyaipole.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.    

• Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
• Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis
• Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
• Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
• Significant Activity in Belarus

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Nothing significant to report.

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in northern Ukraine along the international border)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Sumy Oblast on December 27 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces seized Andriivka (north of Sumy City).[32]

Russian forces attacked in Sumy and Kursk oblasts, including north of Sumy City near Kindrativka, Andriivka, and Oleksiivka, on December 26 and 27.[33] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Varachyne (north of Sumy City).[34]

A Russian milblogger reportedly affiliated with the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces claimed on December 27 that relatives of soldiers of the Russian 1st Motorized Rifle Regiment (Russian Strategic Missile Forces [RVSN] and reportedly under the operational control of the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces), which the milblogger previously claimed were operating near Oleksiivka as of November 2025, report that the command is not rotating soldiers due to the lack of trained replacements.[35] The milblogger added that the commander of the Russian 2nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (RVSN and reportedly under the operational control of the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces), which the milblogger previously claimed were operating near Novyi Put (northwest of Sumy City) as of November 2025, is threatening to kill soldiers should their relatives complain about losses.[36]

Order of Battle: Molniya drone operators of the Russian 33rd Motorized Rifle Battalion (reportedly under the 80th Separate Arctic Motorized Rifle Brigade, 14th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions in Korenok (northwest of Sumy City).[37]

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on December 27 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northwest of Kharkiv City near Sotnitskyi Kazachok and northeast of Kharkiv City near Prylipka, Vovchanski Khutory, Vovchansk, Starytsa, Vilcha, Izbytske, and Lyman and toward  Symynivka on December 26 and 27.[38] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked in Vilcha.[39]

A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed on December 27 that Ukrainian forces maintain a presence in Vovchanski Khutory, prevented further Russian advances on the western outskirts of the settlement, but have not pushed Russian forces out of the area.[40]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Velykyi Burluk direction on December 27 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northeast of Velykyi Burluk near Milove and Khatnie; east of Velykyi Burluk near Dvorichanske and toward Hryhorivka; and southeast of Velykyi Burluk toward Kolodyazne on December 26 and 27.[41]

Order of Battle: Fiber optic first-person view (FPV) drone operators of the Russian 79th Motorized Rifle Regiment (18th Motorized Rifle Division, 11th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions in Kolodyazne.[42]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Kupyansk direction.

See topline text for reports of assessed Ukrainian advances in the Kupyansk direction.

Russian forces attacked near and within Kupyansk itself; east of Kupyansk toward Petropavlivka; and southeast of Kupyansk toward Pishchane on December 26 and 27.[43] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Kupyansk, Palamarivka, Monachynivka (both northwest of Kupyansk), Myrove, Sobolivka (both west of Kupyansk), Blahodativka, Prokopivka, Boldyrivka (all southwest of Kupyansk),  Sadove, Osynove, and Kupyansk-Vuzlovyi (all south of Kupyansk).[44]

The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Kupyansk direction reported on December 27 that Russian forces significantly increased the number of drone crews in the area to respond to Ukrainian counterattacks after the weather cleared up recently.[45] The spokesperson stated that Russian forces recently deployed elements of the Sudny Den unit (affiliated with the Sudoplatov Battalion volunteer group) and are using more fiber optic and Molniya drones. The spokesperson stated that the number of Russian assaults has decreased, however, and that Russian forces are accumulating forces in rear positions on the east (left) bank of the Oskil River. A Russian milblogger and former Storm-Z instructor noted that other Russian sources are increasingly reporting that Russian drone operators in the Kupyansk direction are working constantly and without breaks and assessed that this indicates that Russian forces lack the necessary number of drone operators to react to Ukrainian counterattacks that have been ongoing "for quite some time."[46]

[47]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 245th Motorized Rifle Regiment (47th Tank Division, 1st Guards Tank Army [GTA], Moscow Military District [MMD]) are reportedly operating in the Kharkiv direction.[48]

Russian forces continued offensive operations northeast of Borova near Kruhlyakivka and toward Novoplatonivka; east of Borova near Kopanky; and southeast of Borova near Hrekivka, Novovodyane, and Novoyehorivka and toward Druzhelyubivka but did not advance on December 26 and 27.[49]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Slovyansk-Lyman direction on December 27 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced along the O0526 Lyman-Druzhelyubivka  highway north of Lyman and in eastern Stavky (north of Lyman).[50]

The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Lyman direction reported that the manpower ratio is six-to-one to 10-to-one in Russia's favor.[51] The spokesperson stated that Russian forces have recently begun to use mechanized equipment but only to transport infantry.

Russian forces attacked within and near Lyman itself; northwest of Lyman near Novoselivka, Serednie, and toward Drobysheve; north of Lyman near Ridkodub, Karpivka, and toward Stavky; northeast of Lyman near Kolodyazi; and east of Lyman near Zarichne.[52]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Siversk direction on December 27 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced within, north of, and south of Riznykivka (west of Siversk).[53]

Russian forces attacked near Siversk itself; northwest of Siversk near Dronivka, Zakitne, and Ozerne; northeast of Siversk near Serebryanka; south of Siversk near Kuzmynivka; and southwest of Siversk near Vasyukivka and toward Riznykivka on December 26 and 27.[54]

A Ukrainian brigade operating in the Siversk direction reported on December 27 that Russian forces are using small group infiltration tactics to enter Dronivka and secure positions along key ground lines of communication (GLOCs) from Siversk and Yampil.[55] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian drone operators continue to deny Ukrainian forces the ability to safely move along GLOCs between Slovyansk to Rai-Oleksandrivka (southwest of Siversk).[56]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area on December 27 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked near and within Kostyantynivka itself; north of Kostyantynivka near Virolyubivka and Markove; northeast of Kostyantynivka near Minkivka and Novomarkove; east of Kostyantynivka near Predtechyne and Oleksandro-Shultyne; southeast of Kostyantynivka near Pleshchiivka and Shcherbynivka; southwest of Kostyantynivka near Yablunivka and toward Stepanivka; south of Druzhkivka near Rusyn Yar; and southwest of Druzhkivka toward Sofiivka on December 26 and 27.[57]

A Ukrainian volunteer reported on December 26 that Russian drones are targeting civilian evacuation crews operating in Kostyantynivka and killed one volunteer and injured two others during an attempted evacuation on December 25.[58] A Russian milblogger posted footage on December 27 of Russian Aerospace Forces (VKS) conducting glide bomb strikes against Kostyantynivka.[59]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the 2nd and 3rd motorized rifle battalions of the Russian 255th Motorized Rifle Regiment (20th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]);  238th Artillery Brigade (8th CAA); and  944th Self-Propelled Artillery Regiment (20th Motorized Rifle Division) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Mykolaipillya (south of Druzhkivka).[60] Drone operators of the 58th Separate Spetsnaz Battalion (unofficially designated the Okhotnik [Hunter] Spetsnaz Detachment) (51st CAA, formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic Army Corps [DNR AC], SMD), the Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies, and the Smuglyanka Detachment are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions in the Kostyantynivka direction.[61]

Russian forces recently conducted an unsuccessful mechanized assault in the Dobropillya direction.

Ukraine's 1st Azov National Guard Corps reported on December 26 that Russian forces conducted a company-sized mechanized assault in the Dobropillya direction consisting of one tank, nine armored fighting vehicles (AFVs), one armored repair and recovery vehicle, four all-terrain vehicles (ATVs), and one armored vehicle-launched bridge.[62] The 1st Corps reported that the Russian vehicles moved along several routes simultaneously. The Ukrainian National Guard reported that Ukrainian forces destroyed or struck the tank, six AFVs, and the armored vehicle-launched bridge.[63] Geolocated footage from a Ukrainian brigade that participated in repelling the assault shows that Russian forces attacked near Boykivka (southeast of Dobropillya) and on both sides of the Kazennyi Torets River near Mayak and Novotoretske (both east of Dobropillya).[64] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces tried to take advantage of snowy weather to conduct the assault, likely due to the snow's negative effects on Ukrainian drone operations.[65] The milblogger complained, however, that Russian forces are conducting mechanized assaults along the same routes and not displaying "outside the box" thinking. ISW continues to assess the recent Russian mechanized assaults demonstrate that Russian forces have failed to restore mechanized maneuver to the battlefield and that Russian gains likely will continue to be constrained to a slow foot pace.[66]

Russian forces attacked east of Dobropillya near Kucheriv Yar, Shakhove, and Toretske and southeast of Dobropillya near Pankivka, Zapovidne, Nove Shakhove, and Dorozhnie on December 26 and 27.[67]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction on December 27 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced to Bilytske (north of Pokrovsk) and in northern Myrnohrad (east of Pokrovsk).[68]

Russian forces attacked within and near Pokrovsk itself; north of Pokrovsk near Bilytske and Rodynske; northeast of Pokrovsk near Krasnyi (Chervonyi) Lyman; east of Pokrovsk near Myrnohrad; southwest of Pokrovsk near Kotlyne, Udachne, and Molodetske; and northwest of Pokrovsk near Hryshyne on December 26 and 27.[69] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Hryshyne.[70]

The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Pokrovsk direction stated that Russian forces continue to use small group infiltration tactics.[71] The spokesperson stated that Russian forces are sending one poorly equipped, often sick or wounded, solider forward to divert Ukrainian attention, after which better trained Russian groups attack. Myrnohrad City Military Administration Head Yuriy Tretyak stated that Russian forces are conducting artillery, first-person view (FPV) drone, and air strikes daily against Myrnohrad and that the intensity of Russian guided glide bomb strikes against the town has significantly increased.[72] Tretyak reported street battles on the town's outskirts and that Russian forces are trying to advance in southeastern Myrnohrad. Tretyak stated that slightly fewer than 1,000 Ukrainian civilians remain in Myrnohrad but that evacuations are almost impossible due to Russian FPV drone strikes.

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 9th Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA, SMD) are reportedly operating in Rodynske.[73] Elements of the 71st Separate Spetsnaz Battalion (operationally subordinated to the 2nd CAA, Central Military District [CMD]) are reportedly operating in Pokrovsk.[74] Drone operators of the Smuglyanka Detachment and Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Hryshyne.[75] FPV drone operators of the 57th Spetsnaz Company (8th CAA, SMD) and 80th Sparta Separate Reconnaissance Battalion (51st CAA) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces and vehicles in Myrnohrad.[76] Drone operators of the 61st Separate Naval Infantry Brigade (Northern Fleet) and ZALA reconnaissance drone operations of the 39th Motorized Rifle Brigade (68th AC, Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly operating in the Pokrovsk direction.[77]

Russian forces continued offensive operations northeast of Novopavlivka near Novoserhiivka and south of Novopavlivka near Filiya, Yalta, and Dachne on December 26 and 27 but did not advance.[78]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Oleksandrivka direction on December 27 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northeast of Oleksandrivka near Tovste, Zelenyi Hai, and Andriivka-Klevtsove; east of Oleksandrivka near Sichneve, Velykomykhailivka, and Tykhe; and southeast of Oleksandrivka near Vyshneve, Verbove, and Vorone on December 26 and 27.[79]

The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Oleksandrivka direction reported on December 27 that Russian forces operate on the frontline for approximately one month, rotate to the rear for recovery, then often return to the front.[80] The spokesperson stated that Russian military authorities are supplying soldiers with flags to film flag raisings that the Russian military command uses to claim seizures and advances.

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)

Russian forces recently advanced in the Hulyaipole direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on December 26 indicates that Russian forces recently marginally advanced in central Hulyaipole.[81] Available video evidence and reports from Ukrainian military sources indicate that Russian forces also advanced north of Hulyaipole and that the Russian forward edge of battle area (FEBA) is further south in the fields north of Hulyaipole than ISW previously assessed.[82]

Assessed Russian infiltrations: Geolocated footage published on December 26 shows Ukrainian forces striking a Russian-occupied building in northwestern Hulyaipole and Russian forces raising flags in western Hulyaipole after what ISW assesses were Russian infiltrations missions that did not change control of terrain or the FEBA at this time.[83]

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced further in central and in southern Hulyaipole.[84]

Russian forces attacked near and within Hulyaipole itself; northwest of Hulyaipole toward Ternuvate; north of Hulyaipole near Varvarivka; and northeast of Hulyaipole near Rybne, Pryvilne, and Solodke on December 26 and 27.[85]

A Ukrainian regiment operating in the Hulyaipole direction reported on December 26 that Russian losses in the area during an unspecified time frame amount to almost three battalions' worth of personnel.[86]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 394th Motorized Rifle Regiment and of the 1171st Anti-Aircraft Missile Regiment (both of the 127th Motorized Rifle Division, 5th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Hulyaipole.[87] Drone operators and other elements of the 57th and 60th separate motorized rifle brigades (both of the 5th CAA, EMD); the 114th Motorized Rifle Regiment (127th Motorized Rifle Division); the 305th Artillery Brigade (5th CAA); and the 14th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff's Main Directorate [GRU]) are reportedly operating in and around Hulyaipole.[88]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on December 27 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northwest of Orikhiv toward Lukyanivkse; west of Orikhiv near Prymorske, Shcherbaky, Stepnohirsk, Stepove,  and Mali Shcherbaky; and southeast of Orikhiv near Bilohirya and Mala Tokmachka on December 26 and 27.[89] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Novodanylivka (south of Orikhiv).[90]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian Nemets group of the 3rd Assault Company of the 291st Motorized Rifle Regiment (42nd Motorized Rifle Division, 58th CAA, Southern Military District [SMD]); 1430th Motorized Rifle Regiment (58th CAA); 108th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (7th VDV Division); and 31st Separate VDV Brigade are reportedly operating in the Zaporizhia direction.[91]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kherson direction on December 27 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked east of Kherson City toward the Antonivskyi Bridge on December 26 and 27.[92]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 215th Separate Reconnaissance Battalion of the 98th VDV Division are reportedly operating in the Kherson direction.[93]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

See topline text for reports of Russian drone and missile strikes against Ukraine.

 Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

 Russia reportedly deployed an Oreshnik missile to a former airbase in eastern Belarus. Jeffrey Lewis, Michael Duitsman, and Decker Eveleth, researchers affiliated with Middlebury College, assessed on December 26 that statements from Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko and Planet Labs satellite imagery suggest that Belarus plans to deploy Russian Oreshnik intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) systems to the former Krichev-6 aerodrome in Mogilev Oblast five kilometers from the Russian-Belarusian border.[94] The researchers noted that satellite imagery shows that construction crews completely rebuilt the railhead servicing the former aerodrome and built across the disused runway, suggesting use by Russia's Strategic Rocket Forces.  An anonymous source familiar with the matter confirmed to Reuters on December 26 that the researchers’ assessment broadly aligns with US intelligence findings.[95] Belarusian First Deputy Defense Minister and Chief of the General Staff Major General Pavel Muraveiko stated on December 26 that Belarusian authorities identified combat patrol areas for the Oreshnik missile system and are coordinating combat crews.[96]

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.