Assessment as of: 11:15 pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

For more information on ISW's map methodology, please view our statement here.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 12:45pm ET on December 26. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the December 27 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov reiterated that the Kremlin will not sign any peace agreements to end the war in Ukraine "right now." Ryabkov stated in a December 24 interview with Russian newswire Interfax that reports about imminent progress in peace negotiations to end the war in Ukraine should not be interpreted as a sign that Russia is ready to sign any "packages of documents right now."[1] Ryabkov similarly stated in an interview on Russian state television on December 26 that it is inappropriate to set specific dates for a peace settlement and that there is "no point" in establishing any deadlines to sign a peace agreement.[2] Ryabkov rejected the 20-point peace plan, which Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky shared on December 24 after talks with the United States and Europe, claiming that it "differs radically" from the points Russia has been working on with the United States in recent weeks.[3] Ryabkov also attempted to frame Ukrainian and European contributions to the draft peace plan as an impediment to peace efforts and reiterated Russia's commitment to continuing its war until the accomplishment of the Kremlin's goals.[4] The Kremlin's stated objectives for its war in Ukraine include the destruction of the Ukrainian military, capitulation of the Ukrainian government, and the undermining of Ukraine's sovereignty.[5] Kremlin officials, including Russian President Vladimir Putin and Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, have been effectively rejecting key points of the 28-point peace plan and signaling that the plan would not serve as the final agreement.[6]

Ryabkov and other Kremlin officials are trying to exploit the lack of clarity about the outcome of the US-Russian Alaska Summit in August 2025 to claim that the summit achieved a joint US-Russian understanding and agreement to end the war in Ukraine — contrary to US accounts of the summit. Ryabkov stated in the December 24 interview that the framework that Russia and the United States allegedly formed during the Alaska Summit "has no alternative" and that the United States and Russia were able to agree and formalize a framework "generally acceptable" to Russia in the "Anchorage agreement."[7] Ryabkov stated in the December 26 interview that the alleged framework from Alaska is "fundamental" and "imperative" for Russia and that Russia cannot "go beyond" the boundaries of this framework when considering a peace agreement.[8] Ryabkov added that any peace deal outside of the alleged Alaska framework risks not only the formalization of an "unstable agreement" but also the possibility that the parties will not reach any agreement.[9] The Russian Foreign Ministry (MFA) similarly claimed in its December 26 report on key foreign policy outcomes in 2025 that the United States and Russia reached an "understanding" in Alaska that could form the framework for addressing the "root causes" of Russia's war in Ukraine, which the MFA defined as NATO expansion and the claimed discrimination of Russians and Russian-speakers in Ukraine.[10] Putin reportedly stated at the December 25 Russian State Council meeting that he is ready to make the "concessions" he offered during the Alaska Summit - possibly referring to Putin's reported willingness at the summit to discuss security guarantees for Ukraine that include the People's Republic of China (PRC) or Russia as a guarantor.[11] No public agreements were issued after the Alaska Summit, but Lavrov subsequently claimed that the parties agreed to principles based on Putin's June 2024 speech to the Russian MFA, in which Putin demanded the Ukraine and the West capitulate to Russia's original war demands before the start of negotiations.[12] US President Donald Trump notably stated at the press conference following the Alaska Summit, however, that the meeting had been “productive” but that the US and Russian delegations reached “no deal.”[13] The Kremlin's continued insistence that any future agreement adhere to Russia's demands is a dismissal of Trump's renewed peace efforts in recent weeks.

Ryabkov demanded that any peace agreement must completely address the ultimatums that Russia issued to the West in late 2021, demonstrating how Russia is demanding a radical restructuring of the security architecture in all of Europe. Ryabkov responded on December 24 to a question on whether the peace agreement in Ukraine would satisfy Russia's 2021 ultimatums to the United States and NATO. Russia demanded "security guarantees" from NATO in late 2021 that would have amounted to the destruction of the NATO alliance and required an overhaul of Europe’s security architecture.[14] The Kremlin also demanded in January 2022 (as part of the extended negotiations on the initial 2021 suite of demands) that NATO roll back to its 1997 borders.[15] Ryabkov responded to the interview question that Russia started its war in Ukraine as a "forceful resolution" of Russia's "national security challenges," implying that Russia launched its war because the United States and NATO did not meet Russia’s demands of NATO about NATO itself, Russia’s demands concerning Ukraine notwithstanding. Ryabkov noted that Lavrov again recently mentioned the 2021 ultimatums on December 11 in an effort to convey that Russia must resolve the underlying issues that prompted Russia to issue the 2021 ultimatums in the first place- a statement indicating that Russia likely will not be satisfied with any peace agreement that pertains to only Ukraine and that also does not weaken or destroy NATO.[16] The terms of Russia's 2021 ultimatums notably contradict provisions of every iteration of the 28-point peace plan as Russia continues to insist on a rollback of NATO forces already present in eastern Europe, rather than just freezing further NATO expansion as provided in the 28-point plan.[17] The most recent publicly available 20-point plan also included no mention of either NATO expansion or Ukraine's possible membership in the alliance, although these provisions may be present in the unpublished documents that accompanied the 20-point plan.[18] Ryabkov effectively signaled that a peace deal that does not address Russian demands of NATO and the West outside of Ukraine will not satisfy Russia nor lead to a lasting peace that can normalize Russian-European or US-Russian relations. Russia's goals in Ukraine, therefore, exceed territorial demands such as the seizure of Donetsk Oblast or other objectives that concern only Ukraine.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky will meet with US President Donald Trump on December 28 to continue talks to finalize the US-Ukrainian-European 20-point peace plan. Zelensky stated on December 25 that he and members of the Ukrainian negotiating team spoke on the phone with US Special Envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff and former Senior Advisor to the US President Jared Kushner.[19] Zelensky stated on December 26 that the 20-point peace plan is 90 percent ready.[20] Zelensky stated that he will meet with Trump on December 28, and Axios reported that Ukrainian official sources stated that the meeting is likely to happen at Mar-a-Lago.[21] Zelensky noted that he is in constant contact with European leaders, who will join the December 28 meeting virtually. Zelensky stated that he and Trump will discuss security guarantees for Ukraine, territorial issues, and Ukraine's post-war reconstruction.[22] Zelensky reported that Ukrainian parliamentary groups are discussing how Ukraine can hold a referendum for the Ukrainian people to decide on "sensitive issues" in a future peace plan.[23] Zelensky noted that the 20-point plan calls for such a referendum and that this was a US initiative. Axios stated that a senior US official stated that Russia has agreed that a temporary ceasefire to allow Ukraine to hold a referendum is necessary.[24] The source reportedly stated that Ukraine is seeking a 60-day ceasefire, but that Russia may demand a shorter ceasefire. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov stated on December 26 that Russian Presidential Aide Yuriy Ushakov spoke on the phone with US representatives following lead Russian negotiator and Russian Direct Investment Fund (RDIF) CEO Kirill Dmitriev's recent meetings with the United States in Miami.[25]

Ukrainian forces continue to make tactical gains in Kupyansk, and Russian milbloggers are increasingly acknowledging Ukrainian successes. Geolocated footage published on December 24 shows Russian forces striking Ukrainian forces in central Kupyansk, indicating that Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the area.[26] Russian milbloggers acknowledged that Ukrainian forces have advanced in central, western, northwestern, and southern Kupyansk, and one milblogger stated that Russian forces do not maintain positions in central Kupyansk.[27] A milblogger active in Russian crowdfunding efforts stated that Russian forces maintain positions in northeastern Kupyansk but that Ukrainian forces are active in the remaining urban areas.[28] A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger acknowledged that Ukrainian forces are operating throughout almost all of Kupyansk and retain control over Kupyansk-Vuzlovyi (south of Kupyansk).[29] Russian milbloggers reported that Ukrainian forces advanced near Zapadne and maintain positions southeast of Holubivka (both north of Kupyansk).[30] One milblogger acknowledged that Russian forces have lost control over Kindrashivka, Radkivka (both northwest of Kupyansk), and Myrove (west of Kupyansk).[31] A Russian milblogger stated that recent Ukrainian advances in eastern Kupyansk have made the situation for Russian forces on the west (right) bank of the Oskil River "hopeless" as this was the last area through which Russian forces could supply units on the right bank.[32] The milblogger reported that Russian forces therefore had to immediately abandon a significant portion of their positions on the right bank.

Russian milbloggers continued to blame Russia's deteriorating situation in Kupyansk on the widespread Russian practice of sending false reports up the chain of command.[33] A Russian milblogger assessed that the Russian military command will need to redeploy additional forces to the Kupyansk sector and adjust their plans to reflect the actual situation – not the "reported situation" - in order to stabilize the area.[34] The milblogger assessed that a rapid turnaround in Russia's favor is unlikely, however. Another Russian milblogger stated that Russia's problems with false reports about Kupyansk have been accumulating since Summer 2025 when the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces had semi-encircled Kupyansk and seized a number of settlements to the west.[35] The milblogger stated that Russian forces never established solid and sustainable control over Radkivka, Myrove, and Sobolivka (all northwest and west of Kupyansk), however, and that Ukrainian forces were able to exploit these weak points. The milblogger added that Russian forces only controlled slightly more than half of Kupyansk when the Russian MoD announced the seizure of the town in late November 2025. The Russian milblogger active in crowdfunding efforts amplified footage of a Russian soldier commenting on Kupyansk, stating that you cannot surrender something you have not completely captured.[36]

Some Russian milbloggers, however, downplayed Ukrainian successes in the area, and the situation in Kupyansk is dividing the milblogger community. Some Russian milbloggers reacted to the deteriorating situation by stating that enemy counteroffensive operations are a "natural process" in war.[37] One milblogger claimed that Russia will "of course" experience "unpleasant" events on the front, but that this will not change the war's final outcome.[38] Another milblogger claimed that Russian defenses in the town are still holding despite other sources' claims to the contrary.[39] One milblogger minimized widespread reports of Ukrainian successes, claiming that most of Kupyansk is a contested "gray zone" covered by the fog of war.[40] The milblogger claimed that Russia "has not lost" Kupyansk but is engaged in fighting that is extremely difficult given the "geographical complexity" of the area. Another Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces' chances of stabilizing the situation is currently "out of the question" but that Russian forces should work to recapture lost positions later.[41] The milblogger claimed that Russia "needs" to seize Kupyansk as the frontline may freeze under a future peace settlement, and it is not guaranteed that there will be post-war territorial swaps. The milblogger's fear of losing the town if the front freezes along the current lines is noteworthy as it demonstrates the way the Kremlin has not socialized Russian society, particularly the milblogger community, to the idea of possible Russian territorial losses.[42]

The scale of Russian milblogger complaints about Kupyansk, including from milbloggers whom the Kremlin has largely coopted in recent years, demonstrates the scale and egregiousness of the Russian military command's lies about Kupyansk. Russian President Vladimir Putin held multiple public meetings with Russian military commanders in late November and December 2025 that flaunted the claimed seizure of Kupyansk.[43] Putin awarded Western Grouping of Forces Commander Colonel General Sergei Kuzovlev the Hero of Russia award on December 9, likely for commanding the operation to seize Kupyansk.[44] Russian Chief of the General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov claimed in October 2025 that Russian forces encircled 18 Ukrainian battalions in Kupyansk.[45] These public spectacles were part of the wider Kremlin effort to present claimed Russian advances as alleged evidence of the inevitability of a Russian victory in Ukraine. This Kremlin cognitive warfare effort aims to influence the ongoing negotiations by pushing Ukraine and the West to give in to Russia's demands by arguing that Russian forces are on the verge of a breakthrough while Ukrainian forces are on the verge of collapse. A Russian milblogger and former Storm-Z instructor even noted that the false reports about Kupyansk "fit seamlessly" into media narratives that Russian forces are "confidently" maintaining the initiative and are inflicting "vastly superior" losses on Ukrainian forces.[46] Another milblogger assessed that Russian commanders' reports to Putin about Russia's control of Kupyansk were likely part of a plan to enter the next round of negotiations "on the back of strong news."[47]

The situation in Kupyansk highlights how Kremlin claims that Russian forces can take all of Donetsk Oblast quickly are not true. Putin and Russian military commanders' claimed advances are not only purposely exaggerated for informational effects, but Russian military leaders are routinely receiving false reports from the ground about battlefield successes – as Russian milbloggers have long noted.[48] Assessments about Kremlin claims about the quick tempo or relative ease of future Russian advances must take into account the pervasiveness of the culture of lying, both internally within the military and externally in public statements. ISW continues to assess that it will take Russian forces at least another two-to-three years to seize the remainder of Ukrainian-controlled Donetsk Oblast.[49]

The situation in the Oleksandrivka and Hulyaipole directions continues to show how Russian forces are able to make gains when they concentrate forces on a specific sector, but often at the expense of other areas. A Ukrainian regiment operating in the Oleksandrivka direction reported on December 25 that Ukrainian forces liberated five settlements southeast of Oleksandrivka - Orestopil, Novoselivka, Sosnivka, Khoroshe, and Vorone – during an operation that lasted over 100 days (since at least mid-September).[50] A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger acknowledged on December 22 that Ukrainian forces had advanced on the outskirts of Orestopil on a previous date.[51] The Ukrainian counterattacks as part of this activity have likely blunted the Russian Eastern Grouping of Forces' attempts to cross the Vovcha River in the area for the time being.

Geolocated footage published on December 26 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in central Hulyaipole.[52] Russian forces reportedly recently seized the headquarters of a Ukrainian battalion in central Hulyaipole.[53] Ukrainian reporting suggests that Russian forces took advantage of Ukrainian tactical mistakes to make this advance within Hulyaipole, similar to how Russian forces exploited tactical Ukrainian errors during a rotation near Ocheretyne in the Avdiivka direction in April 2025 to narrowly penetrate Ukrainian defenses.[54] Recent Russian advances in Hulyaipole are also likely due to Russia's numerical superiority in the area. Russian forces have concentrated two Russian combined arms armies (CAA) – the 35th and 5th CAAs (both of the Eastern Military District [EMD]) – and the 11th Air Force and Air Defense Army (Russian Aerospace Forces [VKS] and EMD) to the Hulyaipole area.[55] The prioritization of forces to the effort to seize Hulyaipole, however, likely left other nearby areas, such as the Orestopil-Novoselivka-Khoroshe-Vorone-Sosnivka area, roughly 30 kilometers north of Hulyaipole, vulnerable to Ukrainian counterattacks. Russian forces have shown that they can advance - although still at a foot pace and at high costs - when they concentrate high quantities of personnel and equipment on a certain sector. ISW assessed that Russian forces achieved a tactical breakthrough northeast and east of Hulyaipole in mid-November 2025 in part by concentrating and accumulating over several months a force grouping comparable in size to the one operating in the Pokrovsk-Dobropillya direction against relatively smaller Ukrainian forces.[56] Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets noted on December 13 that Russian forces are increasingly struggling to conduct simultaneous offensive operations in the 5th CAA's area of responsibility (AOR) east and northeast of Hulyaipole and in the AOR of the 36th CAA (EMD) in the Oleksandrivka direction.[57] Mashovets assessed that the Russian Eastern Grouping of Forces will need to regroup or receive troops and materiel reinforcements from other operational directions in order to continue offensive operations in the Hulyaipole direction. Russian President Vladimir Putin and high-ranking Russian military officials continue to claim that Russian forces are continuously making advances along the entire frontline, but Russian failures to protect the flanks while focusing on Hulyaipole belies Russia’s actual ability to do so.[58] Russian efforts to start the battle for the Fortress Belt — Ukraine’s main fortified defensive line in Donetsk Oblast since 2014 — will likely further stretch Russian resources, and Russia will likely need to concentrate even more forces and deprioritize other sectors to try to seize the rest of Donetsk Oblast.[59]

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky reported that Russian forces are using Belarusian territory to intensify Russian drone strikes against railway infrastructure in western Ukraine.[60] Zelensky stated on December 26 that Russian forces are using Belarusian territory to bypass Ukrainian drone interception systems and credited the increase in Russian Shahed drone strikes against western Ukraine to Russia's exploitation of Belarusian territory and technical means to enable Russia to launch these strikes. Zelensky noted the December 26 Russian drone strikes against the Kovel railway station in Volyn Oblast (64 kilometers south of the Belarusian border), which reportedly damaged Lviv Railway's locomotive and a freight wagon and shattered windows at a locomotive depot workshop.[61] Russian forces recently targeted a freight train near Korosten, Zhytomyr Oblast (roughly 50 kilometers south of the Belarusian border), derailing the freight train and a passenger train.[62] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces used Geran (Shahed) drones with artificial intelligence capabilities to strike the freight train, and Ukrainian electronic and radio warfare expert Serhiy “Flash” Beskrestnov assessed on December 23 that a Russian drone operator likely located in Belarus (roughly 80 kilometers from the derailed train) used a first-person view (FPV) Shahed drone with online controls to strike the moving train.[63] ISW previously observed Russian forces pursuing locomotives in Chernihiv and Sumy oblasts with Shahed and Geran drones that have integrated cameras and radio control capabilities.[64] ISW assessed on December 22 that Russian forces either launched the drones in the Zhytomyr Oblast strike from Belarus or were using a new Russian capability.[65] Russia has de facto annexed Belarus and has used Belarus as a sanctuary from which to conduct strikes and launch its 2022 invasion of Ukraine.[66] Russia will likely continue to develop its military capabilities in Belarus to support its military operations in Ukraine and set conditions to use Belarus for any future military contingency with NATO.

Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov appears to be trying to replicate the Ukrainian model with the Russian Unmanned Systems Forces (USF). BBC Russia reported on December 26 that sources in the Russian drone industry confirmed multiple Russian milblogger reports that the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) appointed Lieutenant Colonel Yuri Vaganov as the commander of the USF.[67] Vaganov sold plumbing fixtures before the full-scale invasion of Ukraine and began delivering humanitarian aid to residents in occupied Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts in 2022. Vaganov became one of the main suppliers of first-person view (FPV) drones to the Russian military, having based his production on the Sudoplatov Battalion volunteer group. The Sudoplatov Battalion produces drones and trains drone operators, eventually becoming an official drone supplier of the Russian MoD.[68] BBC Russia noted that an award ceremony in October 2025 introduced Vaganov as an advisor to the Russian deputy defense minister for armaments. Ukrainian USF Commander Major Robert “Magyar” Brovdi was similarly a businessman with experience in construction, industry, and agriculture before the full-scale invasion.[69] Belousov, who previously served as the Russian Minister of Economic Development, also did not have military experience before becoming the defense minister.[70] Belousov is likely bringing in people with business backgrounds who can apply their skills to the Russian military's efforts to scale up drone production and procurement.

The Russian military command continues efforts to integrate new drone units into the Russian military. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) announced on December 25 that it formed a new regiment within the Unmanned Systems Forces (USF).[71] The Russian MoD claimed that the regiment began training to counter unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and operate unmanned ground vehicles (UGVs) at a training ground in the Moscow Military District (MMD). The MoD published footage of a servicemember of the new regiment with an MMD patch, indicating that the new regiment is directly subordinated to the MMD and is intended to operate as a Grouping of Forces-level unit, similar to the 7th Unmanned Systems Regiment that is reportedly under the operational control of the Southern Grouping of Forces.[72] A Russian milblogger recently claimed that the Russian 18th CAA (SMD) is also forming a new separate drone battalion based in occupied Kherson Oblast.[73] ISW previously observed that the 3rd Separate Drofa Drone Battalion and the Hyperion Unmanned Systems Battalion are directly subordinated to CAAs.[74]

Key Takeaways:

• Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov reiterated that the Kremlin will not sign any peace agreements to end the war in Ukraine "right now."
• Ryabkov and other Kremlin officials are trying to exploit the lack of clarity about the outcome of the US-Russian Alaska Summit in August 2025 to claim that the summit achieved a joint US-Russian understanding and agreement to end the war in Ukraine — contrary to US accounts of the summit.
• Ryabkov demanded that any peace agreement must completely address the ultimatums that Russia issued to the West in late 2021, demonstrating how Russia is demanding a radical restructuring of the security architecture in all of Europe.
• Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky will meet with US President Donald Trump on December 28 to continue talks to finalize the US-Ukrainian-European 20-point peace plan.
• Ukrainian forces continue to make tactical gains in Kupyansk, and Russian milbloggers are increasingly acknowledging Ukrainian successes.
• Russian milbloggers continued to blame Russia's deteriorating situation in Kupyansk on the widespread Russian practice of sending false reports up the chain of command.
• The scale of Russian milblogger complaints about Kupyansk, including from milbloggers whom the Kremlin has largely coopted in recent years, demonstrates the scale and egregiousness of the Russian military command's lies about Kupyansk.
• The situation in the Oleksandrivka and Hulyaipole directions continues to show how Russian forces are able to make gains when they concentrate forces on a specific sector, but often at the expense of other areas.
• Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky reported that Russian forces are using Belarusian territory to intensify Russian drone strikes against railway infrastructure in western Ukraine.
• Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov appears to be trying to replicate the Ukrainian model with the Russian Unmanned Systems Forces (USF).
• The Russian military command continues efforts to integrate new drone units into the Russian military.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Kupyansk and Oleksandrivka, and in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area. Russian forces recently advanced in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area, western Zaporizhia Oblast, and near Siversk and Hulyaipole.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.  

• Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
• Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis
• Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
• Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
• Significant Activity in Belarus

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Ukrainian forces continued their long-range strike campaign against Russian oil and energy infrastructure on the night of December 24 to 25. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on December 25 that Ukrainian forces struck the Novoshakhtinsk Petroleum Products Plant in Rostov Oblast with Storm Shadow air-launched cruise missiles.[75] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that the Novoshakhtinsk plant is one of the largest suppliers of petroleum products in southern Russia with a tank volume of 210 thousand cubic meters and supplies diesel fuel and aviation kerosene to Russian forces. Geolocated footage published on December 25 shows a smoke plume coming from the direction of the Novoshakhtinsk Petroleum Products Plant.[76] Local news reported on December 25 that there were visible smoke plumes and a large fire in Novoshakhtinsk.[77] Rostov Oblast Governor Yuri Sluysar acknowledged on December 25 that Ukrainian forces struck an unspecified industrial facility in Novoshakhtinsk, starting a fire.[78]

The Ukrainian General Staff reported on December 25 that Ukrainian drones struck the Temryuk seaport in Krasnodar Krai, Moscow Oblast, causing fires and explosions at a tank farm that engulfed 2,000 square meters and two oil tanks.[79] The Ukrainian General Staff noted that the Temryuk seaport hosts infrastructure that stores liquified petroleum gas and other oil products. The Krasnodar Krai Operational Headquarters confirmed that a drone strike against the Temryuk seaport caused an eventual 4,000 square meter fire that engulfed two oil storage tanks.[80] National Aeronautics and Space Administration Fire Information for Resource Management System (NASA FIRMS) data published on December 25 indicates that the strike occurred in the early morning.[81]

The Ukrainian General Staff also reported that Ukrainian forces carried out a strike against a military airfield near Maykop, Adygea Republic, which preliminary data suggests set fire to an unspecified target.[82] SBU sources told Ukrainian broadcaster Suspilne that Ukrainian forces struck the Orenburg Gas Processing Plant in Orenburg Oblast, which has an annual processing capacity of 37.5 billion cubic meters of gas.[83] SBU sources stated that the strike caused a fire on the overpass of the 3U-70 unit that cleans raw gas from hydrogen sulfide and carbon dioxide.

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in northern Ukraine along the international border)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Sumy Oblast on December 25 and 26 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced east and south of Oleksiivka (north of Sumy City) and along the H-07 Sumy City-Sudzha highway south of Yunakivka (northeast of Sumy City).[84]

Russian forces attacked in Kursk and Sumy oblasts, including north of Sumy City near Oleksiivka, Kindrativka, and Andriivka and toward Mala Korchakivka; northeast of Sumy City near Yunakivka; and southeast of Sumy City near Hrabovske, on December 24, 25, and 26.[85]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Chechen Akhmat Spetsnaz Pitersk Battalion and Kashtan Detachment and the 15th Tank Regiment (69th Motorized Rifle Division, 6th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Myropillya (northeast of Sumy City).[86] Artillery and drone elements of the 106th Airborne Division reportedly continue to strike Ukrainian positions in Sumy Oblast.[87]

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on December 25 and 26 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northeast of Kharkiv City near Vilcha, Prylipka, Vovchanski Khutory, Vovchansk, Starytsia, and Lyman and toward Bilyi Kolodyaz, Symynivka, and Izbytske on December 24, 25, and 26.[88]

A Ukrainian brigade operating in the Kharkiv direction reported on December 25 that Russian forces are using small group infiltration tactics with the support of drones and guided glide bombs in attempts to gain a foothold on the outskirts of Vilcha.[89] A spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Vovchansk direction reported that sub-zero winter temperatures are degrading both Russian and Ukrainian drone operations, but have not halted Russian assaults.[90]

A Russian milblogger reportedly affiliated with the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces claimed that elements of the Russian 245th Motorized Rifle Regiment (47th Tank Division, 1st Guards Tank Army [GTA], Moscow Military District [MMD]), reinforced by elements of the 347th Motorized Rifle Regiment (47th Tank Division) and 1472nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (68th AC, Eastern Military District [EMD]) attempted to seize Baranivka and Basove (both northwest of Kharkiv City).[91] The milblogger claimed that elements of the 3rd Battalion of the 245th Motorized Rifle Regiment retreated after suffering heavy losses in attacks near Baranivka. The milblogger claimed that Russian forces also failed in an attack north of Basove. The milblogger claimed that Russian command continues to order advances despite sustained losses and that Russian units are experiencing personnel and discipline issues, including refusals to fight and absent without leave (AWOL) incidents.

Order of Battle: Armored elements of the Russian 34th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (49th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly shelling Ukrainian positions in Kharkiv Oblast.[92]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Velykyi Burluk direction on December 25 and 26 but did not make confirmed advances.

Assessed Russian infiltration: Geolocated footage published on December 25 shows Russian forces operating south of Dvorichanske (southeast of Velykyi Burluk) after what ISW assesses was a Russian infiltration mission that did not change the control of terrain or the forward edge of the battle area (FEBA).[93]

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced west of Odradne (east of Velykyi Burluk).[94]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Velykyi Burluk near Milove and Khatnie; east of Velykyi Burluk near Dvorichanske and toward Hryhorivka; and southeast of Velykyi Burluk near Kolodyazne on December 24, 25, and 26.[95]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Ukrainian forces recently marginally advanced in the Kupyansk direction.

See topline text for assessed Ukrainian advances in the Kupyansk direction.

Assessed Russian infiltrations: Geolocated footage published on December 24 shows Russian forces operating along the P-79 Kupyansk-Chuhuiv highway north of and in northern Kupyansk to the south of Radkivka (north of Kupyansk) in what ISW assesses was a Russian infiltration mission that did not change control of terrain or the forward edge of battle (FEBA).[96] Ukrainian Joint Forces Task Force Spokesperson Colonel Viktor Trehubov reported on December 24 that Russian infiltrators are operating in northern Kupyansk and areas north of Kupyansk, indicating that Russian forces are conducting infiltration operations in northeastern Kupyansk.[97] ISW does not assess that this change in control of terrain occurred in the previous 24 hours.

Refinement of areas under Russian infiltrations: Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces advanced in central and southern Kupyansk – areas where ISW previously assessed that Russian forces conducted infiltration operations.[98]

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger posted a map claiming the current extent of Russian forces in Kupyansk’s urban center, including claiming that Russian forces advanced in southern Kupyansk. ISW has adjusted its assessment of Russian-claimed territorial control in northern, northwestern, and central Kupyansk on the basis of this map.[99]

Russian forces attacked near Kupyansk itself; east of Kupyansk toward Petropavlivka; southeast of Kupyansk near Hlushkivka and toward Kurylivka and Pishchane; and south of Kupyansk near Kupyansk-Vuzlovyi on December 24, 25, and 26.[100] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked north of Kupyansk toward the Oskil River and near Osynovo (south of Kupyansk).[101]

A Russian milblogger stated that intensified drone operations facilitated recent Ukrainian advances in the Kupyansk direction.[102] The milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces attacked from Myrove, Sobolivka (both west of Kupyansk), Sadove, and Kupyansk-Vuzlovyi (both south of Kupyansk).[103] A Russian milblogger stated that Russian forces are unlikely to seize Kupyansk-Vuzlovyi in the near future.[104]

Trehubov reported that Russian forces continue attempts to regroup and retake settlements north of Kupyansk as encircled Russian servicemembers within the town surrender.[105] Trehubov stated that Russian forces lack the capability to change the situation at the moment. A Ukrainian officer operating in the Kupyansk direction reported that freezing weather conditions are impeding Russian forces’ ability to accumulate forces.[106] The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Kupyansk direction reported that Russian forces continue to employ buggies and motorcycles during attacks in the direction.[107] A Ukrainian drone platoon commander operating in the Kupyansk direction reported that Russian forces are employing fiber optic first-person view (FPV) drones to interdict Ukrainian logistics.[108]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 68th Motorized Rifle Division (6th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) reportedly continue to operate near Kupyansk.[109] Elements of the 26th Tank Regiment (47th Tank Division, 1st Guards Tank Army [GTA], Moscow Military District [MMD]) reportedly continue to strike Ukrainian forces near Hlushkivka.[110] Elements of the 352nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (11th Army Corps [AC], LMD) reportedly continue to operate in the Kupyansk direction.[111]

Russian forces continued offensive operations northeast of Borova near Bohuslavka, Zahryzove, and Novoplatonivka and southeast of Borova near Druzhelyubivka, Hrekivka, Novovodyane, Novoyehorivka , and toward Novoserhiivka on December 24, 25, and 26 but did not advance.[112]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Slovyansk-Lyman direction on December 25 and 26 but did not make confirmed advances.

Russian forces attacked in and near Lyman itself; northwest of Lyman near Shandryholove, Novoselivka, and Serednie; north of Lyman near Stavky and Ridkodub; northeast of Lyman near Kolodyazi; and east of Lyman near Zarichne on December 24, 25, and 26.[113]

The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Lyman direction reported on December 25 that Russian forces are increasing both the variety and number of drones used in strikes against Ukrainian ground lines of communication (GLOCs).[114] The spokesperson reported that 70 percent of drones used by Russian forces in the Lyman direction are fiber-optic drones and that the remaining 30 percent are conventional first-person view (FPV) drones.

Order of Battle: FPV drone operators of the Russian Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions in the Lyman direction.[115]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)

Russian forces recently advanced in the Siversk direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on December 26 indicates that Russian forces recently seized and advanced north of Svyato-Pokrovske (southwest of Siversk).[116] Geolocated footage published on December 21 and 25 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced southeast of Dronivka (northwest of Siversk) and in northern Svyato-Pokrovske (southwest of Siversk).[117] Russian sources, including the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD), claimed on December 25 that Russian forces seized Svyato-Pokrovske (southwest of Siversk).[118]

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced north of and over eastern Riznykivka (west of Siversk) and southwest of Platonivka (northwest of Siversk).[119]

Russian forces attacked near Siversk itself; northwest of Siversk near Dronivka, Zakitne, and Ozerne and toward Kryva Luka; northeast of Siversk near Serebryanka; southwest of Siversk near Svyato-Pokrovske, Riznykivka, Bondarne, and Pazeno; and south of Siversk near Kuzmynivka and toward Mykolaivka on December 24, 25, and 26.[120]

Ukrainian 11th Army Corps (AC) Spokesperson Colonel Dmytro Zaporozhets reported that foggy conditions significantly complicate Ukrainian infantry and drone surveillance, which allows Russian forces to advance in small assault groups and infiltrate Ukrainian positions.[121] A Ukrainian servicemember operating in the Siversk direction reported that Russian forces intensified infiltration and assault activity by exploiting persistent fog and poor winter weather to mask movement.[122] Ukrainian officials stated that Russian forces increased such small-group assaults beginning December 20 in an effort to penetrate Siversk, while Russian forces used Geran, Gerbera, and Italmas drones to strike the Slovyansk-Lyman highway and target civilian infrastructure.[123] Ukrainian officials reported that Siversk’s lowland terrain enables Ukrainian forces to localize and destroy Russian elements once detected.

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 169th Motorized Rifle Brigade (25th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Central Military District [CMD]) are reportedly operating near Yampil (northwest of Siversk).[124] Elements of the 123rd Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd CAA, formerly 2nd Luhansk People's Republic [LNR] AC, Southern Military District [SMD]) are striking Ukrainian positions north of Svyato-Pokrovske.[125]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area.

Assessed Russian advances: Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported on December 25 that Russian forces advanced in southern Kostyantynivka.[126] Geolocated footage published on December 24 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced along the T-0516 Toretsk-Kostyantynivka highway south of Kostyantynivka.[127]

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced in along the E-40 Slovyansk-Izyum highway eastern Pryvillya (northeast of Kostyantynivka) and in eastern Minkivka (both northeast of Kostyantynivka).[128]

Refinement of areas under Russian claims: Geolocated footage published on December 25 shows Ukrainian forces operating in eastern Kostyantynivka, an area where Russian sources have previously claimed that Russian forces maintained a presence.[129] Mashovets reported on December 25 that Ukrainian forces maintain positions in southern Chasiv Yar and eastern Mykolaivka and control over Chervone (both northeast of Kostyantynivka) – areas where Russian sources previously claimed that Russian forces maintained positions.[130] ISW assesses that this change did not occur in the past 24 hours.

Russian forces attacked near and within Kostyantynivka itself; north of Kostyantynivka near Maiske, Virolyubivka and Markove; northeast of Kostyantynivka near Orikhovo-Vasylivka, Chasiv Yar, and Novomarkove; east of Kostyantynivka near Oleksandro-Shultyne; southeast of Kostyantynivka near Pleshchiivka, Nelipivka, Shcherbynivka, Ivanopillya and Kleban-Byk; south of Kostyantynivka toward Berestok; southwest of Kostyantynivka near Yablunivka; south of Druzhkivka near Rusyn Yar; and southwest of Druzhkivka near Sofiivka on December 24, 25, and 26.[131]

Mashovets reported on December 26 that Russian forces likely reinforced their efforts in the Chasiv Yar area with mobilization reserve units.[132] Mashovets reported that Russian forces regrouped naval infantry elements in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area, and Russian forces in the area compromise 80,000 to 90,000 servicemembers with 10,000 to 12,000 more in reserve. Mashovets stated that Russian forces are conducting frontal assault operations toward Kostyantynivka from Toretsk while possessing numerical superiority in artillery and mortars. Mashovets added that Russian forces are failing to significantly advance near Chasiv Yar, but they are gradually advancing south and southwest of Kostyantynivka. Mashovets noted that Russian forces may conduct an offensive from the south toward Novodmytrivka-Chervone line while infiltrating into Kostyantynivka further. Mashovets stated that the Russian 51st Combined Arms Army (CAA) significantly strengthened the stability of its bridgehead west of the Kazennyi Torets River and that Russian forces will attack Ukrainian positions on both banks of the river and may break through to the outskirts of Druzhkivka from the southwest.

The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Kostyantynivka direction reported on December 26 that Russian forces continue small group assaults while concealing heavy equipment away from the frontline for the past month.[133]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 6th Motorized Rifle Division (3rd AC, under operational control of the Southern Grouping of Forces), including its 27th Artillery Regiment, are striking Ukrainian forces in southern Kostyantynivka.[134] Drone operators of the Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies and the Smuglyanka Detachment are reportedly coordinating FAB unguided glide bomb strikes against Ukrainian forces in the Kostyantynivka direction.[135] First-person view (FPV) drone operators of the 58th Separate Spetsnaz Battalion (unofficially designated the Okhotnik [Hunter] Spetsnaz Detachment, 51st CAA, formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic [DNR] AC, SMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian vehicles and unmanned ground vehicles (UGVs) in the Kostyantynivka direction.[136] Lancet loitering munition operators of the 238th Artillery Brigade (8th CAA, SMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Druzhkivka.[137] Drone operators of the 381st Artillery Regiment (150th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA) are reportedly striking Ukrainian artillery near Torske with Skalpel loitering munitions.[138] Drone operators and artillery elements of the Sever-V Brigade (Russian Volunteer Corps) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces north of Chasiv Yar.[139] Elements of the 70th Motorized Rifle Division (18th CAA, SMD) are operating toward Virolyubivka and along the Maiske-Markove line.[140] Elements of the 80th Separate Arctic Motorized Rifle Brigade (14th AC, Leningrad Military District [LMD]), 40th Separate Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet), 155th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet), 336th Naval Infantry Brigade (Baltic Fleet), 177th Separate Naval Infantry Regiment (Caspian Flotilla), 72nd Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd AC), and the 4th Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd CAA) continue to operate in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area.[141]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Dobropillya tactical area on December 25 and 26 but did not make confirmed advances.

Assessed Russian advances: Mashovets reported on December 25 that Russian forces seized Shakhove (east of Dobropillya) on a prior date.[142]

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced north of Shakhove.[143]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Dobropillya toward Kucheriv Yar; east of Dobropillya near Nove Shakhove and toward Vilne and Novyi Donbas; southeast of Dobropillya near Pankivka and Zapovidne on December 24, 25, and 26.[144]

Geolocated footage published on December 26 shows a failed at least reduced company-size Russian mechanized assault north of Novotoretske (southeast of Dobropillya), involving one tank, nine MT-LBs, an armored recovery vehicle, a bridge layer, and four quad bikes.[145]

Order of Battle: FPV drone operators of the Russian 102nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (150th Motorized Rifle Division) are reportedly striking Ukrainian drone antennas in the Dobropillya direction.[146] Drone operators of the Smuglyanka Detachment are reportedly directing FAB unguided glide bomb strikes against Ukrainian positions near Kucheriv Yar.[147] Elements of the 20th Motorized Rifle Division (8th CAA) are reportedly operating north of Shakhove.[148] Elements of the 33rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (20th Motorized Rifle Division) and the 174th Separate Reconnaissance Battalion (150th Motorized Rifle Division) reportedly continue to operate in the Dobropillya direction.[149]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction on December 25 and 26 but did not make confirmed advances.

Assessed Russian infiltrations: Geolocated footage published on December 25 shows Ukrainian forces striking Russian-occupied buildings in northeastern Myrnohrad (east of Pokrovsk) and Russian forces northwest of Pokrovsk in what ISW assesses were Russian infiltration missions that did not change control of terrain or the FEBA.[150]

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced in northern Myrnohrad, northwest of Rodynske (north of Pokrovsk), and north of Udachne (southwest of Pokrovsk).[151]

Refinement of areas under Russian claims: Geolocated footage published on December 26 shows Russian forces operating in southern Hryshyne (northwest of Pokrovsk) - an area in which Russian sources previously claimed that Russian forces maintained positions.[152]

Russian forces attacked near and within Pokrovsk; northwest of Pokrovsk toward Hryshyne; north of Pokrovsk near Rodynske; northeast of Pokrovsk near Krasnyi Lyman, Sukhetske, and Novoekonomichne; east of Pokrovsk near and within Myrnohrad; south of Pokrovsk near Leontovychi; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Kotlyne, Udachne, and Molodetske on December 24, 25, and 26.[153] The MoD and a Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Pokrovsk and Hryshyne.[154]

An intelligence officer of a Ukrainian unit operating in the Pokrovsk direction reported on December 25 that Russian forces are attempting to infiltrate Ukrainian positions near Pokrovsk with support from first-person view (FPV) drones, artillery, and airstrikes.[155] The commander of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Pokrovsk direction reported on December 25 that Russian forces are taking advantage of fog to infiltrate Ukrainian positions near Pokrovsk and that Ukrainian forces are striking Russian positions and ground lines of communications (GLOCs) to complicate Russian advances.[156] An officer of a Ukrainian special forces detachment operating in the Pokrovsk direction reported on December 25 that Russian forces are taking advantage of poor weather conditions to infiltrate groups of one to two servicemembers towards Ukrainian positions until Russian forces accumulate enough servicemembers to mass an assault.[157] The officer stated that Russian forces are attempting to preserve their Spetsnaz servicemembers by infiltrating and massing attacks using regular servicemembers. 

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 35th Motorized Rifle Brigade (41st CAA, CMD) continue to strike Ukrainian positions northwest of Pokrovsk.[158] Elements of the 71st Separate Spetsnaz Battalion (operationally subordinated to the 2nd CAA, CMD) are reportedly operating near Pokrovsk.[159] Elements of the 5th Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Myrnohrad.[160] FPV drone operators of the 57th Spetsnaz Company (8th CAA) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Myrnohrad.[161] Drone operators of the 9th Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA) are striking Ukrainian positions in western Rodynske.[162] Artillery elements of the 268th Artillery Regiment (27th Motorized Rifle Division) reportedly continue to strike Ukrainian positions in the Pokrovsk direction.[163] Elements of the 24th Engineer and Sapper Regiment (41st CAA) are reportedly operating in the Pokrovsk direction.[164]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Novopavlivka direction on December 25 and 26 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced northwest of Filiya (south of Novopavlivka).[165]

Russian forces attacked near Novopavlivka itself; northeast of Novopavlivka near Novoserhiivka; and south of Novopavlivka near Filiya and Dachne on December 24, 25, and 26.[166]

 Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Oleksandrivka direction.

See topline text for assessed Ukrainian advances in the Oleksandrivka direction.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed on December 25 that Russian forces advanced in northwestern and eastern Ivanivka (northeast of Oleksandrivka).[167]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Oleksandrivka near Tovste, Yalta, Zelenyi Hai, and Andriivka-Klevtsove and southeast of Oleksandrivka near Vyshneve, Krasnohirske, Oleksandrohrad, and Vorone on December 24, 25, and 26.[168]

Ukrainian forces continued their mid-range strike campaign against Russian military targets in occupied Donetsk Oblast. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on December 25 that Ukrainian forces conducted a drone strike against a repair unit of the 143rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (127th Motorized Rifle Division, 5th CAA, Eastern Military District [EMD]) near occupied Truzhenka (roughly 73 kilometers from the frontline) overnight on December 24 to 25.[169] Geolocated footage published on December 26 shows a Ukrainian drone striking buildings in northern Truzhenka.[170] The Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces reported on December 26 and published geolocated footage showing Ukrainian forces striking a base of the Russian 14th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff's Main Directorate [GRU]) in Berdyanske (east of Mariupol, roughly 125 kilometers from the frontline) overnight on December 25 to 26.[171]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)

Russian forces recently advanced in the Hulyaipole direction.

See topline text for assessed Russian advances and infiltrations in the Hulyaipole direction.

Assessed Russian advances: A Ukrainian military source reported on December 26 that Russian forces advanced into central Pryluky (northwest of Hulyaipole).[172]

Unconfirmed claims: The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on December 26 that elements of the Russian 37th Motorized Rifle Brigade (36th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Eastern Military District [EMD]) seized Kosivtseve (northwest of Hulyaipole).[173] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces seized and advanced west of Dobropillya (north of Hulyaipole) and advanced in northwestern and south of Hulyaipole.[174]

Russian forces attacked near and within Hulyaipole; northwest of Hulyaipole toward Pryluky, Bratske, Ternuvate, and Kosivtseve; north of Hulyaipole near Nove Zaporizhzhia, Varvarivka, Dobropillya, and Yehorivka; and northeast of Hulyaipole near Zlahoda, Rybne, Pryvilne, Uspenivka, and Solodke on December 24, 25, and 26.[175] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked from Ternuvate and Prydorozhnie (northwest of Hulyaipole).[176]

Ukrainian Southern Defense Forces Spokesperson Colonel Vladyslav Voloshyn reported on December 24 that Russian forces are conducting 20 to 25 KAB guided glide bomb strikes daily against Hulyaipole.[177]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 57th Motorized Rifle Brigade (5th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Eastern Military District [EMD]) are operating in central Hulyaipole.[178] Elements of the 60th Motorized Rifle Brigade (5th CAA) are reportedly operating in Hulyaipole.[179] Drone operators of the 14th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff's Main Directorate [GRU]) are striking Ukrainian vehicles southeast of Vozdvyzhivka (northwest of Hulyaipole).[180] Drone operators of the 143rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (127th Motorized Rifle Division, 5th CAA) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces in Pryluky.[181] Elements of the 11th Air Force and Air Defense Army (Russian Aerospace Forces [VKS] and EMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces in Ternuvate (northwest of Hulyaipole).[182] Drone operators of the 218th Tank Regiment (127th Motorized Rifle Division) and the 305th Artillery Brigade (5th CAA) reportedly continue to operate in Zaporizhzhia Oblast.[183]

 Russian forces recently advanced in western Zaporizhia Oblast.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on December 25 indicates that Russian forces advanced south of Stepnohirsk (west of Orikhiv).[184]

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced southwest of Pavlivka (northwest of Orikhiv), north of Stepnohirsk, in southern Novoandriivka and north of Prymorske (all west of Orikhiv).[185]

Russian forces attacked northwest of Orikhiv toward Pavlivka and Lukyanivske and west of Orikhiv near Prymorske and Stepnohirsk on December 24, 25, and 26.[186]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 7th Airborne (VDV) Division, including its 247th VDV Regiment, are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Prymorske and Stepnohirsk and operating in Stepnohirsk.[187] Elements of the 291st Motorized Rifle Regiment (42nd Motorized Rifle Division, 58th CAA, Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating near Novodanylivka (south of Orikhiv).[188] Drone operators of the 104th VDV Division are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Orikhiv.[189] Elements of the 108th VDV Regiment (7th VDV Division) reportedly continue to operate in the Zaporizhia direction.[190]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kherson direction on December 25 and 26 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked east of Kherson City toward the Antonivskyi Bridge on December 24, 25, and 26.[191]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 98th VDV Division are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Prydniprovske (northeast of Kherson City).[192]

Ukrainian forces continued their mid-range strike campaign against Russian military targets in occupied Crimea on the night of December 24 to 25. Ukraine’s Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported on December 26 that Ukrainian forces struck multiple Russian targets in occupied Crimea on December 24, including a S-300V system, an RSP-6M2 radar system, a Redut-221 command vehicle and RPN-9S36M fire control radar from the Buk-M3 air defense system, and a weapons and ammunition facility.[193]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Russian forces conducted a series of long-range drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of December 24 to 25. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 131 Shahed-type, Geran-type, and other drones, of which about 90 were Shahed-type drones, from the directions of Kursk and Oryol cities; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; occupied Donetsk City; and occupied Hvardiiske and Cape Chauda, Crimea.[194] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 106 drones in northern, eastern, and southern Ukraine and that 22 drones struck 15 locations in Ukraine. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces struck residential areas, energy infrastructure, and other critical infrastructure in Chernihiv Oblast; port, industrial, and energy infrastructure in Odesa Oblast; and energy infrastructure in Sumy, Dnipro, and Kharkiv oblasts.[195]

Russian forces conducted a series of long-range drone and missile strikes against Ukraine on the night of December 25 to 26. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 99 Shahed-type, Geran-type, and other drones, of which about 60 were Shahed-type drones, and one Iskander-M ballistic missile, from the directions of Bryansk and Kursk cities; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; and occupied Hvardiiske, Crimea.[196] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 73 drones in northern, eastern, and southern Ukraine and that 26 drones and the Iskander-M missile struck 16 locations in Ukraine. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces struck energy, transportation, and port infrastructure in Mykolaiv Oblast; port infrastructure in Odesa Oblast; and energy, logistics, and critical infrastructure in Volyn Oblast.[197]

Ukrainian state electricity transmission operator Ukrenergo reported that Russian strikes caused power outages throughout Ukraine on December 27.[198]

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

 See topline for reports on significant activity in Belarus.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.