Assessment as of: 9:30 pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

For more information on ISW's map methodology, please view our statement here.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 2 PM ET on December 24. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the December 26 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment. ISW will not publish a Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment tomorrow, December 25.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky released the latest US-Ukrainian-European 20-point peace plan on December 23, which the United States will reportedly present to Russia.[1] The 20-point plan appears to summarize the US-Ukrainian-European proposals, and Zelensky stated that there are three additional, unpublished documents: a US-Ukrainian-European document outlining security guarantees for Ukraine; a US-Ukrainian document about the US military's role in security guarantees that includes a detailed plan of action and response mechanisms in the event of renewed Russian aggression; and a US-Ukrainian document called the "Roadmap for Ukraine's Prosperity" outlining Ukraine's post-war recovery and economic development.[2] The 20-point plan appears to include points that the United States, Ukraine, and Europe have largely agreed upon, but Zelensky noted that some points, including issues related to control over the Russian-occupied Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) and mechanisms to create a demilitarized zone or "free economic zone" in Donetsk Oblast, remain unresolved and still under discussion.[3]

The 20-point plan differs from the November 2025 28-point plan in significant ways. The 28-point plan called for Ukraine to withdraw from the remainder of unoccupied Donbas (Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts), for the creation of a demilitarized zone in Donbas that would be internationally recognized as de facto Russian territory, and for the war to freeze along the current frontline in Zaporizhia and Kherson oblasts.[4] The 28-point plan also capped the Ukrainian military during peacetime at 600,000 personnel and called for Ukraine to abandon its efforts to seek NATO membership. The 20-point plan, in contrast, calls for the war to freeze in Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts along the frontline as of the date of the agreement's signing; caps Ukraine's peacetime military at 800,000; and does not mention Ukraine's possible NATO membership.[5] References to Ukrainian NATO membership may be in the other unpublished documents, however.

The Kremlin will need to compromise on demands it has long insisted on, including many that are incompatible not only with the latest 20-point peace plan but also with the initial 28-point plan. US Ambassador to NATO Matt Whitaker stated on December 23 on Fox News that "the ball is currently in [Russia's] court" to respond to the four documents that emerged from the recent US-Ukrainian-European talks.[6] Whitaker noted that the high casualties that Russian forces have been taking in exchange for "very small" gains on the battlefield have not been pushing the Kremlin to try to end the war. The Kremlin has already signaled that it is not interested in accepting Ukrainian or European counterproposals to any peace agreement, with Russian Presidential Aide Yuriy Ushakov stating on December 21 (before the publication of the 20-point plan) that he is “certain” that the proposals that Ukrainian and European delegations made during their talks with the US delegation in Miami would be “rather unconstructive” and not “improve” the then proposed settlement agreement.[7] The Kremlin has repeatedly made demands that are incompatible with many proposals in the 20-point plan and shown that it is not interested in a resolution based on compromises, like the ones the latest document seems to embody. Russian President Vladimir Putin outlined as recently as December 19 his commitment to the demands he laid out in his June 2024 speech to the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA): Ukraine’s complete withdrawal from all of Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts; Ukraine's abandonment of its NATO membership aspirations and commitment to neutrality; Ukraine's demilitarization (the Russian demand for limits on the Ukrainian military such that Ukraine cannot defend itself), Ukraine's denazification (the Russian demand for the replacement of the current Ukrainian government with a pro-Russian puppet government), international recognition of Russia's annexations of the four Ukrainian oblasts and Crimea in international agreements; and the lifting of all Western sanctions against Russia.[8] Putin's June 2024 demands essentially repeated his demands from the start of the full-scale invasion in 2022. Kremlin officials have also claimed that Russia and the United States reached an understanding based on Putin's June 2024 demands during the August 2025 summit in Alaska, but no publicly available agreements emerged from the summit.[9] The Kremlin's continued references to the June 2024 speech and alleged agreements from Alaska demonstrate the Kremlin’s rejection of the proposals in the 28- and 20-point plans to freeze the current lines in Zaporizhia and Kherson oblasts or in all four oblasts.

Statements from Russian State Duma deputies and insider sources about Russia's likely discontent with the latest proposals are in line with Kremlin statements and messaging in recent weeks about Russia's demands and uncompromising negotiating position. The Kremlin has not officially and publicly responded to the latest US-Ukrainian-European peace proposal as of this writing. Russian State Duma International Affairs Committee First Deputy Head Alexei Chepa criticized the plan's lack of a provision prohibiting Ukrainian membership in NATO and rejected proposals about Ukrainian participation in the management of the ZNPP.[10] Chepa stated that Russia will make significant adjustments to the clause on territories, the current version of which Chepa noted will not satisfy the Kremlin. Bloomberg reported on December 24 that a source close to the Kremlin stated that Russia will likely seek changes to the 20-point plan as the plan lacks provisions that are important to Russia.[11] The source reportedly stated that Russia's concerns about the document include the lack of guarantees prohibiting NATO's eastward expansion, insufficient limits on Ukraine's peacetime military forces and weapons, the lack of provisions about Ukraine's neutral status should Ukraine join the EU, and the lack of assurances about the status of the Russian language in Ukraine. Bloomberg reported that the source stated that the Kremlin also wants provisions on frozen Russian assets and the removal of Western sanctions in the peace proposal. The Kremlin has repeatedly called for any future peace settlement to eliminate the alleged "root causes" of the war, which the Kremlin defines as NATO expansion and Ukraine's alleged discrimination against Russian speakers.[12] Russia's demonstrated unwillingness to engage in compromises and its unwavering commitment to achieving its original war goals from 2022 suggest that the prospects for this peace agreement to end the war remain low at this time.

Kremlin-affiliated milbloggers are acknowledging significant Ukrainian successes in the Kupyansk direction and criticizing the Kremlin and the Russian military command for providing false battlefield reports. A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger retroactively claimed on December 24 that Russian forces lost a significant part of their bridgehead on the west (right) bank of the Oskil River as Ukrainian forces regained positions immediately north and northwest of Kupyansk in Kindrashivka and Radkivka, and on the outskirts of Myrove on a prior unspecified date.[13] The milblogger noted that the three settlements were the only settlements that Russian forces controlled prior to the launch of Ukrainian counterattacks in recent weeks, despite Russian military officials claiming control over 11 settlements in the area. The milblogger published a refined map that refuted previous Russian claims and showed that Ukrainian forces maintained or regained positions north of Kupyansk in Dovhenke, southeast of Zapadne, and northeast of Kindrashivka; northeast of Kupyansk in the area northeast of Holubivka; east of Kupyansk in, northeast of, and southeast of Petropavlivka and in Kucherivka; southeast of Kupyansk in, northeast of, east of, and south of Pishchane and in Kurylivka; and south of Kupyansk in the area east and northwest of Kolisnykivka.[14] The milblogger criticized the Russian military command for exaggerating Russian gains in and around Kupyansk and for prematurely redeploying reserves from the Kupyansk direction to reinforce other frontline sectors, leaving the town vulnerable to Ukrainian infiltrations. The milblogger noted that the Russian military command similarly tried to exaggerate successes in the Siversk direction in 2024. Another Russian milblogger claimed, citing sources in the Russian 112th Motorized Rifle Brigade (1st Guards Tank Army [GTA], Moscow Military District [MMD]) and 16th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff's Main Directorate [GRU]), that Russian forces had "lost" Kupyansk and that Ukrainian forces cut off elements of the Russian 27th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (1st GTA) from their ground lines of communication (GLOCs).[15] A prominent milblogger involved in Russian crowdfunding efforts stated that local Russian reports suggest that Russian positions continue to deteriorate as Ukrainian forces achieved successes in Myrove, Radkivka, and Sobolivka (west of Kupyansk).[16] Russian milbloggers, therefore, have acknowledged that Ukrainian forces have liberated or maintained positions in 182.64 square kilometers in the Kupyansk direction since December 11.

Another Kremlin-affiliated milblogger stated that information is emerging about the "real state of affairs" in the Kupyansk direction and that the Russian military command has been blatantly "lying" to the "very, very top," referring to Russian President Vladimir Putin.[17] The milblogger stated that the Russian military command is exaggerating Russian successes in a "number of areas" along the front. A Russian military journalist and retired colonel, who frequently contributes to Russian state media reporting on the war, stated that the situation in Kupyansk is challenging for Russian forces as Ukrainian forces continue to infiltrate in an effort to regain positions on the west bank of the Oskil River.[18] The journalist observed that Russian state media has deliberately decreased its coverage of the Kupyansk direction despite the fact that the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) had been providing detailed accounts about Kupyansk in late November 2025. The journalist stated that the Russian MoD has turned to reporting only "dry statistical reports" that are not useful. The prominent milblogger involved in Russian crowdfunding efforts claimed that exaggerated or false reports of Russian advances in Kupyansk misled the Russian military command into issuing inappropriate orders, such as redeploying reserves before Russian forces consolidated positions in the Kupyansk direction and ultimately undermined Russian forces' operational effectiveness.[19] The milblogger also accused the Kremlin of stopping compensations for Russian servicemembers fighting in Kupyansk after "rosy" reports that Russian forces had "captured everything" in the area became official.[20] A Russian milblogger covering the Russian Western Grouping of Forces (GoF) claimed that Russian commanders tailor their reports at each command level in an effort to appease the expectations of senior commanders and officials, creating an inefficient system that undermines decision-making.[21] The widespread milblogger criticism of the Kremlin's and the Russian military command's false and exaggerated claims in Kupyansk further exposes how the ongoing Russian cognitive warfare effort, which aims to paint Ukrainian defenses as on the verge of collapse and major Russian battlefield victories as inevitable, does not reflect the battlefield realities.[22]

Russian milbloggers also acknowledged that Russia's failures in Kupyansk indicate that Russia does not have sufficient manpower or materiel to imminently defeat the northern part of the Fortress Belt while simultaneously continuing offensive operations elsewhere. The Fortress Belt refers to Ukraine's main fortified defensive line in Donetsk Oblast since 2014 that includes four cities — Slovyansk, Kramatorsk, Druzhkivka, and Kostyantynivka.[23] The Russian milblogger covering the Russian Western GoF implied that the Russian failure to seize Kupyansk, continue advances in the area, and further develop the ongoing Lyman offensive before 2026 is fixing a significant number of Russian troops in the area.[24] The milblogger claimed that multiple Russian units failed to meet their objectives. The milblogger claimed that elements of the Russian 121st and 122nd motorized rifle regiments (both of the 68th Motorized Rifle Division, 6th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) did not fully seize Kupyansk nor reach the Blahodativka-Nechvolodivka line (southwest of Kupyansk); that elements of the 153rd Tank Regiment and 272nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (both of the 47th Tank Division, 1st GTA, MMD) did not start assaults against Kupyansk-Vuzlovyi (southeast of Kupyansk); that elements of the 423rd Motorized Riffle Regiment (4th Tank Division, 1st GTA) failed to seize Korovii Yar, Yarova, and Sosnove (all northwest of Lyman); and that elements of the 19th Tank Regiment and 31st and 36th motorized rifle regiments (all three of the 67th Motorized Rifle Division, 25th CAA, Central Military District [CMD]) did not seize Lyman.[25] The milblogger noted that Russian attempts to conduct multi-pronged offensives are preventing Russian forces from "methodically" breaking Ukrainian defenses in one priority area. The prominent milblogger involved in Russian crowdfunding efforts claimed that Ukrainian successes in the Kupyansk direction will prevent Russian forces from exploiting recent Russian advances near Lyman and Siversk, thus inhibiting Russia's offensive toward Slovyansk.[26] The milblogger added that Russian forces will need to cross the Siverskyi Donets River in the Lyman direction to reach Slovyansk and will need to protect their flanks from Ukrainian forces in Izyum. The milblogger assessed that Russian forces are unable to develop the Slovyansk offensive from the Siversk direction because they do not have a sufficient number of troops to conduct a frontal assault against Slovyansk. The milblogger noted that the Russian military command's redeployment of reserves from the Kupyansk direction to other sectors and Russian failures in Kupyansk show that Russian forces are unable to secure positions in previously seized areas without additional reserves.

ISW recently assessed that Russian forces will likely continue to struggle to maintain the Kremlin's desired multi-pronged offensives in different directions due to the long-term materiel and manpower costs of these simultaneous operations.[27] Russian efforts to start the battle for the Fortress Belt will likely further stretch Russian resources, and Russia will likely need to deprioritize other frontline sectors in order to concentrate even more forces to the Fortress Belt area. The Kremlin is therefore making demands in negotiations that Ukraine cede the unoccupied parts of Donetsk Oblast, likely in order to save Russia the personnel and materiel resources and possibly to put Russia in a more advantageous position to re-invade in the future to pursue Putin's longer-term strategic goal of controlling all of Ukraine.

Russian forces continue to strike energy infrastructure in Ukraine and particularly targeted critical infrastructure in Chernihiv Oblast overnight on December 23 and 24. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 116 Shahed-type, Gerbera-type, and other strike drones — of which roughly 90 were Shahed-type drones — from the directions of Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Kursk and Oryol cities; Shatalovo, Smolensk Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; and occupied Hvardiiske, Crimea.[28] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces shot down 60 drones in northern, southern, and eastern Ukraine. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces directed a significant number of drones against critical infrastructure facilities in Chernihiv Oblast and that 48 drones struck 19 locations as of 0830 local time. Ukrainian state energy operator Ukrenergo reported power outages in Sumy, Dnipropetrovsk, Kherson, Kharkiv, and Chernihiv oblasts following the overnight strikes.[29] Chernihiv City and Oblast officials reported that Russian forces struck critical and energy infrastructure in Chernihiv Raion on the evening of December 23 and on December 24, causing tens of thousands of Chernihiv Oblast residents to lose power.[30] Chernihiv City officials also reported that Russian forces struck an apartment building and at least two other locations in the city, possibly with a jet-propelled Shahed drone.[31] Kharkiv City and Oblast officials reported that Russian forces struck a thermal power plant (TPP) in the Kharkiv City suburbs, possibly with a Tornado multiple launch rocket system (MLRS), killing at least one person and injuring 13, and damaging a nearby transportation enterprise.[32] Kharkiv City Mayor Ihor Terekhov stated that the strike disrupted power generation, heat supplies, and transport in the city and that serious damage to the TPP forced the city to switch to providing power via "energy islands."[33] Kherson City Military Administration Head Yaroslav Shanko also reported that Russian forces struck critical and residential infrastructure in Kherson City, killing at least one person and injuring another.[34] Ukrainian oil and natural gas extracting company Ukrnafta reported that Russian forces launched almost 100 strike drones against Ukrnafta's production facilities between December 22 and 24, causing damage to equipment and forcing Ukrnafta to temporarily stop some production.[35] Russia's December 23 to 24 strikes follow the large-scale combined missile and drone strikes that primarily impacted energy infrastructure in western Ukraine on December 22 to 23.[36] Russian consecutive strikes on energy infrastructure in western and eastern Ukraine are likely part of the Russian ongoing campaign to split Ukraine's energy grid in half.[37]

Key Takeaways:

• Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky released the latest US-Ukrainian-European 20-point peace plan on December 23, which the United States will reportedly present to Russia.
• The Kremlin will need to compromise on demands it has long insisted on, including many that are incompatible not only with the latest 20-point peace plan but also with the initial 28-point plan.
• Statements from Russian State Duma deputies and insider sources about Russia's likely discontent with the latest proposals are in line with Kremlin statements and messaging in recent weeks about Russia's demands and uncompromising negotiating position.
• Kremlin-affiliated milbloggers are acknowledging significant Ukrainian successes in the Kupyansk direction and criticizing the Kremlin and the Russian military command for providing false battlefield reports.
• Russian milbloggers also acknowledged that Russia's failures in Kupyansk indicate that Russia does not have sufficient manpower or materiel to imminently defeat the northern part of the Fortress Belt while simultaneously continuing offensive operations elsewhere.
• Russian forces continue to strike energy infrastructure in Ukraine and particularly targeted critical infrastructure in Chernihiv Oblast overnight on December 23 and 24.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Pokrovsk. Russian forces recently advanced near Hulyaipole.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.    

• Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
• Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis
• Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
• Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
• Significant Activity in Belarus

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Ukrainian forces continued their long-range strike campaign against Russian defense industrial infrastructure overnight on December 23 to 24. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on December 24 that Ukrainian forces struck the Efremov Synthetic Rubber Plant in Tula Oblast, which produces components for explosives and solid rocket fuel.[38] Ukraine’s Security Service (SBU) reported on December 23 that the SBU’s 13th Main Directorate of the Military Counterintelligence Department struck a Russian Il-38N maritime patrol aircraft at Yeysk Airbase with a drone before the December 15 strike on the Kilo-class submarine at Novorossiysk Naval Base.[39] The 13th Main Directorate of the SBU‘s Military Counterintelligence Department reported that the Il-38N was the only Russian asset in the area capable of detecting Ukrainian Sea Baby drones that struck the Kilo-class submarine.

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in northern Ukraine along the international border)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Sumy Oblast on December 24 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced north of Hrabovske (southeast of Sumy City).[40]

Russian forces attacked in Kursk and Sumy oblasts, including north of Sumy City near Oleksiivka and Andriivka, northeast of Sumy City near Yunakivka, and southeast of Sumy City near Hrabovske, on December 23 and 24.[41]

A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed that further Russian advances from Hrabovske toward Krasnopillya (northwest of Hrabovske) would require significantly more forces than the Russian military command has currently deployed to the area.[42] A Russian milblogger reportedly affiliated with the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces claimed that servicemembers of the Russian 83rd Separate Airborne (VDV) Brigade suffered injuries following Ukrainian drone strikes against their bunkers near Yunakivka on December 23.[43] The milblogger claimed that Russian authorities are waiting for snowy weather in the coming days that will hinder Ukrainian drone operations to conduct evacuations.

Order of Battle: Elements of the 2nd Battalion of the Russian 1443rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (reportedly under the operational control of the Northern Grouping of Forces and formed during the 2022 partial reserve call up) are reportedly operating near Yunakivka.[44]

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on December 24 but did not advance.

Assessed Russian infiltrations: Geolocated footage published on December 24 shows Ukrainian forces striking Russian-occupied buildings in northern and central Vilcha (northeast of Kharkiv City) after what ISW assesses were Russian infiltration missions that did not change control of terrain or the forward edge of battle (FEBA).[45]

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced southwest of Lyman (northeast of Kharkiv City).[46]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Kharkiv City near Prylipka, Vovchanski Khutory, Vovchansk, Starytsia, and Lyman and toward Izbytske on December 23 and 24. [47] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked west of Lyman.[48]

A Russian milblogger reportedly affiliated with the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces claimed that there is no evidence to support the Russian Ministry of Defense's (MoD) claim that Russian forces seized Prylipka on December 23, as fighting continues on the outskirts and Russian forces have not entered the settlement.[49]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 245th Motorized Rifle Regiment (47th Tank Division, 1st Guards Tank Army [GTA], Moscow Military District [MMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces in Baranivka (northwest of Kharkiv City).[50] Drone operators of the 41st Motorized Rifle Regiment (72nd Motorized Rifle Division, 44th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian artillery near Verkhnyi Saltiv (northeast of Kharkiv City).[51] Elements of the 136th Motorized Rifle Brigade (58th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating in the Kharkiv direction.[52]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Velykyi Burluk direction on December 24 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northeast of Velykyi Burluk near Milove and toward Khatnie, east of Velykyi Burluk near toward Hryhorivka, and southeast of Velykyi Burluk near Dvorichanske and toward Kolodyazne on December 23 and 24.[53]

A Russian milblogger reportedly affiliated with the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces claimed that the command of the 69th Motorized Rifle Division (6th CAA, LMD) tried to cover up a recent incident where a soldier of the 1st Battalion of its 83rd Motorized Rifle Regiment shot seven other Russian soldiers before disappearing in the Milove-Khatnie direction.[54] The milblogger claimed that there are ongoing investigations at the division, regiment, and battalion levels to uncover who spread information about the incident to the public.

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on December 24 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked near Kupyansk itself; east of Kupyansk near Petropavlivka; and southeast of Kupyansk near Pishchane and Stepova Novoselivka on December 23 and 24.[55]

A Russian milblogger claimed on December 24 that Russian forces on the west (right) bank of the Oskil River in Kupyansk are in a difficult situation.[56]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 1486th Motorized Rifle Regiment (comprised of mobilized personnel, reportedly of the 6th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) and the 15th Motorized Rifle Regiment (2nd Motorized Rifle Division, 1st Guards Tank Army [GTA], Moscow Military District [MMD]) are reportedly operating in Kupyansk-Vuzlovyi (south of Kupyansk).[57] Artillery elements of the 27th Motorized Rifle Brigade (1st GTA) are reportedly operating in the Kupyansk direction.[58] First-person view (FPV) drone operators of the 352nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (11th Army Corps [AC], LMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Pishchane.[59]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Borova direction on December 24 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northeast of Borova near Kruhlyakivka and Bohuslavka; and east of Borova near Kopanky on December 23 and 24.[60]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 2nd Guards Motorized Rifle Division (1st GTA) are striking Ukrainian forces in southwest Zahryzove (northeast of Borova).[61]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Slovyansk-Lyman direction on December 24 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced north of Dibrova (southeast of Lyman).[62]

Russian forces attacked in and near Lyman itself; northwest of Lyman near Shandryholove, Yarova, Novoselivka, and Drobysheve and toward Oleksandrivka and Sosnove; north of Lyman near Stavky; northeast of Lyman near Kolodyazi; and east of Lyman near Zarichne on December 23 and 24.[63]

A non-commissioned officer (NCO) of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Lyman direction reported on December 24 that Russian forces in the direction conduct assaults with lone armored vehicles rather than in massed columns.[64] Ukrainian Donetsk Oblast Military Administration Head Vadym Filashkin reported on December 24 that 2,420 civilians remain in Lyman.[65]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Siversk direction on December 24 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced west of Siversk and south of Svyato-Pokrovske (southwest of Siversk).[66]

Russian forces attacked near Siversk itself, northwest of Siversk near Dronivka and toward Zakitne and Ozerne, and southwest of Siversk near Svyato-Pokrovske and Pazeno on December 23 and 24.[67]

Russian forces reportedly established fire control over the road between Slovyansk and Rai-Oleksandrivka (southwest of Siversk).[68]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area on December 24 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced northeast of Stinky (north of Kostyantynivka).[69]

Russian forces attacked near and within Kostyantynivka itself; north of Kostyantynivka toward Virolyubivka; east of Kostyantynivka near Predtechyne and Oleksandro-Shultyne; southeast of Kostyantynivka near Kleban-Byk, Pleshchiivka, and Shcherbynivka; southwest of Kostyantynivka near Yablunivka and Stepanivka; south of Druzhkivka near Rusyn Yar; and southwest of Druzhkivka near Sofiivka on December 23 and 24.[70]

A Russian milblogger claimed on December 24 that Russian forces are encountering difficulties in attacks in southern Kostyantynivka.[71]

The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Kostyantynivka direction reported on December 24 that Russian forces’ inability to control unmanned ground vehicles (UGVs) at long distances forces Russian servicemembers to escort UGVs on foot during logistics missions.[72] A Ukrainian drone battalion commander operating in the Kramatorsk direction reported that Russian forces continue to employ small group infiltration tactics, exploiting weather conditions that hinder Ukrainian drone operations.[73]

Order of Battle: First-person view (FPV) drone operators of the Russian 71st Motorized Rifle Division (reportedly under the operational control of the Southern Grouping of Forces) are striking Ukrainian vehicles northwest of Stinky.[74] Elements of the 13th Rusichi Assault Detachment of the 1194th Motorized Rifle Regiment (4th Motorized Rifle Brigade, 3rd Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 2nd Luhansk People's Republic Army Corps [LNR AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) are operating near Dyliivka (southeast of Kostyantynivka).[75] FPV drone operators of the 68th Separate Reconnaissance Battalion of the 20th Motorized Rifle Division (8th CAA, SMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Raiske (southwest of Druzhkivka) and Andriivka (west of Druzhkivka).[76] FPV drone operators of the 255th Motorized Rifle Regiment (20th Motorized Rifle Division) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Mykolaipillya (south of Druzhkivka).[77] FPV drone operators of the 58th Separate Spetsnaz Battalion (unofficially designated the Okhotnik [Hunter] Spetsnaz Detachment) (51st CAA, formerly 1st Donetsk People’s Republic [DNR] AC, SMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian equipment in the Kostyantynivka direction.[78]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Dobropillya tactical area on December 24 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked east of Dobropillya near Nove Shakhove and toward Vilne and southeast of Dobropillya near Ivanivka and Zapovidne on December 23 and 24.[79]

A Russian milblogger criticized Russian Lieutenant General Sukhrab Akhmedov for committing Naval Infantry elements to a costly reduced battalion-sized Russian mechanized assault on December 22.[80]

The milblogger acknowledged that Russian forces lost six tanks, nine BMP infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs), five BTR armored personnel carriers (APCs), one armored recovery vehicle, and 10 all-terrain vehicles (ATVs) during the assault.[81]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 33rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (20th Motorized Rifle Division) are reportedly operating north of Shakhove (east of Dobropillya).[82] Elements of the 40th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet), the 110th Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA), and the 39th Motorized Rifle Brigade (68th AC, Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly operating in the Dobropillya direction.[83]

Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Pokrovsk direction.

Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on December 24 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced in northwestern Pokrovsk.[84]

Refinement of areas under Russian claims: Geolocated footage shows Ukrainian forces operating in western, central, and southern Rodynske (north of Pokrovsk), areas where Russian sources have previously claimed that Russian forces maintained a presence.[85]

Russian forces attacked near and within Pokrovsk; north of Pokrovsk near Rodynske; northeast of Pokrovsk near Krasnyi Lyman, Sukhetske, and Zatyshok; east of Pokrovsk near and within Myrnohrad; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Kotlyne, Udachne, and Molodetske on December 23 and 24.[86] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked in western Pokrovsk.[87]

The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in Myrnohrad reported on December 23 that Ukrainian forces continue to control parts of Myrnohrad and refuted Russian claims that Russian forces have fully encircled Ukrainian forces within the town.[88] The spokesperson added that Russian forces occasionally have ”tens to hundreds” of personnel operating within Myrnohrad, and that the number of Russian forces entering the town is weather-dependent. The spokesperson reported that Ukrainian troop rotations into Myrnohrad require thorough planning and depend on weather and Russian activity levels. The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Pokrovsk direction reported on December 24 that well-trained Russian drone operators are creating significant difficulties for Ukrainian forces.[89]

Order of Battle: Drone operators and artillery elements of the Russian 9th Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA) are striking Ukrainian forces in central and southern Rodynske.[90] Assault elements of the 9th Motorized Rifle Brigade, including its 286th Separate Rifle Battalion, are reportedly operating in Rodynske.[91] Elements of the 35th Motorized Rifle Brigade and the 1452nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (both of the 41st CAA, Central Military District [CMD]) are reportedly operating in northwestern Pokrovsk.[92] Elements of the 5th Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA) are reportedly operating in northern Myrnohrad.[93] FPV drone operators of the 238th Artillery Brigade (8th CAA) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Myrnohrad.[94] FPV drone operators of the Anti-Aircraft Artillery Battalion of the 61st Naval Infantry Brigade (Northern Fleet) are reportedly operating in the Pokrovsk direction.[95]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Novopavlivka direction on December 24 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northeast of Novopavlivka near Novoserhiivka; southeast of Novopavlivka near Horikhove; and south of Novopavlivka near Dachne and Filiya on December 23 and 24.[96]

A Russian milblogger claimed on December 24 that Russian forces within Novopavlivka are facing an unfavorable situation.[97]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 6th, 80th, and 239th tank regiments (90th Tank Division, 41st CAA) reportedly continue to operate in the Novopavlivka direction.[98]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Oleksandrivka direction on December 24 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked southeast of Oleksandrivka near Sosnivka and Oleksandrohrad on December 23 and 24.[99] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked north of Hai (southeast of Oleksandrivka).[100]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)

Russian forces recently advanced in the Hulyaipole direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on December 24 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in southern Hulyaipole and suggests that Russian forces advanced farther in southern and northeastern Hulyaipole than ISW previously assessed.[101] Additional geolocated footage published on December 23 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced to the T-0401 Pokrovske-Hulyaipole highway in Varvarivka (north of Hulyaipole).[102]

Assessed Russian infiltrations: A Russian milblogger claimed on December 24 that Russian forces advanced in northern Hulyaipole, suggesting that Russian forces likely entered northern Hulyaipole from the north during a recent infiltration mission that ISW assesses did not change control of terrain or the forward edge of battle (FEBA).[103]

Unconfirmed claims: Russian sources, including the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD), claimed that elements of the Russian 36th Motorized Rifle Brigade (29th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Eastern Military District [EMD]) seized Zarichne (north of Hulyaipole on the west bank of the Haichur River).[104] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced east of Andriivka (north of Zarichne) and south of Hulyaipole.[105]

Russian forces attacked near Hulyaipole itself; northeast of Hulyaipole near Zlahoda, Solodke, Krasnohirske, Rybne, and Pryvilne; north of Hulyaipole near Dobropillya; and northwest of Hulyaipole near Andriivka and Herasymivka and toward Bratske, Ternuvate, and Kosivtseve on December 23 and 24.[106] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked east of Ternuvate and west of Hulyaipole.[107]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 57th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (5th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces in Hulyaipole.[108] Drone operators of the 16th Radiation, Chemical, and Biological Defense Brigade (EMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces in the Vremivka (Hulyaipole) direction.[109]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on December 24 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked southeast of Orikhiv near Mala Tokmachka and west of Orikhiv near Stepove, Stepnohirsk, Prymorske, and Lukyanivske on December 23 and 24.[110]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 108th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (7th VDV Division) and the BARS-37 Detachment (Russian Combat Army Reserve) reportedly continue to operate in the Zaporizhia direction.[111]

Russian forces continued limited offensive operations in the Kherson direction on December 24 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked east of Kherson City toward the Antonivskyi Bridge on December 23 and 24.[112]

A Russian milblogger assessed that the frontline situation in the Kherson direction is unlikely to change and that Russian artillery and drone strikes will continue against Kherson City and neighboring areas.[113] The milblogger claimed that there is no need for Russian offensive operations as the situation is currently unfavorable, but that Russian forces must take advantage of strikes while they "remain possible."

Order of Battle: Artillery elements of the Russian 217th VDV Regiment (98th VDV Division) are reportedly striking Ukrainian air defense systems in Kherson Oblast, and Molniya-2 drone operators of the 98th VDV Division are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions on west (right) bank Kherson Oblast.[114]

Ukraine continued its long-range strike campaign against Russian military infrastructure in occupied Crimea on the night of December 23 to 24. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian storage and maintenance site for naval drones near occupied Myrnyi, Crimea.[115]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

See topline text for reports of Russian drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of December 23 to 24.

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

Ukrainian Foreign Intelligence Service (SZR) Head Oleh Ivashchenko reported on December 24 that SZR obtained unspecified additional information on the Oreshnik intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) deployment to Belarus.[116] Belarusian Defense Minister Viktor Khrenin claimed on December 24 that he briefed Belarusian President Aleksandr Lukashenko on the deployment and activation of the Oreshnik missile in Belarus and further military cooperation with Russia.[117]

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.