Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, December 23, 2025

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

For more information on ISW's map methodology, please view our statement here.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 1:30pm ET on December 23. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the December 24 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Russia conducted another large-scale combined missile and drone strike against Ukraine overnight on December 22 and 23, primarily targeting energy infrastructure in western Ukraine. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched a combined missile and drone strike against Ukrainian critical infrastructure using 635 Shahed-type, Gerbera-type, and other strike drones (of which around 400 were Shaheds); three Kinzhal Kh-47M2 ballistic missiles; and 35 Kh-101 and Iskander-K cruise missiles.[i] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces repelled 587 drones and 34 Kh-101 and Iskander-K cruise missiles as of 1130 local time; that the three Kinzhal missiles did not reach their targets; and that 39 strike drones struck 21 locations while drone debris fell in eight locations.[ii] Ukrainian Air Force Spokesperson Yuriy Ihnat credited Ukrainian F-16 fighter aircraft with shooting down most of the Russian cruise missiles.[iii] Ukrainian Prime Minister Yulia Svyrydenko reported that the attack primarily damaged energy infrastructure in western Ukraine.[iv] Ukrainian regional officials reported that Russian forces struck critical and energy infrastructure in Novohrod-Siverskyi, Chernihiv Oblast; Shostka, Sumy Oblast; and Ivano-Frankivsk, Khmelnytskyi, Rivne, and Lviv oblasts.[v] Ukrainian Acting Energy Minister Artem Nekrasov stated that Russian strikes caused nearly full power outages in Rivne, Ternopil, and Khmelnytskyi oblasts and milder power outages in Vinnytsia, Chernihiv, Zhytomyr, Donetsk, Dnipropetrovsk, and Kharkiv oblasts.[vi] The Ukrainian state energy operator Ukrenergo stated that the December 22 to 23 strike is the ninth large-scale Russian combined strike against Ukrainian energy infrastructure since the start of 2025, and Ukraine’s largest private energy company, DTEK, reported that the strike marked the seventh large-scale attack on DTEK's thermal power plants (TPPs) since October 2025.[vii]

Ukrainian officials reported that drone debris fell in Svyatoshynskyi Raion, Kyiv City and injured five people, and that Russian strikes against civilian infrastructure in Kyiv Oblast killed one person and injured three.[viii] Ukrainian officials also reported that Russian strikes killed one child and injured five people in Zhytomyr Oblast; damaged a two-story apartment building in Rivne Oblast; and damaged 14 residential buildings in Vinnytsia Oblast.[ix] Odesa Oblast Military Administration Head Oleh Kiper stated that Russian forces targeted energy, port, transport, industrial, and residential infrastructure in Odesa Oblast – damaging 112 buildings, causing power outages, and striking an empty storage facility.[x] Ukraine's Sea Port Administration also reported that Russian strikes damaged a civilian Lebanese-flagged vessel that was transporting Ukrainian soy in Odesa City port and Reniyskyi port infrastructure (southwest of Odesa City).[xi] Zaporizhstal (Zaporizhzhia Steel Works) metallurgical plant announced that it temporarily stopped production after losing power.[xii] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and Ukrainian Foreign Minister Andriy Sybiha noted that Russia launched the combined strike after rejecting the US and German-proposed Christmas ceasefire, and Zelensky emphasized Ukraine's need for additional Western air defense systems.[xiii]

Russian forces conducted a reduced battalion-sized mechanized assault in the Dobropillya direction and a reduced-platoon sized mechanized assault in the Kostyantynivka direction on December 22. Ukraine’s 1st Azov Army Corps [AC] reported that Russian naval infantry forces conducted a series of mechanized assaults moving along different routes in the Dobropillya direction on the morning of December 22.[xiv] Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) Commander Major Robert “Magyar” Brovdi reported that elements of the Russian Pacific Fleet's 40th Separate Naval Infantry Brigade and 155th Naval Infantry Brigade (recently reformed into the 55th Naval Infantry Division) conducted the assaults with a total of 24 armored vehicles and dozens of motorcycles and all-terrain vehicles (ATVs).[xv] The Ukrainian National Guard reported that Russian forces moved in four armored columns during the attack.[xvi] The 1st AC reported that Ukrainian forces destroyed six tanks, nine infantry fighting vehicles, five armored personnel carriers, and one armored repair and recovery vehicle. The 1st AC reported that Russian forces used ATVs in the final assault phase and that Ukrainian forces destroyed 10 out of 11 ATVs. The 1st AC noted that Ukrainian forces used a combination of strike drones, tube artillery, multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS), small arms, and land mines to repel the assaults. Geolocated footage of the assault shows destroyed Russian vehicles near Razine and Fedorivka (both southeast of Dobropillya and northeast of Pokrovsk).[xvii]

Two Ukrainian brigades operating in the Kostyantynivka direction reported that Russian forces conducted a reduced-platoon mechanized assault from the directions of Toretsk (southeast of Kostyantynivka), Shcherbynivka (south of Kostyantynivka), and Ivanopillya (north of Shcherbynivka) on December 22.[xviii] One of the Ukrainian brigades reported that Ukrainian forces destroyed the two tanks and three all-terrain vehicles (ATVs) involved in the assault.[xix] Geolocated footage of the assault indicates that Russian forces advanced southeast of Kostyantynivka and likely seized Oleksandro-Shultyne (east of Kostyantynivka) on a prior date.[xx]

Combat footage showing failed Russian mechanized assaults continue to demonstrate that Russian forces have been unable to restore mechanized maneuver to the battlefield. Russian milbloggers criticized the Russian military command for conducting the mechanized assault in the Dobropillya direction, noting that Russian forces do not currently have the capability to successfully maneuver in mechanized columns. One milblogger claimed that the density of Ukrainian first-person view (FPV) drone and artillery strikes is such that even heavily protected vehicles cannot withstand multiple hits and are eventually immobilized.[xxi] The milblogger noted that experience has "repeatedly shown" that mechanized assaults during daylight hours and good weather conditions without concealment from fog "rarely lead to anything good." Another milblogger criticized the mechanized assault in the Dobropillya direction and implied that Lieutenant General Sukrab Akhmedov, the former commander of the 155th Naval Infantry Brigade and later the 20th Combined Arms Army (Moscow Military District [MMD]), commanded the mechanized assault.[xxii] The Russian military command reportedly removed Akhmedov from command of the 20th CAA in May 2024 after complaints that he commanded the Russian attritional assaults near Vuhledar in Winter 2022-2023 as the 155th Naval Infantry Brigade commander or his role in significant casualties after a Ukrainian rear strike in Summer 2023.[xxiii] The milblogger complained that Akhmedov now "received even more power" and formed several naval infantry columns near Dobropillya.[xxiv] The milblogger noted that the nature of the battlefield situation in the Dobropillya sector - and the wider frontline in the current war – means that groups larger than two soldiers would lead to "deadly consequences" as both Ukrainian and Russian drones have the immediate rear under "total surveillance." The milblogger stated that Russian forces can only ensure advances via their ongoing infiltration tactics using groups of one to two personnel who move on foot to concealed rally points areas before launching subsequent attacks. Another milblogger questioned why Russian forces are still using mechanized columns after achieving some battlefield successes recently using infiltration tactics.[xxv] The milblogger noted that a breakthrough with heavy armored vehicles requires proper planning, condition setting, and comprehensive support, such as the destruction of Ukrainian drone crews, adequate counterbattery fire to a significant depth, and coordination between units across a wide area. The milblogger particularly noted Ukraine's ability to strike the depth of the Russian Dobropillya salient from positions north of Myrnohrad and Pokrovsk and observed that rivers and the lack of bridges, anti-tank ditches, and lowlands in the area also constrain Russia's ability to maneuver.

Russian gains likely will continue to be constrained to a slow foot pace, and any sudden Russian operational-level breakthrough remains unlikely. Russian forces have been relying on infiltration tactics to make tactical gains across the front in recent months.[xxvi] Ukrainian forces have been reliably defeating Russia's periodic attempts to conduct mechanized assaults at and above the platoon level. ISW continues to assess that Russian forces have optimized for positional warfare in Ukraine, and Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov's December 17 statements about Russian technological and tactical adaptations in 2025 enforced this assessment.[xxvii] Russian gains across the theater – even in areas of relatively more rapid advances – have been limited to a foot pace, and Russia's inability to conduct mechanized assaults that result in large-scale gains confirms that Russian forces will be unable to make rapid breakthroughs and collapse Ukrainian defenses. The Kremlin's ongoing cognitive warfare effort that aims to paint Ukrainian defenses as on the verge of collapse and major Russian battlefield victories as inevitable does not reflect the battlefield realities about the ongoing nature and tempo of Russian advances.[xxviii]

The Russian Baltic Fleet is reportedly reforming its 336th Naval Infantry Brigade into the 120th Naval Infantry Division – the ninth new maneuver division that Russia has formed since 2022.[xxix] The Kaliningrad Oblast-based Russkiy Zapad media outlet reported on December 2 that the Russian Baltic Fleet is reforming its 336th Naval Infantry Brigade into the 120th Naval Infantry Division and that the division will have the 336th Naval Infantry Regiment.[xxx] Russkiy Zapad reported that the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) had already begun reforming the brigade on an unspecified prior date. The Russian MoD indirectly confirmed on December 22 that the Russian Baltic Fleet is forming a new division and that elements of the division are undergoing intensive training at the Khmelevka Training Ground, Kaliningrad Oblast.[xxxi] An OSINT analyst observed that elements of the 120th Naval Infantry Division is currently operating near Shakhove in the Dobropillya direction alongside the recently reformed 55th Naval Infantry Division (formerly 155th Separate Naval Infantry Brigade, Pacific Fleet), 40th Separate Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet), 61st Separate Naval Infantry Brigade (Northern Fleet), and 117th Separate Naval Infantry Regiment (Caspian Flotilla).[xxxii] Primorsky Krai Governor Oleg Kozhemyako earlier announced that the Pacific Fleet reformed the 155th Separate Naval Infantry Brigade into the 55th Naval Infantry Division on December 1.[xxxiii] Former Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu announced in December 2022 that the Russian military command intended to form 17 new maneuver divisions, including by expanding five existing naval infantry brigades into five divisions.[xxxiv] ISW has observed evidence to support the formation and combat deployment of at least nine new Russian divisions since December 2022.[xxxv] The Russian military command has formed the 104th Airborne (VDV) Division and the 27th, 68th, 69th, and 71st motorized rifle divisions from previously existing brigades, the 55th Naval infantry Division, and the new 67th, 70th, and 72nd motorized rifle divisions since December 2022. ISW continues to assess that the expansion of Russian conventional forces and the Russian military’s larger force structure reform back to maneuver divisions is in line with Russia’s preparation for a possible NATO-Russia war in the future, as the Russian military command likely assesses that the Russian military will require more mass and higher echelon formations to wage effective combat operations.[xxxvi]

Key Takeaways:

• Russia conducted another large-scale combined missile and drone strike against Ukraine overnight on December 22 and 23, primarily targeting energy infrastructure in western Ukraine.
• Russian forces conducted a reduced battalion-sized mechanized assault in the Dobropillya direction and a reduced-platoon sized mechanized assault in the Kostyantynivka direction on December 22.
• Combat footage showing failed Russian mechanized assaults continue to demonstrate that Russian forces have been unable to restore mechanized maneuver to the battlefield.
• Russian gains likely will continue to be constrained to a slow foot pace, and any sudden Russian operational-level breakthrough remains unlikely.
• The Russian Baltic Fleet is reportedly reforming its 336th Naval Infantry Brigade into the 120th Naval Infantry Division – the ninth new maneuver division that Russia has formed since 2022.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Kupyansk and Pokrovsk. Russian forces recently advanced near Pokrovsk and in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.  

• Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
• Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis
• Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
• Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
• Significant Activity in Belarus

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Ukrainian forces continued their long-range strike campaign against Russian gas and oil infrastructure overnight on December 22 and 23. Stavropol Krai Governor Vladimir Vladimirov claimed on December 23 that Ukrainian forces targeted Budyonnovsk, causing a fire in the industrial zone.[xxxvii] Geolocated footage published on December 22 and December 23 shows a fire at the Stavrolen Petrochemical Plant in Budyonnovsk on December 23.[xxxviii] Russian opposition outlet Astra reported that Lukoil's Stavrolen plant is one of the largest producers of polyethylene and polypropylene in Russia, which Ukrainian defense outlet Militarnyi noted Russia uses for insulating elements and wire sheaths in drones, missiles, and electronic warfare (EW) systems.[xxxix]

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in northern Ukraine along the international border)

Russian forces continued offensive operations north and southeast of Sumy City but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked in Kursk and Sumy oblasts, including north of Sumy City near Andriivka and Oleksiivka and southeast of Sumy City near Hrabovske and Vysoke on December 22 and 23.[xl] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces unsuccessfully counterattacked in and near Hrabovske and Vysoke.[xli]

Ukrainian Joint Forces Task Force Spokesperson Colonel Viktor Trehubov refuted Russian social media rumors that about 10,000 Ukrainian forces abandoned their positions in Sumy Oblast after the Russian attack in a border area southeast of Sumy City. Trehubov stated that these claims are false and intend to sow panic among the Ukrainian population – a statement consistent with ISW assessment and December 21 forecast.[xlii] Trehubov also stated that around 100 Russian servicemembers entered Hrabovske, attempted to advance towards Ryasne (west of Hrabovske), and are currently trying to secure positions in the southern part of Hrabovske.[xliii] Trehubov stated that Ukrainian forces are actively counterattacking and that battles are ongoing in Hrabovske. Trehubov added that elements of the Russian 36th Motorized Rifle Brigade (29th Combined Arms Army (CAA), Eastern Military District [EMD]) kidnapped 52 civilians from Hrabovske and transported them to Russia on December 20. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky reported on December 22 that the 52 civilians did not evacuate despite Ukrainian officials' warnings and noted that Russian forces captured 13 Ukrainian servicemembers.[xliv] Zelensky added that Ukrainian forces did not repel the attack to avoid casualties among the civilians that remained in the border area.

A Russian milblogger reportedly affiliated with the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces claimed that multiple Russian servicemembers, likely from the 1st and 3rd Battalions of the 30th Motorized Rifle Regiment (72nd Motorized Rifle Division, 44th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]), retreated from Oleksiivka without weapons after suffering from shell shock and being wounded.[xlv] The milblogger claimed that Russian forces are attempting to advance south of Yablunivka (northeast of Sumy City) even though settlements are far apart in that area, making Russian advances unlikely in the near term.[xlvi] The milblogger claimed that Russian military commanders do not care about the Russian forces' challenges with gaining a foothold and that Ukrainian forces began targeting lightly fortified positions of the 83rd Separate Airborne (VDV) Brigade with mortars.[xlvii]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies are reportedly striking Ukrainian military equipment near Shostka (northwest of Sumy City) with Lancet loitering munitions.[xlviii] Drone operators of the 34th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (49th CAA, Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian vehicles near Osoivka (east of Sumy City).[xlix] Artillery elements of the 106th VDV Division are reportedly striking Ukrainian manpower in the Sumy direction.[l]

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: The Russian MoD and Russian milbloggers claimed that elements of the Russian 41st Motorized Rifle Regiment (72nd Motorized Rifle Division, 44th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) and elements of the 74^th Separate Reconnaissance Battalion (likely a special forces reconnaissance unit) seized Prylipka (northeast of Kharkiv City).[li] A Russian milblogger reportedly affiliated with the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces refuted Russian milblogger claims that Russian forces seized Prylipka.[lii] A Russian milblogger also claimed that Russian forces advanced near Starytsia and in the Lymanskyi Forest (both northeast of Kharkiv City).[liii]

Russian forces attacked northwest of Kharkiv City near Sotnytskyi Kozachok; and northeast of Kharkiv City near Prylipka, Vovchansk, Vovchanski Khutory, Lyman, and toward Vilcha on December 22 and 23.[liv]

A Kremlin-affiliated milblogger claimed on December 23 that Russian seizures of Vilcha and Prylipka could enable a Russian offensive toward Hrafske and Buhaivka (both northeast of Kharkiv City), and along the Siverskyi Donets River toward the Pechenihy Reservoir, allowing Russian forces to approach critical Ukrainian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) for the Velykyi Burluk direction and the Pechenihy Reservoir crossing near Staryi Saltiv (northeast of Kharkiv City).[lv]

Order of Battle: First-person view (FPV) drone and Molniya loitering munition operators of the 128th Motorized Rifle Brigade (44th AC) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Vilcha.[lvi]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Velykyi Burluk direction on December 23 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northeast of Velykyi Burluk near Milove and Khatnie; east of Velykyi Burluk near Hryhorivka, Dvorichanske, and Odradne; and southeast of Velykyi Burluk near Kolodyazne on December 22 and 23.[lvii]

A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian Geran-2 drone crews and Russian Aerospace Forces are targeting Ukrainian positions near Velykyi Burluk, Kolodyazne, and Prykolotne (north of Velykyi Burluk).[lviii]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Kupyansk direction.

Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on December 22 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced south of Zapadne (north of Kupyansk).[lix]

Russian forces attacked near and within Kupyansk itself; east of Kupyansk near Petropavlivka and Kucherivka; southeast of Kupyansk near Pishchane and Kurylivka; and south of Kupyansk near Kupyansk-Vuzlovyi on December 22 and 23.[lx] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked within Kupyansk and near Kindrashivka, Radkivka, Holubivka (all north of Kupyansk), Sobolivka, and Myrove (both west of Kupyansk).[lxi]

Ukraine’s Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported on December 23 that Ukrainian forces are successfully counterattacking near and within Kupyansk and have cut off the remnants of the Russian groups in the town from logistics.[lxii] President Volodymyr Zelensky reported on December 22 that Ukrainian forces are conducting clearing operations in Kupyansk at a distance of about 1.5 kilometers and that only about 80 to 100 Russian servicemembers remain in the town.[lxiii] The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Kupyansk direction reported on December 23 that Ukrainian forces are clearing Kupyansk house-by-house as Russian forces often hide in the destroyed urban buildings.[lxiv] The spokesperson reported that Ukrainian forces have surrounded some Russian forces within the town and that Ukrainian forces are gradually moving toward the center of Kupyansk.[lxv] The spokesperson stated that Russian reinforcements are unsuccessfully trying to break through the encirclement from the north.

A milblogger reporting on the Russian Western Grouping of Forces claimed that drone operators from the Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies recently entered the Kupyansk area in order to assist elements of the 68th Motorized Rifle Division (6th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) to hold Kupyansk.[lxvi] The milblogger claimed that the quantity of Russian drones in the area has significantly increased in recent days, but observed that almost all of Russia's drone launch points are on the east (left) bank of the Oskil River, which increases flight times and gives Ukrainian forces more time to react to strikes. The milblogger claimed that Russian forces are trying to strike Ukrainian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) but that foggy weather is limiting Russian drone operations in the Kupyansk direction.[lxvii] The milblogger claimed that Russian forces have entered Petropavlivka and Kucherivka but are unable to gain a foothold. The milblogger claimed that the Russian military command tasked elements of the Russian 27th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (1st Guards Tank Army [GTA], Moscow Military District [MMD]) with holding the Kindrashivka-Radkivka-Holubivka line, followed by an advance to the northern outskirts of Kupyansk.[lxviii] The milblogger noted elements of the 27th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade struggled to traverse over 30 kilometers of difficult wooded terrain under threat from Ukrainian drone and mortar strikes in an effort to reach the starting points for their assaults.[lxix] The milblogger claimed that commanders deployed Russian forces to areas allegedly under Russian control, but that the pervasive contested "gray zone" in the area meant Russian forces would often engage with Ukrainian forces.

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 352nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (11th Army Corps [AC], LMD) are reportedly operating near Kupyansk.[lxx]

Russian forces continued offensive operations northeast of Borova near Kruhlyakivka, Bohuslavka, Zahryzove, and Novoplatonivka; east of Borova near Nadiya; and southeast of Borova toward Cherneshchyna on December 22 and 23.[lxxi]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Slovyansk-Lyman direction on December 23 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northwest of Lyman near Novoselivka, Drobysheve, and Serednie; north of Lyman near Stavky and northeast of Lyman near Kolodyazi and Myrne on December 22 and 23.[lxxii]

A milblogger reporting on the Russian Western Grouping of Forces claimed on December 23 that elements of the Russian 25th CAA (Central Military District [CMD]) in the Lyman direction are facing a serious drone shortage, which is slowing down Russian advances.[lxxiii]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)

The Ukrainian General Staff confirmed on December 23 that Ukrainian forces withdrew from Siversk.

The Ukrainian General Staff reported on December 23 that Ukrainian forces withdrew from Siversk in order to preserve Ukrainian forces' lives and combat power.[lxxiv] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces were able to seize the settlement due to their significant personnel and equipment advantages and use of small groups to maintain pressure on Ukrainian forces, especially during difficult weather conditions. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces maintain fire control over Siversk and are severing Russian logistics within the settlement. ISW assessed on December 21 that Russian forces had likely seized Siversk – a town with a pre-war population of less than 11,000 – after 41 months of fighting.[lxxv]

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced west of Siversk, northwest of Svyato-Pokrovske (southwest of Siversk), and west of Kuzmynivka (south of Siversk).[lxxvi]

Russian forces attacked near Siversk itself; northwest of Siversk near Dronivka and Zakitne; northeast of Siversk near Serebryanka; south of Siversk near Kuzmynivka, Pereizne, and Zvanivka; southwest of Siversk near Svyato-Pokrovske, Bondarne, Fedorivka, and Pazeno; and west of Siversk near Dibrova on December 22 and 23.[lxxvii]

The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Slovyansk direction reported that Russian forces are attempting to infiltrate Dronivka and are using rubber motorboats under the cover of fog to transport forces across the Siverskyi Donets River to reach Zakitne and Platonivka (northwest of Siversk).[lxxviii] A Ukrainian brigade operating in the Siversk direction reported that Russian assault groups are increasingly entering Siversk without body armor or helmets, equipped only with automatic rifles.[lxxix] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces are striking Ukrainian forces and equipment along ground lines of communication (GLOCs) near Svyato-Pokrovske and Riznykivka (west of Siversk) in order to force Ukrainian forces to reorganize their logistics along alternative routes.[lxxx]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 85th Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 2nd Luhansk People's Republic Army Corps [LNR AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Bondarne.[lxxxi] Elements of the 169th Motorized Rifle Brigade (25th [CAA], Central Military District [CMD]) are reportedly operating near Yampil (northwest of Siversk).[lxxxii]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area on December 23

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on December 22 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced south of the T-0504 Kostyantynivka-Bakhmut highway on the eastern outskirts of Kostyantynivka.[lxxxiii]

See topline text for reports of additional assessed Russian advances in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces seized Pleshchiivka (southeast of Kostyantynivka) and advanced in central and south of Kostyantynivka, northeast of Zaliznyanske, southeast of Mynkivka (both northeast of Kostyantynivka), northwest of Stupochky (east of Kostyantynivka), west of Pleshchiivka, northwest of Ivanopillya (both southeast of Kostyantynivka), south of Berestok (south of Kostyantynivka), northwest of Rusyn Yar (south of Druzhkivka), and northeast of Sofiivka (southwest of Druzhkivka).[lxxxiv]

Russian forces attacked near Kostyantynivka itself; southeast of Kostyantynivka near Pleshchiivka, Oleksandro-Shulytne, Shcherbynivka, and Kleban-Byk; south of Kostyantynivka toward Berestok; southwest of Kostyantynivka near Yablunivka and toward Stepanivka; south of Druzhkivka near Rusyn Yar; and southwest of Druzhkivka near Sofiivka on December 22 and 23.[lxxxv] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Sofiivka.[lxxxvi]

Ukrainian broadcaster Suspilne reported on December 23 that Ukrainian forces operating in the Kostyantynivka, Pokrovsk, and Novopavlivka direction stated that Russian Gerbera, Lancet, Molniya, and Geran drones can strike Ukrainian targets within a range of 30 kilometers and that modified versions of these drones can operate as mothership drones and carry FPV drones.[lxxxvii] The Ukrainian military sources stated that Russian forces are operating fiber optic FPV drones with a range of 25 kilometers and that the "kill zone" (an area of elevated drone strike risk), which was previously about 15 kilometers from the frontline, is now expanding. Suspilne noted that Russian guided and unguided glide bomb strikes are impacting Ukrainian logistics in Kostyantynivka by denying Ukrainian forces the ability to operate vehicles five to six kilometers outside of the city. Suspilne's sources stated that Russian reconnaissance and sabotage groups are operating outside of Kostyantynivka.

A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger stated that reports of a Russian breakthrough near Vyrolyubivka (north of Kostyantynivka) are still unconfirmed and most likely based on a Russian information operation or erroneous reports.[lxxxviii] The milblogger added that Russian claims that Russian forces control over almost half of Kostyantynivka are exaggerated and are likely based on outdated maps from the 1980s, when Kostyantynivka consisted of several satellite towns. The milblogger claimed that some Russian sources have erroneously assessed that the area west of Pleshchiivka is under stable Russian control despite unsuccessful Russian attacks in the area. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on December 1 that Russian forces seized Klynove (just west of Vryolyubivka) - a claim which the milblogger also denied at the time as an exaggeration.[lxxxix] Kremlin officials, including Russian President Vladimir Putin and high-ranking Russian military commanders, recently issued inflated claims that Russian forces had seized more than half of Kostyantynivka as part of the Russian cognitive warfare effort to present exaggerated and false claims of advance as alleged evidence of the inevitability of a Russian military victory in Ukraine.[xc]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 58th Separate Spetsnaz Battalion (unofficially designated the Okhotnik [Hunter] Spetsnaz Detachment) (51st CAA, formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic [DNR] AC, [SMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Kostyantynivka.[xci]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Dobropillya tactical area on December 23 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced northwest of Nove Shakhove (east of Dobropillya).[xcii]

Russian forces attacked east of Dobropillya toward Toretske and southeast of Dobropillya near Dorozhnie and Zapovidne on December 23.[xciii]

See topline for reports of Russian mechanized assaults in the Dobropillya tactical area.

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 174th Separate Reconnaissance Battalion (150th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA, SMD) and the 33rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (20th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA) are reportedly operating in the Dobropillya direction.[xciv]

Ukrainian and Russian forces recently advanced in the Pokrovsk direction.

Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on December 23 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced east of Rodynske (north of Pokrovsk).[xcv]

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on December 22 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced south of Zatyshok (northeast of Pokrovsk).[xcvi]

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced in northeastern Myrnohrad (east of Pokrovsk) and west of Zatyshok.[xcvii]

Russian forces attacked near Pokrovsk itself; north of Pokrovsk near Rodynske; northeast of Pokrovsk near Chervonyi (Krasnyi) Lyman, and Sukhetske; east of Pokrovsk near Myrnohrad and Rivne; south of Pokrovsk near Novopavlivka and Leontovychi; southwest of Pokrovsk near Kotlyne, Udachne, Novopidhorodne, Molodetske and Novoserhiivka; and northwest of Pokrovsk near Hryshyne on December 22 and 23.[xcviii] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Rodynske and Hryshyne, and a Ukrainian regiment operating in the Pokrovsk direction published footage on December 23, reportedly showing Ukrainian forces conducting a mechanized assault near Pokrovsk.[xcix] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted a mechanized assault from the Hryshyne area and reached the outskirts of the Pokrovsk industrial zone.[c] Milbloggers claimed that Russian forces, including from the Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies, repelled the assault.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on December 22 that there are roughly 1,100 Russian servicemembers operating within Pokrovsk.[ci] Ukrainian broadcaster Suspilne reported on December 23, Ukrainian servicemembers operating in the Pokrovsk direction, that Russian drone strikes noticeably increased when Rubikon elements arrived to support the Pokrovsk offensive in August 2025 and that Russian forces can use up to 200 first-person view (FPV) drones against one road per day.[cii] The Ukrainian servicemembers told Suspilne that Russian forces have used up to 350 FPV drones per day against the T-0515 Pokrovsk-Rodynske highway. Suspilne reported that Rubikon drone strikes complicated Ukrainian logistics and pushed Ukrainian drone operators an additional 10 kilometers back from the frontline, degrading Ukrainian battlefield air interdiction (BAI) efforts against Russian near rear areas. Ukrainian servicemembers told Suspilne that Russian drones could reach Pavlohrad (approximately 100 kilometers northwest of Pokrovsk) should Russian forces be able to move their drone operators forward to Pokrovsk and seize the dominant heights in the area.

Order of battle: Elements of the 27th Motorized Rifle Division (2nd CAA, Central Military District [CMD]) are reportedly operating in the Pokrovsk direction.[ciii]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Novopavlivka direction on December 23 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked near Novopavlivka itself; southeast of Novopavlivka near Horikhove; and south of Novopavlivka near Filiya and Dachne on December 22 and 23.[civ]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 20th Motorized Rifle Division (8th CAA, SMD), including of its 944th Self-Propelled Artillery Regiment and 242nd Motorized Rifle Regiment, are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions in Novopavlivka.[cv]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Oleksandrivka direction on December 23 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northeast of Oleksandrivka near Andriivka-Klevtsove; east of Oleksandrivka near Oleksandrohrad, Sosnivka, and Vorone; and southeast of Oleksandrivka near Vyshneve and Oleksiivka on December 22 and 23.[cvi]

A non-commissioned officer (NCO) of a Ukrainian drone platoon operating in the Oleksandrivka direction reported on December 23 that Russian forces are leveraging foggy weather conditions to bring artillery closer to the frontline and have been constantly moving one to two infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs) in an effort to find areas for future assaults.[cvii] The NCO stated that Russian forces are regularly conducting guided glide bomb strikes and that Russian Rubikon drone operators are operating in the area. The NCO stated that Russian forces are also using technological innovations, including modernized Mavic drones that can locate Ukrainian FPV drone pilots via their Wi-Fi signals. Ukrainian electronic and radio warfare expert Serhiy “Flash” Beskrestnov stated on December 22 that the modules allowing Russian drones to detect wireless internet signals are not new or useful due to the high density of forces using the Internet on the frontline.[cviii]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Hulyaipole direction on December 23 but did not make confirmed advances.

Assessed Russian infiltrations: Geolocated footage published on December 23 shows four Russian servicemembers raising flags in northern, central, and southern Andriivka (north of Hulyaipole) during what ISW assesses was a Russian infiltration mission that did not change control of terrain or the forward edge of the battle area (FEBA) at this time.[cix] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on December 23 that elements of the Russian 36th Motorized Rifle Brigade (29th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Eastern Military District [EMD]) seized Andriivka.[cx]

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced northeast of Andriivka.[cxi] Another Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces have seized 60 percent of Hulyaipole.[cxii]

Russian forces attacked near and within Hulyaipole itself; northwest of Hulyaipole toward Ternuvate and Kosivtseve; north of Hulyaipole near Zelene, Varvarivka, Dobropillya, Nove Zaporizhzhia, Andriivka, Radisne, Herasymivka, and Ostapivske; northeast of Hulyaipole near Solodke, Zlahoda, Pryvilne, and Rybne; southeast of Hulyaipole near Marfopil; and south of Hulyaipole near Dorozhnianka on December 22 and 23.[cxiii] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Andriivka and Ternuvate.[cxiv]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 127th Motorized Rifle Division, 60th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade, and 57th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (all of the 5th CAA, EMD), and elements of the 38th Motorized Rifle Brigade (35th CAA, EMD) reportedly continue to operate near Hulyaipole.[cxv] Artillery elements of the 305th Artillery Brigade (5th CAA, EMD) reportedly continue to strike Ukrainian positions in Hulyaipole.[cxvi] Elements of the 11th Air Force and Air Defense Army (Russian Aerospace Forces [VKS] and EMD) reportedly continue to conduct glide bomb strikes against Ukrainian positions in Hulyaipole.[cxvii]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on December 23 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked southeast of Orikhiv near Mala Tokmachka and west of Orikhiv near Shcherbaky, Stepove, Plavni, Stepnohirsk, and Prymorske and toward Lukyanivske on December 22 and 23.[cxviii]

Order of Battle: First-person view (FPV) drone operators of the Russian Nemets group of the 3rd Assault Company of the 291st Motorized Rifle Regiment (42nd Motorized Rifle Division, 58th CAA, Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Orikhiv.[cxix] FPV drone operators and other elements of the 108th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (7th VDV Division) and the 143rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (127th Motorized Rifle Division, 5th CAA, EMD) reportedly continue to operate in the Zaporizhia direction.[cxx]

Russian forces continued limited ground assaults in the Kherson direction on December 23 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked east of Kherson City near the Antonivskyi Bridge on December 23.[cxxi]

A Russian milblogger claimed on December 23 that Ukrainian forces struck a substation in occupied Vynohradove (southeast of Kherson City, about 50 kilometers from the frontline).[cxxii]

Order of Battle: Molniya-2 fixed-wing drone operators of the Russian 98th VDV Division reportedly continue to strike Ukrainian positions on west (right) bank Kherson Oblast.[cxxiii]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

See topline text for reports of Russian missile and drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of December 22 to 23.

Russian forces continue to target Ukraine's thermal power plants (TPPs). Ukraine’s largest private energy company, DTEK, reported on December 23 that Russian forces have struck DTEK TTPs over 210 times since the start of the full-scale invasion in 2022, injuring 59 TPP workers and killing four.[cxxiv]

Russian forces continue to use modified Shahed (Geran) drones to target Ukrainian helicopters involved in air defense operations. Ukrainian broadcaster Suspilne reported that a Ukrainian Mi-24 helicopter crew died while repelling a Russian Shahed strike on December 17 and that preliminary reports found that the helicopter collided with a Shahed drone that was flying very low.[cxxv] A Russian milblogger speculated that a Shahed drone equipped with an R-60 air-to-air missile downed the helicopter.[cxxvi] The milblogger noted that modifications to Shahed jets allow them to fly at low altitudes and to provide optical reconnaissance.[cxxvii] ISW has previously assessed that Russian forces are increasingly using modified Shaheds drones, including those with R-60 missiles and those that are operator-controlled, to target Ukrainian mobile fire teams moving in vehicles and to counter Ukrainian helicopters and tactical aircraft that hunt Shaheds.[cxxviii]

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

Poland implemented the first phase of new air defenses to detect Belarussian drone incursions near the Poland-Belarus border. Polish Interior Minister Marcin Kierwiński reported on December 23 that Poland has installed the first elements of an anti-drone system, including a radar on an observation tower, near Krynki on the Polish-Belarussian border.[cxxix] ISW continues to assess that the Russian drone violation of Polish airspace from the direction of Belarus marked an inflection in Russian activity and the beginning of Russia's "Phase Zero" - the informational and psychological condition setting phase — to prepare for a possible NATO-Russia war in the future.[cxxx]

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.