Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, December 22, 2025

Assessment as of: 9:45 PM ET

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Note: The data cutoff for this product was 1 PM ET on December 22. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the December 23 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

False reports are likely shaping Russian President Vladimir Putin's understanding of the battlefield situation. The Financial Times (FT) reported on December 22 that two unspecified officials stated that Russian military and security authorities regularly give Putin updates that inflate Ukrainian battlefield casualties, highlight Russia's resource advantages, and downplay tactical failures.[1] FT reported that Russian Chief of the General Staff, Army General Valery Gerasimov, is responsible for briefing Putin about the war. The sources reportedly stated that the "rosy picture" that military officials paint during their briefs has led Putin to believe that Russia can win the war. FT stated that the sources noted that Putin regularly meets with "confidants" who tell him that the war has become a "growing drag" on the Russian economy, however. The Washington Post reported on December 22 that a Russian official stated that a banking or non-payments crisis in Russia is possible and that they do not "want to think about a continuation of the war or an escalation."[2] A Russian academic source close to senior Kremlin diplomats told the Washington Post that 2026 will be the "first difficult year" since the start of the full scale invasion but assessed that growing economic problems will not lead to social or political problems.

FT and the Washington Post's reports cohere with ISW's observations from open-source information about the pervasive culture of lying in the Russian military, in contrast with the increased willingness of Kremlin officials overseeing the economy to present more truthful reports to Putin. High-ranking Russian military officials, including Gerasimov and Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov, recently publicly briefed Putin and the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) on the battlefield situation, providing exaggerated and false reports about Russian gains.[3] On December 18, Gerasimov presented even more exaggerated reports than Belousov did on December 17, suggesting that Russian military officials may be competing with each other to present Putin with optimistic reports. Russian milbloggers have long complained about commanders submitting "beautiful" but erroneous reports to their superiors that subsequently result in unnecessary losses, indicating that false reports are affecting the chain of command in the Russian military broadly.[4] Russian officials, such as Russian Central Bank Chairperson Elvira Nabiullina and Finance Minister Anton Siluanov, in contrast, have provided more sober and downbeat public statements about issues affecting the Russian economy, including by acknowledging that Russia had exhausted many of its "free resources" throughout the war and that the share of the Russian federal budget from oil and gas revenues is significantly dropping.[5]

Putin's own cognitive warfare effort, which exaggerates Russian advances to push Ukraine to capitulate to Russian demands during negotiations, feeds on and likely encourages the false reports his military officials provide him. The inaccurate battlefield reports that Putin receives are likely confirming for him his long-held theory of victory in Ukraine, which assumes that the Russian military and economy can outlast Ukraine and Western support for Ukraine.[6] Putin, believing that Russia can win a war of attrition, has repeatedly rejected peace proposals short of his demands and continues to declare his willingness to continue hostilities to achieve his war aims militarily.[7] Kremlin officials have been engaged in a cognitive warfare effort aimed at influencing the ongoing negotiations to achieve Russia's demands through diplomatic means.[8] Kremlin officials have been publicly presenting exaggerated claims of Russian advances as alleged evidence of the inevitability of a Russian military victory in Ukraine. Putin notably presented even more exaggerated claims of battlefield successes on December 19 than either Belousov or Gerasimov did, suggesting that Putin himself is exaggerating the already inflated battlefield reports he receives as part of this cognitive warfare effort.

Senior US and Ukrainian officials commented on the outcome of separate meetings between US and Ukrainian as well as US and Russian representatives in Miami. US Vice President JD Vance stated on December 22 that negotiations have yet to resolve issues about the future of Ukrainian-controlled parts of Donetsk Oblast, the control of the Russian-occupied Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP), the status of Ukrainian civilians in Russian-occupied territories and ethnic Russians in Ukraine, and the postwar reconstruction of Ukraine.[9] Vance observed that Russia "really wants" to control all of Donetsk Oblast, a demand that Vance noted would "understandably" pose a "major security problem" for Ukraine and would take Russian forces a year or more to achieve militarily. ISW continues to assess that it would likely take Russia at least two to three years of difficult and costly battles to militarily seize the rest of Donetsk Oblast at the current tempo.[10]

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy stated on December 22 that Ukrainian and US delegations have completed 90 percent of the "first developments" in negotiations and have a concrete but unfinalized 20-point plan.[11] Zelensky stated that the plan includes a document on security guarantees with secret clauses and details on postwar military support for the Ukrainian military that the US Senate would have to ratify. Zelensky stated that the parties have also completed a first draft of an agreement on Ukraine's reconstruction. The November 23 Ukraine-Europe-US talks in Geneva resulted in a 19- and then 20-point plan, which is likely the basis of the 20-point plan that Zelensky referenced.[12]

Ukrainian officials also continue to work toward establishing legal mechanisms to hold elections in Ukraine during martial law, something that both the US and the Kremlin have been calling for, although the Kremlin is now signaling that it will not recognize Ukrainian elections that it cannot easily manipulate.[13] Head of the Ukrainian Servant of the People Party Davyd Arakhamia announced on December 22 that the Ukrainian Verkhovna Rada is forming a working group on holding elections during martial law.[14] Ukraine's Constitution and law notably prohibit Ukraine from holding elections during martial law, which the statute prohibits the Ukrainian government from lifting while Ukraine remains under attack.[15] Ukraine's efforts to hold elections are in line with the initial US-proposed 28-point plan.[16]

Russia reportedly rejected a US-proposed temporary ceasefire, and a high ranking Kremlin official publicly indicated that Russia will reject many of the latest Ukrainian and European peace proposals. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on December 22 that Russia rejected a Christmas ceasefire that the United States had proposed to serve as a signal that both parties were interested in finding a diplomatic solution to end the war.[17] Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov stated that Russia's position is clear and that Russia does not support a temporary ceasefire.[18] Ryabkov called for a permanent ceasefire as part of an agreement that eliminates the alleged "root causes" of the war (a term that the Kremlin has long used as shorthand to mean its original war justifications and demands). Ryabkov also called for a peace settlement to guarantee the results of Russia's sham and illegal referendums in occupied Ukraine in 2022 and the Russian Constitution's inclusion of all of Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts as part of the Russian Federation.

Russian Presidential Aide Yuriy Ushakov stated on December 21 that the Kremlin will decide which proposals Russia can accept and which Russia must "absolutely" reject when lead Russian negotiator and Russian Direct Investment Fund (RDIF) CEO Kirill Dmitriev reports back about his recent meetings with the US delegation in Miami.[19] Ushakov stated that he is "certain" that the proposals that Ukrainian and European delegations made during their talks with the US delegation in Miami are "rather unconstructive" and do not "improve" the proposed settlement agreement.[20] Ushakov stated that Russia will adhere to the agreements it allegedly made with the United States during the August 2025 Alaska Summit and at other unspecified meetings with US delegations.[21] No agreements from the Alaska Summit were made public, but Kremlin officials have recently claimed that Russia and the United States reached an understanding at the meeting based on Russian President Vladimir Putin's June 2024 speech, in which Putin reiterated his original war demands and called for Ukraine to withdraw entirely from Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts and abandon its North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)  aspirations.[22] Repeated Russian references to the June 2024 speech signal the Kremlin's rejection of the original 28-point plan that called for freezing the current lines in Zaporizhia and Kherson oblasts.

Ryabkov claimed on December 22 that Russia is ready to legally formalize its intention not to attack European Union (EU) or NATO states in a future resolution to end the war in Ukraine.[23] The 1994 Budapest Memorandum formalized Russia's commitment not only to respect Ukraine's territorial integrity but also to take action in the event of any aggression against Ukraine in return for the Soviet nuclear weapons then on Ukraine's territory.[24] Putin has repeatedly shown his willingness to change Russian law to serve his own purposes, including by changing the Russian Constitution in 2020 to allow him to continue to hold the presidency. The Kremlin's pattern of violating international agreements and modifying its own constitution demonstrates the hollowness of such Russian promises and highlights the need for robust security guarantees for Ukraine to prevent renewed Russian aggression.

Ukrainian security services likely assassinated Lieutenant General Fanil Sarvarov, the chief of the Russian General Staff’s Operational Training Department, in Moscow City on December 22. The Russian Investigative Committee (Sledkom) reported on December 22 that unknown actors detonated a car bomb, killing Sarvarov in Moscow City.[25] Sledkom claimed that Ukrainian security services may have been involved in Sarvarov’s assassination.[26] Ukrainian security services killed Russian Nuclear, Biological, Chemical Defense Forces (NBC) Head Lieutenant General Igor Kirillov and his assistant, Major Ilya Polikarpov, with an improvised explosive device (IED) in Moscow on December 17, and unknown actors similarly detonated an IED on a vehicle to kill deputy head of the Russian General Staff’s Main Operational Directorate, Lieutenant General Yaroslav Moskalik, in Balashikha, Moscow Oblast, on April 25.[27]

Russian security services likely assassinated former leader of the Russian Hispaniola Brigade Stanislav Orlov in occupied Crimea on December 4. Russian opposition outlet Astra reported on December 22 that it obtained surveillance footage from emergency services in occupied Crimea showing four vehicles arriving at Orlov's residence in Sevastopol on December 4.[28] The vehicles had black plates, which Astra implied usually belong to Russian military or security personnel. Astra observed masked men with machine guns leave the vehicles and reported that Orlov's neighbors heard several rounds of gunshots. Astra reported that the footage later showed ambulances arriving without any flashing lights or sirens to remove Orlov's body. Astra's sources claimed that Russian security services suspected Orlov of arms trafficking and participating in an organized crime group and that Russian officials earlier arrested another well-known former commander of the Hispaniola Naval Detachment on the same charges several weeks ago. Orlov was a prominent Russian ultranationalist who had fought in eastern Ukraine since 2014 alongside other prominent ultranationalists, such as Alexander Khodakovsky. Orlov participated in Russia's illegal annexation of Crimea and fought in the Second Chechen War. Orlov created the Hispaniola Detachment, which was composed of ultranationalists, football fans, and former Russian veterans, as part of Donetsk People's Republic's (DNR) militia in spring 2022. Astra reported that the Hispaniola Detachment later became the Hispaniola Separate Private Military Group (also known as the 88th Hispaniola Reconnaissance and Sabotage Brigade under the Russian Volunteer Corps) until the Kremlin suddenly disbanded the unit in October 2025. ISW last observed elements of the Naval Spetsnaz Detachment of the 88th Hispaniola Volunteer Brigade operating in occupied Crimea in late October 2025.[29]

Key Takeaways:

• False reports are likely shaping Russian President Vladimir Putin's understanding of the battlefield situation.
• FT's and the Washington Post's reports cohere with ISW's observations from open-source information about the pervasive culture of lying in the Russian military, in contrast with the increased willingness of Kremlin officials overseeing the economy to present more truthful reports to Putin.
• Putin's own cognitive warfare effort, which exaggerates Russian advances to push Ukraine to capitulate to Russian demands during negotiations, feeds on and likely encourages the false reports his military officials give him.
• Senior US and Ukrainian officials commented on the outcome of separate meetings between US and Ukrainian as well as US and Russian representatives in Miami.
• Russia reportedly rejected a US-proposed temporary ceasefire, and a high ranking Kremlin official publicly indicated that Russia will reject many of the latest Ukrainian and European peace proposals.
• Ukrainian security services likely assassinated Lieutenant General Fanil Sarvarov, the chief of the Russian General Staff’s Operational Training Department, in Moscow City on December 22.
• Russian security services likely assassinated former leader of the Russian Hispaniola Brigade Stanislav Orlov in occupied Crimea on December 4.
• Ukrainian forces advanced in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area and near Pokrovsk. Russian forces advanced in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports. 

• Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
• Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis
• Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
• Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
• Significant Activity in Belarus

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Ukrainian forces continued their long range strike campaign against Russian oil infrastructure on the night of December 21 to 22. Geolocated footage published on December 22 shows smoke rising from the direction of the port of Taman, Krasnodar Krai.[30] The Ukrainian General Staff reported on December 22 that Ukrainian forces struck the Tamanneftegaz oil terminal in Krasnodar Krai.[31] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that the Tamanneftegaz oil terminal is involved in the shipment of crude oil, petroleum products, and liquified hydrocarbon gases. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that the strikes damaged the pipeline, two berths, and two vessels, and caused a fire of more than 1,000 square meters. The Krasnodar Krai Operational Headquarters claimed that drone debris damaged a pipeline at an unspecified terminal in Krasnodar Krai.[32]

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in northern Ukraine along the international border)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Sumy direction on December 21 and 22 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked in Kursk and Sumy oblasts, including north of Sumy City near Andriivka and southeast of Sumy City near Hrabovske and toward Ryasne, on December 21 and 22.[33]

Order of battle: Artillery elements of the Russian 106th Airborne (VDV) Division and drone operators of the 34th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (49th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions and equipment in Sumy Oblast.[34] Drone operators of the 56th VDV Regiment (7th VDV Division) reportedly continue to strike Ukrainian forces in the Sumy Oblast border region.[35]

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on December 22 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: The Russian Ministry of Defense (MOD) and Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces seized Vilcha and advanced south of Lyman (both northeast of Kharkiv City) along the T-2104 Vovchansk-Chuhuiv highway.[36] The Russian Northern Grouping of Forces credited elements of the Russian 69th Motorized Rifle Division (6th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Leningrad Military District [LMD]), the 128th Motorized Rifle Brigade (44th Army Corps [AC], LMD), and the Chechen Zapad-Akhmat Battalion with the claimed seizure of Vilcha. [37]

Russian forces attacked northwest of Kharkiv City near Sotnytskyi Kozachok and northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk, Vilcha, Starytsia, Vovchanski Khutory, Prylipka, Lyman, and Izbytske on December 21 and 22.[38]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Velykyi Burluk direction on December 22 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked toward Velykyi Burluk itself and southeast of Velykyi Burluk near Dvorichanske and toward Obukhivka and Kolodyazne on December 21 and 22.[39]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 83rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (69th Motorized Rifle Division) and the 79th Motorized Rifle Regiment (18th Motorized Rifle Division, 11th AC, LMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Kolodyazne.[40]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on December 22 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked east of Kupyansk near Petropavlivka and southeast of Kupyansk near Pishchane and toward Kurylivka and Hlushkivka on December 21 and 22.[41] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Kupyansk.[42]

Ukrainian Joint Forces Task Force Spokesperson Colonel Viktor Trehubov stated on December 22 that Ukrainian forces continue to clear remaining encircled Russian forces from Kupyansk.[43] Trehubov stated that Russian forces cannot sufficiently supply the remaining Russian forces in Kupyansk, who are without food and running out of weapons and ammunition. A Russian milblogger criticized official Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) information sources on December 21, claiming that the MoD prematurely announced the capture of Kupyansk, which caused unnecessary losses and embarrassment.[44]

A Russian milblogger reporting on the Western Grouping of Forces claimed on December 21 that Russian forces have replaced the commander of the 272nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (47th Tank Division, 1st Guards Tank Army [GTA], Moscow Military District [MMD]) due to lack of progress towards seizing Pishchane and Kurylivka and that the Russian military command ordered the new commander to seize these settlements by January 1, 2026.[45] The milblogger claimed that Russian forces operating in the area face a severe shortage of drone components and equipment, limiting drone logistics, and that the Russians lack enough drones, personnel, and equipment to quickly seize Pishchane and Kurylivka. 

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 47th Tank Division, including its 153rd Tank Regiment and 272nd Motorized Rifle Regiment, are reportedly operating towards Pishchane and Kurylivka.[46] Elements of the 27th Motorized Rifle Brigade (1st GTA) are reportedly operating towards Kindrashivka (north of Kupyansk).[47] Elements of the 68th Motorized Rifle Division (6th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Leningrad Military District [LMD]), including its 121st and 122nd motorized rifle regiments, reportedly continue to operate near Kupyansk.[48] Elements of the 352nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (11th Army Corps [AC], LMD) reportedly continue to operate in the Kupyansk direction.[49]

Russian forces continued offensive operations north of Borova near Novoplatonivka; northeast of Borova near Bohuslavka; east of Borova toward Nadiya; and southeast of Borova toward Cherneshchyna, Druzhelyubivka, Stepove, Olhivka, and Novoserhiivka on December 21 and 22 but did not advance.[50]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Slovyansk-Lyman direction on December 22 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked near and within Lyman itself; northwest of Lyman near Serednie and Novoselivka and toward Drobysheve, Korovii Yar, and Yarova; north of Lyman near Stavky; and east of Lyman near Zarichne on December 21 and 22.[51]

A Russian milblogger reporting on the Western Grouping of Forces claimed on December 22 that Russian forces are setting conditions to resume offensive operations against Lyman itself by using drones to strike Ukrainian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) near the settlement and by attacking towards Drobysheve and Yarova to cut Ukrainian GLOCs to Lyman from Izyum (northwest of Lyman).[52]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Siversk direction on December 22 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced east, west, and north of Pazeno and north of Fedorivka (both southwest of Siversk).[53]

Russian forces attacked near Siversk itself; northwest of Siversk near Dibrova, Ozerne, Yampil, Dronivka, and Zakitne; northeast of Siversk near Serebryanka; and southwest of Siversk toward Pazeno on December 21 and 22.[54]

A Ukrainian brigade operating in the Siversk direction reported that Russian forces are attacking Serebryanka with small infantry groups and recently unsuccessfully attempted to use armored vehicles to transport infantry toward Ukrainian positions in the area for an assault.[55] The brigade reported that Russian forces are trying to send reinforcements across the Siverskyi Donets River from the Serebryanske forest area and that Ukrainian forces destroyed two Russian boats between December 20 and 22. The brigade stated that Russian forces are trying to seize Serebryanka and Dronivka to establish a bridgehead to accumulate manpower and equipment to advance further to the heights near Zakitne and Platonivka (northwest of Siversk).

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 2nd Artillery Brigade (3rd Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 2nd Luhansk People's Republic Army Corps [LNR AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces in Zakitne.[56] Elements of the 169th Motorized Rifle Brigade (25th CAA, Central Military District [CMD]) reportedly continue to operate near Yampil.[57]

Ukrainian and Russian forces recently advanced in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area.

Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on December 21 indicates that Ukrainian forces advanced in northern Kleban-Byk (southeast of Kostyantynivka).[58] ISW assesses that this change did not occur in the last 24 hours.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on December 22 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced southeast of Stepanivka (southwest of Kostyantynivka).[59]

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces seized Orikhovo-Vasylivka (northeast of Kostyantynivka); advanced east of Kostyantynivka; north of Orikhovo-Vasylivka; north of Oleksandro-Kalynove (south of Kostyantynivka); west of Pleshchiivka (southeast of Kostyantynivka); and south of Novopavlivka (southwest of Druzhkivka).[60]

Refinement of areas under Russian claims: Geolocated footage published on December 21 shows Ukrainian forces operating west of Ivanopillya (southeast of Kostyantynivka), an area where Russian sources have previously claimed that Russian forces maintained a presence.[61]

Russian forces attacked near Kostyantynivka itself; north of Kostyantynivka near Virolyubivka; northeast of Kostyantynivka near Minkivka and Orikhovo-Vasylivka; east of Kostyantynivka near Oleksandro-Shultyne; southeast of Kostyantynivka near Pleshchiivka, Shcherbynivka, and Kleban-Byk; southwest of Kostyantynivka toward Stepanivka; south of Druzhkivka near Rusyn Yar; and southwest of Druzhkivka near Sofiivka on December 21 and 22.[62]

An officer of a Ukrainian drone unit, operating in the Lyman direction, reported on December 22 that Russian forces are taking advantage of poor weather conditions to advance toward Lyman and Svyatohirsk (northwest of Lyman) to reach within striking distance of Kramatorsk and Slovyansk.[63] A Russian milblogger claimed on December 22 that Russian forces do not completely control Predtechyne (east of Kostyantynivka).[64]

Order of Battle: First-person view (FPV) drone operators of the Russian 103rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (150th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA, SMD), including its 4th Assault Battalion, are striking Ukrainian servicemembers west of Ivanopillya (southeast of Kostyantynivka), north of the Kleban-Byk Reservoir (south of Kostyantynivka), and west of Pleshchiivka.[65]  FPV drone operators of the Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Rozkishne (west of Kostyantynivka).[66]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Dobropillya tactical area on December 22 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked east of Dobropillya near Shakhove and Nove Shakhove and southeast of Dobropillya near Zapovidne and Dorozhnie on December 21 and 22.[67]

Order of Battle: FPV drone operators of the Russian 102nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (150th Motorized Rifle Division) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Toretske (east of Dobropillya).[68] Elements of the 174th Separate Reconnaissance Battalion (150th Motorized Rifle Division) and of the 33rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (20th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA) reportedly continue to operate in the Dobropillya direction.[69]

Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Pokrovsk direction.

Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on December 22 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced along the E-50 Pokrovsk-Pavlohrad highway northwest of Pokrovsk.[70]

Russian forces attacked near Pokrovsk itself; northwest of Pokrovsk near Hryshyne; north of Pokrovsk near Rodynske; northeast of Pokrovsk near Rivne and Sukhetske; east of Pokrovsk near Myrnohrad; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Kotlyne, Udachne, Novopidhorodne, and Molodetske and toward Serhiivka on December 21 and 22.[71]

Ukrainian 7th Rapid Reaction Corps of the Air Assault Forces Spokesperson Volodymyr Polevyi reported on December 22 that Ukrainian forces are engaging Russian forces with small arms within Pokrovsk and that Russian forces have established drone operator positions within the town.[72] The spokesperson stated that Russian forces are targeting roads and tunnels to interdict Ukrainian logistics. Polevyi reported that Ukrainian forces inflicted 373 Russian casualties over the past week (from December 15 to 22) and 1,243 Russian casualties in December 2025 in the corps area of responsibility (AoR) as of December 22. Polevyi added that Ukrainian forces control northern Pokrovsk and are still able to conduct rotations in Pokrovsk.[73] Ukrainian Eastern Group of Forces Spokesperson Captain Hryhorii Shapoval reported that Russian forces are mostly attempting to infiltrate Ukrainian lines in small assault groups and that Russian forces are most active on the western outskirts of Hryshyne.[74] Shapoval stated that Ukrainian forces have repelled several recent Russian motorcycle assaults and destroyed a mass concentration of armored vehicles that Ukraine suspects Russian forces planned to use to conduct mechanized assaults. A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces control roughly 30 percent of Myrnohrad.[75]

The Ukrainian General Staff reported on December 22 that Ukrainian forces struck the ammunition depot of an unspecified Russian motorized rifle regiment in occupied Ukrainsk (southeast of Pokrovsk).[76]

Ukraine’s 1st Azov National Guard Corps and other Ukrainian units operating in the Pokrovsk direction published footage and reported on December 22 that Russian forces conducted a roughly company-sized mechanized assault near Fedorivka (northeast of Pokrovsk), in the course of which Ukrainian forces destroyed at least eight tanks, 18 infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs), five armored personnel carrier (APCs), and eleven motorcycles.[77]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces in Svitle (northeast of Pokrovsk).[78] First person view (FPV) drone operators of the 68th Separate Reconnaissance Battalion of the 20th Motorized Rifle Division (8th CAA) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Hryshyne.[79] Elements of the 9th Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA, formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic Army Corps [DNR AC], SMD) reportedly continue to operate near Rodynske.[80] FPV drone operators of the 76th Airborne (VDV) Division are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Pokrovsk.[81] FPV drone operators of the 15th Motorized Rifle Brigade (2nd CAA, CMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Serhiivka.[82] Multiple-launch rocket system (MLRS) elements of the 30th Motorized Rifle Brigade (2nd CAA) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces in the Pokrovsk direction.[83]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Novopavlivka direction near Novopavlivka itself and south of Novopavlivka near Filiya on December 21 and 22 but did not advance.[84]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Oleksandrivka direction on December 22 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked toward Oleksandrivka itself; northeast of Oleksandrivka near Andriivka-Klevtsove and Ivanivka; and southeast of Oleksandrivka near Sichneve, Sosnivka, Oleksiivka, Vorone, and Vyshneve on December 21 and 22.[85]

Order of Battle: Assault and reconnaissance elements of the Russian 37th Motorized Rifle Brigade and of the 5th Tank Brigade (both 36th CAA, Eastern Military District [EMD]) reportedly continue to operate in the southern Dnipropetrovsk Oblast direction.[86]

Ukrainian forces continued their mid-range strike campaign against Russian military assets near occupied Donetsk City on the night of December 21 to 22. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on December 22 that it struck a Shahed drone warehouse and launch site near occupied Donetsk City overnight.[87]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Hulyaipole direction on December 22 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced west of Dobropillya (north of Hulyaipole).[88]

Russian forces attacked near and within Hulyaipole; northwest of Hulyaipole toward Ternuvate; north of Hulyaipole near Andriivka, Radisne, and Dobropillya and toward Bratske, Zelene, Herasymivka, and Varvarivka; and northeast of Hulyaipole near Pryvilne, Zlahoda, Solodke, and Rybne on December 21 and 22.[89] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked within Hulyaipole and Andriivka and near Bratske.[90]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 57th Motorized Rifle Brigade (5th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Eastern Military District [EMD]) reportedly continue to strike Ukrainian forces in Hulyaipole.[91] Drone operators of the 114th and 143rd motorized rifle regiments and the 218th Tank Regiment (all of the 127th Motorized Rifle Division, 5th CAA); the 60th Motorized Rifle Brigade (5th CAA); the 38th Motorized Rifle Brigade and the 1198th Motorized Rifle Regiment (both of the 35th CAA, EMD); and the 14th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff’s Main Directorate [GRU]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Hulyaipole.[92]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on December 22 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced north of Stepnohirsk (west of Orikhiv).[93]

Russian forces attacked west of Orikhiv near Novoandriivka, Shcherbaky, Mali Shcherbaky, Stepove, Kamyanske, Plavni, Stepnohirsk, Lukyanivske, and Prymorske and toward Pavlivka and Novoyakovlivka on December 21 and 22.[94]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 7th Airborne (VDV) Division, including its 108th VDV Regiment, are reportedly operating near Prymorske and north of Stepnohirsk.[95] First-person view (FPV) drone operators of the 4th Military Base (58th CAA, Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Orikhiv.[96]

Russian forces continued limited ground assaults east of Kherson City toward the Antonivskyi Bridge on December 21 and 22 but did not advance.[97]

Ukrainian forces continued their mid-range strike campaign against Russian military targets in occupied Crimea on the night of December 21 to 22. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on December 22 that Ukrainian forces struck a temporary base for vessels of the Russian 92nd River Boat Brigade (Dnepr Flotilla) in occupied Olenivka.[98]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Russian forces launched a series of drone strikes targeting Ukrainian transport and critical infrastructure overnight on December 21 and 22. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 86 Shahed-type, Gerbera-type, and other strike drones – of which at least 50 were Shahed-type drones – from the directions of Oryol City; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; occupied Donetsk Oblast; and occupied Cape Chauda, Crimea.[99] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 58 drones over northern, southern, and eastern Ukraine as of 0830 local time. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that 26 drones struck 12 locations in Ukraine and that drone debris fell at an unspecified location. Ukrainian Deputy Energy Minister Roman Andarak reported that Russian forces targeted energy infrastructure in Odesa, Zaporizhia, Donetsk, Dnipropetrovsk, and Zhytomyr oblasts.[100] Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces targeted civilian and administrative infrastructure in Kryvyi Rih and damaged energy infrastructure and an agricultural warehouse in Odesa City and Odesa Oblast, causing power outages and injuring one civilian.[101]

Russian forces are continuing to target Ukrainian rail infrastructure and locomotives, possibly with modified Shahed (Geran) drones. The Ukrainian Emergency Service reported on December 22 that Russian forces struck energy and transport infrastructure in Zhytomyr Oblast with drones, injuring four Ukrzaliznytsia (Ukrainian Railways) workers.[102] Ukrzaliznytsia reported that a detonation, possibly from a Shahed-type drone, derailed a freight train near Korosten (around 50 kilometers south of the Ukrainian-Belarusian border) and injured the freight train crew.[103] Ukrzaliznytsia also reported that the freight train's derailment blocked a nearby rail track and forced a passenger train to conduct an emergency stop, causing the passenger locomotive to derail.[104] Korosten Military Administration Head Oleh Ryaboy reported that Russian forces launched a double tap strike in an unspecified area, where Ukrainian emergency personnel and officials were responding to an earlier Russian strike.[105] Russian milbloggers speculated that Russian forces may have used a Geran drone with artificial intelligence capabilities to strike the Ukrainian freight train.[106] ISW previously observed Russian forces pursuing moving targets, namely locomotives in Chernihiv and Sumy oblasts, with Shahed and Geran drones that have integrated cameras and radio control capabilities.[107] The strike in Zhytomyr was either launched from Belarus or else demonstrated a new Russian capability, since Shahed (Geran) strike drones modified to be able to hit moving targets like trains have previously been assessed to have ranges up to 200 kilometers.

Increased Russian strike drone production is enabling Russian forces to stockpile drones for large-scale strikes against Ukraine. Ukrainian electronic and radio warfare expert Serhiy “Flash” Beskrestnov assessed on December 22 that Russia has stockpiled around 2,000 strike drones, of which approximately 1,400 are Shahed drones.[108] Beskrestnov noted that Russian forces possess additional stockpiles of strike drones in reserve. Beskrestnov assessed that Russian forces could use the estimated 2,000 strike drones to launch two or three mass strikes or evenly distribute this stockpile throughout the winter.

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

Belarusian President Aleksandr Lukashenko stated on December 22 that Russia will deploy a maximum of 10 Oreshnik intermediate range ballistic missiles (IRBMs) to Belarus.[109]

Belarusian opposition organization BELPOL representative Vladimir Zhygar reported on December 21 that the State Military-Industrial Committee of Belarus is supervising the construction of a large ammunition factory near Pavlovka and Shyshchytsi in Minsk Oblast to produce 122 and 152mm artillery shells for Russia’s war in Ukraine.[110]

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.