2 days ago

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, December 12, 2025

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

 

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

 

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

 

For more information on ISW's map methodology, please view our statement here.

 

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 12:15 pm ET on December 12. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the December 13 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

 

Ukrainian forces recently liberated territory including part of the city of Kupyansk in a tactical counterattack in the Kupyansk direction. Ukrainian 2nd Khartiya Corps reported on December 12 that Ukrainian forces conducted a successful counterattack to stabilize the situation in the Kupyansk direction and liberated Kindrashivka and Radkivka (both north of Kupyansk) and the surrounding forests, liberated areas in northern Kupyansk, and broke through to the Oskil River, cutting Russian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) to the Kupyansk area.[1] The Ukrainian 2nd Corps stated that Ukrainian forces have encircled roughly 200 Russian personnel in Kupyansk as of December 12.[2] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky published a photo of himself on the southwestern outskirts of Kupyansk along the P-07 Kupyansk-Shevchenkove highway on December 12 — indicating that Ukrainian forces have likely pushed Russian forces much farther back from this area.[3] Geolocated footage published on December 12 also shows Ukrainian forces operating throughout Kupyansk.[4] Other Russian and Ukrainian sources corroborated the Ukrainian counterattack.[5] A source reportedly affiliated with Ukrainian military intelligence reported that Ukrainian forces encircled Russian forces within Kupyansk, cleared northwestern Kupyansk, and liberated Myrove, Kindrashivka, and Radkivka.[6] The source indicated that Russian forces still hold Holubivka (north of Kupyansk). A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces began infiltrating the northwestern outskirts of Kupyansk from Myrove (just northwest of Kupyansk) and Radkivka, indicating that Ukrainian forces also liberated Myrove.[7] The milblogger noted that Russian forces do not control eastern Kupyansk and that the Oskil River (which flows through Kupyansk) complicates Russian efforts to reach central Kupyansk. Other Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces launched a counterattack and made some advances but rejected the extent of observed Ukrainian advances.[8] The Ukrainian Joint Forces Task Force reported on November 16 that it began efforts to push back Russian advances in the Kupyansk direction, and these recent advances are likely the result of a multi-week effort to retake Kupyansk.[9]

 

 

This Ukrainian counterattack demonstrates that Ukrainian forces remain capable of defending and counterattacking against significant Russian offensive efforts, contrary to the claims of Russian President Vladimir Putin that the Ukrainian lines are collapsing. The Ukrainian advances in and near Kupyansk show that Ukrainian forces are capable of conducting successful counterattacks and making tactically significant gains, particularly when Russian forces are overstretched. The seizure of Kupyansk has been a Russian priority since mid to late July 2025, but Russian forces have been unable to allocate sufficient force concentrations to overcome Ukrainian defenses in this area as they pursue intense offensive operations elsewhere in the theater.[10] Russian forces have also struggled to move troops into Kupyansk because Ukrainian forces have been successfully maintaining fire control over Russian logistics into northern Kupyansk since before the recent Ukrainian advances.[11] Russian advances have come at disproportionately high casualty rates and significant time costs, and Russian forces have had to commit 150,000 servicemembers to the Pokrovsk direction alone.[12] Putin and senior Russian military officials have recently intensified exaggerated claims of advances across the frontline in recent weeks, and Putin highlighted on November 21 that Russian forces will "inevitably" repeat their operations in the Kupyansk direction in other areas of the front.[13] These exaggerated claims of advance are false, however, and even a prominent Kremlin-coopted milblogger claimed that the Ukrainian counterattack "took advantage" of "some not entirely truthful statements" — recognizing that Putin's November 27 claim of seizing Kupyansk was false.[14] Putin and senior Russian military officials have been attempting to portray the frontline in Ukraine as imminently on the verge of collapse, such that Ukraine and the West should concede to Russia’s demands, but this Ukrainian counterattack in Kupyansk along with staunch Ukrainian resistance along the rest of the line shows that this narrative is false.

 

The contours of the Ukrainian counterproposal to the most recent US peace proposal are emerging, but details of this counterproposal remain unclear. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky reported on December 11 that Ukraine gave the United States an updated peace proposal framework containing 20 key points and is waiting for a US response.[15] Ukrainian Presidential Advisor Mykhailo Podolyak told French outlet Le Monde that the Ukrainian proposal to the United States contains three parts: the 20-point proposal to end the war itself, a proposal about the creation of a postwar European security architecture and security guarantees for Ukraine, and a proposal on Ukraine's reconstruction and defensive capabilities.[16] Podolyak stated that Russia must pay reparations to help rebuild Ukraine. Podolyak stated that Ukraine agreed to create a demilitarized "buffer” zone in Donbas, but that both Russian and Ukrainian forces will need to pull back from the current front line to create this zone. Zelensky additionally proposed at a briefing that Ukraine should hold a referendum on the territorial provisions of the US peace proposal.[17]  Zelensky reiterated his offer to hold elections but stated that Ukraine would need a ceasefire and additional security from the US and European states to ensure democratic elections.[18] The exact components of the Ukrainian counterproposal — including the provisions of such a referendum and the possible bounds and terms of a ceasefire or demilitarized zone — remain unclear as of December 12.

 

The Kremlin explicitly rejected Ukraine's proposals for a ceasefire and referendum.  Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov responded to Zelensky’s territorial referendum proposal on December 12 by explicitly rejecting a ceasefire as a pause that "will not work" for Russia.[19] Peskov claimed that the ceasefire proposal is ”another deception, another delay” to prolong the war and re-arm Ukraine and suggested that a ceasefire is incompatible with a ”guaranteed, long-term” peace. Russian Presidential Aide Yuriy Ushakov also rejected any outcome that does not place Donbas under Russian control, by claiming that all of Donbas is Russian and reiterating the Kremlin's long-held demand that Ukraine must withdraw from all of Donbas before Russia will agree to a ceasefire.[20] Several Russian officials, including Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev and others who frequently parrot Kremlin narratives, also rejected Zelensky's proposed ceasefire and referendum.[21] Russian officials have rejected a ceasefire not only within the context of a territorial referendum but also throughout several attempts to arrive at a peace agreement to end the war.[22] The length of a ceasefire necessary to conduct an election or referendum would not be long enough to allow Ukraine to restore its combat capabilities, which is the continual Russian justification for refusing all ceasefire proposals. Russia continues to insist on the right to continue full-scale offensive operations until Russia is able to conclude the war on its terms

 

The Kremlin rejected the Ukrainian offer to establish a demilitarized zone. Ushakov responded to the proposal to establish a demilitarized zone in Donbas by stating that such a zone is possible but that Russia must deploy Rosgvardia — Russia's national guard — as well as Russian law enforcement and "everything necessary to maintain order and organize life" to this zone.[23] Such a deployment would militarize this zone. Putin created Rosgvardia in 2016 with the official mission of ensuring public order and guarding against terrorist attacks, but Rosgvardia possesses extensive conventional military capabilities and has active combat experience consistent with a conventional military.[24] Rosgvardia demonstrated combined arms capabilities prior to the February 2022 full-scale invasion in exercises using rotary-wing aircraft, artillery, air defense systems, drone support, and electronic warfare (EW) and conducted operations in Syria and occupied Crimea.[25] Rosgvardia units participated in the initial full-scale invasion of Ukraine in the efforts to seize Kyiv and Kharkiv cities, fought across the theater, including in the Russian offensive in Kursk Oblast, and are currently conducting rear area internal security operations and limited combat operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast.[26] Rosgvardia continues building out its conventional military capabilities, including by taking the heavy armored vehicles and other military equipment formerly belonging to the Wagner Group.[27] The deployment of Rosgvardia to a demilitarized zone is therefore incompatible with the purpose and meaning of such a zone, and Ushakov's insistence on deploying Russian units with full military capabilities to a demilitarized zone is therefore a rejection of the demilitarized zone. Such a deployment would also set conditions for Russia to further threaten Ukraine and conduct renewed combat operations using rested forces from more favorable lines, as ISW has previously assessed.[28]

 

The European Union (EU) agreed on December 12 to indefinitely freeze 210 billion euros (roughly $247 billion) in Russian assets to provide Ukraine with a reparations loan of up to 165 billion euros (roughly $194 billion).[29] The EU agreed to implement Article 122 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU, which allows the EU to indefinitely extend the asset freeze.[30] The EU vote to invoke Article 122 to freeze Russian assets indefinitely required only a qualifying majority (at least 15 of the 27 member states).[31] The EU previously required a unanimous, bi-annual vote to renew the asset freeze, so the December 12 agreement supports EU efforts to leverage Russian assets to finance a reparations loan for Ukraine. The European Council plans to finalize the details of the reparations loan on December 18.[32] The European Commission initially proposed using the proceeds from frozen Russian assets to support Ukraine in December 2023.[33] The EU would only require Ukraine to repay the loan if Russia pays reparations to Ukraine.[34]

 

Key Takeaways:

  • Ukrainian forces recently liberated territory including part of the city of Kupyansk in a tactical counterattack in the Kupyansk direction.
  • This Ukrainian counterattack demonstrates that Ukrainian forces remain capable of defending and counterattacking against significant Russian offensive efforts, contrary to the claims of Russian President Vladimir Putin that the Ukrainian lines are collapsing.
  • The contours of the Ukrainian counterproposal to the most recent US peace proposal are emerging, but details of this counterproposal remain unclear.
  • The Kremlin explicitly rejected Ukraine's proposals for a ceasefire and referendum.
  • The Kremlin rejected the Ukrainian offer to establish a demilitarized zone.
  • The European Union (EU) agreed on December 12 to indefinitely freeze 210 billion euros (roughly $247 billion) in Russian assets to provide Ukraine with a reparations loan of up to 165 billion euros (roughly $194 billion).
  • Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Kupyansk and Oleksandrivka. Russian forces recently advanced in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area and near Hulyaipole.

 

 

 

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.    

 

  • Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
  • Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis
  • Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
  • Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
  • Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
  • Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
  • Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
  • Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
  • Significant Activity in Belarus

 

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

 

Ukrainian forces continued their long-range strike campaign against Russian oil and military infrastructure on the night of December 11 to 12. The Ukrainian Special Operations Forces (SSO) reported on December 12 that SSO elements, in cooperation with the Russian Chernaya Iskra insurgency group, struck two sanctioned Russian cargo vessels in the Caspian Sea off the coast of the Republic of Kalmykia.[35] Geolocated footage published on December 12 shows explosions and fires at the Slavneft-YANOS refinery in Yaroslavl City, Yaroslavl Oblast and Orsk Mechanical Plant in Orenburg Oblast, reportedly after Ukrainian drone strikes.[36]

 

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in northern Ukraine along the international border)

 

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Sumy Oblast on December 12 but did not make confirmed advances. 

 

 

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed on December 12 that Russian forces advanced to Andriivka (north of Sumy City) after the claimed withdrawal of Ukrainian forces from northern Andriivka.[37]

 

Russian forces attacked in Kursk and Sumy oblasts, including north of Sumy City near Andriivka and Oleksiivka and northeast of Sumy City near Yunakivka, on December 11 and 12.[38] A Russian milblogger claimed on December 12 that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Andriivka and Oleksiivka.[39]

 

A Russian milblogger claimed on December 12 that Russian President Vladimir Putin’s recent statements reiterating Russian objectives of establishing a buffer zone in Sumy and Kharkiv oblasts may indicate that Russian forces intend to intensify attacks in these areas.[40] 

 

Order of Battle: First-person view (FPV) and strike drone operators of the Russian 106th Airborne (VDV) Division, the Anvar Spetsnaz Detachment (possibly referring to the BARS-25 Anvar volunteer detachment), and the Chechen 1434th Akhmat-Chechnya Regiment (42nd Motorized Rifle Division, 58th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating in the Sumy direction.[41]    

 

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

 

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

 

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on December 12 but did not advance.

 

 

Russian forces attacked northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk, Synelnykove, Prylipka, Vovchanski Khutory, and Vilcha and toward Okhrimivka and Izbytske on December 11 and 12.[42]

 

The commander of a Ukrainian drone company operating in the Kharkiv direction reported on December 12 that Russian forces continue to leverage poor weather conditions to infiltrate Ukrainian positions in small groups.[43] The commander reported that Russian forces in the Kharkiv direction are using interceptor first-person view (FPV) drones to counter Ukrainian drone operations and that Russian forces are also using unmanned ground vehicles (UGVs) to conduct logistics. The commander noted that Russian forces rarely employ UGVs for casualty evacuation as the Russian military command is indifferent to the lives of its servicemembers.

 

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Velykyi Burluk direction on December 12 but did not advance.

 

Russian forces attacked southeast of Velykyi Burluk near Kolodyazne on December 11 and 12.[44]

 

A Russian milblogger claimed on December 12 that Russian forces conducted a Geran-2 drone strike against a Ukrainian position near Pidserednie (northwest of Velykyi Burluk).[45]

 

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 83rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (69th Motorized Rifle Division, 6th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian drones in the Kharkiv (likely Velykyi Burluk) direction.[46]

 

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

 

 

Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Kupyansk direction.

 

See topline for more information on recent Ukrainian advances in the Kupyansk direction.

 

Unconfirmed claims: The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on December 11 that Russian forces seized Kurylivka (southeast of Kupyansk).[47] Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov credited elements of the Russian 153rd Tank Regiment and 272nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (both of the 47th Tank Division, 1st Guards Tank Army [GTA], Moscow Military District [MMD]) with the claimed seizure of Kurylivka.[48]

 

Russian forces attacked east of Kupyansk near Kucherivka and Petropavlivka and southeast of Kupyansk near Pishchane, Kurylivka, and Stepova Novoselivka on December 11 and 12.[49]

 

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 68th Motorized Rifle Division (6th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) reportedly continue to operate in Kupyansk.[50] Elements of the 352nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (11th Army Corps [AC], LMD) reportedly continue to operate in the Kupyansk direction.[51]

 

Russian forces attacked northeast of  Borova near Nova Kruhlyakivka and southeast of Borova near Karmazynivka, Druzhelyubivka, Novoyehorivka, and Hrekivka and toward Novoserhiivka on December 11 and 12.[52]

 

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Slovyansk-Lyman direction on December 12 but did not make confirmed advances.

 

Russian forces attacked near Lyman itself; northwest of Lyman near Derylove, Yarova, Novoselivka, and Drobysheve and toward Oleksandrivka and Svyatohirsk; north of Lyman near Stavky and Novyi Myr; northeast of Lyman near Kolodyazi, and Serednie; and east of Lyman near  Zarichne on December 11 and 12.[53]

 

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 144th Motorized Rifle Division (20th CAA, Moscow Military District [MMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions in the Lyman direction.[54]

 

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)

 

 

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Siversk direction on December 12 but did not make confirmed advances.

 

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced southwest of Siversk and north of Svyato-Pokrovske (southwest of Siversk).[55]

 

Russian forces attacked near Siversk itself; northwest of Siversk near Zakitne, Platonivka, and Dronivka; northeast of Siversk near Serebryanka; south of Siversk near Pereizne; and southwest of Siversk near Svyato-Pokrovske on December 11 and 12.[56]

 

Ukrainian 11th Army Corps (AC) Spokesperson Lieutenant Colonel Dmytro Zaporozhets reported on December 12 that there may be about 50 to 60 Russian servicemembers in Siversk and refuted claims that Russian forces seized the town.[57] Zaporozhets noted that fighting is ongoing in Siversk and emphasized that Russian forces are conducting highly publicized flag raisings for informational effects – in line with ISW’s assessment that Russian forces are relying on flag raisings to claim advances in areas where Russian forces conducted small group infiltration missions and did not establish enduring positions.[58]

 

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 169th Motorized Rifle Brigade (25th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Central Military District [CMD]) reportedly continue to operate near Yampil (northwest of Siversk).[59] Elements of the 6th, 7th, and 123rd motorized rifle brigades, and of the 1102nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (all of the 3rd CAA, formerly 2nd Luhansk People’s Republic [LNR] AC, Southern Military District [SMD]) reportedly continue to operate in Siversk.[60] Molniya first-person view (FPV) drone operators of the 85th Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd CAA) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Vasyukivka (southwest of Siversk).[61]

 

Russian forces recently advanced in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area.

 

 

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on December 10 and 12 indicates that Russian forces marginally advanced in southeastern Kostyantynivka and in eastern Oleksandro-Shultyne (east of Kostyantynivka) and advanced northeast of and in the western outskirts of Ivanopillya (southeast of Kostyantynivka).[62]

 

Russian forces attacked near Kostyantynivka itself; north of Kostyantynivka near Virolyubivka; northeast of Kostyantynivka toward Pryvillya and Minkivka; east of Kostyantynivka near Oleksandro-Shultyne; southeast of Kostyantynivka near Ivanopillya, Shcherbynivka, and Pleshchiivka; south of Kostyantynivka near Yablunivka; southwest of Kostyantynivka toward Stepanivka; south of Druzhkivka near Rusyn Yar; and southwest of Druzhkivka near Sofiivka on December 11 and 12.[63]

 

Order of Battle: FPV drone operators of the Russian 346th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff's Main Directorate [GRU]) are striking Ukrainian vehicles along the H-32 Pokrovsk-Kostyantynivka highway in southwestern Kostyantynivka.[64] FPV drone operators of the 33rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (20th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA, SMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian vehicles near Novopavlivka (southwest of Druzhkivka).[65] FPV drone operators of the 27th Artillery Regiment (6th Motorized Rifle Division, 3rd AC, under operational control of the Southern Grouping of Forces) reportedly continue to operate in the Kostyantynivka direction.[66]

 

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Dobropillya tactical area on December 12 but did not advance.

 

Russian forces attacked east of Dobropillya near Shakhove and Nove Shakhove and toward Novyi Donbas and Toretske and southeast of Dobropillya near Zapovidne and Dorozhnie on December 11 and 12.[67]

 

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 114th Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA, formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic [DNR] AC, SMD) are reportedly operating in eastern Nove Shakhove.[68] Elements of the 174th Separate Reconnaissance Battalion (150th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA), the 33rd Motorized Rifle Regiment, and the 39th Motorized Rifle Brigade (68th AC, Eastern Military District [EMD]) reportedly continue to operate in the Dobropillya direction.[69]

 

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction on December 12 but did not advance.

 

 

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed on December 12 that Ukrainian forces continue to enter the Dinas Microraion of northeastern Pokrovsk.[70]

 

Assessed Russian infiltrations: Geolocated footage published on December 12 shows Russian forces operating in northern Pokrovsk during what ISW assesses to have been a Russian infiltration mission.[71] Satellite imagery taken on December 7 shows an increase in damaged buildings in northern Pokrovsk compared to prior images, indicating a likely expansion of Russian infiltration efforts in the area.[72] ISW assesses that these events did not change the control of terrain or the forward edge of the battle area (FEBA) at this time.

 

Russian forces attacked near and within Pokrovsk; northwest of Pokrovsk near Hryshyne; north of Pokrovsk near Rodynske and toward Bilytske; east of Pokrovsk near and within Myrnohrad and Svitle; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Kotlyne, Udachne, and Molodetske on December 11 and 12.[73]

 

Geolocated footage published on December 12 but likely filmed earlier shows elements of the all-Russian pro-Ukrainian Freedom of Russia Legion (LSR) conducting a sabotage and reconnaissance operation between Pishchane, Shevchenko and Novotroitske (all southwest of Pokrovsk).[74] The LSR reported that LSR elements destroyed a drone control point of the 7th Company of the Russian 35th Motorized Rifle Brigade (41st CAA, SMD).[75]

 

The Ukrainian 7th Rapid Reaction Corps of the Air Assault Forces reported on December 12 that Ukrainian forces conduct 50 percent of logistics in the Pokrovsk direction through drone drops from low-visibility FPV and heavy bomber drones.[76]

 

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 27th Motorized Rifle Division (2nd CAA, CMD), including its 506th Motorized Rifle Regiment, reportedly continue to operate in Pokrovsk.[77] Elements of the 5th Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA) are reportedly operating in Myrnohrad.[78] Loitering munition operators of the 132nd Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA) are reportedly striking Ukrainian vehicles near Myrnohrad.[79] Drone operators and assault elements of the 110th Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA) are reportedly operating near Sukhetske (north of Pokrovsk) and striking Ukrainian forces near Zatyshok (northeast of Pokrovsk).[80]

 

Russian forces attacked near Novopavlivka itself, northeast of Novopavlivka near Novomykolaivka, and south of Novopavlivka near Filiya on December 11 and 12 but did not advance.[81]

 

 

Ukrainian forces recently marginally advanced in the Oleksandrivka direction.

Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on December 11 indicates that Ukrainian forces marginally advanced in the eastern outskirts of Orestopil (east of Oleksandrivka).[82]

 

Refinement of areas under Russian claims: Geolocated footage published on December 11 shows Ukrainian forces operating in the eastern outskirts of Orestopil – an area where Russian sources have previously claimed Russian forces maintained a presence.[83] Geolocated footage published on December 10 shows Ukrainian forces operating in northern Ivanivka (northeast of Oleksandrivka) – an area where Russian sources have previously claimed Russian forces maintained a presence.[84]  A Ukrainian brigade operating in the Oleksandrivka direction reported on December 10 that Ukrainian forces control Ivanivka, and Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported on December 3 that Ukrainian forces liberated Ivanivka and pushed Russian forces back across the Vovcha River.[85] ISW assesses that this change did not occur in the past 24 hours and likely occurred prior to Mashovets’ December 3 report.

 

Russian forces attacked northeast of Oleksandrivka near Zelenyi Hai and Oleksandrohrad and southeast of Oleksandrivka near Verbove, Vyshneve, Oleksiivka, Sichneve,  Krasnohirske, and Vorone on December 11 and 12.[86]

 

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)

 

Russian forces recently advanced in the Hulyaipole direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on December 11 and 12 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in southeastern Hulyaipole and northeast of Varvarivka (northwest of Hulyaipole).[87]

Refinement of areas under Russian claims: Geolocated footage published on December 10 shows Ukrainian forces operating northeast of Varvarivka — an area where Russian sources have previously claimed Russian forces maintained a presence.[88]

 

Russian forces attacked near and within Hulyaipole itself; northwest of Hulyaipole near Dobropillya and Varvarivka and toward Andriivka and Herasymivka; north of Hulyaipole near Solodke and Pryvillya; and northeast of Hulyaipole near Pryvilne and Rybne on December 11 and 12.[89] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked from Kosivtseve (northwest of Hulyaipole).[90]

 

A senior non-commissioned officer (NCO) of a Ukrainian drone battalion operating in the Hulyaipole direction reported on December 12 that Russian forces are attempting to attack Hulyaipole both frontally with infantry groups and from its flanks using a combination of infiltration tactics and direct assaults.[91] The NCO reported that Russian forces are wearing civilian clothes to infiltrate into the settlement in deception tactics that amount to acts of perfidy — a war crime under the Geneva Convention. ISW has recently observed multiple reports of Russian forces committing acts of perfidy across the frontline while employing infiltration tactics.[92]

 

Order of Battle: Assault elements of the Russian 57th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (5th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Eastern Military District [EMD]) are operating in southeastern Hulyaipole.[93] Elements of the 11th Air Force and Air Defense Army (Russian Aerospace Forces [VKS] and EMD) are reportedly conducting FAB guided glide bomb strikes against Ukrainian forces in Hulyaipole.[94] Drone operators of the 14th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff's Main Directorate [GRU]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Kosivtseve.[95] Drone operators of the 38th Motorized Rifle Brigade (35th CAA, EMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Vozdvyzhivka (northwest of Hulyaipole).[96]

 

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the western Zaporizhia direction on December 12 but did not advance.

 

 

Refinement of areas under Russian claims: Geolocated footage published on December 12 shows Ukrainian forces operating along the T-0408 Orikhiv-Robotyne highway north of Novodanylivka (south of Orikhiv) – an area where Russian sources have previously claimed Russian forces maintained a presence.[97]

 

Russian forces attacked southeast of Orikhiv near Mala Tokmachka and west of Orikhiv near Novoandriivka, Stepove, Stepnohirsk, and Prymorske on December 11 and 12.[98]

 

Order of Battle: Drone operators and other elements of the Russian 7th Airborne (VDV) Division, including its 108th VDV Regiment, reportedly continue to operate in the Zaporizhia direction, including near Prymorske and Stepnohirsk.[99]

 

Russian forces continued limited ground assaults in the Kherson direction on December 12 but did not advance.

 

 

Russian forces attacked in unspecified areas of the Kherson direction on December 11 and 12.[100]

 

Ukrainian Southern Defense Forces Spokesperson Colonel Vladyslav Voloshyn reported on December 12 that Russian forces recently resumed assault operations near the Antonivskyi bridge (east of Kherson City) as part of weekly efforts to consolidate positions on the Dnipro River islands and strike the west (right) bank of the Dnipro River.[101] Voloshyn stated that Russian forces are experiencing heavy losses from these ineffective efforts.

 

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 98th VDV Division are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces in Mykilske (northeast of Kherson City).[102] Elements of the 126th Coastal Defense Brigade (22nd Army Corps [AC], Black Sea Fleet) are reportedly operating in the Kherson direction.[103]

 

Ukrainian forces continued their mid-range strike campaign against Russian military targets in occupied Crimea. Ukraine’s Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported on December 12 and geolocated footage confirmed that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian An-26 multi-purpose military transport aircraft at the Kacha Air Base north of occupied Sevastopol, as well as 55Zh6M Nebo-M and 64N6E radars at unspecified locations in occupied Crimea on the night of December 10 to 11.[104]

 

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

 

Russian forces conducted a series of missile and drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of December 11 to 12. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 80 Shahed-type, Gerbera-type, and other drones — of which roughly 50 were Shahed-type drones — from the directions of Bryansk, Kursk, Oryol cities; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; and occupied Cape Chauda, Crimea.[105] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 64 drones and that 12 drones struck eight locations, but that the strike series was ongoing as of 0900 local time. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces struck residential, civilian, and energy infrastructure in Sumy, Kharkiv, Dnipropetrovsk, and Odesa oblasts, causing power outages for about 90,000 customers in Odesa Oblast.[106] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and other Ukrainian officials reported on December 12 that Russian forces struck Odesa Oblast with missiles during the day, damaging a civilian vessel in Chornomorsk.[107]

 

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

 

Nothing significant to report.

 

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

 


[1] https://www.facebook.com/khartiiacorps/posts/pfbid0zVRr3sUAjqzcvFPk9JNPnNjWd5ux5o5gkBnjdhKgdeAvcg6KDvjYkV6vaKHYDY5hl ; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/12/12/syly-oborony-likviduvaly-proryv-voroga-pivnichnishe-kupyanska-znyshheno-ponad-1000-okupantiv/

[2] https://www.facebook.com/khartiiacorps/posts/pfbid0zVRr3sUAjqzcvFPk9JNPnNjWd5ux5o5gkBnjdhKgdeAvcg6KDvjYkV6vaKHYDY5hl ; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/12/12/syly-oborony-likviduvaly-proryv-voroga-pivnichnishe-kupyanska-znyshheno-ponad-1000-okupantiv/

[3] https://www dot president.gov.ua/news/sogodni-nadzvichajno-vazhlivo-dosyagati-rezultativ-na-fronti-101945 ; https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/17268 ; https://meduza dot io/news/2025/12/12/zelenskiy-priehal-v-kupyansk-genshtab-rf-utverzhdal-chto-kontroliruet-gorod-s-kontsa-noyabrya ; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1999469400102175229

[4] https://x.com/Bielitzling/status/1999519340316512629; https://t.me/rug_ua/202; https://t.me/skala425/741; https://x.com/Bielitzling/status/1999529966761804227; https://t.me/DniproOfficial/6961; https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/17267; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1999469400102175229 ; https://x.com/Tatarigami_UA/status/1999489918222107104

[5] https://t.me/motopatriot78/46049; https://t.me/motopatriot78/46048; https://t.me/rybar/75918; https://t.me/milinfolive/162196 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/37312; https://t.me/DeepStateUA/22908 ; https://t.me/osetin20/12297; https://t.me/dva_majors/84865;  https://t.me/dva_majors/84828; https://t.me/rybar/75899; https://www.facebook.com/diana.butsko/posts/pfbid02SvxVPjTUuNc1RxRHEjkjYcaYBnUQ56GZrvgvMcfki9BiLgLd2XimqCTYUcT59CcRl; https://x.com/Tatarigami_UA/status/1999449000567799928; https://x.com/Tatarigami_UA/status/1999451038622056554 ; https://t.me/z_arhiv/32963  

[6] https://t.me/DeepStateUA/22908 

[7] https://t.me/milinfolive/162196

[8] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/37312 ; https://t.me/rybar/75918

[9] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-16-2025/

[10] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-26-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-23-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-30-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-19-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-25-2025

[11] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-16-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-21-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-3-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-29-2025/ ;

[12] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-22-2025/

[13] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-21-2025/ ; http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/78524

[14] https://t.me/rybar/75918

[15] https://www.president dot gov.ua/news/zvernennya-prezidenta-do-uchasnikiv-zasidannya-koaliciyi-oho-101917

[16] https://www.lemonde dot fr/en/international/article/2025/12/11/ukraine-ready-to-accept-donbas-demilitarized-zone-in-concession-to-end-war_6748397_4.html

[17] https://suspilne dot media/1186856-pitanna-teritorij-propisanih-u-mirnomu-plani-mae-virisiti-narod-ukraini-cerez-vibori-abo-referendum-zelenskij/

[18] https://www.president dot gov.ua/news/zvernennya-prezidenta-do-uchasnikiv-zasidannya-koaliciyi-oho-101917

[19] https://www.1tv dot ru/news/2025-12-12/528442-moskva_otvetila_na_ocherednuyu_popytku_kieva_obmanom_dobitsya_peredyshki_na_fronte

[20] https://tass dot ru/politika/25895467; https://www.kommersant dot ru/doc/8289344

[21] https://x.com/MedvedevRussiaE/status/1999188396439372032; https://news dot ru/vlast/komu-golosovat-v-gosdume-unizili-zelenskogo-posle-slov-o-referendume; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-21-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-28-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-22-2025/

[22] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-2-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-10-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-13-2025; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-10-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-21-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-29-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-21-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-20-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-27-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-22-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-21-2025/

[23] https://www.kommersant dot ru/doc/8289344

[24] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-national-guard-rosgvardia/

[25] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-national-guard-rosgvardia/

[26] https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/russian-national-guard-troops-are-fighting-and-dying-ukraine-211972; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-31-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-26-2025/  ; https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/may/27/115-russian-national-guard-soldiers-sacked-for-refusing-to-fight-in-ukraine ; https://understandingwar.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/The-Russian-Military-Forecasting-the-Threat.pdf

[27] https://warsawinstitute.org/rosgvardia-receives-heavy-weaponry-wagners-failed-rebellion/

[28] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-9-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-4-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-20-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-16-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-3-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-25-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment_4-9/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/the-critical-importance-of-ukraines-fortress-belt-in-donetsk-oblast/;

[29] https://www.reuters.com/business/finance/eu-set-indefinitely-freeze-russian-assets-removing-obstacle-ukraine-loan-2025-12-12/; https://www.reuters.com/business/finance/eu-aims-agree-by-friday-long-term-freeze-russian-central-bank-assets-2025-12-11/; https://www.euractiv.com/news/eu-greenlights-indefinite-immobilisation-of-russian-assets/; https://www.euronews dot com/my-europe/2025/12/11/eu-triggers-emergency-clause-to-indefinitely-immobilise-russian-assets; https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c98nnd01g91o; https://www.zeit dot de/politik/ausland/2025-10/ukraine-krieg-finanzen-russland-staatsvermoegen-kredit-eu; https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2025-12-11/eu-seeks-russian-asset-freeze-deal-by-friday-to-ease-ukraine-aid

[30] https://www.reuters.com/business/finance/eu-aims-agree-by-friday-long-term-freeze-russian-central-bank-assets-2025-12-11/; https://www.euractiv.com/news/eu-greenlights-indefinite-immobilisation-of-russian-assets/

[31] https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/council-eu/voting-system/qualified-majority/; https://eur-lex.europa dot eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:12008E122:EN:HTML; https://www.europarl.europa.eu/thinktank/en/document/EPRS_BRI(2025)769579

[32] https://www.reuters.com/business/finance/eu-set-indefinitely-freeze-russian-assets-removing-obstacle-ukraine-loan-2025-12-12/; https://www.euronews dot com/my-europe/2025/12/11/eu-triggers-emergency-clause-to-indefinitely-immobilise-russian-assets; https://www.cnn.com/2025/12/12/europe/eu-freezes-russian-assets-hungary-and-slovakia-veto-latam-intl; https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2025-12-11/eu-seeks-russian-asset-freeze-deal-by-friday-to-ease-ukraine-aid

[33] https://www.politico.eu/article/eu-takes-first-step-to-raise-money-for-ukraine-from-russian-frozen-assets/#:~:text=The%20European%20Commission%20presented%20a%20plan%20on,as%20they%20reach%20maturity%20and%20are%20reinvested

[34] https://www.zeit dot de/politik/ausland/2025-10/ukraine-krieg-finanzen-russland-staatsvermoegen-kredit-eu; https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2025-12-11/eu-seeks-russian-asset-freeze-deal-by-friday-to-ease-ukraine-aid

[35] https://x.com/SOF_UKR/status/1999423095170596916; https://x.com/bayraktar_1love/status/1999423027239387477;  https://t.me/akovalenko1989/10166

[36] https://x.com/wartranslated/status/1999389857718706236  https://x.com/NOELreports/status/1999389969534632374 https://x.com/neonhandrail/status/1999297674408030405 ; https://t.me/astrapress/99390 ; https://t.me/astrapress/99400 ; https://t.me/astrapress/99414; https://x.com/wartranslated/status/1999433176373133655; https://t.me/andriyshTime/48249 ; https://t.me/astrapress/99404   

 

[37] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/37305

[38] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/32468; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/32464; https://t.me/dva_majors/84828; https://t.me/severnnyi/6001; https://t.me/rybar/75919

[39] https://t.me/dva_majors/84828

[40] https://t.me/rybar/75919; https://t.me/rybar/75892; http://www.special dot kremlin.ru/events/president/news/78716

[41] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/190312; https://t.me/RKadyrov_95/6219; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/37284

[42] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/32468; https://t.me/Joint_Forces_Task_Force/19799; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/32464; https://t.me/Joint_Forces_Task_Force/19798; https://t.me/Joint_Forces_Task_Force/19801; https://t.me/wargonzo/31049; https://t.me/severnnyi/6001; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/37289

[43] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/12/12/ne-shkoduyut-lyudej-yim-bajduzhe-na-pivnochi-harkivshhyny-rosiyany-sunut-v-ataky-pid-chas-negody/

[44] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/32494; https://t.me/Joint_Forces_Task_Force/19801

[45] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/37289

[46] https://t.me/dva_majors/84896

[47] https://t.me/mod_russia/59327; https://t.me/mod_russia/59343

[48] https://t.me/mod_russia/59317; https://t.me/mod_russia/59320

[49] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/32494; https://t.me/Joint_Forces_Task_Force/19801;  https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/32468 ; https://t.me/Joint_Forces_Task_Force/19799; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/32464  ; https://t.me/Joint_Forces_Task_Force/19798; https://t.me/rybar/75899; https://t.me/osetin20/12297; https://t.me/motopatriot78/46010; https://t.me/motopatriot78/46010; https://t.me/wargonzo/31049

[50] https://t.me/motopatriot78/46049; https://t.me/motopatriot78/46048

[51] https://t.me/motopatriot78/45886; https://t.me/motopatriot78/45918

[52] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/32494 ;  https://t.me/Joint_Forces_Task_Force/19801 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/32468 ;  https://t.me/Joint_Forces_Task_Force/19799 ;  https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/32464  ;  https://t.me/Joint_Forces_Task_Force/19798    

[53] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/32494 ; https://t.me/Joint_Forces_Task_Force/19801https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/32468  ; https://t.me/Joint_Forces_Task_Force/19799  ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/32464 ; https://t.me/Joint_Forces_Task_Force/19798https://t.me/wargonzo/31049

[54] https://t.me/vysokygovorit/21679 ;

[55] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/105481 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/69352

[56] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/32468 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/32464 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/69352 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/31049 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/37307 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/45885 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/46028

[57] https://suspilne dot media/donbas/1187204-rosijski-zaavi-pro-okupaciu-siverska-ne-vidpovidaut-dijsnosti-zaporozec/

[58] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-21-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-25-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-5-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-6-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-7-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-10-2025/

[59] https://t.me/motopatriot78/45918 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/45886

 

[60] https://t.me/motopatriot78/45891 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/46028 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/69353 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/45891 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/45892

[61] https://t.me/motopatriot78/46042 ; https://t.me/shock3OA/3852

[62] https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1999487067852771746; https://t.me/kurt_compani_group/806; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1999211374698811560; https://t.me/Gryphon501/49; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1999487067852771746; https://t.me/kurt_compani_group/806; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1999506308932718622; https://t.me/craftoriz/416; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1999508592735457422

[63] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/32494; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/32468; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/32464; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/37293; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/37273;   https://t.me/wargonzo/31049

[64] https://t.me/yuzhny_front_ZOV/20691; https://t.me/Osintpen/2220

[65] https://t.me/nm_dnr/14731

[66] https://t.me/sashakots/58373 ; https://t.me/epoddubny/25847 ;

[67] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/32494; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/32468; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/32464; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/37293; https://t.me/wargonzo/31049

[68] https://t.me/motopatriot78/45938

[69] https://t.me/dva_majors/84846; https://t.me/motopatriot78/45886 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/45918; https://t.me/motopatriot78/45989

[70] https://t.me/motopatriot78/46030

[71] https://x.com/ChaMapping/status/1999404157179166988; https://t.me/corps7DSHV/882

[72] Assessment based on imagery collected by Planet Labs PBC on December 7, 2025.

[73] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/32494; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/32468; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/32464; https://t.me/motopatriot78/46010; https://t.me/wargonzo/31049

[74] https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/32390; https://t.me/legionoffreedom/1718

[75] https://x.com/legion_svoboda/status/1999402118520644041; https://t.me/legionoffreedom/1718

[76] https://t.me/corps7DSHV/890

[77] https://t.me/SolovievLive/348441 ; https://t.me/basurin_e/23229

[78] https://t.me/mod_russia/59340

[79] https://t.me/nm_dnr/14732

[80] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/37293

[81] https://t.me/dva_majors/84828; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/32494; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/32468; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/32464

[82] https://x.com/ukrliberation/status/1999220887610859988; https://x.com/klinger66/status/1999250655417176480; https://x.com/ukrliberation/status/1999219461359018296; https://t.me/OSHP_225/5216; https://x.com/ukrliberation/status/1999223878267383863; https://x.com/klinger66/status/1999244890438533551; https://x.com/ukrliberation/status/1999223509780734133; https://x.com/klinger66/status/1999244330842882324

[83] https://x.com/ukrliberation/status/1999220887610859988; https://x.com/klinger66/status/1999250655417176480; https://x.com/ukrliberation/status/1999219461359018296; https://t.me/OSHP_225/5216; https://x.com/ukrliberation/status/1999223878267383863; https://x.com/klinger66/status/1999244890438533551; https://x.com/ukrliberation/status/1999223509780734133; https://x.com/klinger66/status/1999244330842882324

[84] https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/32382; https://www.facebook.com/reel/1175233867538479

[85] https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/32382; https://www.facebook.com/reel/1175233867538479; https://t. me/zvizdecmanhustu/3121

[86] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/32494; https://t.me/SJTF_Odes/13452; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/32468; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/32464

[87] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/32465; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/10759; https://x.com/GeneralStaffUA/status/1999212308585713882; https://x.com/moklasen/status/1999232262466851069; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/10762; https://t.me/Mavic_57/79; https://t.me/voin_dv/18019 

[88] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/32465; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/10759; https://x.com/GeneralStaffUA/status/1999212308585713882; https://x.com/moklasen/status/1999232262466851069

[89] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/105479; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/32494; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/32468; https://t.me/SJTF_Odes/13452; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/32464 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/32465; https://t.me/dva_majors/84828; https://t.me/dva_majors/84850; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/69355; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/69368 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/31049

[90] https://t.me/voin_dv/18019   

[91] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/12/12/prymushuyut-czyvilnyh-nosyty-yim-yizhu-odyag-rosiyany-perekydayut-rezervy-do-gulyajpolya/

[92] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-11-2025/

[93] https://t.me/voin_dv/18012; https://t.me/voin_dv/18022; https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/1999527832712593729; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/10762; https://t.me/Mavic_57/79; https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/1999513473072460168

[94] https://t.me/voin_dv/18017  

[95] https://t.me/voin_dv/18019  

[96] https://t.me/voin_dv/18018 

[97] https://x.com/NOELreports/status/1999475197074911693; https://x.com/99Dominik_/status/1999527204510630153

[98] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/32494; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/32468; https://t.me/SJTF_Odes/13452; https://t.me/wargonzo/31049

[99] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/37276; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/37306; https://t.me/mod_russia/59329; https://t.me/vrogov/22555

[100] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/32494; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/32468; https://t.me/SJTF_Odes/13452; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/32464

[101] https://suspilne dot media/kherson/1187632-rosijski-vijskovi-vidnovili-sturmovi-dii-u-rajoni-antonivskogo-mostu-na-hersonsini-volosin/

[102] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/37284

[103] https://t.me/milinfolive/162191

[104] https://gur dot gov.ua/content/transportnyk-an26-ta-dvi-rls-prymary-hur-u-krymu-spalyly-cherhovi-dorohovartisni-tsili-moskovytiv.html; https://t.me/DIUkraine/7495; https://x.com/auditor_ya/status/1999459300721492050; https://x.com/bayraktar_1love/status/1999455450174226811;

[105] https://t.me/kpszsu/49525

[106] https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/26316 ; https://t.me/astrapress/99395 ; https://t.me/bbcrussian/88900 ; https://suspilne dot media/dnipro/1187128-armia-rf-atakuvala-pavlograd-sinelnikivsinu-ta-nikopolsinu-e-zagiblij-ta-poraneni-stalisa-pozezi-u-budinkah/; https://t.me/synegubov/18840; https://t.me/hryhorov_oleg/1292; https://x.com/ZelenskyyUa/status/1999513523471122796; https://t.me/odeskaODA/12783; https://t.me/odeskaODA/12770; https://suspilne dot media/odesa/1187134-nicnij-obstril-odesi-zaznali-poskodzen-budinok-i-civilna-infrastruktura/; https://suspilne dot media/1187258-rf-vnoci-atakuvala-energoobekti-na-odesini-ta-doneccini-znacni-znestrumlenna-ukrenergo/;

[107] https://x.com/ZelenskyyUa/status/1999513523471122796; https://suspilne dot media/odesa/1187720-v-odesi-bulo-cutno-vibuh-2/; https://suspilne dot media/odesa/1187720-v-odesi-bulo-cutno-vibuh-2/; https://suspilne dot media/odesa/1187824-v-odesi-pisla-vibuhiv-spalahnulo-sudno-e-travmovanij/; https://x.com/wartranslated/status/1999485962179740186

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