Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, August 5, 2026

Assessment as of: 9:15 PM ET

Data Cutoff: 1:15 PM ET

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 Russian President Vladimir Putin reshuffled military commanders, including those associated with logistics and Russia's Unmanned Systems Forces (USF), against the backdrop of Ukrainian strike campaigns that these services have failed to defend against. Putin met with senior Russian military commanders and defense officials on August 5 and announced a reorganization of leadership and duties regarding Russian military logistics, supplies, and procurement.[1] Putin appointed Central Military District (CMD) Commander Colonel General Valery Solodchuk as deputy defense minister for logistics, replacing Colonel General Alexander Sanchik.[2] Sanchik was appointed to the position of Southern Military District (SMD) commander in November 2024 and has also served as deputy defense minister for logistics since November 2025.[3] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) clarified that Solodchuk will be responsible for rear-area logistics as deputy defense minister for logistics, Sanchik will be responsible for procurement, and Deputy Defense Minister for Military-Technical Provision Alexey Krivoruchko, who was previously responsible for military-technical support, is responsible for the development of advanced weapons and technology.[4] Putin also appointed CMD Chief of Staff Colonel General Denis Lyamin as commander of the USF. BBC's Russia service and several Russian milbloggers claimed in December 2025 that Lieutenant Colonel Yuri Vaganov was USF commander, but Russian officials never confirmed this appointment.[5] Putin's appointment of Lyamin indicates that Vaganov was likely ousted from his role before the Kremlin chose to publicize this appointment. Russian milbloggers have heavily criticized Vaganov for lack of military education and experience, as he sold plumbing fixtures before February 2022.[6] These demotions come amid Ukraine's intermediate- and long-range strike campaigns which aim in part to degrade Russian logistics from rear areas to the frontline and which Russian forces, including the USF, have proven unable to counter in the near-term.[7]

Putin also appointed EMD Commander Colonel General Andrey Ivanayev to replace Solodchuk as CMD commander and EMD Chief of Staff Colonel General Pyotr Bulgaruev to replace Ivanayev as EMD commander.[8] The command changes in the USF and Russian ground forces largely represent reshufflings of existing high-level commanders rather than the promotion of new commanders who may change the way Russia wages war. Putin has largely circulated senior commanders around the battlefield and high command for much of the war, with the exception of some purges of commanders deemed disloyal in the aftermath of the June 2023 Wagner Group rebellion.[9]

 Russian forces launched a relatively small strike package against Ukraine on the night of August 4 to 5, nonetheless causing significant civilian damage and casualties due to Russia's use of ballistic and quasi-ballistic missiles that Ukraine was unable to intercept. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched four Zirkon/Onyx anti-ship missiles from Kursk and Rostov oblasts; 24 Iskander-M/S-400 ballistic missiles from Bryansk and Kursk oblasts; and 115 Shahed-type, Gerbera-type, and Italmas-type strike drones and Parodiya-type decoy drones from the directions of Kursk and Oryol cities; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; occupied Donetsk City; and occupied Hvardiiske, Crimea.[10] The Ukrainian Air Force noted that most of the Shahed-type drones that Russian forces launched overnight were jet-powered drones and that Russia's primary target was Kyiv Oblast. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 98 drones while missiles and 17 strike drones struck 26 locations. Debris reportedly fell at six locations.

The Russian strikes inflicted high civilian casualties, killing at least 16 people and injuring at least 29 in Kyiv Oblast alone.[11] Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces primarily targeted civilian warehouse facilities, including warehouses of Ukrainian shopping center network Epicenter, Ukrainian online retailer Rozetka, and Ukrainian postal service Nova Poshta in and near Kyiv City.[12] Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces also struck railway infrastructure near Kyiv City and in Sumy Oblast and civilian infrastructure in Odesa Oblast.[13] The Kyiv Oblast Military Administration reported that the air quality temporarily worsened in a number of settlements in the oblast due to fires after the Russian strikes.^[14] The administration also reported that strikes against Holosiivsky Raion caused an ammonia leak that Ukrainian authorities subsequently contained.^[15]

Ukrainian forces did not intercept any of the 28 missiles that Russia launched overnight, as Russia continues to purposefully exploit Ukraine's depleted stocks of anti-ballistic missile interceptors. All missiles that Russian forces launched overnight were either ballistic missiles or missiles following ballistic trajectories that only US-produced Patriot systems and their analogues can intercept.[16] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky noted on August 5 that Ukraine has been receiving three times fewer anti-ballistic missile interceptors since the start of 2026, largely due to the war in the Middle East.[17] Russia launched a record number of missiles against Ukraine in July 2026 and has been undertaking a campaign in recent weeks that leans more heavily into missile strikes while decreasing the number of drone strikes.[18]

North Korea has escalated its involvement in Russia's war in Ukraine, reportedly deploying missileers and over 100 ballistic missiles to Russia. Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Spokesperson Andriy Chernyak told Reuters in an article published on August 5 that an unspecified North Korean missile unit has started to deploy to western Russia, possibly equipped with 120 ballistic missiles of an unspecified model and six missile launchers.[19] Chernyak stated that Russia plans to base the North Korean missile unit, which includes about 90 North Korean soldiers, in Voronezh Oblast within Russia's 112th Missile Brigade (1st Guards Tank Army, Moscow Military District). It is unclear if the North Korean elements are deploying to a forward deployment area of the 112th Missile Brigade in Voronezh Oblast, as the brigade is based in Ivanovo Oblast.[20] Chernyak added that North Korea already sent a batch of 40 North Korean KN-23/24 ballistic missiles and personnel to Russia but that top-level talks in September 2026 will finalize the configuration and number of missiles of this planned deployment.[21] Chernyak noted that the North Korean missile that Russian forces used in their strike on July 29 to 30 came from the earlier batch of 40 North Korean-provided missiles. Reuters' Ukrainian military sources stated that the KN-23/24 missiles have a greater range and can carry larger payloads than Russia's Iskander-M ballistic missiles but are less accurate and have often led to high civilian casualties. Russia’s use of North Korean missiles will also provide North Korea with battlefield testing and feedback to improve the missiles — as Russia and North Korea have done in the past.[22]

North Korea previously sent infantry, sappers, and construction workers to Kursk Oblast in late October 2024, and North Korea's deployment of missileers is new and noteworthy.[23] North Korea seems to be trying to gain combined arms knowledge from its involvement in Russia's war. North Korean missileers will bring new combat lessons to North Korea beyond those that North Korean soldiers previously gained fighting and operating in Kursk Oblast.[24] It is unclear why North Korea chose to deploy its missileers and missiles to Russia now, but Russia and North Korea may aim to take advantage of Ukraine's current depleted stocks of ballistic missile interceptors to test the performance of North Korean missiles, including those possibly launched by North Korean soldiers operating North Korean launchers.

The addition of more North Korean missiles to Russia's arsenal will likely allow Russia to intensify its ballistic missile strikes against Ukraine in the near future without having to dip into its S-400 and Zirkon missile stocks. Russia increasingly leveraged Zirkon and altered S-400 missiles (both of which follow ballistic trajectories) in its July 2026 strikes, likely to offset the strain on Russia’s traditional ballistic missile production and stockpiles.[25] Ukrainian defense source Militarnyi estimated on July 19 that Russia had used up to two-thirds of its planned annual production of Zirkon missiles in just the first 19 days of July 2026.[26] A Ukrainian defense expert, citing data from the GUR, reported on July 23 that Russian forces have been able to intensify their ballistic missile strikes by increasingly relying on altered S-400 systems.[27] The addition of roughly 160 North Korean ballistic missiles will allow Russia to increase the number of ballistic missiles in each strike package or to sustain similarly sized packages for longer. The North Korean missiles, with their higher payloads but lower accuracy, will likely cause higher degrees of destruction and casualties, particularly among civilian infrastructure and civilians.

Unspecified actors likely piloted a drone containing explosives at Germany's Leipzig/Halle Airport, a known hub for transporting Western-provided military equipment to Ukraine.[28] German authorities announced that a drone containing explosives was found near a Ukrainian Antonov cargo plane at the airport's south runway overnight on August 4 to 5 and that German personnel had diffused the explosives.[29] German media reported that the detonator had broken off the drone, preventing the explosives from detonating.[30] The drone incident forced authorities to divert and delay several flights. German authorities stated that a flying object, reportedly a second drone, collided with another cargo plane that was aborting its landing at Leipzig/Halle Airport due to the first drone incident, slightly damaging the plane.[31] German Interior Minister Alexander Dobrindt stated that the explosive-laden drone at a German airport represents a new level of threat and assessed that the actors involved are not amateurs and may have been familiar with existing German counter-drone capabilities.[32] German authorities have not attributed a specific actor to the drone incident.

Key Takeaways:

• Russian President Vladimir Putin reshuffled military commanders, including those associated with logistics and Russia's Unmanned Systems Forces (USF), against the backdrop of Ukrainian strike campaigns that these services have failed to defend against.
• Russian forces launched a relatively small strike package against Ukraine on the night of August 4 to 5 nonetheless causing significant civilian damage and casualties due to Russia's use of ballistic and quasi-ballistic missiles that Ukraine was unable to intercept.
• Ukrainian forces did not intercept any of the 28 missiles that Russia launched overnight, as Russia continues to purposefully exploit Ukraine's depleted stocks of anti-ballistic missile interceptors.
• North Korea has escalated its involvement in Russia's war in Ukraine, reportedly deploying missileers and over 100 ballistic missiles to Russia.
• The addition of more North Korean missiles to Russia's arsenal will likely allow Russia to intensify its ballistic missile strikes against Ukraine in the near future without having to dip into its S-400 and Zirkon missile stocks.
• Unspecified actors likely piloted a drone containing explosives at Germany's Leipzig/Halle Airport, a known hub for transporting Western-provided military equipment to Ukraine.
• Ukrainian forces continued their long-range strike campaigns against Wildberries warehouses and Russian oil infrastructure on August 4 and 5.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area and Slovyansk and Oleksandrivka directions on August 4 and 5.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

• Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
• Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis
• Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
• Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
• Significant Activity in Belarus

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Ukrainian forces continued their strike campaign against Wildberries warehouses on August 4. Geolocated footage published on August 4 shows a fire at a Wildberries warehouse east of Aleksin, Tula Oblast.[33] The Wildberries press service and Tula Oblast Governor Dmitry Milyaev confirmed on August 4 that a drone strike started a fire at a Wildberries logistics facility in Tula Oblast.[34] Geolocated footage published on August 4 shows a fire at a Wildberries distribution center in Krasny Bor, Leningrad Oblast, following a reported Ukrainian drone strike.[35]

Ukrainian forces continued their long-range strike campaign against Russian oil infrastructure on August 5. Russian opposition sources reported on August 5 that Ukrainian drones struck the Bashneft-Novoil, Bashneft-UNPZ, and Bashneft-Ufaneftekhim oil refineries in Ufa, Bashkortostan at least twice on August 5, causing a fire and large smoke plumes, after previously damaging the facilities in June and previous days in August 2026.[36] A Ukrainian source claimed that the strike damaged two secondary oil processing depots: the combined technological depot ZHEKSA and the catalytic reforming depot L-35-11/100, causing a large fire and thick smoke plumes.[37]

Independent media outlet Agenstvo reported on August 5, citing leaked documents and the Russian register of legal entities, that the August 3 explosion at the Moscow City Balzi Rossi restaurant killed Daniil Peredriy, the son-in-law of Russian Aerospace Forces (VKS) Commander-in-Chief Alexander Chaiko.[38] Chaiko's status is still unknown as of the time of this writing.

Geolocated footage published on August 5 shows a Russian fuel and lubricants plant on fire northeast of Perm City, Perm Krai (roughly 1,500 kilometers from the international border).[39] ISW has not observed confirmation of the cause of the fire.

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in Sumy Oblast along the international border)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in Sumy Oblast on August 4 and 5 but did not advance.[40] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on August 5 that elements of the Russian 1427th Motorized Rifle Regiment (11th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) seized Ryzhivka (northwest of Sumy City).[41] A Russian milblogger claimed on August 5 that Russian forces advanced in central Mohrytsya (northeast of Sumy City) and south of Taratutyne (southeast of Sumy City).[42]

Order of Battle: elements of the Chechen 204th Akhmat Spetsnaz Regiment reportedly struck Ukrainian personnel east of Velykyi Prykil (east of Sumy City).[43] ISW previously observed evidence of the Chechen 204th Akhmat Spetsnaz Regiment operating in the Kharkiv direction as recently as April 2026.[44]

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border to create a defensible buffer zone with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on August 4 and 5 but did not make confirmed advances.[45]

Footage published on July 17 and geolocated on August 4 shows Ukrainian forces striking a dam northwest of Bezlyudivka (south of Kharkiv City), Belgorod Oblast using GBU-39 guided bombs.[46]

Russian forces recently conducted an infiltration mission in the Velykyi Burluk direction. Geolocated footage published on August 5 shows Ukrainian forces striking a Russian position in Ustynivka (northeast of Velykyi Burluk) after what ISW assesses was a Russian infiltration mission.[47]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Oskil River (Russian objective: Cross the Oskil River in Kharkiv Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian sources claimed that Russian forces attacked in the Kupyansk direction on August 5, but ISW has not observed evidence of Russian advances.[48] A source reporting on the Russian Western Grouping of Forces (GoF) claimed on August 5 that technical malfunctions and Ukrainian strikes are causing communications equipment shortages in the Kupyansk direction.[49]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Borova direction on August 5 but did not make confirmed advances.[50] A source reporting on the Russian Western Grouping of Forces (GoF) claimed on August 5 that Russian forces advanced in and near Nova Kruhlyakivka (northeast of Borova).[51]

Ukrainian forces continued their intermediate-range strike campaign against electrical infrastructure in occupied Luhansk Oblast. Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) Commander Major Robert “Magyar” Brovdi reported on August 5 that Ukrainian forces struck an electrical substation in occupied Kadiivka (roughly 60 kilometers from the frontline).[52]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)

Ukrainian forces recently advanced northeast of Slovyansk and maintain positions in key settlements in the Slovyansk direction as Russian forces continue infiltration missions. Geolocated footage published on August 4 indicates that Ukrainian forces advanced northeast of Dibrova (northeast of Slovyansk).[53] Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported on August 5 that Ukrainian forces maintain positions northwest of Kryva Luka (east of Slovyansk) and in southern Rai-Oleksandrivka (east of Slovyansk), contrary to Russian claims that Russian forces have seized both settlements.[54] Mashovets also reported that Russian forces are infiltrating north of and within eastern Rai-Oleksandrivka, northeast and southeast of Malynivka (southeast of Slovyansk), and west of Minkivka (southeast of Slovyansk).

The Russian 3rd Combined Arms Army (CAA, Southern Military District [SMD]) reportedly intends to expand the scope of its infiltration missions in the Slovyansk direction as it faces declining combat effectiveness. Mashovets noted that while Ukrainian forces have not been able to fully halt Russian advances east of the Fortress Belt cities of Slovyansk and Kramatorsk, Russian forces, specifically elements of the 3rd CAA, have failed to seize a significant amount of territory in these areas.[55] Mashovets reported that the Russian 3rd CAA’s rate of advance has been declining due to a reduction in the formation’s overall combat effectiveness, particularly of the 3rd CAA's 6th and 123rd separate motorized rifle brigades, which can only conduct some small-group infiltrations. Mashovets noted that elements of the Russian 3rd CAA intend to conduct infiltration missions in Mykolaivka (east of Slovyansk) from their infiltrated positions north of Rai-Oleksandrivka and in southern Kryva Luka. Mashovets stated that the command of the Russian 3rd CAA will have to choose either to attempt to break through into the Slovyansk-Kramatorsk agglomeration in the immediate future, or to support Russia’s broader efforts to advance toward the Slovyansk-Kramatorsk agglomeration, including the 25th CAA’s (Central Military District [CMD]) efforts in the Lyman direction and the 8th CAA (Southern Military District [SMD]) and 3rd Army Corps’ (Southern Grouping of Forces ) efforts in the Kramatorsk direction.

Donetsk Oblast Head Vadym Filashkin reported on August 5 that Ukrainian authorities will begin mandatory evacuations for 525 children from 424 families in Kramatorsk Raion due to intensified Russian drone, artillery, and glide bomb strikes.[56]

Russian forces recently advanced in Kostyantynivka. Geolocated footage published on August 4 indicates that Russian forces advanced in western Kostyantynivka.[57]

The Ukrainian General Staff reported on August 5 that Ukrainian forces struck Russian drone control points near Kostyantynivka, occupied Chasiv Yar (northeast of Kostyantynivka), and occupied Zelene Pole (southwest of Kostyantynivka) and a Russian command post near occupied Bakhmut (northeast of Kostyantynivka).[58]

Order of Battle: Geolocated footage published on August 4 indicates that the Russian 224th Anti-Tank Artillery Battalion (150th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA, SMD) is operating south of Sofiivka (southwest of Druzhkivka).[59] ISW has not previously observed evidence of the 224th Anti-Tank Artillery Battalion involved in combat operations in Ukraine.

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Dobropillya direction on August 4 and 5 but did not advance.[60]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction on August 4 and 5 but did not make confirmed advances.[61] A Russian milblogger claimed on August 5 that Russian forces advanced east of Raipole and east of Kolona-Mezhova (both west of Pokrovsk).[62]

Neither Ukrainian nor Russian sources reported ground activity in the Novopavlivka direction on August 5.

Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Oleksandrivka direction. Geolocated footage published on August 1 shows Russian forces striking Ukrainian servicemembers west of Zirka (northeast of Oleksandrivka).[63] The Ukrainian General Staff reported on August 5 that Ukrainian forces struck a crossing over the Mokri Yaly River near Vesele, occupied Donetsk (likely referring to the Vesele east of Oleksandrivka and roughly six kilometers from the frontline) that Russian forces use for logistics.[64]

 Ukrainian forces continued their intermediate-range strike campaign against Russian military assets and energy infrastructure in occupied Donetsk Oblast. Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) Commander Robert "Magyar" Brovdi reported on August 5 that Ukrainian forces struck an electrical substation at the Zuyivksa Thermal Power Plant near occupied Zuhres (roughly 67 kilometers from the frontline), the Pivdennodonbaska electrical substation near occupied Kremenivka (roughly 88 kilometers from the frontline), the Topolyne electrical substation near occupied Topolyne (roughly 93 kilometers from the frontline), and the Myrna, Misto-11, and NS-2 electrical substations near occupied Mariupol (roughly 113 kilometers from the frontline).[65]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Hulyaipole direction on August 4 and 5 but did not make confirmed advances.[66] A Russian milblogger claimed on August 5 that elements of the Russian 5th Separate Tank Brigade (36th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Eastern Military District [EMD]) seized Zirnytsya (southwest of Oleksandrivka).[67] This is a highly implausible claim considering that Zirnytsya is about 14 kilometers from the nearest assessed Russian advance and about nine kilometers from the closest observed Russian infiltration position. Russian milbloggers have complained about Russian military commanders exaggerating claims of advance across the theater, including in the Oleksandrivka direction.[68]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on August 4 and 5 but did not advance, as Ukrainian forces counterattacked.[69] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian drone control point near Mali Shcherbaky (west of Orikhiv) on the night of August 4 to 5.[70]

Ukrainian forces continued their intermediate-range and frontline strike campaign against Russian military assets in occupied Zaporizhia Oblast. Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) Commander Robert "Magyar" Brovdi reported on August 5 that Ukrainian forces struck electrical substations near occupied Prymorskyi Posad, Melitopol (95 and 78 kilometers from the frontline), Berdyansk, and Yakymivka (all about 78 to 100 kilometers from the frontline).[71]

Neither Ukrainian nor Russian sources reported ground activity in the Kherson direction on August 5.

Ukrainian forces continued to strike Russian military assets and energy and gasoline infrastructure in occupied Kherson Oblast and Crimea. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian materiel and equipment depot near occupied Ishun, Crimea (about 112 kilometers from the frontline) overnight on August 4 to 5.[72] Brovdi reported on August 5 that Ukrainian forces struck the Tymofiivka electrical substation near occupied Tymofiivka, Kherson Oblast (roughly 67 kilometers from the frontline) and the Natashyne gas distribution station near occupied Natashyne, Crimea (roughly 138 kilometers from the frontline).[73] Geolocated footage published on August 4 shows Ukrainian forces striking the Lymane gas pumping station near occupied Kolosky (roughly 153 kilometers from the frontline) and the Nyva gas pumping station near occupied Nyva (roughly 137 kilometers from the frontline) in occupied Crimea.[74] A Ukrainian source that frequently publishes footage of successful Ukrainian strikes published footage on August 4 of Ukrainian forces striking a Russian S-400 missile launcher, which Russian forces frequently use to launch quasi-ballistic missiles at Ukraine, near occupied Kerch, Crimea.[75]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

 See topline text for Russian overnight missile and drone strikes on Ukraine.

 Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

 Nothing significant to report.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.