August 13, 2026

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, August 13, 2026

Arielle Sher, Grace Mappes, Kateryna Shymkiv and Frederick W. Kagan

Assessment as of: 7:30 PM ET

Data Cutoff: 1:00 PM ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

For more information on ISW’s map methodology, please view our statement here. 

Russian President Vladimir Putin visited the Kuril Islands, whose occupation by Russia Japan disputes, for the first time on August 13, likely in response to the more assertive defense policy Japan has recently adopted. Putin visited the largest Kuril Island, Iturup – which Japan calls Etorofu – and held several meetings, including with Sakhalin Oblast Governor Valery Limarenko, Russian Pacific Fleet Commander-in-Chief Admiral Viktor Liina, Sakhalin Oblast Federal Security Service (FSB) Border Service Head Sergey Makhorin, and the acting commander of the Russian 68th Guards Army Corps (Eastern Military District [EMD]), Alexey Shvedov.[1] Elements of the 68th Guards Army Corps are fighting in the Oleksandrivka direction.[2] Putin’s visit to the disputed Kuril Islands is likely part of the Kremlin’s response to Japan’s 2026 Defense White Paper, published earlier in August, and aims to undermine Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi’s efforts to improve Japan’s defense capabilities.[3] Putin criticized the Japanese White Paper for identifying Russia as one of Japan’s critical threats.[4] Putin’s comments addressed the need for Russia to “ensure security” on “all of its borders, all of its territories,” a noteworthy statement in the context of frequent Russian air operations requiring Japan to scramble aircraft in response, as noted by the White Paper.[5] Takaichi strongly condemned Putin’s visit to Etorofu and reiterated Japan’s territorial claims to the Kuril Islands.[6] Russia and Japan never signed a formal peace treaty at the end of the Second World War, and the dispute over the Kuril Islands remains, which Japan refers to as the Northern Territories.[7]

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky continues emphasizing Ukraine’s need for US-produced Patriot interceptor missiles to defend against Russian ballistic missile strikes during Winter 2026-2027. Zelensky stated in a CNN interview aired on August 13 that Ukraine needs significantly more Patriot interceptor missiles than it is receiving to repel larger and more frequent Russian ballistic missile strikes.[8] Zelensky noted that Russia is exploiting Ukraine’s very low Patriot interceptor missile stockpiles and is launching twice as many ballistic missiles per month as it did in 2025.

Polish Deputy Defense Minister Magdalena Sobkowiak-Czarnecka stated on August 13 that the Polish government is considering supplying Patriot interceptors to Ukraine and could make a decision in the coming days.[9] Sobkowiak-Czarnecka noted that Polish Deputy Prime Minister and Defense Minister Wladyslaw Kosiniak-Kamysz is inclined to approve the transfer to ensure that Ukraine can intercept Russian missiles over Ukrainian territory before they fly into Polish airspace. A Russian Kh-101 cruise missile crashed in eastern Poland on the night of July 29 to 30, although no Russian ballistic missiles have yet landed in Poland.[10] Russia’s increasing use of ballistic missiles reflects Putin’s belief that Russia can exploit the ongoing Patriot interceptor missile shortage to pressure Ukraine into accepting Russia’s maximalist demands while delaying meaningful negotiations and protracting the war in Ukraine.[11]

An improvised explosive device (IED) explosion in occupied Sevastopol reportedly killed Russian Captain 1st Rank Robert Shageev on August 13.[12] Captain Shageev reportedly served as commander of the Zaporizhzhia – Ukraine’s only submarine at the time – before defecting to Russia in 2014 and serving as the deputy commander of the Russian 4th Separate Submarine Brigade (Black Sea Fleet).[13] Russian officials confirmed the death of an individual serving in the Russian Ministry of Defense but not his identity.[14]

Key Takeaways:

  • Russian President Vladimir Putin visited the Kuril Islands, whose occupation by Russia Japan disputes, for the first time on August 13, likely in response to the more assertive defense policy Japan has recently adopted.
  • Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky continues emphasizing Ukraine’s need for US-produced Patriot interceptor missiles to defend against Russian ballistic missile strikes during the winter 2026/2027.
  • An improvised explosive device (IED) explosion in occupied Sevastopol reportedly killed Russian Captain 1st Rank Robert Shageev on August 13.
  • Ukrainian forces conducted a large strike against Russian oil infrastructure and Wildberries facilities in the Bashkortostan Republic on the night of August 12 to 13. Russia launched 133 drones against Ukraine overnight.
  • Russian forces recently advanced in the Kupyansk and Slovyansk directions.  

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

  • Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
  • Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis
  • Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
  • Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
  • Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
  • Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
  • Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
  • Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
  • Significant Activity in Belarus

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Ukrainian forces conducted a large strike against Russian oil infrastructure and Wildberries facilities in the Bashkortostan Republic on the night of August 12 to 13. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces struck the Gazprom Neftekhim Salavat oil refining and petrochemical complex in Salavat, Bashkortostan Republic on the night of August 12 to 13, causing a fire.[15] The General Staff noted that the complex is about 1,300 kilometers from the international border and has a refining capacity of up to 10 million tons per year. Geolocated footage published on August 13 shows a fire at the complex.[16] Bashkortostan Republic Governor Radiy Khabirov confirmed on August 13 that drone debris fell in an industrial zone near Salavat.[17]

Geolocated footage published on August 13 shows smoke rising from a Wildberries warehouse and logistics center following Ukrainian drone strikes near Chishmy, Bashkortostan Republic.[18] Khabirov confirmed that Ukrainian drones targeted a logistics center near Chishmy, reportedly injuring two, and the Wildberries Press Service confirmed Ukrainian strikes against a Wildberries facility.[19]

Ukrainian sources provided an updated battle damage assessment (BDA) of recent Ukrainian strikes against the Black Sea Fleet (BSF) base and Russian oil infrastructure in Novorossiysk. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on August 12 that the Ukrainian strike against a Russian naval base in Novorossiysk, Krasnodar Krai, on August 11 to 12 damaged four Russian ships, including the project 11356 frigates Admiral Makarov and Admiral Essen, a small project 21631 Buyan-M class missile ship, and the Project 22160 patrol ship Vasil Bykov.[20] Ukraine’s Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported on August 12 that Ukrainian strikes against Novorossiysk also struck the Grushovaya oil depot infrastructure, the Sheshkaris oil terminal, and a 30N6E radar of the S-300 air defense system.[21] Russian opposition source Meduza reported on August 12 that the Kombinat Stroikomplekt (KSK) grain terminal halted operations following a Ukrainian strike on Novorossiysk – the third major grain terminal in Novorossiysk to stop operations due to these strikes.[22] Orenburg Oblast Governor Yevgeny Solntsev on August 13 confirmed reporting from Reuters that the Orsknefteorgsintez oil refinery in Orsk, Orenburg Oblast fully halted operations following a Ukrainian strike on August 11 and noted that the repairs can take up to six months.[23]

Forbes’ Russia Service cited a leading analyst at the research agency Data Insight on August 13, estimating that Wildberries will likely have to pay between 147 and 223 billion rubles (about $1.77 to $2.68 billion) to restore its warehouses and infrastructure following Ukrainian strikes thus far.[24] The head of the Russian Association of Suppliers of Goods for Trading on Electronic Platforms, Margarita Evstigneeva, estimated that the total value of damages to Wildberries and its sellers is between 600 and 800 billion rubles (about $7.22 to 9.63 billion).

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in Sumy Oblast along the international border)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Sumy Oblast on August 12 and 13 but did not advance.[25]

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border to create a defensible buffer zone with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Russian forces are struggling to advance south from Vovchansk (northeast of Kharkiv City) amid continued offensive operations along the international border east of Vovchansk. Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported on August 13 that forward Russian assault groups penetrated Ukrainian lines from positions across the international border along the vectors of Marino toward Zybyne (northeast to east of Vovchansk), Krasnoye toward Volokhivka (northeast to east of Zybyne), and Dehtyarne toward Budarky (both northeast of Volokhivka) but have failed to make significant gains along their main line of effort from Vovchansk toward Bily Kolodyaz (south of Vovchansk).[26] Mashovets reported that some Russian forces had infiltrated into Hrafske and Symynivka (both southwest of Vovchansk) on an unspecified prior date but that Russian forces are struggling to supply or reinforce these troops due to enduring Ukrainian positions in the area. A source reporting on the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces refuted Russian claims of seizing Ivanivka (southeast of Vovchansk), stating that Russian forces have not entered Ivanivka and only have a marginal presence in Zakharivka (north of Ivanivka).[27]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Velykyi Burluk direction on August 12 and 13 but did not make confirmed advances. Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces entered Vilkhuvatka and advanced near Ustynivka, Ivashkyne, Anyskyne, and Shevyakivka (all northeast of Velykyi Burluk).[28] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces struck a Russian troop concentration near Butyrki, Belgorod Oblast (northeast of Velykyi Burluk immediately across the international border).[29]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Oskil River (Russian objective: Cross the Oskil River in Kharkiv Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces continue efforts to push Ukrainian forces from the east (left) bank of the Oskil River east of Kupyansk. Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported on August 13 that Russian forces east of Kupyansk are focusing offensive operations in the Pishchane direction Kupyansk-Vuzlovyi direction (east of Kupyansk) in order to divide the Ukrainian bridgehead into a northern and southern half, then to push Ukrainian forces from the northern half before doing the same in the southern half.[30] Mashovets reported that elements of the Russian 47th Tank Division (1st Guards Tank Army [GTA], Moscow Military District [MMD]) reached the northern bank of the Lozovatka River, consolidated in Kurylivka and on the northeastern outskirts of Kivsharivka, and reached the eastern outskirts of Kupyansk-Vuzlovyi (all southeast of Kupyansk) in the past two days (since August 11). A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced in northern Kutkivka (north of Kupyansk on the west [right] bank of the Oskil River).[31]

Russian forces continued limited offensive operations northeast of Borova on August 12 and 13 but did not advance.[32]

Ukrainian forces continued their intermediate-range strike campaign against electrical and fuel infrastructure in occupied Luhansk Oblast. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on August 13 that Ukrainian forces struck a fuel and lubricants depot near Dovzhansk (roughly 145 kilometers from the frontline).[33] Geolocated footage published on August 13 shows Ukrainian forces striking a Russian military transport vehicle along the M-30 Donetsk-Luhansk City highway near Bryanka (roughly 65 kilometers from the frontline).[34] Luhansk People's Republic (LNR) Head Leonid Pasechnik claimed on August 13 that Ukrainian forces struck a warehouse near occupied Troitske (one of multiple settlements between 40 and 82 kilometers from the frontline), a power company in Rubizhne (roughly 33 kilometers from the frontline), a gas compressor station in occupied Rovenky (roughly 131 kilometers from the frontline), and a train station in occupied Dovzhansk.[35]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)

Ukrainian forces recently advanced or maintained positions southeast of Slovyansk as Russian forces continue infiltration missions in the area. Geolocated footage published on August 12 shows Ukrainian positions in the northwestern outskirts of Pyskunivka (southeast of Slovyansk), where Russian sources had previously claimed that Russian forces held positions.[36] Additional geolocated footage published on August 13 shows Ukrainian forces striking a Russian position in southern Lyman after what was likely a Russian infiltration mission.[37] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced east of Mykolaivka (east of Slovyansk).[38]

Russian forces appear to be focusing on offensive operations east and southeast of Lyman as Ukrainian counterattacks are constraining Russian operations northwest of Lyman. Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported on August 13 that Russian forces seem to have consolidated some positions on the southeastern outskirts of Lyman and in Dibrova (southeast of Lyman).[39] Mashovets reported that Russian forces seized the forest area between Lyman and Yampil (east of Slovyansk) and are using the forest area to accumulate personnel for infiltration missions. Mashovets reported that Ukrainian counterattacks near Drobysheve (northwest of Lyman) are constraining Russian advances northwest of Lyman and that enduring Ukrainian positions near Zarichne, Myrne, and Stavky (all northeast of Lyman) are complicating Russian operations east of Lyman. Mashovets acknowledged that Russian forces have achieved unspecified successes near Staryi Karavan and Brusivka (both southeast of Lyman and northeast of Slovyansk), indicating that Russian forces in the area have likely made advances of which ISW has not yet observed dispositive evidence.

The spokesperson of a Ukrainian assault brigade operating in the Lyman direction reported that Russian forces are using a large number of glide bombs in the Lyman direction to strike Ukrainian crossings, logistics, and rear areas.[40] The spokesperson noted that Russian forces are relying on glide bombs over artillery because Ukrainian drones target Russian artillery systems.

Russian forces continue infiltrating in small groups and conducting glide bomb strikes in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area. The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Kostyantynivka direction reported on August 13 that Russian forces decreased the common size of their infiltration groups from four or five soldiers to only a single servicemember.[41] The spokesperson reported that the Russian infiltration groups use drones, rather than paper or virtual maps, to guide them on their attack routes. The spokesperson noted that Russian forces are conducting heavy glide bomb strikes against Druzhkivka to destroy the city and the surrounding settlements. Geolocated footage published on August 12 shows a Russian glide bomb strike in Druzhkivka.[42]

Russian sources continue to post likely AI-altered footage of flag-raising events as part of a cognitive warfare effort aimed at exaggerating Russian advances. The Donetsk People's Republic (DNR) People's Militia claimed on August 12 that elements of the Russian 102nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (150th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th Combined Arms Army, Southern Military District) seized Petrivka (northwest of Kostyantynivka) and published likely AI-altered footage of Russian soldiers raising a flag in Petrivka.[43] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) reiterated on August 13 the claim of seizing Petrivka.[44] Russian sources affiliated with the high Russian military command have increasingly published suspicious footage to propagate claims of expansive Russian advances for informational effects.[45]

Russian forces continued limited offensive operations in the Dobropillya direction on August 12 and 13 but did not advance.[46]

Russian forces continue infiltration missions in the Pokrovsk direction. Geolocated footage published on August 13 shows Ukrainian forces striking a Russian servicemember in central Bilytske (northeast of Pokrovsk) after what ISW assesses was a Russian infiltration mission.[47]

Russian forces are using interceptor drones to protect their strike drones in the Pokrovsk direction. A Ukrainian servicemember operating in the Pokrovsk direction reported that Russian forces launch an interceptor drone with two or three Molniya fixed-wing loitering munitions in order to protect them from Ukrainian interceptor drones, allowing Russian drone operators to use the Molniyas to interdict Ukrainian logistics.[48]

Russian forces continued limited offensive operations near Novopavlivka on August 12 and 13 but did not advance.[49]

Additional geolocated footage supports Ukrainian reporting from August 12 of Ukrainian advances in the Oleksandrivka direction.[50] Geolocated footage published on August 12 shows Ukrainian forces raising flags in various settlements east and southeast of Oleksandrivka, supporting reports from the Ukrainian military command on August 12 that Ukrainian forces liberated 26 settlements during a counteroffensive operation in the Oleksandrivka direction from January 29 to August 12.[51] A Russian milblogger acknowledged on August 13 that Ukrainian forces liberated 10 settlements east and southeast of Oleksandrivka during this operation.[52]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Hulyaipole direction and in western Zaporizhia Oblast on August 12 and 13 but did not advance.[53]

Ukrainian forces continued their frontline and intermediate-range strike campaign against Russian military assets in occupied western Zaporizhia Oblast. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on August 13 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian drone control point near occupied Myrne (one of multiple settlements between the frontline and 93 kilometers from the frontline).[54]

Russian forces continued limited offensive operations in Kherson Oblast on August 12 and 13.[55]

Ukrainian forces continued their intermediate-range strike campaign against Russian military assets in Kherson Oblast on August 12 to 13. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on August 13 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian material and equipment depot near occupied Kalanchak, Kherson Oblast (approximately 60 kilometers from the frontline) and an ammunition depot in the Novyi Hai (likely referring to Novyi Hai, Kherson Oblast, about 38 kilometers from the frontline).[56] A Crimea-based Telegram channel reported on August 13 that Ukrainian forces struck several Russian military vehicles on an unspecified highway leading to occupied Crimea.[57]

Ukrainian intermediate-range strikes against occupied Crimea continue to target Russian military assets and hinder the power supply on the peninsula. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on August 13 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian control tower at the Saki Airfield near occupied Novofedorivka (roughly 175 kilometers from the frontline) and a repeater for Geran- and Gerbera-type long-range strike drones near occupied Chornomorske (roughly 110 kilometers from the frontline) on August 12.[58] The General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces also struck a Russian Nebo-U radar station near occupied Sevastopol (roughly 230 kilometers from the frontline) overnight on August 12 to 13.[59] NASA Fire Information for Resource Management System (FIRMS) data from August 12 and 13 shows heat anomalies at a substation near occupied Solene Ozero (one of multiple settlements between roughly 110 and 160 kilometers from the frontline) and a railway bridge near occupied Ostanine (roughly 240 kilometers from the frontline).[60] A local Crimea-based Telegram channel published a photo and claimed on August 13 that a Ukrainian strike damaged a side of the Balaklava Therman Power Plant (TPP) near occupied Sevastopol.[61] Sevastopol occupation head Mikhail Razvozhaev claimed on August 13 that Ukrainian strikes against occupied Sevastopol damaged the city’s power grid and caused power outages.[62] A local Crimean Telegram channel reported on August 12 that Ukrainian forces began striking Wildberries trucks while they transport goods to occupied Crimea to disrupt Russian logistics.[63]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Note: The Ukrainian military ceased reporting the numbers of Russian missiles fired and the number of missiles intercepted as of August 11.[64]

Russian forces conducted a series of drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of August 12 to 13. The Ukrainian Air Force reported on August 13 that Russian forces launched 133 Shahed- and Gerbera-type strike drones and Parodiya-type decoy drones from the directions of Kursk and Oryol cities; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; occupied Donetsk City; and occupied Hvardiiske, Crimea.[65] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 111 drones, that Russian drones struck 15 locations, and that debris fell on 16 locations. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces struck commercial, logistics, civilian, and residential infrastructure in Chernihiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Donetsk, Kharkiv, and Zaporizhia oblasts.[66] Ukrainian officials reported on August 13 that Russian jet-powered drones deliberately struck the locomotives of two trains in Odesa Oblast on August 13, killing one train driver and his assistant.[67]

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

Nothing significant to report.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

[1] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/80522; http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/80524; http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/80523

[2] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-30-2026/

[3] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-12-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/china-taiwan/china-taiwan-update-august-7-2026/

[4] https://news.usni.org/2026/08/04/japans-2026-defense-white-paper-digest; https://www.mod dot go.jp/j/press/wp/wp2026/pdf/DOJ2026_Digest_EN.pdf; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-12-2026/

[5] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/80522;  dot jp/j/press/wp/wp2026/pdf/DOJ2026_Digest_EN.pdf

[6] https://x.com/takaichi_sanae/status/2087811911962484934

[7] https://www.mofa dot go.jp/region/europe/russia/territory/overview.html

[8] https://edition.cnn.com/2026/08/12/world/patriots-ukraine-zelensky-interview-cnn-latam-intl

[9] https://www.rmf24 dot pl/rozmowy/poranna-rozmowa/news-magdalena-sobkowiak-czarnecka-o-zmianach-w-alertach-rcb-to-m,nIdn,1013459; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=i4EEJ-6yZFM

[10] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-30-2026/; https://www.eurointegration dot com.ua/news/2026/08/13/7243434/

[11] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-10-2026/

[12] https://t.me/sotaproject/117308 ; https://t.me/ASupersharij/58598;  https://t.me/rucriminalinfo_2/2185; https://t.me/tass_agency/390111; https://t.me/milinfolive/177583; https://t.me/Crimeanwind/107062; https://t.me/Crimeanwind/107063; https://militarnyi dot com/uk/news/u-sevastopoli-pidirvaly-jmovirno-ekskomandyra-ukrayinskogo-pidvodnogo-chovna-zaporizhzhya/ ; https://t.me/chp_crimea/79788 ; https://meduza dot io/news/2026/08/13/v-sevastopole-v-rezultate-vzryva-bomby-pogib-mestnyy-zhitel-telegram-kanaly-pishut-chto-pogibshiy-ofitser-vmf-rossii; https://t.me/bazabazon/48239 ; https://t.me/Crimeanwind/107071

[13] https://t.me/milinfolive/177586 ; https://t.me/istories_media/13215

[14] https://www.interfax dot ru/russia/1109105;  dot com/2026/08/13/russian-military-officer-killed-in-annexed-crimea-bomb-explosion-a93488

[15] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41867 ; https://t.me/usf_army/2319 ;

[16] https://x.com/bayraktar\_1love/status/2087760726555304044; https://t.me/astrapress/121954;

[17] https://t.me/radiyhabirov/13589; https://ufa1 dot ru/text/gorod/2026/08/13/76585417/; https://meduza dot io/news/2026/08/13/ukraina-atakovala-bashkortostan-telegram-kanaly-soobschayut-o-pozhare-na-npz-i-sklade-wildberries

[18] https://t.me/exilenova_plus/28709 ; https://x.com/Grimm_Intel/status/2087781028941221963?s=20 ; https://x.com/Grimm_Intel/status/2087781434454888567?s=20 ; https://t.me/andriyshTime/65392; https://x.com/bayraktar\_1love/status/2087830172988821630 ; https://t.me/sotaproject/117299; https://x.com/Grimm_Intel/status/2087787086342439066?s=20 ; https://x.com/Grimm_Intel/status/2087787696949207529?s=20 : https://t.me/exilenova_plus/28712 ; https://x.com/zarGEOINT/status/2087798149599437263; https://t.me/supernova_plus/57984

[19] https://t.me/radiyhabirov/13590; https://t.me/rwb_press_service/1697; https://t.me/bbcrussian/98295

[20] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41861; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-12-2026/

[21] https://t.me/DIUkraine/9094

[22] https://meduza dot io/news/2026/08/13/tretiy-krupnyy-zernovoy-terminal-v-novorossiyske-ostanovil-rabotu-posle-ataki-vsu

[23] https://x.com/bayraktar_1love/status/2087858602048454755; https://t.me/tass_agency/390109; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-11-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-12-2026/

[24] https://www.forbes dot ru/biznes/566547-kassovyj-razryv-80-menedzerov-sokratili-sellery-isut-zasity-u-gosudarstva; https://meduza dot io/news/2026/08/13/obschie-poteri-wildberries-i-prodavtsov-ot-atak-ukrainskih-dronov-otsenili-v-600-800-milliardov-rubley

[25]https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41864 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41862 ; https://t.me/severnnyi/9007 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/36194

[26] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/3556

[27] https://t.me/severnnyi/9009

[28] https://t.me/rybar/82405; https://t.me/divgen/83164

[29] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41870

[30] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/3554

[31] https://t.me/wargonzo/36194

[32] https://t.me/grvZapad/19426 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41864 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41862

[33] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41870

[34] https://x.com/klinger66/status/2087839716653641981; https://t.me/Centr_omega_NGU/10363

[35] https://t.me/glava_lnr_info/5394

[36] https://x.com/Bielitzling/status/2087561572327575714 ; https://t.me/Ukr_G_M/87656

[37] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/12691; https://www.facebook.com/reel/4667462000244599

[38] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/46411

[39] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/3555

[40] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/08/13/luplyat-kabamy-po-vsih-budivlyah-yaki-bachat-pid-lymanom-rosiyany-skydayut-rekordnu-kilkist-bomb/; https://youtu.be/kMikL1XMELU?t=1189

[41] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/08/13/idut-naodynczi-bez-map-ta-telefoniv-rosijskyh-shturmovykiv-vedut-v-ataku-drony/; https://youtu.be/kMikL1XMELU

[42] https://t.me/Osintpen/3337; https://t.me/dva_majors/97416

[43] https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/2087575061477871708; https://t.me/nm_dnr/15733; https://t.me/Osintpen/3335; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/12685; https://t.me/mod_russia/66476

[44] https://t.me/mod_russia/66476

[45] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-31-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-22-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-13-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-27-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-28-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-30-2026/

[46]https://t.me/wargonzo/36194 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41864 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41862 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/74149

[47] https://x.com/Bielitzling/status/2087866871911448782

[48] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/08/12/vorozhi-molniyi-letyat-u-suprovodi-ohorony-okupanty-zminyuyut-taktyku-vykorystannya-udarnyh-droniv/; https://youtu.be/h8gn5UGF3HM

[49] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41864 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41862

[50] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-12-2026/

[51] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/12684; https://t.me/ua_dshv/8563; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/12687; https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/2087830210951692371; https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/2087832623049814176

[52] https://t.me/milinfolive/177597

[53] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41864; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41862; https://t.me/wargonzo/36194; https://t.me/voin_dv/20651; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/46391; https://t.me/dva_majors/97421

[54] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41870

[55] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41864; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41862

[56] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41870

[57] https://t.me/Crimeanwind/107075

[58] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41868

[59] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41870

[60] https://firms.modaps.eosdis.nasa.gov/map/#d:24hrs;@34.400,45.836,11.302zl ; https://t.me/Crimeanwind/107052; https://firms.modaps.eosdis.nasa.gov/map/#d:2026-08-07..2026-08-13;@35.904,45.339,13.152z; https://t.me/Crimeanwind/107041

[61] https://t.me/Crimeanwind/107086

[62] https://t.me/razvozhaev/23037; https://t.me/dva_majors/97419; https://x.com/GirkinGirkin/status/2087686156339052718; https://t.me/tass_agency/390029; https://t.me/astrapress/121951;

[63] https://t.me/Crimeanwind/107005

[64] https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-08-11/ukraine-stops-reporting-russia-missile-data-as-defenses-struggle?srnd=homepage-americas; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-11-2026/

[65] https://t.me/kpszsu/72591

[66] https://t.me/chernihivrada/4191; https://t.me/chernihivrada/4190; https://t.me/dsns_telegram/71479; https://t.me/chernigivskaODA/31018; https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/31354; https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/31376; https://t.me/Yevtushenko_E/42977; https://t.me/VadymFilashkin/17349; https://t.me/synegubov/24726; https://t.me/vkarabanov/2601; https://t.me/olexandrprokudin/14504; https://t.me/Mykola_Kalashnyk/11084; https://t.me/odeskaODA/18453; https://t.me/ivan_fedorov_zp/46030

[67] https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/20379; https://www.facebook.com/oleksandr.pertsovskyi/posts/pfbid0DC5dFw8bdsZZnyJqQSoqWDpYbahhQaAtjB25d9hEamrJ3LZL2TqhMxunNviLtyNdl?rdid=45F956wLDCwZYgxz; https://t.me/odeskaODA/18457; https://suspilne.media/odesa/1378084-rf-vdruge-za-den-atakuvala-lokomotiv-ukrzaliznici-na-odesini/; https://t.me/kyivoda/54069