Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, April 7, 2026

Assessment as of: 6:45 PM ET

Data Cutoff: 11:30 AM ET

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Russian forces continue to conduct drone strikes intentionally targeting civilians in southern Ukraine, weaponizing civilian harm as an intentional tool of war. Dnipropetrovsk Oblast Military Administration Head Oleksandr Hanzha reported on April 7 that Russian forces conducted an FPV drone strike against a city bus in Nikopol, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast, killing at least four civilians and injuring at least 24 others.[1] Hanzha later reported on April 7 that Russian forces conducted another strike against a civilian bus in Chervonohryhorivka Hromada (east of Nikopol), injuring at least five civilians.[2] Russian forces have been routinely striking civilian targets in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast since February 2022, with the most recent instances including a drone strike against a market in Nikopol on April 4 that killed five civilians and injured 28 others.[3] ISW continues to assess that Russian forces pervasively employ human safari tactics — the deliberate tactic of using FPV drones to search for and strike civilian targets — in southern Ukraine using tactical drones, especially FPV drones, to strike civilians and civilian infrastructure.[4] Russian forces have also integrated intentional civilian harm into their wider operation battlefield air interdiction (BAI) template by using FPVs to strike mainly civilian targets in the Ukrainian near rear in order to stop all use of given roads. Traditional BAI focuses strikes on military objects and dual-use infrastructure but does not specifically target civilian objects.[5] The intentional use of civilian harm as a tool of war is a war crime.

The Kremlin continues to set conditions for possible future aggression against the Baltic states. Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) Spokesperson Maria Zakharova announced on April 7 that the Russian government issued a warning to the Baltic states regarding their alleged decision to allow Ukrainian drones to operate in their airspace.[6] Zakharova threatened that Russia will take unspecified “retaliatory measures” if the Baltic states fail to heed Russia’s warning. Russian State Duma deputies also accused the Baltic states of committing acts of aggression against Russia by being "complicit" in Ukrainian drone operations against Russia and claimed that Russian forces will destroy any alleged Ukrainian drones over Baltic airspace and may impose unspecified "blockades" on the Baltic states.[7] The Kremlin may be setting conditions to use these allegations as the basis for military action in the airspace over one or more of the Baltic states.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky reiterated Ukraine’s willingness to conduct a ceasefire over the Easter holiday and/or a ceasefire on energy infrastructure strikes. Zelensky stated on April 6 that Ukraine is prepared to halt strikes against Russian energy infrastructure if Russia reciprocates and reiterated his offer for a temporary ceasefire for the Easter holidays (likely the Orthodox Easter on April 12), including specifically a moratorium against strikes on energy infrastructure.[8] Zelensky stated that the US has already given Ukraine's proposal to Russia and that the US is working with Ukraine on formalizing security guarantees that would accompany the energy infrastructure strikes moratorium. Zelensky continues to offer concessions and demonstrate Ukraine's willingness to make meaningful compromises.[9] Russian officials have, in stark contrast, continuously rejected Ukrainian ceasefire proposals, including Zelensky’s recent Easter ceasefire proposal, and it is highly unlikely Russia will accept Zelensky’s energy ceasefire offer.[10]

The Kremlin is reportedly considering replacing three Russian governors ahead of the September 2026 elections. Three sources close to the Russian Presidential Administration told Russian business newspaper Vedomosti on April 6 that Russian authorities are discussing replacing Belgorod Oblast Governor Vyacheslav Gladkov, Bryansk Oblast Governor Alexander Bogomaz, and Republic of Dagestan Head Sergey Melikov.[11] Belgorod and Bryansk oblasts both border Ukraine and have suffered from the war's effects, along with neighboring Kursk Oblast. One source claimed to Vedomosti that Gladkov could step down prior to the September 2026 Belgorod Oblast elections due to health issues, but a Russian milblogger pointed out that the rumors around Gladkov’s resignation emerged after his criticism of the internet and Telegram shutdowns in the Belgorod Oblast border area.[12] Two sources told Vedomosti that Bogomaz and Melikov may also leave their posts.[13] The Kremlin may be scapegoating local officials for failing to protect Russian border oblasts from Ukrainian strikes and natural disasters like the Dagestan flooding. The Kremlin has persecuted and scapegoated former officials of Kursk, Belgorod, and Bryansk oblasts for the Kremlin’s own failures to adequately respond to the Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast in 2024 and Ukrainian cross-border raids in 2023 and 2024.[14] The Kremlin has already replaced former Kursk Oblast Governor Alexei Smirnov, so replacing Gladkov and Bogomaz would mark leadership changes in all three Russian oblasts bordering northern Ukraine since Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. The Kremlin may hope to deflect dissatisfaction in border areas suffering the effects of Russia's invasion of Ukraine away from Russian President Vladimir Putin and the United Russia party ahead of the September 2026 elections.

Key Takeaways:

• Russian forces continue to conduct drone strikes intentionally targeting civilians in southern Ukraine, weaponizing civilian harm as an intentional tool of war.
• The Kremlin continues to set conditions for possible future aggression against the Baltic states.
• Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky reiterated Ukraine’s willingness to conduct a ceasefire over the Easter holiday and/or a ceasefire on energy infrastructure strikes.
• The Kremlin is reportedly considering replacing three Russian governors ahead of the September 2026 elections.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Slovyansk direction.
• Ukrainian forces struck oil infrastructure in Leningrad Oblast and a defense industrial plant in Voronezh Oblast.
• Russian forces launched 110 drones against Ukraine.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.  

• Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
• Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis
• Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
• Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
• Significant Activity in Belarus

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Ukrainian forces struck oil infrastructure in Leningrad Oblast and a defense industrial plant in Voronezh Oblast overnight on April 6 to 7. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces struck the Ust-Luga oil terminal near Slobodka, Leningrad Oblast, damaging three Transneft-Baltika oil tanks.[15] Leningrad Oblast Governor Alexander Drozhdenko claimed that Russian forces downed 22 drones over the oblast, and footage published on April 7 shows fires at the port of Ust-Luga.[16] The April 6 to 7 strike was the fifth Ukrainian strike against Russian oil infrastructure in and near Ust-Luga since the night of March 24 to 25.[17] Ukrainian Center for Countering Disinformation Head Lieutenant Andriy Kovalenko, who frequently reports on successful Ukrainian strikes, reported that recent Ukrainian strikes have damaged at least 30 percent of oil storage tanks at the port.[18]

Russian opposition outlet Astra reported that Ukrainian forces also struck the Minudobreniya chemical plant in Rossosh, Voronezh Oblast, overnight and assessed that the strike caused a fire at a warehouse.[19] The Minudobreniya chemical plant is one of Russia's largest producers of ammonium nitrate, a component of explosives, with a production capacity of over 550,000 tons per year.[20] A Ukrainian open-source intelligence project reported that the strike damaged the main fertilizer storage building.[21] Voronezh Oblast Governor Alexander Gusev acknowledged that Ukrainian forces struck a warehouse in the oblast, causing a fire.[22]

Ukrainian sources continue to provide battle damage assessments (BDAs) for recent strikes against Russian oil and defense industrial assets. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on April 7 that Ukrainian strikes against oil infrastructure in the port of Primorsk, Leningrad Oblast, on April 4 to 5 damaged three RVSP-20000 oil tanks, each with a capacity of 20,000 cubic meters, and ignited oil products.[23] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that the April 4 to 5 strikes also damaged two primary crude oil processing units and a unit producing petroleum bitumen at the Lukoil-Nizhegorodnefteorgsintez refinery in Kstovo, Nizhny Novgorod Oblast. A Ukrainian open-source intelligence project published satellite imagery on April 7 showing damage to the Tolyattikauchuk chemical plant in Tolyatti, Samara Oblast, following Ukrainian strikes on April 3 to 4.[24] The Ukrainian project assessed that the strikes damaged the BK-4 high-purity isobutylene production plant, disrupting the plant's ability to produce synthetic rubber.

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in Sumy Oblast along the international border)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Sumy Oblast on April 7 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked in northern Sumy Oblast, including northeast of Sumy City near Yunakivka and Oleksiivka, on April 6 and 7.[25]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian Smuglyanka Detachment and Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Kindrativka (north of Sumy City).[26] Elements of the 30th Motorized Rifle Regiment (72nd Motorized Rifle Division, 44th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) reportedly continue to operate near Mala Korchakivka (northeast of Sumy City).[27] Artillery crews of the 56th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (7th VDV Division) reportedly continue to strike Ukrainian forces and drone control points in northern Sumy Oblast.[28]

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border to create a defensible buffer zone with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Russian forces recently conducted an infiltration mission in northern Kharkiv Oblast.

Assessed Russian infiltrations: Geolocated footage published on April 7 shows Ukrainian forces striking a Russian servicemember in central Vilcha (northeast of Kharkiv City) after what ISW assesses was a Russian infiltration mission that did not change control of terrain or the forward edge of the battle area (FEBA).[29]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk, Vovchanski Khutory, and Starytsya and toward Verkhyna Pysarivka and Izbytske on April 6 and 7.[30] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Izbytske.[31]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 71st Guards Motorized Rifle Division (14th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian equipment near Volokhivske (northeast of Kharkiv City).[32] Elements of the Chechen Akhmat Spetsnaz Kornet Group (204th Akhmat Spetsnaz Regiment) are reportedly intercepting Ukrainian drones in the Kharkiv direction.[33]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Velykyi Burluk direction on April 7 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked southeast of Velykyi Burluk toward Kolodyazne on April 6 and 7.[34] A Ukrainian brigade operating in the Velykyi Burluk direction reported on April 6 that Ukrainian forces conducted a mechanized assault in the Dvorichanske direction (southeast of Velykyi Burluk).[35]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Oskil River (Russian objective: Cross the Oskil River in Kharkiv Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on April 7 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked within Kupyansk itself; east of Kupyansk near Petropavlivka; and southeast of Kupyansk near Pishchane and Kurylivka and toward Kivsharivka and Novoosynove on April 6 and 7.[36] A source reporting on the Russian Western Grouping of Forces claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked within northern Kupyansk.[37]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 68th Motorized Rifle Division (6th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) and 1st Guards Tank Army (GTA, Moscow Military District [MMD]) are reportedly operating near Petropavlivka.[38]

Russian forces continued offensive operations east of Borova near Novoserhiivka and southeast of Borova near Tverdokhlibove on April 6 and 7 but did not advance.[39]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)

Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Slovyansk direction.

Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on April 6 shows elements of the Shram battalion of the Russian 204th Akhmat Spetsnaz Regiment shelling Ukrainian positions in central Yampil (southeast of Lyman), indicating that Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the area.[40]

Unconfirmed claims: A source reporting on the Russian Western Grouping of Forces claimed that Russian forces advanced in western Yarova (northwest of Lyman).[41] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced northeast of Nykyforivka (southeast of Slovyansk).[42] A Russian milblogger claimed that northern Nykyforivka is a contested "gray zone."[43]

Refinement of areas under Russian claims: Geolocated footage published on March 27 shows elements of the Russian 85th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 2nd Luhansk People's Republic Army Corps [LNR AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) striking Ukrainian positions in southeastern Lypivka and northeastern Fedorivka Druha (both southeast of Slovyansk), contrary to Russian claims from March 26 that Russian forces held these areas.[44]

Russian forces attacked near Lyman itself; northwest of Lyman near Svyatohirsk; north of Lyman near Stavky and Drobysheve; southeast of Lyman toward Yampil; east of Slovyansk near Kryva Luka and Riznykivka and toward Rai-Oleksandrivka; and southeast of Slovyansk near Lypivka, Fedorivka Druha, and Nykyforivka on April 6 and 7.[45]

A Ukrainian artillery gunner operating in the Slovyansk direction reported on April 7 that Russian forces have intensified motorized assaults and recently conducted an unsuccessful motorized assault with 15 motorcycles.[46]

A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces targeted Ukrainian bridges and other crossings over the Siverskyi Donets River near Mayaky, Ozerne, and Yeremivka (all southwest to southeast of Lyman) and railway crossings along the Sosnove-Svyatohirsk line (northwest of Lyman).[47]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 85th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade are reportedly operating on the outskirts of Fedorivka Druha.[48]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area on April 7 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced northwest of Stupochky (northeast of Kostyantynivka), south of Illinivka (south of Kostyantynivka), and northeast of Stepanivka (southwest of Kostyantynivka).[49] Another Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces seized Berestok (south of Kostyantynivka).[50]

Russian forces attacked near Kostyantynivka itself; northeast of Kostyantynivka near Pryvillya, Minkivka, and Markove and toward Maiske; southeast of Kostyantynivka near Ivanopillya; south of Kostyantynivka near Pleshchiivka and Kleban-Byk; southwest of Kostyantynivka near Stepanivka and Illinivka; south of Druzhkivka near Rusyn Yar; and southwest of Druzhkivka near Sofiivka on April 6 and 7.[51] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked in Kostyantynivka.[52]

The commander of a Ukrainian battalion operating in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area reported on April 7 that Russian forces have switched from sending assault groups of two to three soldiers to attacking with one soldier every 20 to 30 minutes.[53]

Russian milbloggers claimed on April 7 that Minkivka and Illinivka both remain contested “gray zones”.[54]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 70th Motorized Rifle Division (18th CAA, SMD) are reportedly operating near Maiske and Virolyubivka (southeast of Druzhkivka).[55] First-person view (FPV) drones of the 238th Artillery Brigade (8th CAA, SMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian equipment near Mykolaipillya (south of Druzhkivka).[56] Drone operators of the 57th Separate Spetsnaz Company (8th CAA) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Torske and Novohryhorivka (both southwest of Druzhkivka).[57] Drone operators of the Zmey Gorynych detachment (Russian Federal Security Service’s [FSB] Donetsk People’s Republic [DNR] Directorate) and elements of the 4th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd CAA) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Kostyantynivka.[58] Elements of the 102nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (150th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions and equipment in the Kostyantynivka direction.[59]

Neither Ukrainian nor Russian sources reported ground activity in the Dobropillya tactical area on April 7.

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 56th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (7th VDV Division) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Dobropillya and Krasnopodillya (south of Dobropillya).[60] Reconnaissance elements of the 102nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (150th Motorized Rifle Division) are reportedly operating in the Dobropillya direction.[61]

Russian forces recently conducted an infiltration mission in the Pokrovsk direction.

Assessed Russian infiltrations: Geolocated footage published on April 7 shows Ukrainian forces striking a Russian position southwest of Rodynske (north of Pokrovsk) after what ISW assesses was a Russian infiltration mission that did not change the control of terrain or the forward edge of the battle area (FEBA) at this time.[62]

Russian forces attacked near Pokrovsk itself; northwest of Pokrovsk near Hryshyne and toward Novooleksandrivka and Vasylivka; north of Pokrovsk near Rodynske and Bilytske; east of Pokrovsk near Myrnohrad and Rivne; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Udachne, Novopidhorodne, and Kotlyne on April 6 and 7.[63]

Ukrainian forces continued their strike campaign against Russian frontline military assets in the Pokrovsk direction. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on April 7 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian drone control point near Udachne and a personnel concentration near Rodynske.[64]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 56th Separate Spetsnaz Battalion (51st CAA, formerly 1st DNR AC, SMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian communications equipment near Svitle (north of Pokrovsk).[65]

Russian forces continued offensive operations near Novopavlivka itself, northeast of Novopavlivka near Novomykolaivka and Muravka, and south of Novopavlivka near Filiya and Dachne on April 6 and 7 but did not advance.[66]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Oleksandrivka direction on April 7 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northeast of Oleksandrivka near Ivanivka; east of Oleksandrivka near Sichneve, Myrne, and Oleksandrohrad; southeast of Oleksandrivka near Krasnohirske and toward Verbove, Zlahoda, Pryvillya, Vorone, Sosnivka, Berezove, Ternove, and Kalynivske; and southwest of Oleksandrivka toward Ternuvate, Boikove, and Rizdvyanka on April 6 and 7.[67]

Ukrainian drone strikes are reportedly preventing Russian motorized assaults in the Oleksandrivka direction. The head of unmanned systems for a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Oleksandrivka direction reported that Russian forces have conducted offensive operations in the area in the past three weeks (since roughly March 17).[68] The unmanned systems head stated that Russian forces initially attacked Ukrainian defenses on the Donetsk-Dnipropetrovsk Oblast border with motorcycles and all-terrain vehicles (ATVs) with cover from heavy equipment and tanks but that Ukrainian drone strikes forced Russian forces to adjust their tactics to small group infiltrations.

Ukrainian forces continued their strike campaign against Russian frontline military assets in the Oleksandrivka direction. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on April 7 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian personnel concentration near Krasnohirske.[69]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 14th Separate Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff's Main Directorate [GRU]) are striking Ukrainian forces near Zorivka (southwest of Oleksandrivka).[70]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Hulyaipole direction on April 7 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked near Hulyaipole itself; northwest of Hulyaipole near Varvarivka, Svyatopetrivka, Pryluky, Olenokostyantynivka, Dobropillya, Tsvitkove, and Zelene and toward Vozdvyzhivka and Verkhnya Tersa; west of Hulyaipole near Zaliznychne and Hirke; and southwest of Hulyaipole near Charivne and Myrne and toward Hulyapilske on April 6 and 7.[71]

Ukrainian forces continued their strike campaign against Russian frontline military assets in the Hulyaipole direction. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on April 7 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian drone control point near Zelene (northwest of Hulyaipole).[72]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 40th Separate Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet) are striking Ukrainian forces in Vozdvyzhivka.[73] Drone operators of the 38th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (35th CAA, Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Hulyaipilske.[74] Drone operators of the 57th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (5th CAA, EMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces in Zaporizhia Oblast, likely referring to the Hulyaipole direction.[75] Drone operators of the 14th Separate Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff's Main Directorate [GRU]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Lyubitske (northwest of Hulyaipole).[76]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on April 7 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced southwest of Novoyakovlivka (northwest of Orikhiv).[77]

Russian forces attacked west of Orikhiv near Shcherbaky on April 6 and 7.[78] A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Prymorske, Richne, Stepnohirsk, and Novoyakovlivka (all northwest of Orikhiv).[79]

A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed on April 6 that Russian forces are struggling to contain Ukrainian advances in western Zaporizhia Oblast and blamed Russian military authorities for submitting false reports about advances and prematurely claiming seizures.[80]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Shaman detachment of the Russian 1455th Motorized Rifle Regiment (reportedly of the 42nd Motorized Rifle Division, 58th CAA, Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces in the Orikhiv direction.[81]

Ukrainian forces continued their mid-range strike campaign against military targets in occupied Zaporizhia Oblast. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on April 7 that Ukrainian forces struck a concentration of Russian manpower near Strohanivka (approximately 90 kilometers from the frontline).[82] A Ukrainian brigade reported on April 7 that it struck a Russian Pantsir-S air defense system in occupied Zaporizhia Oblast, and geolocated footage published on April 7 confirms the strike at the Melitopol Air Base (approximately 60 kilometers from the frontline).[83]

Russian forces continued offensive operations northeast of Kherson City toward the Antonivskyi Bridge and southwest of Kherson City near Bilohrudskyi Island on April 6 and 7 but did not advance.[84]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

See topline text for reports of Russian strikes against Dnipropetrovsk Oblast.

Russian forces conducted a series of drone strikes against Ukraine overnight on April 6 to 7. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 110 Shahed-type, Gerbera-type, Italmas-type, and other drones — of which about 70 were Shaheds — from the directions of Bryansk and Oryol cities; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; and occupied Hvardiiske and Cape Chauda, Crimea.[85] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 77 drones, that 31 drones struck 14 locations, and that drone debris fell at nine locations. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces struck energy, transport, and administrative infrastructure in Chernihiv Oblast.[86]

Ukraine is preparing to withstand potential Russian strikes against water supply infrastructure in the future. Ukrainian State Agency for Infrastructure Restoration and Development Head Serhiy Sukhomlyn stated on April 7 that the agency is constructing 17 facilities in an unspecified large regional center to protect heat and water supply infrastructure against potential future Russian drone strikes.[87] Sukhomlyn stated that the protections will be available throughout Ukraine. Sukhomlyn stated that the Ukrainian Ministry of Communities and Territorial Development is building protected pumping stations on barges to supply cities with water from the Dnipro or Dniester rivers in the event of a Russian strike on water infrastructure. Ukrainian officials have recently warned that Russian forces will likely shift their long-range strike campaign toward Ukrainian water supply and logistics targets in Spring-Summer 2026 following their campaign against energy infrastructure in Winter 2025-2026.[88]

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

Nothing significant to report.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.