Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, April 6, 2026

Assessment as of: 8:00 PM ET

Data Cutoff: 12:10 PM ET

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Ukraine’s expanding long-range strike campaign against Russian oil infrastructure is exploiting overstretched Russian air defenses and significantly damaging Russian oil export capabilities. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on April 6 that Ukrainian forces struck the Sheskharis oil terminal near the port of Novorossiysk, Krasnodar Krai overnight on April 5 to 6, starting a large fire.[1] Geolocated footage published on April 6 shows fires at oil tanker berths at the port of Novorossiysk.[2] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) acknowledged on April 6 that Ukrainian forces struck oil terminals in Novorossiysk.[3] Two industry sources told Reuters on April 6 that the fires covered the main pier belonging to Russian state-controlled petroleum company Transneft near three oil tanker berths.[4] NASA Fire Information for Resource Management System (FIRMS) data shows heat anomalies at the Sheskharis oil terminal starting on April 5.[5] Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) Commander Major Robert “Magyar” Brovdi reported that Ukrainian forces also struck the Admiral Makarov Admiral Grigorovich-class frigate in the port of Novorossiysk overnight.[6] Geolocated footage published on April 6 shows Ukrainian drones striking a Russian Admiral Grigorovich-class frigate in the port of Novorossiysk.[7] 

Russia’s geographical size poses an enormous challenge to defend, especially with traditional air defense systems on which the Russians reportedly still rely to protect against Ukraine drone salvoes.[8] The need to cover vast areas with air defense systems is reportedly straining Russian air defenses, especially given Ukraine’s extensive strikes campaign against Russian air defense radars.[9]

Russian milbloggers continued to criticize the ineffectiveness of Russian air defense systems and highlight the impact of Ukrainian strikes. A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger stated on April 6 that the constant Ukrainian strikes against Russian facilities are “stretching” Russian surface-to-air missile air defense forces “to the limit” and exhausting ammunition “at an accelerated rate” as Russia cannot simply produce “thousands” of missiles for Pantsir air defense systems “out of thin air.”[10] The milblogger stated that these limitations render ineffective Russian information space suggestions that Russia increase surface-to-air missile and air defense system production and encouraged Russian forces to adapt the Ukrainian emphasis on mobile fire groups, interceptor drones, and acoustic reconnaissance systems. Russian milbloggers also highlighted the resources consumed by repairing damage from Ukrainian strikes, daytime Ukrainian drone strikes exhausting Russian air defense, the systematic nature of the Ukrainian long-range drone strikes, and the vulnerability of Russian warships stationed at bases within Ukrainian drone range.[11]

Russia does not appear to have fully developed or deployed mobile fire teams, drone interceptors, or other low-cost distributable systems to defend against repeated massed Ukrainian drone strikes on widely dispersed targets. The Kremlin has reportedly authorized private enterprises to develop their own, presumably low-cost, counter-drone approaches, but the targets Ukrainian forces have been striking do not appear to have been adequately covered with such techniques.[12] Ukraine’s long-range strike campaign will likely cause Russian forces to divert valuable resources and manpower to air defense efforts away from efforts against Ukraine itself. Russian forces will likely adapt over time, given their initial forays into drone interceptors and discussions of mobile fire teams, but may continue to find the challenge of defending many large, widely separated facilities daunting.

Ukraine’s long-range strike campaign is significantly damaging Russian oil export capabilities. Bloomberg reported that ship tracking data indicates that the Jewel oil tanker began loading at the oil export port of Ust-Luga, Leningrad Oblast on April 4 — nine days after the Ukrainian strike against the port overnight on March 24 to 25 that reportedly halted all oil loadings at the port.[13] A Western security official told the Financial Times (FT) on April 6 that recent Ukrainian strikes against the oil export port of Primorsk have burned $200 million of oil.[14] FT also noted, citing commodity prices benchmarks provider Argus’ data, that exports of the petrochemical naphtha from Ust-Luga fell by about 70 percent in the last week of March following the Ukrainian strikes that began on the night of March 24 to 25.[15]

The Russian military is experiencing manpower challenges and is unable to recruit enough contract soldiers to replace its frontline losses. Ukraine’s “I Want to Live” initiative reported on April 6 that the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) recruited fewer soldiers in the first three months of 2026 than it would need to be on track to meet its 2026 recruiting target of 409,000 contract soldiers.[16] The initiative reported that the Russian MoD would need to recruit 1,100-1,150 soldiers a day to meet its annual recruiting target but was only able to recruit an average of 940 contract soldiers a day in the first three months of 2026. The initiative reported that the MoD plans to recruit most heavily in the Central and Volga federal districts and to continue to recruit in occupied Ukraine. The initiative noted that about 24 percent of all contract soldiers were under criminal investigation or conviction, and that nearly 40 percent of these were debtors.

The Russian MoD is attempting to generate additional manpower through other sources, regardless of the financial and societal costs. Russian independent outlet Mozhem Obyasnit (We Can Explain) reported on April 2 that at least 12 Russian federal subjects increased one-time signing bonuses by between 50 and 80 percent since mid-February 2026.[17] Russian authorities have also recently intensified their forced covert mobilization effort in early 2026, with Russian Minister of Science and Higher Education Valery Falkov reportedly directing large universities to ensure that at least two percent of students must sign MoD contracts and Ryazan Oblast Governor Pavel Malkov issuing a decree requiring medium and large businesses in Ryazan Oblast to select employees to sign contracts with the MoD.[18]

Russian forces are struggling to recruit enough troops to replace frontline losses. Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) Commander Major Robert “Magyar” Brovdi reported that Russia’s recruitment rate in March 2026 was below its loss rate on the battlefield for the fourth month in a row (since December 2025).[19] Ukraine’s “I Want To Live” initiative‘s data indicates that Russian forces recruited roughly 80,456 in the first three months of 2026, and data from the Ukrainian General Staff indicates that Russian forces suffered 85,290 casualties in the same time frame.[20] Russian losses may be even higher than the Ukrainian General Staff data indicates. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky reported that Russian forces lost more than 35,000 soldiers in March alone, whereas the Ukrainian General Staff reported a total of 30,800 Russian losses in March.[21]

Russia is facing increasing recruitment challenges as the pool of Russians willing to sign contracts declines, despite Kremlin efforts to increase signing bonuses and tap additional sources of manpower. ISW previously forecasted in February 2025 that Russia would likely face a number of manpower issues in 12 to 18 months if Ukrainian forces continued to inflict casualties on Russia at the then-prevailing rate, which they have done.[22] Russian President Vladimir Putin likely continues to desire to offset the significant backlash that any future limited involuntary reserve callup would cause and is likely reluctant to increase financial incentives for new recruits dramatically out of concern for the federal budget, any benefits that the Kremlin is gaining from increased oil prices due to the ongoing war in the Middle East and the United States’ partial lifting of sanctions on Russia notwithstanding.[23]

Ukraine’s Western partners continue to provide air defense aid to Ukraine. The Ukrainian Ministry of Defense (MoD) announced on April 6 that Sweden will provide Ukraine with Tridon Mk2 air defense systems (truck-mounted systems equipped with 40 mm anti-aircraft guns) worth 400 million euros (roughly $462 million) designed to counter Shahed drones.[24]

Key Takeaways:

• Ukraine’s expanding long-range strike campaign against Russian oil infrastructure is exploiting overstretched Russian air defenses and significantly damaging Russian oil export capabilities.
• Russian milbloggers continued to criticize the ineffectiveness of Russian air defense systems and highlight the impact of Ukrainian strikes.
• The Russian military is experiencing manpower challenges and is unable to recruit enough contract soldiers to replace its frontline losses.
• The Russian MoD is attempting to generate additional manpower through other sources, regardless of the financial and societal costs.
• Russia is facing increasing recruitment challenges as the pool of Russians willing to sign contracts declines, despite Kremlin efforts to increase signing bonuses and tap additional sources of manpower.
• Ukraine’s Western partners continue to provide air defense aid to Ukraine.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced in northern Kharkiv Oblast and the Velykyi Burluk direction.
• Russian forces launched 141 drones against Ukraine.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.    

• Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
• Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis
• Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
• Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
• Significant Activity in Belarus

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

See topline text for Ukrainian strikes against Russian territory.

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in Sumy Oblast along the international border)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Sumy Oblast on April 6 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked in northern Sumy Oblast, including north of Sumy City near Sopych, northeast of Sumy City near Sadky, and east of Sumy City toward Myropillya, on April 5 and 6.[25]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 41st Motorized Rifle Regiment (72nd Motorized Rifle Division, 44th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) and of the 15th Tank Regiment (69th Motorized Rifle Division, 6th Combined Arms Army [CAA], LMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Mala Rybytsya (northeast of Sumy City).[26]

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border to create a defensible buffer zone with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on April 6 but did not advance.

Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on April 4 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced southwest of Vovchansk (northeast of Kharkiv City), likely connected to other observed Ukrainian positions in southwestern Vovchansk.[27]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Kharkiv City near Starytsya, Hrafske, and Vovchansk and toward Losivka and Buhaivka on April 5 and 6.[28] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Vilcha and Vovchanski Khutory (both northeast of Kharkiv City).[29]

A commander of a Ukrainian battalion operating in northern Kharkiv Oblast reported on April 6 that Russian forces are concentrating manpower close to the frontline and waiting for poor weather conditions to provide concealment for infiltration missions.[30]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 79th Motorized Rifle Regiment and 11th Tank Regiment (both 18th Motorized Rifle Division, 11th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) are reportedly operating near Izbytske (northeast of Kharkiv City).[31]

Ukrainian forces continued their strike campaign against Russian military assets within Russia. The Ukrainian State Border Guard reported on April 6 that drone operators of one of its brigades recently struck a Russian anti-tank mine stockpile in the Kharkiv direction in Belgorod Oblast, causing a large explosion.[32]

Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Velykyi Burluk direction.

Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on April 6 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced west of Milove (northeast of Velykyi Burluk).[33]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Velykyi Burluk near Chuhunivka and Shevyakivka and southeast of Velykyi Burluk toward Kolodyazne on April 6.[34]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Oskil River (Russian objective: Cross the Oskil River in Kharkiv Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on April 6 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked within Kupyansk itself, east of Kupyansk near Petropavlivka, and southeast of Kupyansk near Pishchane and toward Kurylivka and Novoosynove on April 5 and 6.[35] A Russian milblogger claimed Ukrainian forces counterattacked within northern Kupyansk.[36]

The commander of a Ukrainian reconnaissance company operating in the Kupyansk direction reported that Russian forces are attempting to cross the Oskil River near Holubivka (north of Kupyansk) before entering Kupyansk itself.[37] The commander reported that Ukrainian drones are striking Russian forces before they can consolidate positions. The commander stated that 10 to 15 Russian troops remain trapped in the ruins of a destroyed hospital in Kupyansk. The commander reported that Russian forces are attempting to resupply these isolated troops with first-person-view (FPV) drones and that the Russian personnel continue refusing to surrender due to the hope that they will receive reinforcements.[38]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 68th Motorized Rifle Division (6th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) are reportedly operating in the Kupyansk direction.[39]

Russian forces attacked north of Borova toward Novoplatonivka and east of Borova toward Kopanky on April 5 and 6 but did not advance.[40]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)

Russian forces recently infiltrated in the Slovyansk direction.

Assessed Russian infiltrations: Geolocated footage published on April 6 shows Russian servicemembers clearing Ukrainian dugouts in the fields east of Rai-Oleksandrivka after what ISW assesses was a Russian infiltration mission that did not change control of terrain or the forward edge of the battle area (FEBA).[41] Geolocated footage published on April 1 shows a Ukrainian position north of Riznykivka (Riznykivka), indicating that Russian forces most likely infiltrated around existing Ukrainian positions rather than seizing them as previously assessed.[42]

Russian forces attacked toward Lyman itself, southeast of Lyman toward Yampil, and east of Slovyansk near Riznykivka and Zakitne and toward Rai-Oleksandrivka on April 5 and 6.[43]

Russian forces are likely preparing to intensify attacks near the Slovyansk-Kostyantynivka seam as part of the effort to seize Slovyansk. Ukrainian 11th AC Spokesperson Lieutenant Colonel Dmytro Zaporozhets stated on April 6 that Russian forces are accumulating personnel, light motorized vehicles, and armored vehicles for the effort against Slovyansk when weather conditions become drier.[44] Zaporozhets specified that Russian forces are accumulating in the "Kramatorsk direction," likely referring to the area of the frontline east of Kramatorsk and southeast of Slovyansk, but noted that Russian forces here are preparing to support the offensive against Slovyansk. Zaporozhets observed that the terrain east of Kramatorsk is not suitable for ground operations as it consists of open fields and small settlements through which Russian forces would struggle to advance.

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 88th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 2nd Luhansk People’s Republic Army Corps [LNR AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) are operating east of Rai-Oleksandrivka.[45] First-person view (FPV) drone operators of the 1234th Motorized Rifle Regiment (67th Motorized Rifle Division, 25th CAA, Central Military District [CMD]) are conducting reconnaissance in Mykolaivka (east of Slovyansk).[46] Elements of the 85th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd CAA) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Fedorivka Druha (southeast of Slovyansk).[47]

Russian forces recently conducted an infiltration mission in Kostyantynivka.

Russian infiltrations: Geolocated footage published on April 4 shows Russian forces operating in northeastern Kostyantynivka in what ISW assesses was an infiltration mission that did not change the control of terrain of forward edge of the battle area (FEBA).[48]

Russian forces attacked near Kostyantynivka itself; north of Kostyantynivka toward Virolyubivka; northeast of Orikhovo-Vasylivka, Pryvillya, and Markove and toward Maiske; southeast of Kostyantynivka near Ivanopillya; south of Kostyantynivka near Pleshchiivka and Kleban-Byk; southwest of Kostyantynivka near Stepanivka and Illinivka; south of Druzhkivka near Rusyn Yar; southwest of Druzhkivka near Novopavlivka and Sofiivka on April 5 and 6.[49] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Chasiv Yar (northeast of Kostyantynivka).[50]  

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian Zmey Gorynych detachment (Russian Federal Security Service’s [FSB] Donetsk People's Republic [DNR] Directorate) are striking Ukrainian forces in Kostyantynivka.[51] Elements of the 70th Motorized Rifle Division (18th CAA, SMD) are reportedly fighting toward Maiske and Virolyubivka.[52] Elements of the 78th Sever-Akhmat Motorized Rifle Regiment (42nd Motorized Rifle Division, 58th CAA, SMD) and 1195th Motorized Rifle Regiment (41st CAA, Central Military District [CMD]) are reportedly operating in the Kostyantynivka direction.[53]

Russian forces continued offensive operations east of Dobropillya near Novyi Donbas on April 6 but did not advance.[54]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 150th Motorized Rifle Division (8th CAA, SMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces in the Dobropillya tactical area.[55] Drone operators of Smuglyanka Detachment and Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies are reportedly operating between Mezhova (north of Novopavlivka) and Dobropillya.[56]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction on April 6 but did not advance.

Assessed Russian infiltration: Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported on April 5 that Ukrainian forces maintain positions in northern and northeastern Pokrovsk, indicating that Russian forces have most likely infiltrated around the Ukrainian positions rather than having seized them as previously assessed.[57]

Russian forces attacked near Pokrovsk itself; northwest of Pokrovsk near Hryshyne and toward Novooleksandrivka; north of Pokrovsk near Rodynske and Bilytske; northeast of Pokrovsk near Bilytske; east of Pokrovsk near Myrnohrad and Rivne; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Kotlyne and Udachne on April 5 and 6.[58] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked west of Rodynske.[59]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 57th Spetsnaz Brigade (8th CAA) are striking Ukrainian forces near Shevchenko and Novofedorivka (both northwest of Pokrovsk).[60]

Russian forces continued offensive operations northeast of Novopavlivka near Novomykolaivka and Muravka and south of Novopavlivka near Filiya on April 5 and 6.[61]

Russian forces recently conducted infiltrations in the Oleksandrivka direction.

Assessed Russian infiltrations: Geolocated footage published on April 5 and 6 shows Ukrainian forces striking Russian-occupied buildings in central Ternove and northeastern and western Berezove (both southeast of Oleksandrivka) after what ISW assesses were Russian infiltration missions that did not change the control of terrain or the FEBA.[62]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Oleksandrivka near Sichneve, Krasnohirske, Zlahoda, Pryvillya, Ivanivka, Lisne, and Myrne and toward Sosnivka, Verbove, and Kalynivske on April 5 and 6.[63]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 14th Separate Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff's Main Directorate [GRU]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian vehicles near Zorivka (southwest of Oleksandrivka).[64]

Ukrainian forces continued their mid-range strike campaign against Russian military assets in occupied Donetsk Oblast. The Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) published geolocated footage on April 6 showing Ukrainian drone operators striking Russian Gerbera-type drone crews during drone launches from the occupied Donetsk City Airport (roughly 41 kilometers from the frontline) overnight on April 5 to 6.[65]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Hulyaipole direction on April 6 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked near Hulyaipole itself; northwest of Hulyaipole near Varvarivka, Svyatopetrivka, Pryluky, Olenokostyantynivka, and Zelene and toward Verkhnya Tersa and Vozdvyzhivka; west of Hulyaipole near Zaliznychne; and southwest of Hulyaipole near Hulyapilske on April 5 and 6.[66]

Ukrainian forces struck multiple frontline Russian multiple rocket launcher systems (MLRS) and radar systems in the Hulyaipole direction on the night of April 4 to 5. A Ukrainian drone unit operating in the Hulyaipole direction reported on April 5 that it struck $28 million worth of Russian MLRS and radar systems on the night of April 4 to 5, including two Grad MLRS, one Uragan MLRS, and a Zoopark-1 radar system.[67]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian Smuglyanka Detachment are reportedly spotting for guided glide bomb strikes against Vozdvyzhivka.[68]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on April 6 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northeast of Orikhiv near Stepnohirsk and toward Novoyakovlivka and west of Orikhiv near Shcherbaky on April 6.[69] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces continue counterattacking toward Kamyanske, Stepove, and Lobkove (all west of Orikhiv) and Plavni (northwest of Orikhiv).[70]

A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed on April 6 that the situation in western Zaporizhia Oblast continues to deteriorate as Ukrainian forces have pushed Russian infiltration groups from  Novoyakovlivka and Pavlivka (northwest of Orikhiv).[71]  The milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces had interdicted Russian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) ahead of the attacks. The milblogger criticized the Russian military command for false claims that Russian forces seized settlements when only small infiltration groups entered them. The milblogger specifically accused the Russian military command of falsely claiming to have seized Veselyanka and Richne (both northwest of Orikhiv).

Order of Battle: Signal elements of the Russian 7th Airborne (VDV) Division are reportedly operating in Zaporizhia Oblast.[72] Drone operators of the 1455th Motorized Rifle Regiment (operationally subordinated to the 42nd Motorized Rifle Division, 58th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating in the Orikhiv direction.[73]

Russian forces continued offensive operations northeast of Kherson City toward the Antonivskyi Bridge and southwest of Kherson City near Bilohrudyi Island on April 5 and 6 but did not advance.[74]

Ukrainian forces continued their long-range strikes against Russian military assets in occupied Crimea and the Black Sea on the night of April 5 to 6. The Ukrainian General Staff reported April 6 that Ukrainian forces struck a Be-12 amphibious aircraft near occupied Kacha (roughly 250 kilometers from the front line).[75] Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) Commander Major Robert “Magyar” Brovdi reported on April 6 that Ukrainian forces also struck the Syvash drilling platform in the Black Sea, likely west of occupied Crimea.[76] The Ukrainian Navy reported that Russian forces use the Syvash drilling rig to deploy surveillance equipment, communications relays, electronic warfare (EW) equipment, short-range air defenses, and special forces, and as storage for weapons including anti-tank missiles, anti-drone systems, and anti-boat systems.[77] The commander of a Ukrainian maritime drone unit operating in the Black Sea said that the unit recently struck a Russian large landing ship en route to Sevastopol.[78]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Russian forces continued long-range drone strikes against Ukrainian energy infrastructure overnight on April 5 to 6. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 141 Shahed-type, Gerbera-type, Italmas-type, and other strike drones, of which about 80 were Shaheds, from the directions of Bryansk, Kursk, and Oryol cities; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; and occupied Hvardiiske and Cape Chauda, Crimea.[79] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 114 Russian drones, that 26 drones struck 17 locations, and that debris from downed drones struck 13 locations. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces struck energy infrastructure in Chernihiv, Sumy, Kyiv, Zaporizhia, Dnipro, and Odesa oblasts.[80] Russian strikes also hit residential infrastructure in Odesa City, killing at least three and injuring at least 15 civilians.[81] Ukrainian power operators reported significant outages in Sumy, Kharkiv, Odesa, Kherson, and Chernihiv oblasts due to the Russian strikes.[82]

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky reported on April 6 that Russian forces have launched over 2,800 long-range drones, almost 1,350 glide bombs, and over 40 missiles at Ukraine in the past week (since about March 30).[83]

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

Nothing significant to report.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.