Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, April 5, 2026

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Ukrainian forces have intensified their long-range strike campaign against Russian oil infrastructure within roughly the last two weeks (since the night of March 22 to 23), focusing on the Russian Baltic Sea port and oil infrastructure in Leningrad Oblast critical to Russian oil exports. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on April 5 that Ukrainian forces struck the major oil export port of Primorsk, Leningrad Oblast, overnight on April 4 to 5, starting a fire.[1] The April 4 to 5 strike is the third Ukrainian strike against Primorsk within the last two weeks (previous strikes were overnight on March 22 to 23 and March 26 to 27).[2] Leningrad Oblast Governor Alexander Drozdenko acknowledged on April 5 the Ukrainian drone strike on Leningrad Oblast and reported damage to a section of an oil pipeline near Primorsk.[3] The Ukrainian General Staff reported on April 5 that Ukrainian forces also struck the Lukoil-Nizhegorodnefteorgsintez refinery in Kstovo, Nizhny Novgorod Oblast (roughly 1,000 kilometers from Primorsk) overnight, starting a fire.[4] Geolocated footage published on April 5 shows Russian air defenses operating near the refinery in Kstovo.[5] NASA Fire Information for Resource Management System (FIRMS) data shows heat anomalies at the refinery in Kstovo at around 0200 local time on April 5.[6] Nizhny Novgorod Oblast Governor Gleb Nikitin acknowledged on April 5 the Ukrainian strikes against the industrial zone of Kstovsky Raion and reported damage and fires at two facilities of Lukoil-Nizhegorodnefteorgsintez in addition to damage at the Novogorkovskaya Combined Heating and Power Plant (CHPP) in Kstovo.[7]

Russian milbloggers offered a muted response to recent Ukrainian strikes against Russian oil refineries, noting the damage that the strikes have inflicted on Russia’s oil export capacity and that the damage will be costly and time-consuming to repair.[8] A Kremlin-affiliated milblogger focused mostly on the alleged Ukrainian strike against a Russian cargo vessel off occupied Kherson Oblast, noting that the Russian shipbuilding industry will struggle to replace losses from such strikes.[9] A second Russian milblogger also speculated that Ukrainian forces are employing daytime drone strikes against Russian border regions to deplete Russian air defense munitions before employing long-range drones at low altitude for overnight strikes.[10] Russian milbloggers may have refrained from direct criticism of the Kremlin’s lack of response to the strikes due to Russian authorities’ increasing censorship of Telegram in recent weeks, against the backdrop of prominent milbloggers’ criticism of the Russian forces’ battlefield situation.[11] Russian milbloggers have previously complained about the Russian inability to repair damaged facilities due to parts sanctions and Russian air defense failures.[12]

The limitations of available Russian air defenses and the challenges inherent in protecting large infrastructure facilities across thousands of kilometers of distance are hindering the Kremlin's efforts to defend against Ukrainian long-range strikes. The Ukrainian strikes overnight on April 4 to 5 are part of a series of Ukrainian long-range strikes against eight separate Russian oil and defense industrial infrastructure targets in the previous 13 days (since the night of March 22 to 23), including oil terminals at Ust-Luga and Primorsk, Leningrad Oblast, oil refineries in Kstovo, Nizhny Novgorod Oblast, Kirishi, Leningrad Oblast, Yaroslavl, Yaroslavl Oblast, Ufa, Republic of Bashkortostan, and defense plants in Tolyatti and Chapayevsk, Samara Oblast.[13] The targets that Ukrainian forces have struck span over 1,700 kilometers from Primorsk and Ust-Luga in Leningrad Oblast to Ufa in the Republic of Bashkortostan. Ukrainian forces have struck some of these targets multiple times during this period, but the geographic dispersion and large sizes of the facilities likely hinder Russian air defense efforts.

Ukrainian counterattacks in the Hulyaipole and Oleksandrivka directions continue to disrupt Russian efforts in the Pokrovsk direction and the Russian spring-summer offensive throughout the theater. Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported on April 5 that Ukrainian counterattacks in the Hulyaipole and Oleksandrivka directions have forced Russian forces to divert naval infantry elements, including a significant part of the 120th Naval Infantry Division (Baltic Fleet) and the 40th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet), from the Dobropillya tactical area to the Oleksandrivka direction.[14] Mashovets reported on March 16 that Russian forces redeployed elements of the 40th Naval Infantry Brigade and the 120th Naval Infantry Division to the Oleksandrivka direction.[15] ISW previously observed indications that Russian forces had redeployed elements of the 40th Naval Infantry Brigade and 55th Naval Infantry Division (both Pacific Fleet) from the Dobropillya tactical area to the Hulyaipole direction as of late February 2026 and elements of the 68th Army Corps (AC, Eastern Military District [EMD]) from near Pokrovsk and Dobropillya to the Hulyaipole direction in early March 2026.[16] Mashovets noted on April 5 that the heavy losses that Russian forces have suffered in the seizure of Pokrovsk and in the Dobropillya tactical area have forced the Russian Central Grouping of Forces to reduce the intensity of its operations in these areas, and the redeployment of naval infantry and other elements away from the grouping of forces further weakens the Russian effort against Dobropillya.[17]

Ukrainian counterattacks in the Hulyaipole and Oleksandrivka directions continue to present the Russian military command with dilemmas that overstretched Russian forces appear challenged to meet. Continued Ukrainian counterattacks in the Hulyaipole and Oleksandrivka directions will likely continue to force the Russian military command to choose between defending against and trying to reverse the effects of the Ukrainian counterattacks and allocating manpower and material for offensive operations elsewhere on the frontline, including the Russian spring-summer 2026 offensive against Ukraine‘s Fortress Belt, which ISW assessed likely had begun as of March 19.[18]

Russia continues to use gas grenades in frontline chemical weapons strikes — in violation of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), of which Russia is a signatory. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on April 4 that it has documented around 400 instances of Russian forces using ammunition equipped with chemical agents in March 2026 alone and over 13,000 instances since February 2022, in violation of the CWC.[19] The Ukrainian General Staff stated that Russian forces frequently use drone-dropped K-51 and RG-Vo aerosol gas grenades, as well as makeshift containers that disperse chlorobenzylidenemalononitrile (CS) and chloroacetophenone (CN) — both of which are types of riot control (RC) agents banned for use in war — to force Ukrainian soldiers out of cover into the line of fire. ISW has observed reports that Russian forces repeatedly violated the CWC in the past, including an assessment supported by a June 2025 Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons’ (OPCW) report, July 2025 reports from Dutch and German intelligence agencies, and a May 2024 US Department of State (DoS) determination.[20] These reports are consistent with the Russian 810th Naval Infantry Brigade’s (Black Sea Fleet [BSF]) acknowledgement on its Telegram channel of Russia’s deliberate use of K-51 gas grenades in Ukraine in December 2023.[21]

Key Takeaways:

• Ukrainian forces have intensified their long-range strike campaign against Russian oil infrastructure within roughly the last two weeks (since the night of March 22 to 23), focusing on the Russian Baltic Sea port and oil infrastructure in Leningrad Oblast critical to Russian oil exports.
• The limitations of available Russian air defenses and the challenges inherent in protecting large infrastructure facilities across thousands of kilometers of distance are hindering the Kremlin's efforts to defend against Ukrainian long-range strikes.
• Ukrainian counterattacks in the Hulyaipole and Oleksandrivka directions continue to disrupt Russian efforts in the Pokrovsk direction and the Russian spring-summer offensive throughout the theater.
• Ukrainian counterattacks in the Hulyaipole and Oleksandrivka directions continue to present the Russian military command with dilemmas that overstretched Russian forces appear challenged to meet.
• Russia continues to use gas grenades in frontline chemical weapons strikes — in violation of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), of which Russia is a signatory.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Pokrovsk direction. Russian forces recently advanced in the Kupyansk direction.
• Russian forces launched 93 drones against Ukraine.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.  

• Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
• Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis
• Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
• Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
• Significant Activity in Belarus

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

See topline text.

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in Sumy Oblast along the international border)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Sumy direction on April 5 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked in northern Sumy Oblast, including southeast of Sumy City toward Ryasne and Novodmytrivka; northeast of Sumy City near Yablunivka and toward Sadky; and northwest of Sumy City near Sopych, on April 4 and 5.[22]

The Russian military command is reportedly withdrawing airborne (VDV) elements from the Sumy direction. A source reporting on the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces claimed that elements of the 83rd Separate VDV Brigade are withdrawing to Moscow Oblast for reconstitution.[23] ISW has observed reports of the brigade operating in the border areas of Kursk Oblast throughout late March 2026.[24] The source also continued to claim that elements of the 106th VDV Division are redeploying from the Sumy direction to the Kherson direction.[25] Russian milbloggers claimed in early March 2026 that the Russian military command deployed elements of the 106th VDV Division's 137th VDV Regiment from the Sumy direction to the Kherson direction but had to redeploy most of the regiment back to northern Sumy Oblast to respond to the "critical situation" that resulted from the move.[26] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian drone control over the road to Sudzha, Kursk Oblast, is hindering Russian logistics in the Sumy direction.[27]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies are reportedly operating in the Sumy direction.[28]

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border to create a defensible buffer zone with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on April 5 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northeast of Kharkiv City near Hrafske, Vilcha, Vovchansk, Vovchanski Khutory, and Starytsya and toward Verkhyna Pysarivka, Okrimivka, and Bochkove on April 4 and 5.[29] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Vilcha, Vovchanski Khutory, and Verkhnya Pysarivka.[30]

Order of Battle: Molniya drone operators of the Chechen Akhmat Spetsnaz Kornet Group (204th Akhmat Spetsnaz Regiment) are reportedly striking Ukrainian radars, electronic warfare (EW) systems, and positions in the Kharkiv direction.[31]

Russian forces continued offensive operations east of Velykyi Burluk near Ambarne on April 4 and 5 but did not advance.[32]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Oskil River (Russian objective: Cross the Oskil River in Kharkiv Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces recently marginally advanced in the Kupyansk direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on April 4 indicates that Russian forces recently marginally advanced west of Holubivka (northeast of Kupyansk).[33]

Russian forces attacked southeast of Kupyansk toward Kurylivka, Pishchane, Kivsharivka, Kupyansk-Vuzlovyi, and Novoosynove on April 4 and 5.[34] A source reporting on the Russian Western Grouping of Forces claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked within Kupyansk and near Holubivka.[35]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 1st Guards Tank Army (GTA, Moscow Military District [MMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian armored vehicles and artillery guns near Kupyansk and Kivsharivka.[36]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Borova direction on April 5 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked north of Borova near Novoplatonivka and northeast of Borova near Borivska Andriivka on April 4 and 5.[37]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 13th Tank Regiment (4th Tank Division, 1st GTA) are reportedly operating in the Shyikivka direction (southeast of Borova), and elements of the 423rd Motorized Rifle Regiment and 12th Tank Regiment (both 4th Tank Division) are reportedly operating in the Borova direction.[38]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Slovyansk direction on April 5 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked near Lyman itself; south of Lyman near Dibrova and toward Staryi Karavan and Brusivka; southeast of Lyman near Yampil; and east of Slovyansk near Platonivka, Riznykivka, and Kalenyky and toward Rai-Oleksandrivka on April 4 and 5.[39]

Order of Battle: Artillery elements of the Russian 88th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 2nd Luhansk People’s Republic Army Corps [LNR AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian drone operator positions near Rai-Oleksandrivka.[40] Elements of the 85th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd CAA) are reportedly operating near Rai-Oleksandrivka.[41] Drone operators of the Russian Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies and elements of the 488th Motorized Rifle Regiment (144th Motorized Rifle Division, 20th CAA, Moscow Military District [MMD]) are reportedly operating in the Lyman direction.[42]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area on April 5 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced to Dovha Balka (southwest Kostyantynivka).[43]

Russian forces attacked near and within Kostyantynivka itself; northeast of Kostyantynivka near Orikhovo-Vasylivka; south of Kostyantynivka near Pleshchiivka and Kleban-Byk; southwest of Kostyantynivka near Stepanivka and Illinivka, and toward Dovha Balka; and southwest of Druzhkivka near Novopavlivka and Sofiivka on April 4 and 5.[44] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Chasiv Yar (northeast of Kostyantynivka).[45]

Ukrainian 11th AC Spokesperson Lieutenant Colonel Dmytro Zaporozhets stated that Russian forces have intensified their air strikes against Kramatorsk and Slovyansk and Ukrainian frontline positions in the area.[46] Zaporozhets stated that Russian forces conducted fewer ground attacks in the past week (since roughly March 29) but almost doubled their use of tactical aviation. Zaporozhets denied Russian claims that Russian forces seized Minkivka (northeast of Kostyantynivka).

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the 2nd Battalion of the Russian 1442nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (6th Motorized Rifle Division, 3rd AC, under operational control of the Southern Grouping of Forces) are striking Ukrainian vehicles north of Kostyantynivka.[47]

Russian forces continued offensive operations east of Dobropillya near Novyi Donbas on April 4 and 5 but did not advance.[48]

Russian forces have reportedly recently reduced the intensity of their attacks in the Dobropillya tactical area. Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated on April 5 that Russian forces have recently significantly reduced their activity in the Shakhove-Sofiivka direction and Vilne-Nove Shakhove-Novyi Donbas area (all east of Dobropillya).[49] Mashovets reported that Russian forces are conducting attacks in small groups of one to two servicemembers but are accumulating forces in these areas.

Order of Battle: First-person view (FPV) drone operators of the Russian 33rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (20th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA, SMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian communications equipment and intercepting Ukrainian drones near Mykolaivka (northeast of Dobropillya) and Toretske (east of Dobropillya).[50] FPV drone operators of the 80th Sparta Separate Reconnaissance Battalion (51st CAA, formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic [DNR] AC, SMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian vehicles near Dobropillya.[51] Elements of the 102nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (150th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA) are reportedly operating in the Dobropillya direction.[52]

Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Pokrovsk direction.

Assessed Ukrainian advances: Mashovets reported that Ukrainian forces maintain positions between the cemetery in northeastern Pokrovsk and the “Ahroproduct LTD” building in northern Pokrovsk.[53]

Russian forces attacked near Pokrovsk itself; north of Pokrovsk near Bilytske and Rodynske; northeast of Pokrovsk near Rivne; east of Pokrovsk near Myrnohrad; southwest of Pokrovsk near Udachne; west of Pokrovsk toward Serhiivka; and northwest of Pokrovsk near Hryshyne and toward Novooleksandrivka on April 4 and 5.[54] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Rodynske.[55]

Russian forces are reportedly suffering more losses as they increase their attacks in the Pokrovsk direction. The spokesperson of a Ukrainian unmanned systems brigade operating in the Pokrovsk direction reported that Russian forces intensified the number of small group infantry assaults in the Pokrovsk direction in March 2026 as compared to February.[56] The spokesperson stated that Ukrainian forces eliminated over 500 Russian soldiers in March, a 21 percent increase compared to February. The spokesperson forecasted that Russian activity will likely further increase as springtime foliage appears and makes camouflage easier. The spokesperson reported that Russian forces usually operate tanks from concealed firing positions, so Ukrainian forces detect and strike the vehicles when Russian forces move them in the rear. A Ukrainian battalion operating in the Pokrovsk direction reported that Russian forces are launching dozens of FPV drones alongside ground attacks to clear the way for infantry.[57] Mashovets stated that Russian forces are massing near the mine near Rodynske and south of the settlement.[58] Mashovets reported that Russian forces are attacking near Hryshyne in relatively large groups of 10 to 20 servicemembers, often with light motorized vehicles.

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 29th Radiation, Chemical, and Biological Defense Brigade (Central Military District [CMD]) are striking Ukrainian vehicles in Svitle (northwest of Pokrovsk).[59] FPV drone operators of the 80th Sparta Separate Reconnaissance Battalion (51st CAA) are reportedly striking Ukrainian artillery guns and unmanned ground vehicles (UGVs) near Myrne, Matyasheve, and Krasnopillya (all northwest of Pokrovsk).[60]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Novopavlivka direction on April 5 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northeast of Novopavlivka near Novomykolaivka and Muravka and southwest of Novopavlivka near Filiya on April 4 and 5.[61]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian Maksim Krivonos Battalion (Russian Volunteer Corps) are reportedly striking Ukrainian UGVs and drone launchers near Novopavlivka, Mezhova (northwest of Novopavlivka), and Chuhuieve (north of Novopavlivka).[62]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Oleksandrivka direction on April 5 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northeast of Oleksandrivka near Oleksandrohrad, east of Oleksandrivka near Sichneve, and southeast of Oleksandrivka near Krasnohirske and toward Verbove and Kalynivske on April 4 and 5.[63]

Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief General Oleksandr Syrskyi reported on April 5 that Ukrainian forces have liberated over 480 square kilometers, including eight settlements in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast and four settlements in Zaporizhia Oblast, in the Oleksandrivka direction since Ukrainian forces began counterattacks in the area at the end of January 2026.[64] Ukrainian officials previously reported that Ukrainian forces had liberated nine settlements in the Oleksandrivka direction, including two in Zaporizhia Oblast and seven in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast, between an unspecified date and March 29.[65] A Ukrainian regiment operating in the Oleksandrivka direction rejected Russian claims that Russian forces seized Boikove, stating that Ukrainian forces maintain control over the settlement.[66]

Ukrainian forces continued their strike campaign against Russian frontline military assets in the Oleksandrivka direction. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on April 5 that Ukrainian forces struck Russian manpower concentrations near Berezove and Novomykolaivka (both southeast of Oleksandrivka).[67]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 36th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (29th CAA, Eastern Military District [EMD]) are intercepting Ukrainian drones west of Verbove (southeast of Oleksandrivka).[68] Drone operators of the Maksim Krivonos Battalion (Russian Volunteer Corps) are reportedly striking Ukrainian armored vehicles near Havrylivka (northeast of Oleksandrivka).[69]

Ukrainian forces continued their mid-range strike campaign against Russian military assets in occupied Donetsk Oblast. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on April 5 that Ukrainian forces struck Russian manpower concentrations near Yalnyske (roughly 38 kilometers from the front).[70]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)

Russian forces recently conducted an infiltration in the Hulyaipole direction.

Assessed Russian infiltrations: Geolocated footage published on April 4 shows a Russian soldier operating north of Myrne (southwest of Hulyaipole) after what ISW assesses was an infiltration mission that did not change the control of terrain or forward edge of the battle area (FEBA).[71]

Russian forces attacked northwest of Hulyaipole near Varvarivka, Pryluky, Olenokostyantynivka, and Zelene and toward Vozdvyzhivka and Verkhnya Tersa; west of Hulyaipole near Zaliznychne; and southwest of Hulyaipole near Hulyapilske and Myrne on April 4 and 5.[72] A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Charivne (southwest of Hulyaipole).[73]

Ukrainian forces continued their strike campaign against Russian frontline military assets in the Hulyaipole direction. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on April 5 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian personnel concentration near Hulyaipole.[74]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 38th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (35th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Hulyaipilske.[75] Drone operators of the 14th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff's Main Directorate [GRU]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces north of Lyubitske (northwest of Hulyaipole).[76]

Russian forces continued limited offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on April 5 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked west of Orikhiv near Stepove and Prymorske on April 4 and 5.[77]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 38th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade are striking Ukrainian forces south of Chervona Krynytsya (northeast of Orikhiv).[78] First-person view (FPV) drone operators of the 291st Motorized Rifle Regiment (42nd Motorized Rifle Division, 58th CAA, Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Orikhiv.[79] FPV drone operators of the Nemets group of the 3rd Assault Company of the 291st Motorized Rifle Regiment and Osa-AKM air defense crews of the 104th Airborne (VDV) Division are reportedly intercepting Ukrainian drones in the Zaporizhia direction.[80]

Russian forces continued limited ground operations in the Kherson direction on April 5 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked east of Kherson City near the Antonivskyi Bridge and southwest of Kherson City near Bilohrudnyi Island on April 4 and 5.[81]

A Russian milblogger claimed on April 4 that Russian forces in the Kherson direction are increasingly fielding new drone types, including new types of fiber-optic drones.[82] The milblogger claimed that up to 15 percent of Russian drones in this direction consist of new drone types.

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 98th VDV Division are reportedly operating in the Kherson direction.[83]

Ukrainian forces continue their long-range strikes against Russian military assets in occupied Crimea. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on April 5 that Ukrainian forces struck an aviation storage depot in occupied Saky (about 181 kilometers from the frontline) on the night of April 4 to 5.[84]

Russian authorities accused Ukrainian forces of sinking a dry cargo ship in the Sea of Azov on April 3. Kherson Oblast occupation head Vladimir Saldo claimed on April 5 that a dry cargo vessel carrying wheat sank in the Sea of Azov.[85] Saldo claimed that a Ukrainian drone struck the vessel on April 3 and that it took two days for the surviving crewmembers to reach occupied Kherson Oblast.[86] Kremlin newswire TASS claimed that a drone struck the Volgo-Balt dry cargo vessel about 300 kilometers north of occupied Kerch, Crimea.[87] Ukrainian military-focused outlet Militarnyi reported that the Volgo-Balt has carried cargoes of stolen Ukrainian wheat several times throughout the war and assessed that the vessel had departed from a port in occupied Ukraine before it sank.[88]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Russian forces continued long-range drone strikes against Ukraine overnight on April 4 to 5. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 93 Shahed-type, Gerbera-type, Italmas-type, and other strike drones - of which about 60 were Shaheds - from the directions of Bryansk, Kursk, and Oryol cities; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; and occupied Hvardiiske, Crimea.[89] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 76 drones, that 17 drones struck 10 locations, and that drone debris fell at three locations. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian drone strikes hit agricultural, residential, and civilian infrastructure in Chernihiv, Kharkiv, Poltava, and Odesa oblasts.[90]

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

Russia and Belarus continue their defense industrial cooperation. A delegation from the Brest Free Economic Zone signed agreements with Leningrad Oblast on April 4 to develop economic, industrial, and trade relations and visited the Russian shipbuilding company Emperium LLC to explore possible cooperation.[91] A November 2025 investigation from the Belarusian opposition organization BELPOL suggested that Belarus is manufacturing upgraded chassis for Russian Pantsir-S1 air defense system launchers.[92]

Belarus continues to pursue bilateral military cooperation with Russia's partners. Belarusian and Cuban delegations hosted the 12th Belarusian-Cuban Commission on Military-Technical Cooperation in Minsk on April 5 and discussed the current state of bilateral relations, the implementation of current bilateral agreements, and areas for further military-technical cooperation.[93]

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.