April 30, 2026

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, April 30, 2026

Assessment as of: 7:45 PM ET

Data Cutoff: 12:45 PM ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

For more information on ISW's map methodology, please view our statement here.

Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev emphasized Russia's commitment to its war aims in Ukraine and claimed that Russia is in an existential conflict with the West immediately after Trump's call with Russian President Vladimir Putin on April 29.[i] Medvedev gave a speech at the Znanie Pervye (Education First) federal educational marathon on April 30 in which he labeled the United States as Russia’s main geopolitical rival and stated that Russia is in a conflict with the West that is "a question of existence" and will not end "within a generation."[ii] Medvedev claimed that Russia's victory in the war in Ukraine will bring stability to Russia and allow Russia to address its economic, demographic, and social issues.[iii] Medvedev also rejected the ability of the United States to mediate peace negotiations between Ukraine and Russia.[iv] Medvedev has frequently made outlandish statements that represent a more extreme view than the Kremlin itself is willing to publicly portray, and his articulation of these statements a day after a Putin-Trump phone call is likely intended to make Putin’s false claims about the battlefield situation and the supposed inevitability of a Russian victory appear rational in comparison to Western policymakers.[v] Medvedev's statements are likely also intended to reinforce to Russians the Kremlin's justifications for continuing its war in Ukraine, namely that the United States is an adversary and that Russia is engaged in an existential war against the West, and to reassure the Russian population that Russia is and will continue to achieve all of its war aims.[vi] Other, more relatively moderate Kremlin officials also continue to reiterate Russia's commitment to its war aims. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov has continually stressed the need to address the so-called “root causes” of the war in Ukraine, the Kremlin's shorthand to reiterate its maximalist demands for any peace agreement in Ukraine, as a precondition to a long-term peace agreement several times in April 2026, including on April 30.[vii]

The United States released a previously-authorized $400 million in funds for Ukraine. US Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth announced on April 29 that the Department of Defense released the $400 million in funds that Congress previously allocated to Ukraine in 2025 through the Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative (USAI), in which the United States purchases weapons for Ukraine from US defense firms.[viii]

Ukraine has received its first mobile F-16 fighter jet flight simulators. The Ukrainian Ministry of Defense announced on April 30 that Ukrainian forces received the first mobile F-16 flight simulators, which have been adapted for Ukraine’s operating conditions, including Ukraine’s geography.[ix] Ukrainian Defense Minister Mykhailo Fedorov reported on April 30 that Ukrainian forces will be able to rapidly deploy mobile simulators, shortening the gap between training and combat use and improving air target interception during Russia’s constant missile strikes.[x] Ukraine continues to strengthen its air defense capabilities as it expands joint production and defense industrial cooperation with Western partners.[xi]

Key Takeaways:

  • Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev emphasized Russia's commitment to its war aims in Ukraine and claimed that Russia is in an existential conflict with the West immediately after Trump's call with Russian President Vladimir Putin on April 29.
  • The United States released a previously-authorized $400 million in funds for Ukraine.
  • Ukraine has received its first mobile F-16 fighter jet flight simulators.
  • Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Slovyansk and Kostyantynivka directions.
  • Russian forces launched 206 drones toward Ukraine overnight.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.    

  • Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
  • Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis
  • Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
  • Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
  • Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
  • Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
  • Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
  • Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
  • Significant Activity in Belarus

Note: ISW has changed how it reports Russian order of battle (ORBAT) details in the Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment on April 20, 2026. ISW previously published all ORBAT information collected in a daily 24-hour reporting period in the daily assessment. Moving forward, ISW will only publish ORBAT information that is new or indicates a change in Russian units’ positions, deployments, redeployments, or command and control arrangements in order to focus the daily publication on inflections and new information. ISW continues collecting a large amount of repetitive ORBAT information and can make this unpublished data available to selected readers upon request. Please contact [email protected] for any request for information.

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Ukrainian forces continued their long-range strike campaign against Russian oil infrastructure and military assets on the night of April 29 to 30. Ukraine’s Security Service (SBU) reported on April 30 that Ukrainian forces struck the Transeft Perm Linear Production Dispatch Station in Perm Krai for the second day in a row, causing additional fires.[xii] The SBU reported that Ukrainian forces also struck the AVT-4 primary crude processing unit of the Lukoil-Permnaftoorgsintez oil refinery in Perm Krai, causing fires and rendering the unit inoperable. Geolocated footage published on April 30 shows fire and smoke at the AVT-4 primary crude processing unit of the Lukoil-Permnaftoorgsintez oil refinery.[xiii] Perm Krai Governor Dmitry Makhonin acknowledged on April 30that Ukrainian forces struck industrial infrastructure in Perm Krai.[xiv] Russian opposition outlet Astra reported on April 30 that Ukrainian forces also struck the Sverdlov Plant in Dzerzhinsk, Nizhny Novgorod, and published footage of smoke rising from the plant.[xv] Nizhny Novgorod Oblast Governor Gleb Nikitin acknowledged on April 30 that Ukrainian forces launched a strike on Nizhny Novgorod Oblast.[xvi] ISW continues to assess that Ukrainian forces have been increasing the intensity of their long-range strike campaigns against Russian oil and military infrastructure, exploiting weakened Russian air defense and the large attack surface of Russia’s deep rear.[xvii]

Satellite imagery continues to provide updated battle damage assessments (BDA) of recent Ukrainian strikes against the Tuapse Oil Refinery in Krasnodar Krai. Planet Labs satellite imagery collected on April 21 and April 30 and published by Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL) investigative journalist Mark Krutov indicates that the April 28 Ukrainian strike on the Tuapse Oil Refinery destroyed six fuel reservoirs and burnt adjacent infrastructure.[xviii] Ukrainian forces struck the refinery on the nights of April 27 to 28, April 19 to 20, and April 15 to 16.[xix]

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in Sumy Oblast along the international border)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Sumy Oblast on April 30 but did not make confirmed advances. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that elements of the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces seized Korchakivka (north of Sumy City).[xx] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces seized Novodmytrivka (southeast of Sumy City) and advanced into central Myropillya (northeast of Sumy City).[xxi]

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border to create a defensible buffer zone with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations northeast of Kharkiv City on April 30 but did not advance.[xxii] The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Kharkiv direction reported on April 30 that Russian forces continue unsuccessful attempts to cross the Vovcha River in small groups in boats and by swimming.[xxiii]

A Russian milblogger claimed on April 30 that Ukrainian forces counterattacked east of Velykyi Burluk near Hryhorivka.[xxiv]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Oskil River (Russian objective: Cross the Oskil River in Kharkiv Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on April 30 as Ukrainian forces counterattacked in the area.[xxv] Ukrainian Joint Forces Task Force Spokesperson Colonel Viktor Trehubov reported on April 30 that Russian forces are using gas pipelines that run from Holubivka (north of Kupyansk) into northern Kupyansk to infiltrate into the town despite reportedly sustaining up to 70 percent casualties in such assaults.[xxvi]

Neither Ukrainian nor Russian sources reported ground activity in the Borova direction on April 30.

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)

Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Slovyansk direction as Russian forces continued offensive operations in the area.[xxvii] Geolocated footage published on April 30 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced south of Kolodyazi (northeast of Lyman).[xxviii] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces seized Zakitne (east of Slovyansk).[xxix]

Ukrainian 11th Army Corps spokesperson Lieutenant Colonel Dmytro Zaporozhets reported that Russian forces attacking from Siversk are suffering high losses due to the lowland terrain.[xxx] Zaporozhets noted that Russian offensive tactics have "wave-like" characteristics and that Russian troops are now more actively using thermal and camouflage ponchos to move at night, compared to previous tactics of daytime attacks.

Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area as Russian forces conducted infiltration missions in the area. Geolocated footage published on April 30 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced in eastern Kostyantynivka.[xxxi] Additional geolocated footage published on April 29 shows Ukrainian forces striking Russian servicemembers in eastern Kostyantynivka after what ISW assesses was a Russian infiltration mission.[xxxii] Geolocated footage published on April 28 indicates that Ukrainian forces maintain positions northeast of Stepanivka (southwest of Kostyantynivka) in areas where Russian sources previously claimed that Russian forces maintained positions.[xxxiii]

Russian forces are intensifying ground attacks in the Kostyantynivka direction. A non-commissioned officer (NCO) of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Kostyantynivka direction reported on April 30 that Russian forces have intensified strikes and infantry assaults and that Russian forces have shifted tactics to sending individual servicemembers on assaults in intervals, instead of in small groups.[xxxiv] The NCO reported that Russian infantry often relies on directions written on paper or phones with GPS to navigate terrain.

Russian forces continued limited ground assaults in the Dobropillya tactical area on April 30 but did not advance.[xxxv]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction on April 30 but did not make confirmed advances.[xxxvi] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on April 30 that Russian forces seized Novooleksandrivka (northwest of Pokrovsk).[xxxvii]

Russian forces continue suffering heavy losses during unsuccessful assaults in the Pokrovsk direction. The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Pokrovsk direction reported on April 30 that Russian forces conduct tens of assaults daily and are trying to accumulate equipment within and around Pokrovsk.[xxxviii]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Novopavlivka direction on April 30 but did not advance.[xxxix]

Russian forces recently conducted an infiltration mission in the Oleksandrivka direction. Geolocated footage published on April 29 shows Ukrainian forces striking a Russian servicemember north of Novohryhorivka (southeast of Oleksandrivka) after what ISW assesses was an infiltration mission.[xl]

Ukrainian forces continued their mid-range strike campaign against Russian military assets in occupied Donetsk Oblast. Geolocated footage published on April 30 shows Ukrainian forces striking a Russian Zala reconnaissance drone unit's position in occupied Yalynske (approximately 38 kilometers from the frontline).[xli] Geolocated footage published on April 29 shows Ukrainian forces striking a temporary deployment point of the Russian 36th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (29th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Eastern Military District [EMD]) in occupied Hrafske (approximately 67 kilometers from the frontline).[xlii]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)

Russian forces recently conducted infiltration missions in the Hulyaipole direction as Ukrainian forces continued counterattacks in the area.[xliii] Geolocated footage published on April 29 shows Ukrainian forces striking a Russian position northeast of Charvine (southwest of Hulyaipole) after what ISW assesses was a Russian infiltration mission.[xliv] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces also advanced south of Hulyaipilske.[xlv]

Russian forces continued limited offensive operations in Zaporizhia Oblast on April 30 but did not advance.[xlvi]

Order of Battle: Elements of the SHTOPOR group (150th Motorized Rifle Battalion [MRB], 42nd Motorized Rifle Division [MRD], 58th Combined Arms Army [CAA]) are reportedly operating in the Zaporizhia direction, the first evidence ISW has observed of the existence of this unit.[xlvii]

Ukrainian forces continued mid-range strikes against Russian military assets in occupied Zaporizhia Oblast on April 29 and 30. A Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) unit reported on April 30 that Ukrainian forces struck Russian BARS-Sarmat Unmanned Systems Special Purpose Center (formerly BARS-Sarmat Detachment) facilities on Sea of Azov coast.[xlviii] The USF unit reported that the strike damaged a temporary deployment point and workshops that manufacture drones, unmanned ground vehicles (UGVs), and electronic warfare equipment.

Russian forces continued limited ground attacks in the Kherson direction on April 30, including toward islands in the Dnipro River Delta, but did not advance.[xlix]

Ukrainian forces continued their long-range strike campaign against Russian military assets in occupied Crimea on the night of April 29 to 30. The Ukrainian Navy reported on April 30 that it struck the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) Border Service Project 12150 Mangust-class patrol boat Sobol and a Project 21980 Grachonok-class patrol boat near the Kerch Strait.[l] Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) Commander Major Robert “Magyar” Brovdi posted geolocated footage on April 30 showing Ukrainian forces striking a Russian ammunition depot near occupied Bitumne.[li]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Russian forces conducted a series of long-range drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of April 29 to 30. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched one Iskander-M ballistic missile from Rostov Oblast and 206 Shahed, Gerbera, Italmas, and other drones — of which about 140 were Shaheds, including jet-powered Shaheds — from the directions of Bryansk, Oryol, and Kursk cities; Shatalovo, Smolensk Oblast; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; and occupied Hvardiiske, Crimea.[lii] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 172 drones, that the ballistic missile and 32 drones struck 22 locations, and that downed debris fell on nine locations. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces struck administrative, agricultural, energy, industrial, and residential infrastructure in Chernihiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Kharkiv, Mykolaiv, and Odesa oblasts.[liii] Odesa Oblast Military Administration Head Oleh Kiper reported on April 30 that Russian drone strikes against Odesa City injured at least 20 civilians.[liv] Ukrainian state energy operator Ukrenergo reported that Russian strikes against energy infrastructure caused power outages in Sumy, Kharkiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Zaporizhia, Odesa, Kherson, and Mykolaiv oblasts.[lv]

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

Nothing significant to report.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.


[i] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-29-2026/

[ii] https://www.rbc dot ru/rbcfreenews/69f348bb9a794733c8208644; https://ria dot ru/20260430/sopernik-2089810007.html

[iii] https://tass dot ru/politika/27270901

[iv] https://t.me/tass_agency/373650 ; https://tass dot ru/politika/27271041; https://t.me/tass_agency/373661

[v] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-29-2026/

[vi] https://isw.pub/UkrWar072825 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar052025 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar051825 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-6-2025 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar032125; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-10-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-22-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-25-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-21-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-14-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-17-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-4-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-3-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-29-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-20-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-24-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-15-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-19-2025/; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-17-2025; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-8-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-21-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-18-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-16-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-13-2025/

[vii] https://mid dot ru/ru/foreign_policy/news/2101000/; https://mid dot ru/ru/press_service/minister_speeches/2101000/; https://mid dot ru/ru/foreign_policy/news/2099121/  

[viii] https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-04-29/pentagon-released-400-million-ukraine-funding-hegseth-says

[ix] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37988 ; https://www.facebook.com/story.php?story_fbid=1287942980184818&id=100069073844828&rdid=U16UVDY3suNWMCO4#

[x] https://mod.gov dot ua/news/ukrayina-otrimala-mobilni-aviaczijni-trenazheri-f-16-dlya-pidgotovki-pilotiv; https://t.me/zedigital/6773

[xi] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-14-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-17-2026/;  https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-30-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-28-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-8-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-2-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-19-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-25-2026/

[xii] https://t.me/SBUkr/17448

[xiii] https://t.me/kiber_boroshno/12900; https://t.me/kiber_boroshno/12904; https://t.me/kiber_boroshno/12906;

[xiv] https://t.me/mahonin59/12142

[xv] https://t.me/astrapress/111171; https://t.me/astrapress/111168

[xvi] https://t.me/glebnikitin_nn/9084

[xvii] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-29-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-17-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-6-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-26-2026/

[xviii] https://x.com/kromark/status/2049827492735676425?s=20; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-28-2026/

[xix] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-28-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-20-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-16-2026/

[xx] https://t.me/mod_russia/63056

[xxi] https://t.me/rybar/79903 ; https://t.me/rybar/79884; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/208838

[xxii] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37981; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37966; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37964; https://t.me/wargonzo/33862; https://t.me/severnnyi/7801; https://t.me/dva_majors/92186; https://t.me/Joint_Forces_Task_Force/20560;

[xxiii] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/04/30/cherez-virovochku-prodovzhuyut-lizty-okupanty-odyn-za-odnym-tonut-u-vovchij/

[xxiv] https://t.me/dva_majors/92186

[xxv] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37981 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37966 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37964 ; https://t.me/gvZapad/18440 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/42532 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/42538 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/33862

[xxvi] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WY8sDvZdWEA ; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/04/30/20-kilometriv-treba-vyzhyty-i-cze-zavdannya-z-zirochkoyu-rosiyany-znovu-lizut-do-kupyanska-cherez-truby/

[xxvii] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37981 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37966 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37964 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/33862

[xxviii] https://x.com/ZoamSc2/status/2049541987087585298; https://t.me/Secrets_of_Vinakos/14538

[xxix] https://t.me/motopatriot78/51268

[xxx] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/04/30/u-nyzyni-znyshhuvatymemo-v-promyslovyh-masshtabah-na-slovyanskomu-napryamku-11-j-korpus-znyshhuye-piv-sotni-okupantiv-shhodnya/ 

[xxxi] https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/2049794067081425183; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/2049794116683235775; https://t [dot] me/Ukr_G_M/79722

[xxxii] https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/2049489043210080281; https://t.me/Gryphon501/109

[xxxiii] https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/2049806983939645608; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/2049807019155067242; https:/t.me/SouthernRepublic/32793

[xxxiv] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/04/30/tut-jdesh-tak-a-tut-povertayesh-napravo-na-kostyantynivskomu-napryamku-okupantiv-vidpravlyayut-vmyraty-z-intervalom/ ; https://youtu.be/LzxH-ggEYFM?t=2658

[xxxv] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37966; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37964

[xxxvi] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37981; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37966; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37964; https://t.me/wargonzo/33862 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/92186 

[xxxvii] https://t.me/mod_russia/63056 ; https://t.me/sashakots/61447 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/114144 

[xxxviii] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/04/30/poranennya-dlya-voroga-rivnoznachno-smerti-bilya-pokrovska-poranenyh-rosiyan-komandyry-kydayut-vmyraty-v-kilzoni/ ; https://youtu.be/LzxH-ggEYFM?t=473 ;

[xxxix] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37966 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37964

[xl] https://x.com/moklasen/status/2049533642414706986; https://t.me/Assault_Battalion_1/599  

[xli] https://x.com/blinzka/status/2049832933087748554; https://x.com/ayzin_illya/status/2049823723167817986  

[xlii] https://x.com/413_raid/status/2049430706607059070; https://x.com/blinzka/status/2049482121207599250

[xliii] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37981 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37966 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37964 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/33862 ; https://t.me/rybar/79902 ;

[xliv] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/11801; https://t.me/morok_225_oshp/50

[xlv] https://t.me/rybar/79902; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/208838

[xlvi] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37966 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37964 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/92186 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/51257 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/33862 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/114132

[xlvii] https://t.me/dva_majors/92216

[xlviii] https://t.me/raid_413/1269

[xlix] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37981 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37966 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37964

[l] https://t.me/ukrainian_navy/20239

[li] https://t.me/robert_magyar/2282; https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/35233

[lii] https://t.me/kpszsu/60969

[liii] https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/18826; https://t.me/chernigivskaODA/28849; https://t.me/chernihivrada/3643; https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/29148; https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/29135; https://t.me/synegubov/21424; https://www.facebook.com/mykoda/posts/pfbid0mYzFJVrQMQjkQy6D8BoeYDFiRFYAu5ZpypdgKCSc6dxxEAM2wQQXJkNMR5NqU5Ll; https://t.me/UA_National_Police/65136

[liv] https://t.me/odeskaODA/15768; https://t.me/odeskaODA/15766; https://t.me/odeskaODA/15768; https://t.me/od_mva/1642

[lv] https://t.me/Ukrenergo/4917; https://t.me/energyofukraine/6853

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