Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, April 23, 2026

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Russian President Vladimir Putin directly responded to complaints about Russia's mobile internet outages by justifying the outages as necessary for Russian domestic security and setting conditions to prepare Russians for continued restrictions. Putin held an unrelated meeting with the Russian government on April 23 but began the meeting by hearing a report on current issues, including mobile internet restrictions.[i] Putin noted that Russians in large urban centers and in areas bordering Ukraine are struggling with government restrictions on mobile internet during "terrorist attacks" -- the Kremlin's shorthand for Ukraine's long-range strike campaign against Russian military, defense industrial, and oil infrastructure. Putin asserted that Russia must prioritize the protection of its people, particularly civilians, as a means of justifying the outages. Putin claimed that there are security risks in informing Russians about outages ahead of time but did call for the Russian government to be more transparent about the purpose of the outages after-the-fact. Russian authorities have long been using the pretext of Ukrainian drone and missile strikes against legitimate targets on Russian territory to shut off mobile internet service, which has impacted the everyday lives of Russians by depriving them the ability to utilize basic services including banking and transportation.[ii] Putin did partially acquiesce on April 23 to , however, ordering the Russian government to whitelist certain services even during mobile internet outages and to establish physical communications lines to border areas.[iii] This is the first instance that Putin himself has publicly acknowledged the mobile internet outages; Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov was previously the most senior Russian official to acknowledge these outages in mid-March 2026.[iv] tin's acknowledgement of the impact of these outages on the everyday lives of Russians, who are already increasingly bearing the burden of Putin's war in Ukraine, is likely both a response to his dropping approval ratings and a way to justify continued restrictions on mobile internet amid the Kremlin's broader censorship campaign.[v]

The Kremlin continues to set conditions for possible future aggression against Baltic states. The Russian Security Council accused Lithuanian authorities on April 23 of creating a “hotbed of tension” near the border with Kaliningrad Oblast and militarizing the country under the guise of a "Russian threat."[vi] Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Alexander Grushko claimed to Russian state news outlet RIA Novosti on April 23 that NATO's Joint Expeditionary Force exercises are practicing scenarios for a naval blockade and the seizure of Kaliningrad Oblast and accused NATO of purposefully “intensifying confrontation” with Russia.[vii] These statements are part of the Kremlin’s ongoing cognitive warfare narrative aimed at falsely framing NATO as an aggressor in response to the Kremlin’s military aggression in Ukraine and long-term p The Kremlin has been advancing several information operations targeting the Baltic states in order to set long-term informational conditions to justify potential future military action aics. The Kremlin has been using its control of Kaliningrad Oblast in particular to set justifications for future Russian aggression against the Baltic States or Poland under the guise of defending Kaliningrad Oblast.[x]

Russian forces struck an apartment building in Dnipro City, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast overnight on April 22 to 23, killing at least three civilians and injuring at least 10[xi] Ukrainian authorities reported on April 23 and geolocated footage confirms that Russian forces struck an apartment building in Dnipro City and geolocated footage shows severe damage to a high rise building in Dnipro City.[xii]

The European Council (EC) adopted on April 23 the final piece of legislation underpinning the EU's 90 billion euro (roughly $105 billion) interest-free loan to Ukraine, which the EC initially approved in December 2025.[xiv] The loan allocates 60 billion euros (roughly $70 billion) to investing in Ukraine's defense industrial capacities and 30 billion euros (roughly $35 billion) to macroeconomic support for Ukraine. The loan is backed by the EU budget, and Ukraine only needs to repay the loan if Russia pays Ukraine reparations for the war.

Key Takeaways:

• Russian President Vladimir Putin directly responded to complaints about Russia's mobile internet outages by justifying the outages as necessary for Russian domestic security and setting conditions to prepare Russians for continued restrictions.
• The Kremlin continues to set conditions for possible future aggression against Baltic states.
• Russian forces struck an apartment building in Dnipro City, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast overnight on April 22 to 23, killing at least three civilians and injuring at least 10.
• The European Council (EC) adopted on April 23 the final piece of legislation underpinning the EU's 90 billion euro (roughly $105 billion) interest-free loan to Ukraine, which the EC initially approved in December 2025.
• Russian forces advanced in northern Sumy Oblast.
• Russia launched 155 drones against Ukraine overnight. Ukrainian forces struck Russian oil infrastructure in Nizhny Novgorod and Samara oblasts and an air defense system in Bryansk Oblast.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.    

• Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
• Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis
• Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
• Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
• Significant Activity in Belarus

as changed how it reports Russian order of battle (ORBAT) details in the Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment on April 20, 2026. ISW previously published all ORBAT information collected in a daily 24-hour reporting period in the daily assessment. Moving forward, ISW will only publish ORBAT information that is new or indicates a change in Russian units’ positions, deployments, redeployments, or command and control arrangements in order to focus the daily publication on inflections and new information. ISW continues collecting a large amount of repetitive ORBAT information and can make this unpublished data available to selected readers upon request. Please contact [email protected] for any request for information.

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Ukrainian forces struck Russian oil infrastructure in Nizhny Novgorod and Samara oblasts overnight on April 22 to 23. Sources in Ukraine's Security Service (SBU) told Ukrainian broadcaster Suspilne on April 23 that SBU and Ukrainian Special Operations Forces (SSO) drones struck the Gorky oil pumping station in Neshikha, Nizhny Novgorod Oblast overnight, damaging three oil tanks.[xv] Geolocated footage published on April 23 shows a large smoke plume near the Gorky oil station.[xvi] Nizhny Novgorod Oblast Governor Gleb Nikitin claimed on April 23 that drone debris damaged an industrial facility in Kstovo Raion, Nizhny Novgorod Oblast.[xvii] Russian opposition outlet Astra reported on April 23 that Ukrainian forces struck the Novokuibyshevsk petrochemical plant in overnight, and Samara Oblast Governor Vyacheslav Fedorishchev acknowledged that Ukrainian strikes damaged an industrial facility in Novokuibyshevsk.[xviii] Ukrainian forces previously struck the Novokuibyshevsk oil refinery overnight on April 17 to 18.[xix]

Ukrainian forces continue to strike Russian air defense assets in Russia. Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) Commander Major Robert “Magyar” Brovdi reported that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian Tor-M2 air defense system in Bryansk Oblast overnight on April 22 to 23.[xx] Brovdi stated that Ukrainian USF drone operators have struck a total of 22 Russian air defense systems in Russia and occupied Ukraine thus far in April 2026.

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in Sumy Oblast along the international border)

Russian forces are prioritizing offensive operations east and southeast of Sumy City over operations north and northeast of Sumy City.[xxi] Ukrainian Joint Forces Task Force Spokesperson Colonel Viktor Trehubov stated that Russian forces in Sumy Oblast are attacking most intensely along the international border in southern Sumy Oblast and noted that Russian forces have seized Myropilske (east of Sumy City) and have advanced two to three kilometers deep in some areas along the international borde

Russian forces are reportedly struggling to replace Russian airborne (VDV) elements operating in northern Sumy Oblast. A source reporting on the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces claimed that elements of the Russian 9th Motorized Rifle Regiment (18th Motorized Rifle Division, 11th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) are struggling to replace elements of the 119th VDV Regiment (106th VDV Division) as the Russian military command planned.[xxiii] The source also claimed that elements of the 83rd Separate VDV Brigade will redeploy to the Yunakivka (north of Sumy City) area, though elements of the 83rd Separate VDV Brigade have been operating in the northern Sumy Oblast border area consistently for months.[xxiv]

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border to create a defensible buffer zone with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Russian forces conducted an infiltration mission and continued offensive operations northeast of Kharkiv City on April 23 as Ukrainian forces counterattacked in the area.[xxv] Geolocated footage published on April 23 shows Ukrainian forces striking Russian servicemembers northwest of Bochkove (northeast of Kharkiv City) after what ISW assesses was an infiltration mission.[xxvi]

Russian forces continue to intensify battlefield air interdiction (BAI) efforts along the international border with Sumy and Kharkiv oblasts, likely to set conditions for potential future offensive operations. Kharkiv Regional State Administration Head Oleg Synehubov reported on April 22 that Russian drones struck  Bohodukhiv (northwest of Kharkiv City along the Merla River at the intersection of the P-46 Sumy City-Kharkiv City highway and P-45 Kharkiv City-Okhtyrka highway) roughly 50 times on April 22.[xxvii] Russian forces have been intensifying strikes on Bohodukhiv in the last week (since around April 18) likely as part of a BAI campaign, attempting to pressure the Ukrainian rear and disrupt Ukrainian logistics between Sumy and Kharkiv cities and facilitate potential future offensive operations.[xxviii]

Ukrainian forces continued their short-range strike campaign against Russian near-rear military assets in Kharkiv Oblast on the night of April 22 to 23. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian drone control point near Strilecha (north of Kharkiv City along the international border).[xxix]

Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported ground activity in the Velykyi Burluk direction on April 23.

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Oskil River (Russian objective: Cross the Oskil River in Kharkiv Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued ground attacks and are intensifying infiltration attempts in the southern Kupyansk direction.[xxx] Ukrainian Joint Forces Task Force Spokesperson Colonel Viktor Trehubov reported on April 23 that Russian forces have intensified infiltration missions north of Kupyansk near Holubivka and are trying to eliminate the Ukrainian bridgehead by intensifying assault operations on the left bank of the Oskil River.[xxxi] Trehubov added that Russian forces do not hold any permanent positions in Kupyansk-Vuzlovyi (north of Kupyansk) despite Russian Chief of the General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov's April 21 claims.[xxxii]

Ukrainian officials continue to refute Gerasimov's aggrandized battlefield claims. The Ukrainian 3rd Army Corps reported on April 22 that Ukrainian forces control Novoyehorivka, Nadiya, and Hrekivka (all southeast of Borova) despite Gerasimov’s April 21 claims that Russian forces control all of Luhansk Oblast.[xxxiii]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)

Russian forces are likely concentrating equipment for a mechanized assault in the Lyman direction and continue striking Ukrainian logistics in the area. The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Lyman direction reported on April 23 that Russian forces are preparing to conduct a mechanized assault and are continue striking Ukrainian logistics routes to complicate personnel rotations and ammunition supplies.

[Lyman Tactical Area map]

Russian forces continue infiltration missions in the Slovyansk direction. Geolocated footage published on April 23 shows Ukrainian forces striking Russian positions in eastern Rai-Oleksandrivka (southeast of Slovyansk) after what ISW assesses was an infiltration mission that did not occur in the last 24 hours.[xxxv]

Geolocated footage published on April 23 shows Russian forces shelling northeast of Lyman in an area where Russian sources previously claimed that Russian forces maintained positions.[xxxvi]

Russian forces recently continued offensive operations in the Kostyantynivka direction on April 23 but did not make confirmed advances.[xxxvii] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced in southern Illinivka (south of Kostyantynivka).[xxxviii]

Geolocated footage published on April 22 indicates that Ukrainian forces hold positions northeast of Stinky (north of Kostyantynivka) and in southern Chasiv Yar (northeast of Kostyantynivka) in areas where Russian sources previously claimed that Russian forces maintained positions.[xxxix]

Russian forces continue to conduct mechanized and motorized assaults in the Kostyantynivka direction. Footage published on April 22 shows Ukrainian forces striking three Russian vehicles south of Predtechyne (east of Kostyantynivka) in a roughly platoon-sized motorized assault.

Russian forces conducted an infiltration mission and continued offensive operations in the Dobropillya tactical area on April 23 but did not make confirmed advances.[xlii] Geolocated footage published on April 23 shows Ukrainian forces striking Russian positions south of Zapovidne (southeast of Dobropillya) after what ISW assesses was a Russian infiltration mission.[xliii] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces seized Novyi Donbas (east of Dobropillya) and advanced west of the settlement.[xliv]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction, focusing attacks northwest and north of Pokrovsk, but did not make confirmed advances.[xlv] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced in the fields north and south of Hryshyne (northwest of Pokrovsk) and west of Rodynske (north of Pokrovsk).[xlvi]

Russian forces continue to present fabricated evidence in an attempt to support exaggerated battlefield claims. Russian state-run television channel Perviy Kanal published footage on April 21 of two Russian servicemembers, reportedly of the 35th Motorized Rifle Brigade (41st Combined Arms Army (CAA), Central Military District [CMD), raising a flag in what the channel claimed was Hryshyne.[xlvii] A geolocation of the footage published on April 23 shows that the Russian servicemembers were actually in Mykailivka (southeast of Pokrovsk and roughly 40 kilometers from Hryshyne) and staged the flag raising, likely to accomplish informational effects.[xlviii]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Novopavlivka and Oleksandrivka directions on April 23 but did not advance.[xlix]

Ukrainian forces continued their mid-range strike campaign against Russian military assets in occupied southern Ukraine on April 22 and 23. Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) Commander Major Robert “Magyar” Brovdi reported on April 23 that the USF struck a Russian command post and base of the Russian Federal Security Service's (FSB) Mobile Operations Directorate in occupied Donetsk Oblast on the morning of April 22.[l] Brovdi reported that the USF also destroyed two Russian Tor-M2 air defense systems and one Osa-AK air defense system in occupied Donetsk and Zaporizhia oblasts.

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)

Ukrainian forces continue to hold positions southwest of Hulyaipole as Russian forces focus offensive operations northwest and west of Hulyaipole.[li] Geolocated footage published on April 22 shows Ukrainian forces operating within Charivne in areas where Russian sources previously claimed that Russian forces maintained positions.[lii]

Russian forces continued limited offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast, including west of Orikhiv, on April 23  as the Russian military command continues to make aggrandized claims of advance. krainian Southern Defense Forces Spokesperson Colonel Vladyslav Voloshyn reported on April 22 that Russian forces are still 15 kilometers from Orikhiv - refuting Russian officials' claims that street fighting is ongoing within Orikhiv.[liv] Voloshyn noted Russian forces would need to seize Novodanylivka (just south of Orikhiv) before beginning ground assaults against the settlement.

Russian forces continued limited ground attacks in the Kherson direction on April 23, including toward islands in the Dnipro River Delta, but did not advance.[lv]

Ukrainian forces continued their long-range strike campaign against Russian military assets and oil transport infrastructure in occupied Crimea on the night of April 22 to 23. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian P-18 radar system near occupied Yevpatoria (roughly 170 kilometers from the frontline).[lvi] Russian opposition outlet Astra reported on April 23 that Ukrainian forces also struck the JSC Marine Oil Terminal in occupied Fedosia (roughly 250 kilometers from the frontline).[lvii] Astra noted that the terminal acts is a key transport hub for Russian oil between Russia and occupied Ukraine.

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Russian forces conducted a series of long-range drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of April 22 to 23. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 155 Shahed, Gerbera, Italmas, and other drones - of which roughly 100 were Shaheds, including jet-powered Shaheds - from the directions of Kursk and Oryol cities; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; and Shatalovo, Smolensk Oblast.[lviii] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 139 drones, that 11 drones struck nine locations, and that downed debris fell on four locations. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian strikes damaged , energy, railway, and residential infrastructure in Chernihiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Kharkiv, and Zhytomyr oblasts.[lix] Chernihiv Oblast energy operator Chernihivoblenergo reported that Russian strikes against energy infrastructure in Chernihiv Oblast left 152,000 subscribers without power.[lx]

Russian forces conducted an unmanned surface vessel (USV) strike against port infrastructure in Odesa Oblast. The Ukrainian Navy reported on April 23 that it detected and intercepted a Russian USV approaching a port in Odesa Oblast.[lxi]

See topline text for information on the Russian strike against a Dnipro City apartment overnight on April 22 to 23.

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

Nothing significant to report.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.