Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, April 18, 2026

Data Cutoff: 12:45 PM ET

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Ukraine’s long-range strike campaign continues to exploit overstretched Russian air defenses to damage oil infrastructure and military assets in Russia and occupied Crimea. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on April 18 that Ukrainian forces struck the Novokuibyshevsk and Syrzan oil refineries in Samara Oblast, an oil terminal at the Vysotsk Lukoil-2 Distribution Transshipment Complex in Leningrad Oblast, and the Tikhoretsk oil pumping station in Krasnodar Krai on the night of April 17 to 18, causing fires at the facilities.[1] Geolocated footage published on April 18 shows fires at the Novokuibyshevsk and Syrzan oil refineries caused fires, and a Ukrainian open-source intelligence (OSINT) source assessed that the strike on Novokuibyshevsk may have damaged up to three tanks.[2] Regional Russian officials acknowledged that Ukrainian drone strikes caused fires at the port in Vysotsk, Leningrad Oblast, and at an oil depot near Tikhoretsk, Krasnodar Krai.[3] Ukraine's Security Service (SBU) reported on April 18 that Ukrainian forces also struck military and energy targets in occupied Crimea including the Yamal and Azov Ropucha-class project 775 large landing ships (both of the Black Sea Fleet [BSF]), an unidentified third warship, the antenna block of a Delfin communication system, and an MMys-M1 radar station in unspecified areas of occupied Crimea, and fuel tanks at the Yugtorsan oil depot near occupied Sevastopol.[4] The SBU reported that Ukrainian strikes may also have damaged a Russian Grachonok-class project 21980 patrol boat. Geolocated footage published on April 18 shows a fire at the Sevastopol oil depot, and Sevastopol occupation governor Mikhail Razvozhaev acknowledged that the strike caused a fire at a fuel storage tank.[5]

Russian milbloggers criticized Russian air defense failures on the heels of the successful Ukrainian strike campaign against Russian oil and defense industrial infrastructure. A prominent Russian milblogger published a purported note from a Russian air defense servicemember claiming that Ukrainian forces were able to strike the port of Ust-Luga because Russian air defense lacked sufficient surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) to defend against many strike vehicles, leaving Russian air defenses overwhelmed.[6] The note also accused inspectors from the Russian Air Force and Air Defense Forces of caring more about the appearance of the air defense units they inspect than performance. A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed that Leningrad Oblast's April 17 announcement to begin recruiting reservists for mobile fire groups is belated but smart.[7] The milblogger noted that these groups are becoming increasingly important due to Russia's SAM shortage and called for these Russian mobile fire groups to intercept as many Ukrainian long-range drones near the frontline as possible. Drozdenko’s reform and the milblogger criticisms indicate that Russian federal subjects are only beginning to respond seriously to Ukrainian long-range strikes and have not yet learned the lessons of previous Russian air defense failures or of Russia's own strike campaign against Ukrainian infrastructure.[8] It is unclear how successful Russia will be at successfully defending defense industrial and oil infrastructure from Ukrainian strikes, given Russia's need to cover vast areas and dispersed assets with air defenses, and Russian forces thus far have only taken limited measures to actually mitigate these strikes.[9]

Russia appears to be leveraging Russian SIM cards with international roaming data capability in Ukrainian border areas to support its long-range strike campaign against Ukraine. Ukrainian Ministry of Defense (MoD) advisor on defense technology and drone and electronic warfare (EW) expert Serhiy "Flash" Beskrestnov reported on April 17 that Russian forces equip every Shahed-type long-range drone with SIM cards from Russian telecommunications operator T2, a subsidiary of Russian state telecommunications operator Rostelecom.[10] Establishing connections to cellular data allows Russia to control the drones remotely and lets the drones transmit telemetry data and real-time footage to their operators. Beskrestnov noted that the Russian government special orders these SIM cards from T2 and distributes them to Shahed drone manufacturers.[11] Beskrestnov stated that while Ukraine has blocked T2 SIM cards from roaming in Ukraine, the Russian Shaheds can still fly close to the Belarusian, Polish, and Romanian borders as the Tele2 SIM cards connect to the networks of telecommunication operators in Belarus, Poland, and Romania. Russia has been leveraging Belarusian infrastructure to support its long-range drone strikes against Ukraine and likely intends to leverage unknown loopholes in European telecommunications infrastructure for this same effort.[12]

The United States extended on April 17 the waiver allowing Russia to sell its existing seaborne oil until May 16.[13] Russian Direct Investment Fund (RDIF) CEO Kirill Dmitriev claimed that the extension affects over 100 million barrels of Russian oil in transit.[14]

Key Takeaways:

• Ukraine’s long-range strike campaign continues to exploit overstretched Russian air defenses to damage oil infrastructure and military assets in Russia and occupied Crimea.
• Russian milbloggers criticized Russian air defense failures on the heels of the successful Ukrainian strike campaign against Russian oil and defense industrial infrastructure.
• Russia appears to be leveraging Russian SIM cards with international roaming data capability in Ukrainian border areas to support its long-range strike campaign against Ukraine.
• The United States extended on April 17 the waiver allowing Russia to sell its existing seaborne oil until May 16.
• Russian forces advanced in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area.
• Russian forces launched 219 long-range drones against Ukraine.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.    

• Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
• Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis
• Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
• Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
• Significant Activity in Belarus

Note: ISW is adjusting how we write the axis sections of the Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment. ISW will start collecting reader feedback on the changes shortly. ISW will temporarily cease publishing Russian ORBAT information on April 17-19. ISW will resume publishing Russian ORBAT information in a new format on April 20. ISW will continue collecting ORBAT information in this period and can make it available to selected readers upon request. Please contact [email protected] for any request for information.

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

See topline text.

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in Sumy Oblast along the international border)

Russian forces continued ground assaults and conducted infiltration missions in northern Sumy Oblast on April 18.[15] Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported on April 18 that small Russian assault groups are operating in Myropilske and Prokhody (both east of Sumy City), but do not control these settlements.[16] Geolocated footage published on April 18 shows Ukrainian forces striking a Russian-occupied building in southern Taratutyne (southeast of Sumy City) after what ISW assesses was a Russian infiltration mission.[17]

Russian efforts in northern Sumy Oblast since the start of 2026 have yet to achieve tactically-significant penetrations. Mashovets stated that Russian forces have failed to fully unite disparate efforts in the direction after seizing small border villages and have managed to seize only one relatively large village, Hrabovske (southeast of Sumy City), in their 2026 efforts in northern Sumy Oblast.[18] Mashovets noted that Russian forces have penetrated five to six kilometers into Ukraine on average in their salients east and southeast of Sumy City.

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border to create a defensible buffer zone with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Russian forces continued infiltration missions in northern Kharkiv Oblast on April 18.[19] Geolocated footage published on April 15 shows Ukrainian forces striking a Russian-occupied building in northeastern Okhrimivka (northeast of Kharkiv City) after what ISW assesses was a Russian infiltration mission.[20]

Ukrainian forces have likely stalled Russian advances northeast of Kharkiv City around Vovchansk. Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported on April 18 that Ukrainian forces have halted the Russian advance near Vovchansk toward Staryi Saltiv and Bilyi Kolodyaz (both northeast of Kharkiv City), and are counterattacking in southeastern Vovchansk.[21] Mashovets assessed that Ukrainian forces are likely pushing Russian forces back from Prylipka and clearing central and southern Vilcha (both northeast of Kharkiv City). Mashovets noted that Ukrainian strikes are preventing Russian forces from supplying and reinforcing positions near Hrafske and north of Symynivka (both northeast of Kharkiv City), likely such that these forces will struggle to conduct offensive operations.

Neither Ukrainian nor Russian sources reported Russian ground attacks in the Velykyi Burluk direction on April 18.

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Oskil River (Russian objective: Cross the Oskil River in Kharkiv Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued infiltration missions in the Kupyansk direction on April 18 as Ukrainian forces counterattacked in the area.[22] Geolocated footage published on April 17 shows Ukrainian forces striking a Russian-occupied trench network southwest of Pishchane (southeast of Kupyansk) after what ISW assesses was a Russian infiltration mission.[23]

Russian offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction have recently stalled in the face of Ukrainian counterattacks. Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported on April 18 that Ukrainian counterattacks near Pishchane and Kurylivka (southeast of Kupyansk) have halted Russian advances toward Kupyansk-Vuzlovyi (south of Kupyansk).[24] Mashovets added that Russian forces have failed to make progress toward Kucherivka and near Petropavlivka (both east of Kupyansk), forcing Russian forces to pause efforts to eliminate the Ukrainian foothold on the east (left) bank of the Oskil River in the Kupyansk direction in the past two weeks (roughly since April 4).[25]

Neither Ukrainian nor Russian sources reported ground activity in the Borova direction on April 18.

Ukrainian partisans reportedly recently sabotaged railroad infrastructure in occupied Luhansk Oblast. The Atesh Crimea-based Ukrainian partisan group reported that its agents burned a transformer at a railway substation in occupied Luhansk City (roughly 105 kilometers from the frontline), disrupting Russian logistics in the Lyman and Kostyantynivka directions.[26]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)

Russian and Ukrainian sources reported that fighting is largely concentrated southeast of Slovyansk near Rai-Oleksandrivka on April 18, but Russian advances in other areas of the Slovyansk direction appear to have slowed.[27] Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported on April 18 that the pace of Russian advances in the Slovyansk direction has slowed in recent weeks, as Ukrainian counterattacks near Zakitne and south of Kryva Luka (both east of Slovyansk) forced Russian forces to pause offensive operations on the Zakitne-Kalenyky (southwest of Zakitne) line.[28] Mashovets stated that Russian forces are leaning into attacks near Rai-Oleksandrivka (southwest of Kalenyky), constraining Ukraine forces' bandwidth to counterattack on the flanks of the forces operating on the Kryva Luka-Kalenyky line. Mashovets noted that Ukrainian forces still hold positions west of Riznykivka (east of Kalenyky), which allows Ukrainian forces to threaten Russian logistics lines to the Kryva Luka-Kalenyky front from both the north and south.

Geolocated footage published on April 17 and reportedly dated April 11 shows Ukrainian forces striking a Russian-occupied building in southern Yampil (southeast of Lyman) in what ISW assesses was a Russian infiltration mission.[29]

Ukrainian forces continue counterattacks in the Lyman direction. Mashovets reported that Russian forces are also bogged down in fighting northwest of Lyman along the Oleksandrohrad-Novoselivka-Drobysheve-Sosnove line and noted that Ukrainian forces have likely cleared Russian infiltration groups from Oleksandrohrad and Yarova (northwest of Lyman).[30] Mashovets reported that Ukrainian forces are counterattacking southeast of Lyman near Yampil and Ozerne after pushing Russian forces from positions in the area.

Russian forces continued ground operations and infiltration missions in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area on April 18 and conducted a FAB-3000 guided glide bomb strike against Kostyantynivka itself.[31]    

Russian forces recently advanced during a reinforced platoon-sized mechanized assault northeast of Kostyantynivka. Geolocated footage published on April 18 indicates that elements of the Russian 70th Motorized Rifle Division (18th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) recently advanced west of Chasiv Yar (northeast of Kostyantynivka during a reinforced platoon-sized mechanized assault consisting of five infantry fighting vehicles, one tank, 10 motorcycles, and multiple quad bikes.[32] Mashovets indicated that Russian forces seized Pryvillya and Minkivka, likely not within the past day.[33] Geolocated footage published on April 15 and 17 shows Russian forces operating in fields south of Kostyantynivka during what ISW assesses were likely infiltration missions.[34]

Ukrainian forces continue counterattacking in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area, and a Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces still hold positions on the western outskirts of Chasiv Yar.[35]

Geolocated footage published on April 10 shows Russian forces shelling a Ukrainian position in northeastern Kostyantynivka, indicating that Russian forces likely do not hold positions in the immediate vicinity of the Ukrainian position, contrary to Russian claims.[36]

Russian forces continued limited ground attacks in the Dobropillya tactical area on April 18 but did not advance.[37]

Russian forces continued offensive operations and infiltration missions in the Pokrovsk direction on April 18.[38] Geolocated footage published on April 17 shows Ukrainian forces striking a Russian servicemember south of Novooleksandrivka (northwest of Pokrovsk) in what ISW assesses was an infiltration operation.[39]

Russian forces continued limited attacks in the Novopavlivka direction on April 18 but did not advance.[40]

Russian forces recently conducted infiltration missions and offensive operations in the Oleksandrivka direction, as Ukrainian forces continued limited counterattacks.[41] Geolocated footage published on April 17 shows Ukrainian forces striking a Russian position in southern Ternove (southeast of Oleksandrivka) after what ISW assesses was an infiltration operation.[42]

Ukrainian forces continued mid-range strikes against Russian military and logistics assets in occupied Donetsk Oblast overnight on April 17 to 18. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on April 18 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian fuel and lubricant storage site near occupied Mariupol (about 114 kilometers from the frontline).[43] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces also struck Russian repair unit locations near occupied Hrafske (about 66 kilometers from the frontline) and Manhush (about 105 kilometers from the frontline).

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Hulyaipole, western Zaporizhia, and Kherson directions on April 18 but did not advance.[44] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked in the Hulyaipole direction.[45]

Ukrainian forces continue their mid-range strikes against Russian military assets in occupied Zaporizhia and Kherson oblasts overnight on April 18 to 19. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces also struck a Russian repair unit near occupied Tokmak (about 50 kilometers from the frontline).[46] Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) Commander Major Robert “Magyar” Brovdi reported that Ukrainian forces also struck several unspecified Russian military facilities in occupied Zaporizhia Oblast.[47] A Russin milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces are targeting occupied Skadovsk, Kherson Oblast (roughly 55 kilometers from the Dnipro River), a port town at the intersection of several Russian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) between occupied Kherson Oblast, Zaporizhia Oblast, and Crimea.[48]

Russian forces are reportedly attempting to seize more advantageous positions from which to shell west (right) bank Kherson Oblast. Ukrainian Southern Defense Forces Spokesperson Colonel Vladyslav Voloshyn reported April 18 that Russian forces are attempting to displace Ukrainian forces from Oleksiivskyi Island and seize positions on the east (left) bank side of the Antonivskyi Bridge (both east of Kherson City), in order to more actively strike Kherson City.[49] Voloshyn reported that Russian forces are also attempting to transport supplies to their observation posts on islands in the Dnipro River.

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Russian forces continued long-range drone strikes against Ukraine overnight on April 17 to 18. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 219 Shahed-type, Gerbera-type, Italmas-type, and other long-range strike drones, including about 150 Shaheds, from the directions of Bryansk, Kursk, and Oryol cities; Shatalovo, Smolensk Oblast; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai, and occupied Cape Chauda, Crimea.[50] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 190 drones, that 28 drones struck 17 locations, and that drone debris fell at nine locations. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces struck commercial, port, residential, and industrial infrastructure in Kharkiv, Sumy, and Zaporizhzhia cities and Poltava and Odesa oblasts.[51] Ukrainian officials also reported that overnight Russian strikes damaged critical infrastructure in Chernihiv Oblast, cutting power to 380,000 subscribers in Chernihiv Oblast.[52]

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky warned on April 17 that Russian forces are preparing artillery positions along roads to the Belarusian-Ukrainian international border.[53] Zelensky stated that Russia may attempt to bring Belarus into the war against Ukraine.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.