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April 11, 2026
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, April 11, 2026
Data Cutoff: 11:30 AM ET
Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.
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Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.
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The Kremlin’s unilateral short-term, theater-wide ceasefire over the Orthodox Easter holiday came into effect at 1600 local time on April 11, and both Ukrainian and Russian sources accused each other of limited violations in the first hours of the ceasefire. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on April 11 that Ukraine will “observe a regime of silence” and will “mirror” Russian actions, including refraining from its own strikes as long as Russian forces do not conduct strikes in the sky, on land, and at sea.[1] Zelensky also stated that Ukraine has created a proposal to help use the Orthodox Easter ceasefire to move toward peace.
A Ukrainian local Kherson Oblast strikes monitoring channel reported on April 11 that Russian forces conducted a multiple launch rocket system (MLRS) strike against Tyahynska Hromada in Kherson Oblast within a half hour of the ceasefire coming into effect and stated that Russian forces had not stopped first-person view (FPV) drone strikes as of the MLRS strike.[2] A Ukrainian Kherson City news channel published intercepted footage from a Russian FPV strike drone striking a civilian parking lot in Kherson City about two hours and 40 minutes after the start of the declared ceasefire.[3] Nova Kakhovka acting occupation mayor Vladimir Oganesov claimed on April 11 that Ukrainian drone strikes damaged three cars and a house and injured one civilian in occupied Nova Kakhovka, Kherson Oblast, within roughly half an hour of the ceasefire coming into effect.[4]
The Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) has reportedly taken control of seven of eight Russian pre-trial detention centers (SIZOs) as part of the Kremlin's broader effort to strengthen the internal security apparatus. Russian investigative opposition source The Insider reported on April 11 citing the Russian state register of legal entities that the FSB has assumed direct control from the Russian Federal Penitentiary Service over the Lefortovo SIZO-2 in Moscow City, SIZO-3 in St. Petersburg, SIZO-4 in Rostov-on-Don, SIZO-5 in Krasnodar City, SIZO-6 in Vladikavkaz, SIZO-7 in Chelyabinsk City, and SIZO-8 in occupied Simferopol, Crimea, leaving only SIZO-1 in Moscow City under the control of the Federal Penitentiary Service.[5] The Insider reported that the FSB assumed control over the Lefortovo SIZO on March 2 and the other six SIZOs on March 23. The Insider reported that the FSB installed new heads of SIZO-2, SIZO-4, SIZO-5, and SIZO-6, that the existing head of SIZO-3 is already FSB-affiliated, and that the head of SIZO-8 is restricted information. These measures appear to formalize at least de facto FSB control over Russian SIZOs, as the Russian Memorial Center for Human Rights — the successor of the Memorial Human Rights Center that focused on human rights abuses in the Soviet era — reported in October 2024 that the FSB had assumed control over SIZO-2.[6] Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a law in July 2025 granting the FSB the ability to control its own pre-trial detention centers as of January 1, 2026, and the FSB appears to be using this law to displace the Federal Penitentiary Service.[7] The FSB's takeover of SIZO facilities will likely further degrade human rights in Russia, particularly for prisoners. Russian human rights lawyers told the Insider that the FSB's takeover of Russian SIZOs has already degraded the conditions of detainees and restricted their access to legal counsel, and warned that the FSB will likely increase pressure on defendants, prolong investigations, and manipulate cases.[8] ISW has observed reports that the FSB uses SIZO facilities to abuse and torture Ukrainian POWs and civilians, and Russia has implemented measures in recent years to expand the FSB's powers to detain and punish people in Russia and occupied Ukraine.[9] The FSB's takeover of most Russian SIZOs will further institutionalize repression within Russia’s domestic security architecture and worsen the systematic abuse of Ukrainian POWs in Russian detention.[10]
Available independent reporting indicates that Russia's systematic use of short-range first-person view (FPV) drones against civilians in Ukraine is likely partially responsible for the increase in civilian casualties in the war in Ukraine. The UN Human Rights Monitoring Mission in Ukraine (HRMMU) reported on April 10 that short-range weapons, including drones, artillery, and airstrikes, killed 66 civilians and injured 369 in March 2026, more than any other weapon and part of the highest monthly civilian casualty rate since July 2025.[11] The HRMMU reported that 97 percent of recorded incidents of harm to civilians occurred on Ukrainian-controlled territory — indicating that Russian forces are likely responsible for these strikes. The HRMMU reported that the number of civilian casualties from short-range drone strikes has increased significantly from 2024 to 2026 and that the March 2026 civilian casualty rate is 70 percent higher than the March 2025 casualty rate. HRMMU Head Danielle Belle noted that half of the civilian casualties were elderly people whom drones targeted while going to collect their pensions or working in their gardens. ISW has assessed that Russian forces use FPV drones to intentionally harm civilians as part of their wider operational battlefield air interdiction (BAI) template, indicating that the Russian military is using FPV drones to weaponize civilian harm as an intentional tool of war.[12]
Ukraine and Russia conducted civilian prisoner and prisoner of war (POW) exchanges on April 11. Ukrainian and Russian authorities announced on April 11 that Russia and Ukraine exchanged 175 prisoners of war (POWs) each on April 11.[13] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky reported that Russia sent seven civilian prisoners back to Ukraine as part of the exchange.[14] Russian Human Rights Commissioner Tatyana Moskalkova stated that Russia also received seven residents of Kursk Oblast from Ukraine.[15] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) stated that the United Arab Emirates (UAE) mediated the exchange.[16]
Key Takeaways:
- The Kremlin’s unilateral short-term, theater-wide ceasefire over the Orthodox Easter holiday came into effect at 1600 local time on April 11, and both Ukrainian and Russian sources accused each other of limited violations in the first hours of the ceasefire.
- The Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) has reportedly taken control of seven of eight Russian pre-trial detention centers (SIZOs) as part of the Kremlin's broader effort to strengthen the internal security apparatus.
- Available independent reporting indicates that Russia's systematic use of short-range first-person view (FPV) drones against civilians in Ukraine is likely partially responsible for the increase in civilian casualties in the war in Ukraine.
- Ukraine and Russia conducted civilian prisoner and prisoner of war (POW) exchanges on April 11.
- Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area and in the Hulyaipole and Novopavlivka directions.
- Ukrainian forces struck oil infrastructure in Russia. Russian forces launched 160 long-range strike drones against Ukraine.
We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population, and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity, even though we do not describe them in these reports.
NOTE: Military operations below occurred before the ceasefire began unless explicitly noted otherwise.
- Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
- Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis
- Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
- Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
- Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
- Significant Activity in Belarus
NOTE: Military operations below occurred before the ceasefire began unless explicitly noted otherwise.
Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
Ukrainian forces continued their long-range strike campaign against Russian oil infrastructure overnight on April 10 to 11. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on April 11 that Ukrainian forces struck the Krymskaya oil pumping station in Krasnodar Krai overnight — the second such strike in three days.[17] The Krasnodar Krai Operations Headquarters acknowledged the Ukrainian strike and reported a fire at the oil depot.[18] Russian opposition outlet Astra assessed that geolocated footage published on April 11 shows a fire near the Tvernefteprodukt oil depot in Tver City after local residents reported explosions overnight.[19] Ukrainian Center for Countering Disinformation Head Lieutenant Andriy Kovalenko, who frequently reports on successful Ukrainian strikes, reported on April 11 that Ukrainian forces struck Tver City overnight.[20]
Geolocated footage published on April 10 by the Ukrainian Special Operations Forces (SSO) shows Ukrainian forces striking two drilling platforms at the Valery Grayfer and Yuri Korchagin oil fields in the northern Caspian Sea on the night of April 9 to 10.[21]
Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in Sumy Oblast along the international border)
Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Sumy Oblast on April 11 but did not make confirmed advances.
Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced south of Varachyne (north of Sumy City).[22]
Russian forces attacked north of Sumy City near Novomykolaivka and toward Nova Sich, northeast of Sumy City toward Myropillya, and east of Sumy City toward Prokhody and Mala Rybitsa on April 10 and 11.[23]
Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies are reportedly operating in the Sumy and Belgorod directions.[24] Elements of the 22nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (72nd Motorized Rifle Division, 44th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) are reportedly operating in Sumy Oblast.[25]
Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border to create a defensible buffer zone with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)
Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on April 11 but did not advance.
Russian forces attacked northeast of Kharkiv City near Prylipka, Lyman, Starytsya, Vovchansk, Vovchanski Khutory, Hrafske, Izbytske, and Verkhnya Pysarivka on April 10 and 11.[26] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Lyptsi (north of Kharkiv City).[27]
Order of Battle: Drone elements of the Russian 71st Guards Motorized Rifle Division (14th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) are striking Ukrainian personnel in Karaichne (northeast of Kharkiv City).[28]
Russian forces continued limited ground attacks in the Velykyi Burluk direction on April 11 but did not advance.
Russian forces attacked southeast of Velykyi Burluk near Kolodyazne on April 10 and 11.[29]
Ukrainian Joint Forces Task Force Spokesperson Colonel Viktor Trehubov reported that Ukrainian forces pushed Russian forces out of Ambarne (northeast of Velykyi Burluk), taking advantage of ongoing Russian rotations in the area.[30]
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Oskil River (Russian objective: Cross the Oskil River in Kharkiv Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)
Russian forces recently conducted an infiltration mission in the Kupyansk direction.
Assessed Russian infiltration: Geolocated footage published on April 10 shows Ukrainian forces striking a Russian position in central Kurylivka (southeast of Kupyansk) after what ISW assesses was a Russian infiltration mission that did not change the control of terrain or the forward edge of the battle area (FEBA).[31]
Russian forces attacked east of Kupyansk near Petropavlivka and southeast of Kupyansk near Kurylivka and Novoosynove on April 10 and 11.[32]
Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian Rubezh detachment of the 272nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (47th Tank Division, 1st Guards Tank Army [GTA], Moscow Military District [MMD]) are striking Ukrainian forces south of Pishchane (southeast of Kupyansk).[33]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Borova direction on April 11 but did not advance.
Russian forces attacked north of Borova near Novoplatonivka, east of Borova near Nadiya and Shyikivka, and southeast of Borova near Olhivka and Cherneshchyna, and toward Stepove and Druzhelyubivka on April 10 and 11.[34]
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)
Ukrainian forces recently maintained positions or advanced in the Slovyansk direction.
Refinement of areas under Russian claims: Geolocated footage published on April 10 shows Russian forces striking a Ukrainian position in southeastern Lyman — an area where Russian sources previously claimed that Russian forces maintained positions.[35]
Russian forces attacked near Lyman itself; northwest of Lyman near Svyatohirsk; northeast of Lyman near Zarichne; southeast of Slovyansk near Yampil and Dibrova; and east of Slovyansk near Kryva Luka, Kalenyky, Riznykivka, and Rai-Oleksandrivka on April 10 and 11.[36]
Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 16th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff's Main Directorate [GRU]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces in southeastern Lyman.[37] Elements of the 85th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 2nd Luhansk People's Republic Army Corps [LNR AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) reportedly continue to operate in the Rai-Oleksandrivka direction.[38] Drone operators of the Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies are reportedly operating in the Lyman direction.[39]
Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area.
Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on April 7 indicates that Ukrainian forces marginally advanced in the southern outskirts of Kostyantynivka.[40]
Assessed Russian infiltration: Geolocated footage published on April 11 shows Ukrainian forces striking a Russian position north of Stepanivka (southwest of Kostyantynivka) after what ISW assesses was a Russian infiltration mission that did not change the control of terrain or the forward edge of the battle area (FEBA) at this time.[41]
Russian forces attacked near Kostyantynivka itself; northeast of Kostyantynivka near Chasiv Yar; southeast of Kostyantynivka near Ivanopillya; south of Kostyantynivka near Pleshchiivka and Kleban Byk; southwest of Kostyantynivka near Illinivka; west of Kostyantynivka toward Dovha Balka; south of Druzhkivka near Rusyn Yar; and southwest of Druzhkivka near Sofiivka and Novopavlivka on April 10 and 11.[42] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Kostyantynivka and Dovha Balka.[43]
Order of Battle: Drone operators and other elements of the Russian 1008th Motorized Rifle Regiment and the 27th Artillery Regiment (both of the 6th Motorized Rifle Division, 3rd Army Corps [AC], under operational control of the Southern Grouping of Forces) are striking Ukrainian forces in Kostyantynivka.[44] Drone operators of the Khugin Drone Company and 13th Rusichi Assault Detachment of the 1194th Motorized Rifle Regiment (both of the 4th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade [3rd CAA, SMD] are striking Ukrainian forces in Kostyantynivka.[45] Drone operators of the Zmey Gorynych detachment (Russian Federal Security Service's [FSB] Donetsk People's Republic [DNR] Directorate) are striking Ukrainian positions in central Kostyantynivka.[46] Artillery elements of the 238th Artillery Brigade (8th CAA, SMD) are shelling Ukrainian forces in Dovha Balka.[47] First-person view (FPV) drone operators of the 1st Motorized Rifle Battalion of the Baltic Fleet (consolidated motorized rifle regiment of the Navy, under operational control of the Central Grouping of Forces) are striking Ukrainian forces in Stepanivka.[48] FPV drone operators of the 242nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (20th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Novopavlivka and Mykolaipillya (south of Druzhkivka).[49] FPV drone operators of the 58th Separate Spetsnaz Battalion (unofficially designated the Okhotnik [Hunter] Spetsnaz Detachment, 51st CAA, formerly 1st DNR AC, SMD) are reportedly intercepting Ukrainian drones in the Kostyantynivka direction.[50]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Dobropillya tactical area on April 11 but did not advance.
Russian forces attacked east of Dobropillya near Novyi Donbas and southeast of Dobropillya near Ivanivka on April 10 and 11.[51]
Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 102nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (150th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA, SMD) reportedly continue to operate in the Dobropillya direction.[52] Drone operators of the 1st Krasnodar Battalion of the 238th Artillery Brigade (8th CAA) are reportedly intercepting Ukrainian drones in the Shakhove direction.[53]
Russian forces recently conducted infiltration missions in the Pokrovsk direction.
Assessed Russian infiltrations: Geolocated footage published on April 10 shows Ukrainian forces striking a Russian position northwest of Rodynske after what ISW assesses was a Russian infiltration mission that did not change the control of terrain or FEBA at this time.[54]
Refinement of areas under Russian claims: Geolocated footage published on April 10 shows Russian forces shelling Ukrainian forces south of Hryshyne - an area where Russian sources previously claimed that Russian forces maintained positions.[55]
Russian forces attacked near Pokrovsk itself; northwest of Pokrovsk near Hryshyne and toward Novooleksandrivka, Shevchenko, and Vasylivka; north of Pokrovsk near Bilytske and Rodynske; east of Pokrovsk near Myrnohrad; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Udachne, Novopidhorodne, and Molodetske on April 10 and 11.[56]
A spokesperson for the Ukrainian 7th Rapid Reaction Corps of the Air Assault Forces reported on April 11 that Russian forces primarily use infantry in the Pokrovsk direction and are not using heavy equipment for assault operations.[57] The spokesperson stated that Russian forces are attempting to move artillery emplacements closer to the line of contact.
Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 35th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (41st CAA, Central Military District [CMD]) are shelling Ukrainian positions south of Hryshyne.[58]
Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Novopavlivka direction.
Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on April 8 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced in southern Novopavlivka.[59] Russian milbloggers also claimed on April 10 and 11 that Ukrainian forces advanced within Novopavlivka.[60]
Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced west of Novoserhiivka (northeast of Novopavlivka) and southwest of Novopavlivka.[61]
Russian forces attacked near Novopavlivka itself, northeast of Novopavlivka near Novomykolaivka and Novoserhiivka, and southwest of Novopavlivka near Filiya on April 10 and 11.[62]
Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 242nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (20th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA, SMD) are reportedly operating in Novopavlivka.[63]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Oleksandrivka direction on April 11 but did not advance.
Russian forces attacked east of Oleksandrivka near Oleksandrohrad and Sichneve and southeast of Oleksandrivka toward Kalynivske, Verbove, Ternove, and Novohryhorivka on April 10 and 11.[64]
Ukrainian forces continue to maintain the tactical initiative in the Oleksandrivka direction. The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Oleksandrivka direction reported on April 11 that Ukrainian forces have had the tactical initiative for several months in a row and have liberated around 480 square kilometers of territory and 12 settlements in Dnipropetrovsk and Zaporizhia oblasts since the end of January 2026.[65]
Ukrainian forces continue their frontline strikes campaign in the Oleksandrivka direction. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on April 11 that Ukrainian forces struck Russian troop concentrations near Stepove and Rybne (both southeast of Oleksandrivka) overnight.[66]
Ukrainian forces continued their mid-range strike campaign against Russian military assets in occupied Donetsk Oblast. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces also struck Russian ammunition depots near occupied Donetsk City and Makedonivka (roughly 102 kilometers from the frontline) on April 10 or overnight on April 10 to 11.[67] Ukraine's Special Operations Forces (SSO) reported on April 10 that Ukrainian forces struck numerous targets in occupied Donetsk Oblast since April 1, including Russian ammunition depots in occupied Hlyboke and Manhush (each about 120 kilometers from the frontline), and a fuel and lubricants warehouse near occupied Rybynske (roughly 85 kilometers from the frontline).[68]
Order of Battle: Drone operators of the 430th Motorized Rifle Regiment (29th CAA, Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces in Havrylivka (northeast of Oleksandrivka).[69]
Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)
Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Hulyaipole direction.
Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on April 9 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced in central Myrne (southwest of Hulyaipole).[70]
Russian forces attacked near Hulyaipole itself; northwest of Hulyaipole near Olenokostyantynivka, Dobropillya, Varvarivka, and Svyatopetrivka and toward Vozdvyzhivka and Verkhnya Tersa; northeast of Hulyaipole near Solodke; southwest of Hulyaipole near Hulyaipilske and toward Charivne; and west of Hulyaipole near Zaliznychne on April 10 and 11.[71]
Geolocated footage dated April 8 shows Ukrainian forces striking a drone control point of the Russian 114th Motorized Rifle Regiment (127th Motorized Rifle Division, 5th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Eastern Military District [EMD]) with two GBU-62 JDAM-ER bombs in Hulyaipole.[72]
Order of Battle: Drone operators of the 71st Separate Anti-Aircraft Missile Brigade (35th CAA, EMD) are intercepting Ukrainian drones northeast of Myrne.[73]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on April 11 but did not advance.
Russian forces attacked northwest of Orikhiv near Stepnohirsk and Prymorske and southeast of Orikhiv near Bilohirya on April 10 and 11.[74]
Order of Battle: Drone operators of the 38th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (35th CAA) are striking Ukrainian forces west of Chervona Krynytsya (northeast of Orikhiv).[75] Elements of the Russian 7th Airborne (VDV) Division reportedly continue to operate in the Zaporizhia direction.[76]
Ukrainian forces continue their strikes against frontline Russian military assets in the Orikhiv direction. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on April 11 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian drone control point near Konovalova (about six kilometers from the frontline) and a troop concentration near Stepnohirsk (immediately on the frontline) either on April 10 or overnight on April 10 to 11.[77]
Ukrainian forces continue mid-range strikes against Russian military assets in occupied Zaporizhia Oblast. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on April 11 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian personnel concentration near Pryazovske (about 90 kilometers from the frontline) and an ammunition depot near Osypenko (about 91 kilometers from the frontline) within the past day.[78] Ukraine's Special Operations Forces (SSO) reported on April 10 that Ukrainian forces have struck multiple Russian military targets since April 1, including ammunition depots near occupied Svitle and Tokmak (each about 50 kilometers from the frontline); logistics depots near and Svitle, Voskresenka (about 17 kilometers from the frontline), and Zoryane (about 66 kilometers from the frontline); a repair base in Strohanivka (about 91 kilometers from the frontline); and a Russian mobile fire group in Troitske (either 54 or 77 kilometers from the frontline).[79] Geolocated footage published on April 10 confirms the SSO strikes against the logistics depots, ammunition depots, and repair base.[80]
Russian forces continued limited ground assaults northeast of Kherson City toward the Antonivskyi bridge and southwest of Kherson City toward Bilohrudyi Island on April 10 and 11, but did not advance.[81]
Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 331st VDV Regiment (98th VDV Division) reportedly continue to operate in the occupied Kakhovka (northeast of Kherson City) direction.[82]
Ukrainian forces continued their long-range strike campaign against Russian oil infrastructure in occupied Crimea. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on April 11 that Ukrainian forces struck the Hvardiiska oil depot near occupied Hvardiiske either on April 10 or overnight on April 10 to 11.[83]
Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)
Russian forces conducted another long-range drone strike against Ukraine overnight on April 10 to 11. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 160 Shahed-type, Gerbera-type, Italmas-type, and other strike drones, of which about 100 were Shaheds, from the directions of Kursk and Oryol cities; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; occupied Donetsk City; and occupied Cape Chauda, Crimea overnight.[84] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 133 drones, that 20 drones struck 10 locations, and that downed debris fell on 11 locations. Ukrainian officials reported that the Russian drones struck residential infrastructure in Kirovohrad, Sumy, and Poltava oblasts, and civilian and energy infrastructure in Odesa Oblast.[85] The Sumy Oblast Police reported that Russian strikes injured at least 21 in Sumy Oblast, including 17 in Sumy City and four in Konotop.[86]
Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)
Nothing significant to report.
Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media, as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.
[1] https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/18596
[2] https://t.me/kherson_monitoring/65367
[3] https://t.me/kherson_non_fake/29175
[4] https://www.kommersant dot ru/doc/8587120; https://rg dot ru/amp/2026/04/11/reg-hersonskaya/vsu-atakovali-novuiu-kahovku-vo-vremia-pashalnogo-peremiriia.html
[5] https://theins dot ru/news/291339
[6] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-9-2025/
[7] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-23-2025/
[8] https://theins dot ru/news/291339
[9] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-23-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-26-2025 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-9-2025
[10] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-26-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-23-2025/
[11] https://ukraine dot ohchr.org/uk/In-Ukraine-Short-Range-Drones-Were-the-Deadliest-Weapon-for-Civilians-in-March-UN-Human-Rights-Monitors-Say; https://ukraine dot ohchr.org/en/Protection-of-Civilians-in-Armed-Conflict-March-2026
[12] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russias-fpv-drone-campaign-in-ukraine-institutionalizes-intentional-civilian-harm-as-a-tool-of-war/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-12-2026/
[13] https://t.me/mod_russia/62576; https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/18597; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37174
[14] https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/18597
[15] https://tass dot ru/obschestvo/27076529
[16] https://t.me/mod_russia/62576
[17] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-10-2026/
[18] https://t.me/opershtab23/15676
[19] https://t.me/astrapress/109469; https://x.com/Exilenova_plus/status/2042770599169396842
[20] https://t.me/akovalenko1989/10620
[21] https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/34825; https://t.me/ukr_sof/2695; https://x.com/neonhandrail/status/2042720464645337308; https://x.com/wartranslated/status/2042637775413911766; https://x.com/ne_kotletka/status/2042647069622448515; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-10-2026/
[22] https://t.me/rybar/79394
[23] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37181 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37148 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37136; https://t.me/Joint_Forces_Task_Force/20429 ; https://t.me/uvkkursk/311 ; https://t.me/rybar/79394 ; https://t.me/severnnyi/7514
[24] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/206625
[25] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/206493
[26] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37181 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37148 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37136; https://t.me/Joint_Forces_Task_Force/20429 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/91102 ; https://t.me/Sladkov_plus/15407 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/33449 ; https://t.me/severnnyi/7514
[27] https://t.me/dva_majors/91102
[28] https://x.com/Mocca1x/status/2042980566266728638?s=20; https://t.me/warriorofnorth/17093
[29] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37148 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37136; https://t.me/Joint_Forces_Task_Force/20429
[30] https://suspilne dot media/kharkiv/1286941-sili-oboroni-vidnovili-kontrol-bila-ambarnogo-na-harkivsini-rosian-zastali-znenacka-pid-cas-rotacii/
[31] https://t.me/army_corp_10/2003; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/11665
[32] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/3718; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37148; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37136; https://t.me/Joint_Forces_Task_Force/20429
[33] https://x.com/ZoamSc2/status/2042709332681462262?s=20; https://t.me/msprubezh/51
[34] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37181; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37148; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37136; https://t.me/Joint_Forces_Task_Force/20429
[35] https://x.com/ZoamSc2/status/2042797796793946370?s=20; https://t.me/Secrets_of_Vinakos/14187
[36] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37181; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37148; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37136; https://t.me/Joint_Forces_Task_Force/20429; https://t.me/dva_majors/91102; https://t.me/wargonzo/33449
[37] https://x.com/ZoamSc2/status/2042797796793946370?s=20; https://t.me/Secrets_of_Vinakos/14187
[38] https://t.me/motopatriot78/50435; https://t.me/motopatriot78/50444
[39] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/206625
[40] https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/2042930921230286881; https://t.me/TRO_DPR/17242
[41] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/11670; https://t.me/blackraven93ua/941; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/2042993331630698982; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/2042993336747704403 ; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/2042993327314813318; https://t.me/blackraven93ua/941
[42] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37181 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37148 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37136 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/50453 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/33449
[43] https://t.me/wargonzo/33449 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/91102
[44] https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/2042627734942122387; https://t.me/Bahmut_Klehseevka/4604 ; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/2042629083616481314; https://t.me/Bahmut_Klehseevka/4605 ; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/2042636806483489254; https://t.me/Bahmut_Klehseevka/4606 ; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/2042637924445860201; https://t.me/Bahmut_Klehseevka/4611 ; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/2042639055590990265; https://t.me/SouthernRepublic/32228 ; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/2042947053316161901; https://t.me/SouthernRepublic/32359
[45] https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/2042632596740301002; https://vk.com/wall-40316705_54722604 ; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/2042944740014858438; https://t.me/rusich13sho/1520
[46] https://x.com/JoKo47696474602/status/2042610973609984145; https://t.me/TRO_DPR/17252 ; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/2042930921230286881; https://t.me/TRO_DPR/17242
[47] https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/2042641135433040288; https://t.me/SouthernRepublic/32222
[48] https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/2042617075605070033; https://t.me/beslavnaya_baltica/207
[49] https://t.me/nm_dnr/15232
[50] https://t.me/nm_dnr/15233
[51] https://t.me/wargonzo/33449 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37148 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37136
[52] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/112901 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/50447 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/50435; https://t.me/motopatriot78/50444
[53] https://t.me/nm_dnr/15231
[54] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/11667; https://x.com/425Skala/status/2042635034281029867
[55] https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/2042687034415026513?s=20; https://t.me/Sib_army/10322
[56] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37181 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37148 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37136 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/91102 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/50454 ; https://t.me/rybar/79418 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/33449
[57] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/04/11/povernulysya-do-taktyky-infiltracziyi-na-pokrovskomu-napryamku-vorog-prypynyv-lobovi-ataky/
[58] https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/2042687034415026513?s=20; https://t.me/Sib_army/10322
[59] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/11668; https://t.me/izvestia/238930
[60] https://t.me/motopatriot78/50440 ; https://t.me/rybar/79416
[61] https://t.me/rybar/79416
[62] https://t.me/rybar/79416; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37181; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37148; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37136
[63] https://t.me/rybar/79416
[64] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37181; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37148; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37136
[65] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/04/11/na-oleksandrivskomu-napryamku-vorog-kontratakuye-ale-ne-zdatnyj-perehopyty-inicziatyvu/
[66] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37182
[67] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37182
[68] https://x.com/Kukulkan415/status/2042912213468332374?s=20; https://t.me/ukr_sof/2694; https://x.com/PuenteUribarri/status/2042613472597274702?s=20; https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/34824
[69] https://t.me/voin_dv/19232
[70] https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/2042732191432814656?s=20; https://t.me/mod_russia/62531
[71] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37181 ; https://t.me/SJTF_Odes/13691; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37148; https://t.me/SJTF_Odes/13687; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37136; https://t.me/dva_majors/91102; https://t.me/wargonzo/33449
[72] https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/34821; https://x.com/ne_kotletka/status/2042588660051181766; https://t.me/utac_team/169
[73] https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/2042761186341515313?s=20; https://t.me/voin_dv/19229
[74] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37148; https://t.me/SJTF_Odes/13687; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37136; https://t.me/dva_majors/91102; https://t.me/wargonzo/33449
[75] https://t.me/voin_dv/19233; https://x.com/juss_men/status/2042945221822988340?s=20;
[76] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/41750
[77] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37182
[78] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37182
[79] https://t.me/ukr_sof/2694
[80] https://x.com/Kukulkan415/status/2042692462460780752?s=20; https://t.me/ukr_sof/2694; https://x.com/PuenteUribarri/status/2042613472597274702?s=20; https://x.com/PuenteUribarri/status/2042613472597274702?s=20; https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/34824; https://x.com/Kukulkan415/status/2042935249387024561?s=20; https://x.com/Kukulkan415/status/2042943820401119692?s=20; https://x.com/Kukulkan415/status/2042953511181205588?s=20; https://x.com/Kukulkan415/status/2042662164071174625?s=20; https://x.com/PuenteUribarri/status/2042613472597274702?s=20;
[81] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37181 ; https://t.me/SJTF_Odes/13691; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37148; https://t.me/SJTF_Odes/13687; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37136
[82] https://t.me/SALDO_VGA/14735
[83] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37182
[84] https://t.me/kpszsu/59833
[85] https://www.facebook.com/share/p/1B8jKWSVv1/ ; https://suspilne dot media/kropyvnytskiy/1286863-vnaslidok-rosijskoi-dronovoi-ataki-na-kirovogradsini-poskodzenij-budinok/; https://t.me/poltavskaOVA/32937; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/04/11/na-poltavshhyni-cherez-rosijsku-ataku-zagynula-lyudyna/;l https://t.me/police_su_region/36230; https://t.me/odesaMVA/1793 ; https://suspilne dot media/odesa/1286825-v-odesi-vnaslidok-ataki-rf-zaginuli-dvi-ludini/; https://t.me/odesaMVA/1793 ; https://meduza dot io/news/2026/04/11/rossiyskie-voyska-atakovali-odessu-est-pogibshie-i-ranenye
[86] https://t.me/police_su_region/36230












