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6 hours ago
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, January 11, 2026
Assessment as of: 4:30pm ET
Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.
Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.
Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.
For more information on ISW's map methodology, please view our statement here.
Note: The data cut-off for this product was 12:00 pm ET on January 11. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the January 12 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.
Russian forces are reportedly fielding a new Geran long-range strike drone variant, the Geran-5, a drone derived from an Iranian interceptor drone design. The Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported on January 11 that Russian forces used a new Geran-5 strike drone during combined air strikes against Ukraine sometime between January 1 and 11.[1] The GUR reported that the Geran-5 can carry a warhead of about 90 kilograms, has a stated range of about 1,000 kilometers, and has similar components and assembly to other Geran drones. Russia has likely opened a domestic production line for this new type of drone, enabled through an Iranian technology transfer. Russia produces its Geran drones at the Alabuga Special Economic Zone (ASEZ), though it is unclear where Russia could be producing the Geran-5.[2] Russia likely intends to use the Geran-5 to strike aerial targets, rather than only ground targets, potentially augmenting Russian strike packages and air defense capabilities. The GUR reported that Russian forces are developing a way to launch Geran-5 drones from aircraft, including the Su-25 attack aircraft, and to equip the Geran-5s with R-73 air-to-air missiles. The GUR reported that the Geran-5 is based on the Iranian Karrar air-to-air drone, which can also be launched from fighter jets, is equipped with air-to-air missiles, and is part of Iran's air defense umbrella.[3] Russian forces are increasingly modifying their Shahed/Geran-type drones to target the aerial aspects of Ukraine's air defense umbrella interceptor drones and fighter jets — likely to augment the damage that Russian long-range strike series inflict on Ukraine amid continued Ukrainian air defense innovations.[4]
Ukrainian forces continued their long-range strike campaign against Russian oil infrastructure overnight on January 10 to 11. The Ukrainian General Staff and Ukrainian Special Operations Forces (SSO) reported on January 11 that Ukrainian drones struck the Lukoil drilling platforms in the Filanovsky, Graifer, and Korchagin oil fields in the Caspian Sea overnight and are still conducting a battle damage assessment.[5] Geolocated footage published on January 11 shows Ukrainian drones striking drilling platforms in the Filanovsky, Graifer, and Korchagin oil fields.[6] Ukrainian forces have struck oil infrastructure in the Caspian Sea at least five times since December 10, 2025.[7]
Key Takeaways:
- Russian forces are reportedly fielding a new Geran long-range strike drone variant, the Geran-5, a drone derived from an Iranian interceptor drone design.
- Ukrainian forces continued their long-range strike campaign against Russian oil infrastructure overnight on January 10 to 11.
- Russian forces recently advanced in the Borova, Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka, and Hulyaipole directions and in western Zaporizhia Oblast.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.
- Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
- Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis
- Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
- Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
- Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
- Significant Activity in Belarus
Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
Pro-Ukrainian agents reportedly targeted a Russian air defense site in Moscow Oblast. The “Atesh” Crimea-based Ukrainian partisan group reported on January 11 that its agents carried out a sabotage operation in Moscow Oblast, burning a radio mast of the Russian 5th Air Defense Division (1st Air and Missile Defense Army, Russian Aerospace Forces [VKS]).[8]
Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in Sumy Oblast along the international border)
Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Sumy Oblast on January 11 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked in Kursk and Sumy oblasts, including north of Sumy City near Andriivka and Varachyne and southeast of Sumy City near Ryasne, on January 10 and 11.[9]
Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 30th Motorized Rifle Regiment (72nd Motorized Rifle Division, 44th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) are reportedly operating near Oleksiivka (north of Sumy City).[10]
Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border to create a defensible buffer zone with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)
Russian forces continued offensive operations northeast of Kharkiv City near Prylipka, Lyman, Vovchansk, Vilcha, Vovchanski Khutory, and Hrafske, on January 10 and 11 but did not advance.[11]
Russian forces continued offensive operations, including southeast of Velykyi Burluk near Dvorichanske and toward Kolodyazne, on January 11 but did not advance.[12]
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Oskil River (Russian objective: Cross the Oskil River in Kharkiv Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on January 11 but did not make confirmed advances.

Assessed Russian infiltrations: Geolocated footage published on January 10 shows Russian forces operating in southern Podoly (east of Kupyansk) in what ISW assesses was an infiltration mission that did not change the control of terrain or forward edge of the battle area (FEBA).[13]
Russian forces attacked toward Kupyansk itself; northwest of Kupyansk near Tyshchenkivka; north of Kupyansk near Dovhenke; west of Kupyansk near Myrove; east of Kupyansk toward Petropavlivka; and southeast of Kupyansk toward Kurylivka and Pishchane on January 10 and 11.[14] Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Kindrashivka (north of Kupyansk), Kupyansk-Vuzlovyi (south of Kupyansk), and Blahodativka (southwest of Kupyansk).[15]
Ukrainian Joint Forces Task Force Spokesperson Colonel Viktor Trehubov reported on January 10 that preliminary estimates suggest that there are between 25 and 90 Russian soldiers left in Kupyansk and that most figures estimate the number of Russian soldiers left in Kupyansk as between 50 and 60.[16] Trehubov stated that Ukrainian forces hold positions north of Kupyansk and east of Kupyansk across the Oskil River, preventing Russian forces from crossing the Oskil River in Kupyansk.
Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 352nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (11th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) continue operating in the Kupyansk direction, including striking Ukrainian forces in Kurylivka.[17]
Russian forces recently advanced in the Borova direction.

Assessed Russian advance: Geolocated footage published on January 11 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in western Ridkodub (southeast of Borova).[18]
Russian forces attacked north of Borova near Bohuslavka; northeast of Borova near Zahryzove; southeast of Borova near Hrekivka, Karpivka, Druzhelyubivka, and Serednie; and south of Borova near Oleksandrivka, Vovchyi Yar, and Shandryholove on January 10 and 11.[19]
Ukrainian forces continued their mid-range strike campaign against Russian military assets in occupied Luhansk Oblast. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on January 11 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian Buk-M3 air defense system near Baranycheve, Luhansk Oblast (about 20 kilometers behind the frontline), causing a fire and secondary explosions.[20]
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Slovyansk direction on January 11 but did not make confirmed advances.
Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced south of Zakitne (northeast of Slovyansk), west of Dibrova, and near Ozerne (both southeast of Lyman).[21]
Russian forces attacked near and within Lyman itself; northwest of Lyman near Novoselivka, Yarova, and Drobysheve and toward Svyatohirsk; north of Lyman near Stavky; east of Lyman near Zarichne; southeast of Lyman near Yampil; northeast of Slovyansk near Zakitne and Platonivka; and east of Slovyansk near Dronivka and Siversk on January 10 and 11.[22]
Ukrainian Joint Forces Task Force Spokesperson Colonel Viktor Trehubov reported on January 11 that Russian forces have intensified their infiltration efforts in Lyman and their efforts to advance on Slovyansk.[23] Trehubov stated that Russian forces are prioritizing the Slovyansk direction but are failing to advance despite significant efforts. A Russian milblogger reportedly affiliated with the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces claimed that the Russian 254th Motorized Rifle Regiment (144th Motorized Rifle Division, 20th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Moscow Military District [MMD]) is preparing to attack on the Drobysheve-Zarichne line, but that the Russian command is overworking forces and lowering their morale.[24] The milblogger claimed that Russian forces recently suffered eight casualties in a friendly fire incident near the Zherebets River, which the milblogger attributed either to poor communication or the overworked condition of Russian forces.
Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 6th Motorized Rifle Brigades (3rd CAA, formerly 2nd Luhansk People's Republic Army Corps [LNR AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) are operating near Siversk.[25] Drone operators and other elements of the 7th Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd CAA) are reportedly operating near Siversk and Zakitne.[26] Reconnaissance elements of the 752nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (3rd Motorized Rifle Division, 20th CAA) are reportedly operating in the Lyman direction.[27]
Russian forces recently advanced in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on January 10 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in eastern Kostyantynivka.[28]
Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced in central Minkivka (northeast of Kostyantynivka) and west of Stepanivka (southwest of Kostyantynivka).[29]
Russian forces attacked near and within Kostyantynivka itself; north of Kostyantynivka near Markove, Mayske, and Virolyubivka; northeast of Kostyantynivka near Minkivka; east of Kostyantynivka near Oleksandro-Shultyne, Predtechyne, and Chasiv Yar; southeast of Kostyantynivka near Pleshchiivka, Ivanopillya, and Shcherbynivka; south of Kostyantynivka toward Berestok; southwest of Kostyantynivka near Yablunivka; south of Druzhkivka near Rusyn Yar; and southwest of Druzhkivka toward Sofiivka and Torske on January 10 and 11.[30]
Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian Smuglyanka Detachment and the Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies are striking Ukrainian positions south of Petrivka (southeast of Kostyantynivka).[31] Drone operators of the 103rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (150th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA, SMD) are striking Ukrainian unmanned ground vehicles (UGVs) in southwestern Kostyantynivka.[32] Drone operators of the 4th Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd CAA) are striking Ukrainian drone operators in western Kostyantynivka and Ukrainian vehicles in southern Kostyantynivka.[33] First-person view (FPV) drone operators of the 89th Tank Regiment (6th Motorized Rifle Division, 3rd AC, under operational control of the Southern Grouping of Forces) are intercepting Ukrainian drones north of Bila Hora (east of Kostyantynivka).[34] Elements of the BARS-13 Pisarev Detachment (Russian Combat Army Reserve) are reportedly operating southeast of Dyliivka (southeast of Kostyantynivka).[35] Elements of the 20th Motorized Rifle Division (8th CAA) are reportedly operating west of Stepanivka.[36] Drone operators of the Russian 150th Motorized Rifle Division (8th CAA) are reportedly striking Ukrainian artillery in Novohryhorivka and Krasnyi Kut (both southwest of Druzhkivka).[37] FPV drone operators and artillery elements of the 238th Artillery Brigade (8th CAA) and FPV drone operators of the 174th Separate Reconnaissance Battalion (150th Motorized Rifle Division) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions in the Kostyantynivka direction.[38]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Dobropillya direction on January 11 but did not advance.
Russian forces attacked northeast of Dobropillya toward Kucheriv Yar; east of Dobropillya near Nove Shakhove, Shakhove, and Toretske; and southeast of Dobropillya near Zapovidne and toward Ivanivka on January 10 and 11.[39]
Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 150th Motorized Rifle Division (8th CAA) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions in the Dobropillya direction.[40] FPV drone operators of the 80th Sparta Separate Reconnaissance Battalion (51st CAA, formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic [DNR]AC, SMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian vehicles near Dobropillya.[41]
Russian forces recently advanced in the Pokrovsk direction.


Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on January 10 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in northern Pokrovsk in areas where Russian forces previously conducted infiltration missions.[42]
Russian forces attacked near and within Pokrovsk itself; northwest of Pokrovsk near Hryshyne and toward Novooleksandrivka and Serhiivka; north of Pokrovsk near Rodynske; northeast of Pokrovsk near Sukhetske, Zatyshok, Chervonyi (Krasnyi) Lyman and toward Bilytske; east of Pokrovsk near and within Myrnohrad; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Kotlyne, Udachne, and Molodetske on January 10 and 11.[43] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Udachne, Kotlyne and Novopidhorodne (southwest of Pokrovsk).[44]
The Ukrainian 7th Rapid Reaction Corps of the Air Assault Forces reported on January 10 that Russian drone activity complicates Ukrainian logistics near Pokrovsk and that Ukrainian forces are using electronic warfare (EW), air defense, and counter-drone capabilities to counter Russian drone operations in that direction.[45]
Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 9th Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st Combined Arms Army [CAA]) reportedly continue to operate near Rodynske.[46] First-person view (FPV) drone operators of the 80th Sparta Separate Reconnaissance Battalion are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Dobropillya and Novooleksandrivka.[47]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Novopavlivka direction on January 11 but did not make confirmed advances.
Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced along the Solena River to the southwestern outskirts of Novopavlivka.[48]
Russian forces attacked near Novopavlivka itself and south of Novopavlivka near Filiya on January 10 and 11.[49] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Novomykolaivka (northeast of Novopavlivka).[50]
Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 90th Tank Division (41st CAA, Central Military District [CMD]) are reportedly operating north of Filiya.[51]
Russian forces continued offensive operations northeast of Oleksandrivka toward Ivanivka and southeast of Oleksandrivka near Sosnivka, Vyshneve, Verbove, Oleksiivka, and Sichneve on January 10 and 11 but did not advance.[52]
Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)
Russian forces recently advanced in the Hulyaipole direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported on January 11 that Russian forces advanced in northwestern and central Hulyaipole.[53] Geolocated footage published on January 10 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced west of Pryluky (northwest of Hulyaipole).[54]
Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed on January 11 that Russian forces seized Pryluky.[55]
Russian forces attacked near and within Hulyaipole; northwest of Hulyaipole near Olenokostyantynivka and Pryluky and toward Svyatopetrivka; north of Hulyaipole near Andriivka, Zelene, Varvarivka, and Dobropillya; northeast of Hulyaipole near Solodke, Rybne, and Zlahoda; and south of Hulyaipole near Dorozhnyanka on January 10 and 11.[56] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Pryluky.[57]
Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported on January 11 that the Russian military command redeployed elements of the Russian 76th Airborne (VDV) Division to areas north and northeast of Polohy (south of Hulyaipole) from the Sumy direction around November 2025.[58] Mashovets noted that Russian forces are concentrating their offensive efforts in the Hulyaipole direction near and north of Hulyaipole.[59]
Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 57th Motorized Rifle Brigade (5th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces in Zaliznychne (west of Hulyaipole).[60] Elements of the 11th Air Force and Air Defense Army (Russian Aerospace Forces [VKS] and EMD) are striking Ukrainian positions in Staroukrainka (west of Hulyaipole).[61]
Russian forces recently advanced in western Zaporizhia Oblast.


Assessed Russian advances: Mashovets reported on January 11 that Russian forces advanced to the mouth of the Kinka River west of Prymorske (northwest of Orikhiv).[62]
Unconfirmed claims: The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on January 11 that Russian forces seized Bilohirya (southeast of Orikhiv).[63] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced north of and in northwestern Prymorske.[64]
Refinement of areas under Russian claims: Geolocated footage published on January 11 shows Russian forces striking Ukrainian positions southeast of Lukyanivske (northwest of Orikhiv) – an area in which Russian sources previously claimed that Russian forces maintained positions.[65]
Russian forces attacked southeast of Orikhiv near Bilohirya and Mala Tokmachka; west of Orikhiv near Stepove and Stepnohirsk; and northwest of Orikhiv near Prymorske and Lukyanivske and toward Pavlivka, Novoyakovlivka, Mahdalynivka, and Novoboikivske on January 10 and 11.[66]
Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 70th Motorized Rifle Regiment (42nd Motorized Rifle Division, 58th CAA, Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating near Bilohirya.[67] Elements of the 108th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (7th VDV Division) are reportedly operating in Prymorske.[68] First-person view (FPV) drone operators of the 328th VDV Regiment (104th VDV Division) are striking Ukrainian positions near Lukyanivske.[69] Engineer elements of the 7th VDV Division are reportedly demining Russian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) in western Zaporizhia Oblast.[70]
Russian forces continued limited ground assaults east of Kherson City near the Antonivskyi roadway bridge on January 10 and 11 but did not advance.[71]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 98th VDV Division reportedly continue to strike Ukrainian forces in west (right) bank Kherson Oblast.[72]
Ukrainian forces continued their mid-range strike campaign against Russian military assets in occupied Kherson Oblast. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on January 11 that Ukrainian forces struck a depot of a logistics unit of the Russian 49th CAA (SMD) near occupied Novotroitske, Kherson Oblast (about 79 kilometers from the eastern bank of the Dnipro River).[73]
Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)
Russian forces continued drone strikes against Ukraine overnight on January 10 to 11. The Ukrainian Air Force reported on January 11 that Russian forces launched 154 Shahed, Gerbera, and other types of strike drones at Ukraine, including about 110 Shaheds, from the directions of Kursk, Oryol, and Bryansk cities; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; and occupied Hvardiiske, Crimea.[74] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 125 drones and that 22 drones struck 18 locations. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian drones struck residential buildings in Sheptaky, Chernihiv Oblast and civilian infrastructure in Nizhyn and Semenivka, Chernihiv Oblast; Kharkiv City; and Sarny, Rivne Oblast.[75] Ukrainian railway operator Ukrzaliznytsia Spokesperson Nataliya Turchak indicated that Russian forces struck railway infrastructure in Rivne Oblast.[76]
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on January 11 that Russian forces launched almost 1,100 long-range strike drones, over 890 guided glide bombs, and over 50 cruise and ballistic missiles against Ukraine in the past week (since about January 4).[77] Zelensky stated that Russian forces primarily targeted energy infrastructure and residential buildings with these strikes.
Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)
Nothing significant to report.
Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

[1] https://gur dot gov.ua/content/voroh-upershe-zastosuvav-udarnyi-bpla-yeran5-detali-novoi-rozrobky-bude-opryliudneno-na-portali-warsanctions.html; https://t.me/DIUkraine/7685; https://suspilne dot media/1210788-armia-rf-vperse-atakuvala-ukrainu-novim-dronom-geran-5-u-gur-zaavili-so-vin-shozij-na-iranskij-bpla-karrar/;
[2] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-6-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/adversary-entente/adversary-entente-cooperation-at-russias-shahed-factory-threatens-global-security/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-15-2025/
[3] https://www.army-technology.com/projects/karrar-combat-drone-iran/?cf-view
[4] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-5-2026/
[5] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/33665; https://t.me/ukr_sof/2398
[6] ISW geolocated the strike of the Graifer oil field internally.
https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/33034; https://x.com/neonhandrail/status/2010367717082349824; https://t.me/kiber_boroshno/12460; https://x.com/neonhandrail/status/2010385957011509272
[7] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-20-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-19-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-15-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-13-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-11-2025/
[8] https://t.me/atesh_ua/9084
[9] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/33630; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/33627; https://t.me/wargonzo/31638; https://t.me/rusich_army/27775; https://t.me/severnnyi/6312
[10] https://t.me/severnnyi/6317
[11] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/33666; https://t.me/Joint_Forces_Task_Force/19895; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/33630; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/33627; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/38347; https://t.me/wargonzo/31638; https://t.me/severnnyi/6312
[12] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/33666; https://t.me/Joint_Forces_Task_Force/19895;
[13] https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/2010262276021137864; https://t.me/operationall_space/8910; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/10987; https://t.me/Osintpen/2357
[14] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/33666; https://t.me/Joint_Forces_Task_Force/19895; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/33630; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/33627; https://t.me/wargonzo/31638; https://t.me/motopatriot78/47372; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/38385;
[15] https://t.me/mod_russia/60231; https://t.me/wargonzo/31638
[16] https://suspilne dot media/kharkiv/1210800-sodna-ih-stae-na-3-5-mense-tregubov-pro-te-ak-trivae-zacistka-kupanska-ta-ci-vdaetsa-rosianam-perejti-oskil/
[17] https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/2010338092931330519; https://t.me/taran_Z_war/283; https://t.me/dva_majors/86460
[18] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/10989; https://t.me/ombr66/2266
[19] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/33666; https://t.me/Joint_Forces_Task_Force/19895; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/33630; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/33627; https://t.me/rybar/76650; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/38385; https://t.me/wargonzo/31638
[20] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/33665
[21] https://t.me/motopatriot78/47372; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/38379; https://t.me/wargonzo/31638
[22] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/33666; https://t.me/Joint_Forces_Task_Force/19895; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/33630; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/33627; https://t.me/rybar/76650; https://t.me/dva_majors/86456; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/38379; https://t.me/wargonzo/31638
[23] https://suspilne dot media/donbas/1210818-zusilla-duze-veliki-vijska-rf-pragnut-prosocitisa-v-liman-ta-nastupati-na-slovansk-tregubov/
[24] https://t.me/severnnyi/6318
[25] https://x.com/ChaMapping/status/2010307462453457167; http://t.me/shock3OA/4470
[26] https://t.me/motopatriot78/47383
[27] https://t.me/dva_majors/86447
[28] https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/2010371018481946815; https://t.me/kurt_compani_group/821
[29] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/193980; https://t.me/motopatriot78/47379
[30]https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/33666; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/33630; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/33627; https://t.me/motopatriot78/47372; https://t.me/motopatriot78/47370; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/193980; https://t.me/rybar/76663; https://t.me/wargonzo/31638
[31] https://t.me/Osintpen/2358; https://t.me/dva_majors/86446
[32] https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/2010330432127287649; https://t.me/GeorgiyPobedanosec/485
[33] https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/2010345495772967313; https://t.me/z4lpr/1434; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/2010343135122276656; https://t.me/z4lpr/1434
[34] https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/2010319657551667201; https://t.me/razvedkasibir/6140
[35] https://t.me/B_A_R_S_13/221
[36] https://t.me/motopatriot78/47379
[37] https://t.me/nm_dnr/14884
[38] https://t.me/nm_dnr/14886; https://t.me/mod_russia/60226
[39] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/33666; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/38369; https://t.me/wargonzo/31638
[40] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/107307
[41] https://t.me/nm_dnr/14885
[42] https://x.com/MikiValbuena/status/2010322860028612878; https://x.com/PuenteUribarri/status/2010254781369942223; https://t.me/si4eslavskabrygada/1856
[43] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/33666; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/33630; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/33627; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/38386; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/70007
[44] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/38386; https://t.me/motopatriot78/47397; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/70007
[45] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/01/10/7-j-korpus-pokazav-yak-drony-perehoplyuvachi-prykryvayut-logistychni-shlyahy-na-pokrovskomu-napryamku/; https://www.facebook.com/reel/1887751765156255?locale=uk_UA
[46] https://t.me/motopatriot78/47383
[47] https://t.me/nm_dnr/14885
[48] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/193980
[49] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/33666; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/33630; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/33627; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/70007; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/193980; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/38369
[50] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/70007
[51] https://t.me/motopatriot78/47380
[52] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/33666; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/33630; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/33627; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/70007
[53] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/3181
[54] https://x.com/Bielitzling/status/2010118631255093477; https://t.me/romedronen/503; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/10986
[55] https://t.me/motopatriot78/47400
[56] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/33666; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/33630; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/33627; https://t.me/wargonzo/31638; https://t.me/motopatriot78/47400
[57] https://t.me/rybar/76668
[58] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/3180
[59] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/3181
[60] https://t.me/voin_dv/18329
[61] https://t.me/voin_dv/18327; https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/2010304845174264229
[62] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/3182
[63] https://t.me/mod_russia/60230; https://t.me/mod_russia/60232
[64] https://t.me/motopatriot78/47386
[65] https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/2010312277740978317; https://t.me/GORA_GROUP_BPLA/896
[66] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/33666; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/33630; https://t.me/motopatriot78/47393; https://t.me/dva_majors/86456; https://t.me/wargonzo/31638
[67] https://t.me/motopatriot78/47393
[68] https://t.me/motopatriot78/47386
[69] https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/2010312277740978317; https://t.me/GORA_GROUP_BPLA/896
[70] https://t.me/mod_russia/60228
[71] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/33627; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/33630
[72] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/38364
[73] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/33665
[74] https://t.me/kpszsu/52150
[75] https://www.facebook.com/Chaus.Viacheslav/posts/pfbid03378xhZUzPiXFfYesfujPpdtVn42r2VihgCAvA1A6BkVJfcZeT34Qrh9CX6ZNbn3Fl; https://www.facebook.com/DSNSCHERNIHIV/posts/pfbid032B5YDEtYrMwt5G8kackopHGyT4biihvNqm57KoFmCUXZqJEXZs9fxJSRcaYbChS4l; https://suspilne dot media/chernihiv/1210698-u-nizini-poskodzeni-budivli-civilnoi-infrastrukturi-vnaslidok-rosijskoi-ataki/; https://www.facebook.com/permalink.php?story_fbid=pfbid0efnrfnxhNiqbSNWLFaUcsCnb6GPbsantoEreMa92uL5ET9LXpeSERNWPZTAoDDmFl&id=61579137283645; https://suspilne dot media/chernihiv/1210666-rosijski-vijska-zavdali-udaru-dvoma-udarnimi-bpla-tipu-geran-po-zilih-budinkah-na-cernigivsini/; https://www.facebook.com/story.php?story_fbid=122145188264971242&id=61579137283645&mibextid=wwXIfr&rdid=4scbR9Lj2eYP0nhS#; https://suspilne dot media/chernihiv/1210836-rosijski-vijska-atakuvali-civilnu-infrastrukturu-semenivki-na-prikordonni-cernigivsini/; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/01/11/harkiv-i-devyat-naselenyh-punktiv-oblasti-zaznaly-udariv-8-poranenyh-poshkodzheno-zaliznychnu-ta-czyvilnu-infrastrukturu/; https://t.me/synegubov/19465; https://t.me/oleksandrkoval_rv/8508; https://suspilne dot media/rivne/1210650-bula-poskodzena-civilna-infrastruktura-na-rivnensini-vnaslidok-povitranoi-ataki-armii-rf/
[76] https://suspilne dot media/rivne/1210796-pasazirskij-potag-uzgorod-harkiv-ne-zupinatimetsa-v-rokitnomu-na-rivnensini-cerez-poskodzenna-kolii/
[77] https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/17616